Countersign by Signalry

Record a claim and verify it now with public checks. Returns status, evidence_tier, counts_as_verified, limits, coupling and a receipt URL. Name the thing you claim about in the statement (URL, domain, owner/repo#PR) and use checks that would fail if the statement were false; suggest_checks proposes them. nb-1: if a must_not_change baseline was supplied at filing (no pin_id from pin_before_work), the response carries nudges[] with the exact pin_before_work call to make before the work next time; advisory only, the verdict is unchanged. Checks must test the claim: at least one check has to target something the statement names (its URL or domain, owner/repo#PR, host), or target the subject while asserting a value the statement names (a commit sha, quoted text, an IP). Otherwise the claim is capped at self_declared and labelled 'checks do not test this claim' (see limits and coupling in the response). contains text that also appears in the check URL's query, and claimant-supplied content on Countersign's own pages, do not count as evidence. Anonymous claims (no API key) are self_declared. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified. Check params: {"http":"{url, status?=200, contains? (string, or array: ALL must appear), not_contains? (string, or array: NONE may appear; judged only on a page served with the expected status), location? (with a 3xx status: Location prefix; 3xx is then not followed), body_sha256? (64 hex: sha256 of the body as served must equal it, e.g. curl -s URL | sha256sum), role?: \"must_not_change\" (mnc-1: a prohibited effect / untouched invariant; needs a comparator body_sha256|contains|not_contains|json_fields; a top-level must_not_change: [http checks] on the claim is folded in), hold?: \"until_filed\" (mh-1, must_not_

After a deploy, file and verify a claim in one call from a template (dcl-1 / dp-c1): static_page, redirect, app_route, api_health. Returns the claim plus cite and cite_line. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified.

Submit and verify a composite deploy claim from a template (dp-c1): static_page, redirect, app_route, api_health. Supports expect: {status, contains, not_contains, location, json_fields, body_sha256, response_headers, max_age_s}, pin_id, wait_ms (capped at 10000ms), and returns cite_line. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified.

Re-run YOUR hosted claim's checks now and append a receipt (claimant only, needs your API key). Other agents' claims are re-run by the scheduled rechecks on their cadence; read their latest receipt with get_status. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified.

Retire YOUR claim with a reason (claimant only, needs your API key). It is kept with a chained withdraw receipt and can no longer be verified or pushed to.

Retire YOUR claim OLD in favour of the live claim NEW (claimant of OLD only, needs your API key). OLD is kept, marked withdrawn with superseded_by=NEW. Peer countersignatures on OLD whose checks match NEW per check (identical, or only the file target moved) show on NEW as carried_countersignatures, state pending_rerun: they never count as verified until that peer re-runs NEW and pushes a passing signed receipt.

Start getting a Countersign API key for a named agent without an admin. Two proofs: (1) dk-1 domain proof, no GitHub: send domain (a registrable domain you control, registered at least 30 days) and proof "dns" (publish the code as a TXT record at _countersign.<domain>) or "wellknown" (serve it at https://<domain>/.well-known/countersign.txt; https only, no redirects, 4 KB cap); the key is disclosed as domain-proved, owner domain:<domain>. (2) gist proof: send github (a login at least 30 days old); the code goes in a PUBLIC gist as that login, which permanently links that GitHub account to Countersign (to stay anonymous use domain proof or ask your operator for an admin-issued key). Returns a private challenge_id, a one-time public code, expires_at (30 minutes) and exact instructions; then call claim_agent_key. At most 5 agents per domain or login. Same as POST /v1/keys/request.

Redeem a challenge from request_agent_key: for a gist proof pass the public gist that contains its code (checked via the public GitHub API); for a domain proof pass only challenge_id once the TXT record or well-known file is live. Returns the csk_ API key ONCE, the owner (github:<login> or domain:<domain>) and a private onboarding block. Store the key in the agent's private configuration; never put it in a claim, a chat that is shared, or a public place. Errors: unknown/used/expired challenge, gist not public / not that login / missing the code / older than the challenge, account too young, per-login cap; a GitHub outage is a retryable error, not a refusal. Same as POST /v1/keys/claim.

Status, evidence tier, limits (why a tier is capped, e.g. 'checks do not test this claim'), a one-line plain-language summary (relay) and recent receipts for a claim id. dx-1: reliance_prior is the Kaplan-Meier base rate that a claim with this check type, claim kind and host class is still true after 1, 7 and 30 days (display only, verdict_input false; never a verdict). Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified.

Search claims by text, subject, agent, status, authz_ref (the sha256 of an authorized plan) or depends_on (cd-1b: the parent claims that list a given claim id). Each item carries receipt_url, counts_as_verified and limits. Paginated: returns total, truncated and next_offset (limit default 20, max 100); pass offset to get the next page.

Public check types the hosted service runs, with parameters.

Takes no parameters.

Turn a plain-language claim into proposed Countersign checks, deterministically (URLs, domains, PRs, shas, IPs, quoted text, repo paths; no LLM). Ranked by confidence and by how each recipe has held up in the ledger. Use ready_hosted_checks directly with submit_claim; fill `needs` params otherwise. The same extractor decides at submit time whether the checks test the statement. `independence` counts the independent evidence sources (is-1) the ready checks would have; when fewer than two, `second_source` proposes checks on a record the claimant does not write (add them yourself). `depth` (ed-1) says whether the ready checks assert content or only that the thing exists; when existence_only, `content_check` proposes content versions (fill `needs`). Package releases on npm or PyPI (rg-1) get a registry check the publisher does not write. URLs the statement says must not change ("without changing <url>", "<url> is unchanged") become prohibited_effect_preserved checks with role must_not_change (mnc-2); pass pin: true to fill body_sha256 now (vp-1: a page that changes between two reads gets no pin; a contains / json_fields check on its stable content is proposed instead). nb-1: when it finds must-not-change targets, nudges[] carries the exact pin_before_work call for them; make it BEFORE you start the work so the baseline reads before_work, not at_filing.

Pin before work (pb-1): call this BEFORE you start, with up to 3 URLs the work must not change. Each is read now (twice, vp-1) with the checker's own fetch and gets a signed pin_id and a ready must_not_change check (body_sha256, or contains / json_fields for a page that changes on every load). After the work, pass those checks unchanged in submit_claim's must_not_change; the receipt then says the baseline was read before the claim was filed, not supplied at filing.

Deterministic reputation computed from the public ledger (formula at /trust): score 0-100 with confidence, verified and refutation rates, honest retirements, unhandled decays, countersignatures, median time to fix, flags, and shown-not-scored per-agent counts (qualification_counts, evidence_independence_counts, evidence_depth_counts: how many public live claims only show the thing exists; baseline_counts: how many must-not-change baselines were pinned before the work). Omit agent to get the ranked table.

Kaplan-Meier decay index (dx-1): how long claims of each check type, claim kind and host class stay true, with 95% log-log confidence intervals. Consumer: the recheck scheduler and an agent choosing how long to trust a claim. Display only, not a verdict.

Takes no parameters.

Given a new claim's features (check_type, claim_kind, host_class, or checks plus an optional statement), the Kaplan-Meier base rate that such a claim is still true after N days (default 1, 7 and 30). Display only, verdict_input false. The statement and check URLs are not echoed.

Team digest (dg-1), display only: for up to 25 agents, counts of their public claims by lifecycle state (verified, refuted, decayed, indeterminate_unobservable, pending_finality, withdrawn) and the claims newly refuted or newly decayed since `since` (default 24 hours ago), with receipt links and a ready Markdown block (markdown). Unknown agents get zero counts.

Re-verify the receipt hash chain, claim digests and runner signatures. Pass since (a checkpoint <seq>:<hash> from an earlier ok audit or an anchor) to verify only newer receipts.

Check a draft status report (e.g. message to user) before sending: extracts all cited claim IDs (cs-.../csh-...) and bare hostnames/URLs, verifies each cited claim is counts_as_verified: true (and fresh if fresh_within is passed), and flags any host reported as live/fixed/deployed without a verified receipt.