Helixar Security — Claude MCP Connector
Agentic-AI security tools for Claude, exposed as a remote MCP server.
Status: Live at https://mcp.helixar.ai/mcp. Two tools available remotely (Streamable HTTP); a third runs locally over stdio. Public, no-auth in v1 — OAuth lands with Phase 8.
Quick start
Add to Claude
Option A — Custom connector (claude.ai Pro/Team/Enterprise)
- Open Claude → Settings → Connectors → Add custom connector
- URL:
https://mcp.helixar.ai/mcp
- Auth: None (v1 is publicly accessible; OAuth lands with Phase 8)
- Save and refresh —
helixar_inspect_mcp and helixar_hdp_validate appear in the tool picker.
Option B — Anthropic API (mcp_servers)
Add the server directly in a Messages API call (beta header mcp-client-2025-11-20):
Option C — Local stdio (all three tools)
The Workers deployment exposes two of three tools. helixar_releaseguard shells out to a Go binary via child_process and has no Workers equivalent — it remains stdio-only. For the full set, run locally:
Smoke-test the live server
See it work
Once the connector is added, paste either of these into a Claude chat. Both target the same intentionally-risky manifest in examples/risky-manifest.json and trip 7 of 8 quick-mode rules.
Inline JSON (works anywhere — no internet fetch from Claude's side):
URL (the same fixture, fetched by Sentinel through its SSRF guard):
Either prompt produces a CRIT-level finding (risk_score 100) flagging:
Architecture
- Language: TypeScript ESM (Node 20+ for stdio; Node 22+ for Wrangler development and deployment)
- MCP SDK:
@modelcontextprotocol/sdk (official Anthropic)
- Validation: Zod for tool input schemas
- Narration: Anthropic SDK with deterministic fallback when no API key is configured
- Remote hosting: Cloudflare Workers (
src/worker.ts), WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport, stateless
- Local hosting: Node 20+ stdio (
src/server.ts)
- Auth: v1 is open (deep mode requires an
api_key field in the tool's input arguments). OAuth 2.0 + Dynamic Client Registration is Phase 8.
Tool tiers
Repository layout
IP protection
Per the implementation plan §6, internal detection methodology, Hunch Mode internals, sensor implementation, and exact thresholds are never exposed in this codebase. Public surface is rule IDs, severity buckets, public-safe detection categories, and remediation guidance only. The earlier helixar_triage_alert tool was revoked in v0.4.1 after review flagged that exposing kill-chain stage classifiers — even stripped — widened the public attack surface too far; helixar_releaseguard (wrapping the already-open-source Helixar-AI/ReleaseGuard) replaces it.
Links
License
Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE and NOTICE.