Remote MCP server that lets an assistant pre-screen MCP servers, VS Code extensions, Claude Skills, documents and its own outputs for risk signals before…
What you can do
Scan MCP servers for unauthenticated transport, unscoped filesystem, shell or credential access, and known-bad signatures, from a live URL or a manifest of tool definitions
Scan documents and web pages for hidden instructions such as invisible Unicode, obfuscated payloads and prompt-injection phrasing
Check VS Code extensions and Claude Skills before installing, weighing publisher verification against install counts and known-bad signatures
Check structured output for degenerate answers: invalid JSON, placeholder values, identical array items or empty results
When to use it
Useful when an agent is about to connect to an unfamiliar MCP server, install an extension or skill, read untrusted web content, or return structured output that needs a sanity check beyond schema validation.
Requirements
Remote streamable HTTP endpoint; no local install. Structural checks work without a key; the Authorization header with a bearer key is optional and unlocks Basic or Pro features such as the semantic prompt-injection pass.
Before you install
The optional Authorization header carries a secret key. Scanned URLs and raw text are sent to the service, and the instructions point to a separate trust page for what is stored and for how long. Results are heuristic signals, not a guarantee of safety.
Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Web executable via Streamable HTTP. Remote servers run from the web runtime once configured in a workspace.
Use with an agent
Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or another agent — or into SourceWeft chat. The agent reads this server's install guide, shows you its publisher, endpoint and sign-in, and adds it to your client once you agree. Keys never go into a command.
Read https://sourceweft.com/mcp/com.allthepossibles%2Fpreflight/install.md and connect the MCP server it describes to my client. Before changing any config, show me its publisher, endpoint and sign-in method and wait for my OK. Never put an API key in a command or in a file I would commit; ask me where it should come from.
Check an MCP server for real risk signals before trusting it: unauthenticated transport, capability overreach (filesystem/shell/credential access with no scoping), and known-bad signatures. Pass a live server URL, or a manifest of tool definitions if the server isn't reachable over HTTP. Semantic prompt-injection detection runs too if a Pro API key is sent as an Authorization: Bearer header, see /docs.
ParametersurltoolsserverName
scan_content
Scan content
Check a document or web page for hidden instructions before an agent reads, summarizes, or acts on it: invisible Unicode, obfuscated payloads, and (on Pro) a semantic pass for prompt-injection phrasing aimed at the model instead of the human reader. Pass either a URL to fetch, or raw text you already have.
Parametersurlcontent
scan_extension
Scan extension
Check a VS Code extension or a Claude Skill before installing or trusting it. For a VS Code extension (which runs with full Node.js access and no permission model to scope): publisher domain-verification status weighed against install count, and known-bad-signature checks on its description. For a Claude Skill: hidden-instruction and obfuscated-payload detection on the SKILL.md body (the same engine scan_content uses), unscoped or credential-referencing tool grants in its allowed-tools/disallowed-tools frontmatter, inline shell execution baked into the file itself, and pattern matching on any bundled script files for credential-exfiltration signatures. Semantic prompt-injection detection on a skill's body runs too on Pro.
ParametersskillContentmarketplaceIdscriptContents
check_output
Check output
Check a structured output you're about to return or act on for degenerate-answer patterns a schema check can't see: invalid JSON, a placeholder value ('TBD', 'N/A', 'unknown') where a real answer should be, an array of byte-identical items (a common symptom of a loop that never advanced), or an expected field that's missing or empty. Schema validity and answer quality are different guarantees, call this before trusting your own output, not just after validating it parses.
ParametersoutputrequiredexpectedFields
Version history
2
v1.1.0LatestOct 30, 2026
v1.0.0Oct 19, 2026
Score
72%
72% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
Reached in the last 30 daysRequired25 pts
Auth declaredRequired10 pts
Tools listedRequired15 pts
DescriptionRequired15 pts
Logo10 pts
Publish an icon in the registry entry.
Documentation15 pts
Declare a GitHub repository with a README, or serve resource_documentation in the OAuth protected-resource metadata.
LicenseNot applicable
A hosted service is used under its provider's terms, so no license is expected here. This check is left out of the percentage.