
Sato Kit
ai.satohubPublished by satohub.aiv0.1.0Updated Oct 24, 2026
Prepare -> execute for onchain agent actions: policy pre-flight, simulation, receipt log.
The publisher's own server: Sato Hub: Build Onchain & Crypto Agents
Overview
A local stdio MCP server for preparing, policy-checking, simulating and executing onchain agent actions across EVM chains and Solana, with a hash-chained audit.
- What you can do
- Read chain state, token approvals, Safe info, ERC-8004 records and Solana accounts, and fetch swap and bridge quotes across EVM chains and Solana, with Sato Swap as the labelled default venue and a no-fee quote alongside. Prepare unsigned intents for swaps, bridges, x402 payments, token-approval revocations, ERC-8004 registrations, Safe proposals and Solana transfers, each checked against a policy file and simulated before use. Execute a prepared intent by its intent_id through a configured signer, which signs and broadcasts the transaction and appends a hash-chained receipt line. Inspect the tool surface with status, actions_search and actions_describe, and see which policy rule refused an,
- When to use it
- Use it when an agent needs to act onchain with guardrails: quoting and preparing swaps or bridges, checking approvals, proposing Safe transactions, or paying x402 resources, while keeping signing behind a policy pre-flight and an explicit execute step. It suits developers running an agent locally who want a simulation and audit trail before funds move.
- Requirements
- Local process over stdio, run via npx from the npm package; Node 20 or later, with viem as a peer dependency. Config is read from the working directory: policy.json (absent means a default policy on a fork network), a .sato/ directory for intents, the intent HMAC secret and receipts, SATO_RPC_URL_ per chain, and SATO_SIGNER for a local fork signer. Solana actions need a Solana RPC and @solana/kit 8 or later. A signer (local, OWS, CDP or Solana devnet) is needed to execute; Safe's hosted,
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Sato Kit in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
@satohub/kit
0.1.1 preview.
Sato Kit wraps the tools agents already use (viem, signers, x402) with a prepare -> execute
contract: an action prepares an unsigned intent, a policy pre-flight explains any refusal,
the transaction is simulated, and execute({ intent_id }) hands it to your signer and appends
a hash-chained sato.receipt/v1 line.
What it is not: not a wallet, not a custodian, not an agent framework, and not a guarantee. It never holds funds and ships no keys.
- Fork by default. A policy's
networkdefaults tofork; mainnet needs an explicit opt-in. - Pre-flight vs enforcement. The kit's policy check runs before an intent is returned and says which rule refused and why. It does not enforce anything once a key is in play. Enforcement lives in the signer (e.g. a CDP policy compiled from the same file).
scan.payto_changed. Thescanblock ofpolicy.jsonrecordspayto_changed(caution|refuse|off), but it is enforced only by hosts that implement it. The offline guard insatohub-core(scanRecipient) does not enforce it today: a changed x402 payTo needs the payee's earlier value, which the offline check is not given.- Swaps are venue-neutral. Any venue is accepted. Sato Swap is the labelled default and its fee is
disclosed on every response, with a no-Sato-fee quote alongside;
venue: "direct"skips Sato entirely.
Contracts (sato.action/v1, sato.policy/v1, sato.receipt/v1) live in src/spec (see VENDORED.md).
Install
Node 20 or later. viem is a peer; every framework SDK below is an optional peer, installed only
if you use its subpath.
Honest limits
- Pre-flight, not enforcement.
evaluatePreflightruns before an intent is returned and names each refused rule with its limit and the observed value. Once a key is in play the kit enforces nothing: enforcement is the signer's (a CDP, Privy or Turnkey policy compiled from the samepolicy.json, OWS's policy engine, or a Safe's owners).viemLocalSignerenforces only its mainnet refusal. - x402 execution scope.
x402.preparereads what an x402 resource asks to be paid and returns a priced, policy-checked intent.executedoes not send x402 payments: it sends EVM transactions, EIP-712 typed data (Safe proposals) and Solana transactions only. Pay through your x402 client. - AgentKit's own analytics call. AgentKit's
@CreateActiondecorator posts an invocation event tocca-lite.coinbase.comon every invoke. Actions consumed throughfromAgentKitProviderstill make that call; the kit neither blocks nor adds to it. - Unknown prices refuse. When a USD value cannot be read, a
max_usd_*rule refuses withunknown_pricerather than guessing. - Simulation is not a promise. A passing simulation says what the chain answered at that block.
Action reference
Generated from the registered descriptors by node scripts/gen-actions-doc.mjs (after
npm run build); test/readme-actions.test.ts fails when this table drifts from the registry.
"custody" is the descriptor's own answer to three sato.custody/v1 questions. toolset says
whether the tool is in the default MCP profile or only under --toolsets all.
Registered actions
Meta tools
Default MCP profile, in order: chain_read, swap_quote, swap_prepare, x402_prepare, execute, status, actions_search, actions_describe.
Actions consumed from an AgentKit provider (fromAgentKitProvider) are not in this table: they
are built at runtime from the provider you pass, and appear under toolset all.
Entry points
Signers
viemLocalSigner— a key in this process. Fork/testnet by default; refuses mainnet chain ids unlessallowMainnet: true(not recommended).generate: truemakes a throwaway in-memory key.owsSigner— a structural adapter over an Open Wallet Standard account; OWS's policy engine enforces. Seesrc/signers/OWS.md.cdpSigner— a structural adapter over a Coinbase CDP server account; CDP enforces its policies. Pass a compiled policy asnativePolicyto carry it with the signer (the adapter does not register it).solanaLocalSigner— local Solana signing for devnet and tests only; refuses any non-devnet payload and a mainnet-beta RPC, with no mainnet switch.humanApprove(signer, approve)— wraps any signer so a person approves each summary before it signs.
Policy compilers
compileCdpPolicy, compilePrivyPolicy and compileTurnkeyPolicy turn one sato.policy/v1 into
the provider's native policy document. Each result lists what did not compile (not_compiled) with
the reason, so a rule the provider cannot express is never silently dropped.
CLI
Config comes from the working directory: policy.json (absent means the default policy, network
fork), .sato/ (intents, intent secret, receipts), SATO_RPC_URL_<CHAIN> per chain, and
SATO_SIGNER=viem-local-fork (fork network only) for a local signer.
MCP server
npx -y @satohub/[email protected] mcp runs a stdio MCP server (registry name ai.satohub/kit). The default
profile is the eight tools listed above; --toolsets all adds every other registered action.
Tools that sign carry anthropic/requiresUserInteraction in _meta.
Sato Status
status and sato-kit doctor read the nightly per-action results (sato.action-status/v1)
published by the templates repo. When that file cannot be read, the answer says so; nothing is
filled in.
Recommended .gitignore
The file intent store and the intent HMAC secret live under .sato/ by default
(intents/, intent.key, mode 0600). Keep them out of version control:
License: MIT. The bundled Onchain Action Descriptor code (dist/spec) is Apache-2.0, copyright 2026 Prime Signal LLC: see LICENSE-ODA and NOTICE.
sato-kit doctor: template drift
In a repo made by create-sato-agent (one with sato.create.json), doctor
also sends sato.create.json and sato.lock.json to
https://satohub.ai/api/create/drift (3 s timeout) and prints the changes it
returns: a newer template version that passed its checks, a custody change in
a stored Sato Check profile for a pinned package, or a pinned package version
that fails the template checks upstream. It is read-only and opens no issues
(the generated sato-drift.yml workflow does that). With --json the answer
is under result.drift, with state checked, unavailable (with a
reason) or not_applicable; nothing is filled in when the check does not
answer.
Host adapters: envelope and error codes
@satohub/kit/ai-sdk (satoKitTools(kit, opts)), @satohub/kit/agentkit
(satoKitActionProvider(kit, opts)), @satohub/kit/claude-agent-sdk
(createSatoKitSdkServer(kit, opts) + requireApprovalHook()),
@satohub/kit/openai-agents (satoKitOpenAITools(kit, opts), OpenAI Agents
SDK function tools with needsApproval), @satohub/kit/langchain
(satoKitLangChainTools(kit, opts), LangChain JS DynamicStructuredTools
whose func returns the envelope as a JSON string) and @satohub/kit/eliza
(satoKitElizaPlugin(kit, opts)) are built from the same tool surface as the
local MCP server (sato-kit mcp). Options:
{ toolsets?, actions?, policy?, signerKind?, fetch?, statusTimeoutMs? }
(AgentKit, LangChain and elizaOS also take approve; none of these hosts has an approval step,
so execute is refused without it).
@satohub/kit/eliza is a thin compatibility adapter for existing elizaOS 1.x
agents, not a supported framework: no Sato template depends on elizaOS, and
the subpath is dropped rather than patched if an elizaOS release breaks it.
Its actions read arguments from options.parameters (then
message.content.parameters). Each adapter tool returns one envelope:
{ ok: true, tool, result }{ ok: false, tool, error: { code, message, refusals? }, intent? }
Error codes: unknown_tool, invalid_input, policy_refused,
approval_required, approval_denied, not_configured, error. A policy
refusal lists each { rule, limit, observed }. execute takes { intent_id }
and nothing else, and every host asks a person before it runs.
On the MCP server a refused prepare is a normal result whose
structuredContent.policy.refusals names each rule; a failed call sets
isError and carries its detail in _meta["ai.satohub/error"].
Consuming an existing AgentKit provider (@satohub/kit/agentkit)
fromAgentKitProvider(provider, { chain }) turns each action of an AgentKit ActionProvider into kit actions. Read actions (a get_/check_/list_… name, or the names you pass as reads) become reads. Every other action runs the provider's own invoke() against a capturing wallet that records the transaction instead of sending it; that one transaction becomes an ordinary intent — simulated, put through the policy pre-flight, and sent once by execute(intent_id) with your signer.
- An action that tries to send more than one transaction, or to sign a message, typed data or a raw transaction, is refused with the reason. Nothing was sent, so nothing is partly done.
- A schema that cannot be made portable is listed in
not_consumablewith the lint's reasons rather than turned into a tool. An amount-named string with no pattern is narrowed to a decimal pattern and listed inconsumed[].tightened. - The USD value of a consumed action is unknown, so a
max_usd_*cap refuses it underunknown_price;max_per_tradereads the ERC-20 amount or the native value off the captured transaction. - AgentKit's own
@CreateActiondecorator posts an invocation analytics event tocca-lite.coinbase.comon every invoke; the kit does not block or add to it. - Consumed actions appear under toolsets
"all"and throughactions_search/actions_describe; the default MCP profile is unchanged.
Consuming an existing GOAT plugin (@satohub/kit/goat)
await fromGoatPlugin(plugin, { chain }) works like fromAgentKitProvider: reads run as reads; a write runs the plugin's own tool against a capturing wallet that records the one transaction instead of sending it, and that transaction becomes an ordinary intent (simulate, pre-flight, execute(intent_id) once with your signer). Message or typed-data signing, a paymaster request, or more than one transaction is refused with the reason. GOAT has been quiet upstream; if your install holds two copies of @goat-sdk/core, GOAT's own wallet lookup can miss the wallet — keep one copy.
Safe proposals
safe.propose builds the SafeTx for the Safe's owners to sign; the policy pre-flight applies to the call inside it. When the intent has a Safe Transaction Service target, execute signs and submits it and the receipt carries safe_tx_hash; without one, the receipt carries the signature as typed_data_signature. For Safe's hosted gateway, pass safeTxService: { apiKey } to createKit (or opt in to reading SAFE_API_KEY); the key is sent as Authorization: Bearer … only to api.safe.global or an origin you configure, and is never logged or written to a receipt.
Solana
The Solana actions need a Solana RPC (solanaRpc in createKit). solanaLocalSigner is devnet-only and needs @solana/kit 8 or later installed next to the kit (npm i @solana/kit@^8); it is not declared as a peer so that installs holding an older @solana/kit (for example through AgentKit) still resolve.
Use with Base MCP (Coinbase Wallet MCP)
Base MCP, now served at https://wallet-mcp.coinbase.com, signs with your Base Account. The kit's
Base MCP plugin runs the policy pre-flight and the simulation in your shell first, then hands Base
MCP the unsigned call for you to approve in Base Account. It is a custom plugin: Base does not list,
maintain or endorse it.
In a harness with a shell (Claude Code shown; Base's install steps cover Codex and Cursor):
Then write your own policy.json (the plugin file has a starting point; without one the default
policy refuses every mainnet request), set SATO_RPC_URL_BASE, and ask for the plugin by name:
"Use the Sato Kit plugin to swap 5 USDC for WETH on Base." Base routes to a plugin only when you
name it. Chat-only surfaces (Claude.ai, ChatGPT) cannot run the kit, and the plugin says so and stops.
Not included: Stripe MPP
mpp.prepare is not built. Its client (mppx) is pre-1.0 with breaking changes in minor releases, and its payment methods do not map onto one unsigned transaction the kit's signer executes. Reasons and sources: docs/mpp-research.md.
Sato OS hand-off (@satohub/kit/sato-os)
In live mode an agent can send prepared intents to a self-hosted Sato OS for a person's approval and signing there, instead of signing locally. attachToSatoOs({ baseUrl, name, goal, walletAddresses, chains }) attaches the agent and stores its scoped token in .sato/sato-os.json (mode 0600, gitignored; never returned or printed). proposeIntent(prepared, { baseUrl, token }) files the intent (unsigned payload, summary, policy verdict, simulation, fee disclosure) through Sato OS's sato_os_create_action_proposal tool and returns { proposal_id, status }. A refused or expired intent is never sent. Nothing in this path signs or broadcasts.
Source: packages/kit/README.md at commit f4f4778
Tools
0Version history
1- v0.1.0LatestSep 30, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts