McpHub

com.soflutionPublished by soflution.comv5.11.0Updated Oct 31, 2026

One MCP endpoint for all your servers: a few meta-tools, Keychain secrets, sandbox, audit, OAuth.

Overview

AI-generated overview

McpHub is a local gateway that sits between AI editors and all your MCP servers, exposing three meta-tools with search, call and code mode plus sandboxing…

What you can do
  • Search and call tools across every configured MCP server through three meta-tools (search, call, run)
  • Run short JavaScript programs in code mode that chain tool calls in a sandboxed Node process
  • Manage servers: add, enable, disable, edit, inspect status, logs, latency and token savings in a dashboard
  • Browse the official MCP Registry library with trust scores and one-click install, including agent-initiated installs
  • Handle remote servers with native OAuth and store secrets in the macOS Keychain or a secrets file
  • Apply per-client profiles, read-only mode, tool pinning, quarantine and an audit log
When to use it
Useful when you wire many MCP servers into Cursor, Claude, VS Code or Windsurf and want to cut tool-definition token cost, share one server process across editors, and put secrets, sandboxing and audit in one place. Also suited to teams that need per-project or per-client isolation of servers and credentials.
Requirements
A local install of the McpHub binary (macOS, Linux or Windows; macOS sandbox and Keychain features are macOS only). Editors connect over local HTTP at 127.0.0.1:24680 with a bearer token from the auth-token file, or via stdio. Code mode needs Node.js 22.13 or newer; the optional project-aware client needs Node 20 or newer. Linux sandboxing needs bubblewrap. Servers you add may need their own API keys or OAuth sign-in.
Before you install
It is a privileged local hub: it holds credentials for every server, so protect the auth token and the Keychain or secrets file. Sandboxing and Keychain storage are macOS-only; Windows has no sandbox and Linux keeps secrets in a plain file. Agents can install servers from the registry on their own when trust settings allow, and can call tools that write, delete or spend money unless you restrict them with read-only mode, profiles or tool excludes. Auto-update downloads and replaces the binary…

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open McpHub in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

[McpHub, one secure hub for all your MCP servers]

[Download for macOS]   [Install in one line]

[Latest release] [MCP 2026-07-28] [Rust] [macOS and Linux] [MIT]

McpHub sits between your AI editors and all your MCP servers.
Your agents see 3 tools instead of hundreds, every call goes through the same security guards,
and your servers run once, sandboxed, shared by Cursor, Claude, Windsurf and VS Code.

Install · Connect your editor · How it works · Code mode · Security · Dashboard · Library · Linux and sync · Configuration · FAQ


✨ At a glance

-99.9%

tokens spent on tool definitions
1,054,593 → 918 on a 928-tool setup

1 process

for every editor
servers start once, survive editor restarts

8 layers

of security
Keychain, pinning, sandbox, audit...

0 runtime

dependencies
a single signed Rust binary
Each server wired into each editorThrough McpHub
Tool definitions in every promptall of them (hundreds of thousands of tokens)3 tools, schemas loaded on demand
Server processesone copy per editorone shared copy
Secretsplain text in every editor configmacOS Keychain, ${NAME} references
A server silently changes a toolnobody noticesquarantined until you approve
A malicious npm server reads ~/.sshit canblocked by the macOS sandbox
Remote servers with OAuthone mcp-remote process each, tokens in plain filesnative HTTP, tokens in the Keychain, auto refresh
Who called whatunknownaudit log with redacted arguments
Finding a new serversearch GitHub, copy a JSON snippet, paste a tokenLibrary of the official MCP Registry: trust score, one-click add, secrets straight to the Keychain
Your agent needs a tool you lackyou install it by handthe agent installs it itself from the registry, sandboxed, if it is trusted enough
A second machine, a Linux serverredo everything, copy tokens aroundsame binary, bubblewrap sandbox, encrypted sync of servers and secrets

🚀 Install in one line

bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Soflutionltd/McpHub/main/get.sh | bash

The script downloads the latest binary for your machine (signed universal binary on macOS, x64 or arm64 on Linux), verifies its SHA-256 checksum and installs it to ~/.local/bin/McpHub. Then:

bash
McpHub dashboard  # Library tab: add servers from the official MCP Registry (or McpHub add)McpHub generate   # index every tool onceMcpHub install    # start the daemon at login (LaunchAgent on macOS, systemd --user on Linux)
Manual download
  1. Download McpHub-macos-universal.tar.gz and its checksum.
  2. shasum -a 256 -c McpHub-macos-universal.tar.gz.sha256
  3. tar -xzf McpHub-macos-universal.tar.gz && install -m 755 McpHub ~/.local/bin/McpHub
  4. Downloaded through a browser? Clear the quarantine flag: xattr -d com.apple.quarantine ~/.local/bin/McpHub

Linux (amd64, arm64) and Windows (amd64) archives are attached to every release too. On Linux the sandbox uses bubblewrap and secrets live in ~/.McpHub/secrets.env (mode 600, hidden from sandboxed servers), see Linux servers and sync. Windows has no sandbox.

Build from source
bash
git clone https://github.com/Soflutionltd/McpHub.gitcd McpHubmake install      # cargo build --release, install, sign

make install signs with your Developer ID certificate when one is present, so macOS keeps its permissions from one version to the next. Linux and Windows build from source (cargo build --release); the macOS sandbox and Keychain features are macOS only.

🔄 Updates

Once the daemon runs (McpHub install), McpHub keeps itself up to date. Editors connected by URL (Cursor, Claude Code, VS Code, Windsurf) need nothing: they talk to the updated daemon.

  • Signed. Every release publishes latest.json (version and SHA-256 of each file) signed with minisign; the public key is compiled into McpHub. On macOS the new binary must also carry Soflution's Developer ID signature. Anything else is refused.
  • Gradual. A new version reaches 10% of installations on day one, everyone after 24 hours. The daemon checks at start-up, then every 6 hours. The only request is the download from GitHub: no telemetry, the rollout bucket is drawn from a random local id that never leaves your machine.
  • Never in the middle of a call. The new binary is installed next to the old one; each daemon switches over as soon as no request is in flight (editors reconnect by themselves). If the new version fails to start three times, the previous one is restored and that version is skipped.
  • Your choice. "settings": { "autoUpdate": false } turns it off; McpHub update installs the latest release right away, McpHub update --check only reports it. Development builds and named instances never update themselves (the main instance updates the shared binary).
  • Claude Desktop extension. mcphub.mcpb uses the installed McpHub when there is one, so it follows the same updates; otherwise it runs the binary it ships with.
  • Windows. The binary is replaced in place and used from the next session start.

🔌 Connect your editor

The daemon listens on http://127.0.0.1:24680. Your token is in ~/.McpHub/auth-token.

Cursor, ~/.cursor/mcp.json
json
{  "mcpServers": {    "McpHub": {      "url": "http://127.0.0.1:24680/mcp",      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <your-token>" }    }  }}
Claude Code
bash
claude mcp add --transport http mcphub http://127.0.0.1:24680/mcp \  --header "Authorization: Bearer $(cat ~/.McpHub/auth-token)"
Claude Desktop, claude_desktop_config.json
json
{  "mcpServers": {    "McpHub": { "command": "/Users/you/.local/bin/McpHub", "args": ["stdio"] }  }}
VS Code, .vscode/mcp.json
json
{  "servers": {    "mcphub": {      "type": "http",      "url": "http://127.0.0.1:24680/mcp",      "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer <your-token>" }    }  }}
Windsurf and other SSE clients

Use http://127.0.0.1:24680/sse with the same Authorization header.

One profile per client. Give each editor its own view: http://127.0.0.1:24680/mcp/cursor only shows what the cursor profile allows (see Profiles).

Project-aware client (optional)

client/ is a small Node MCP server that sits between your editor and the daemon. It talks to the running daemon (SSE, token from ~/.McpHub/auth-token) and falls back to McpHub stdio. It exposes six tools:

  • mcphub_bootstrap: call once per conversation. Resolves the project from the workspace, returns its aliases and allowed servers, and recalls compact MemoryPilot context, also for folders without a project entry.
  • mcphub_search, mcphub_call: same as the daemon, plus suggestions on a misspelled tool or server, and the input schema on argument errors.
  • mcphub_batch: up to 20 independent calls in one round-trip.
  • mcphub_status, mcphub_savings: server health and an honest context-size comparison.

Per-project policy lives in ~/.McpHub/projects.json (or the path in MCPHUB_PROJECTS), see client/projects.example.json. For a workspace listed there, only its allowedServers are reachable, and a call aimed at another Supabase project, App Store app or Cloudflare project is refused. Without the file there is no policy; an unreadable file is an error, never silently ignored.

Each release ships the client as a single file, mcphub-client.mjs, which the daemon keeps up to date in ~/.McpHub/client/ (Node 20 or later, no npm install). Editors pick up a new version the next time they start the server:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "McpHub": { "command": "node", "args": ["/Users/you/.McpHub/client/mcphub-client.mjs"] }  }}

From a clone instead: cd client && npm ci, then point args at /path/to/McpHub/client/index.js.

npm test runs smoke tests against the local daemon (MemoryPilot and supabase configured), with a throwaway project file.

Working on client accounts

Connecting to a client's Stripe (or Supabase, Cloudflare…) should not log you out of your own, and your own agent should never reach theirs by mistake. Two levels, from light to strict:

1. Client-owned servers (same McpHub). Add the client's server under its own name (stripe-acme, with its own OAuth token or restricted key, since tokens are stored per server name) and list it in the client project's ownedServers:

json
"acme": {  "workspaces": ["/Users/you/Clients/Acme"],  "aliases": { "product": "Acme" },  "allowedServers": ["MemoryPilot", "context7"],  "ownedServers": ["stripe-acme"]}

An owned server only answers, appears in mcphub_search and in mcphub_status when working_dir is inside that client's workspace; the project argument alone is not enough. A server owned by two projects is a start-up error. This guard lives in the Node client: an editor connected straight to the daemon still sees every server, so give it a profile with "excludeServers": ["*-acme"].

2. A separate instance (nothing shared). For clients who require it, run a second McpHub with its own folder, port, Keychain service, auth token and LaunchAgent:

bash
export MCPHUB_INSTANCE=acme MCPHUB_PORT=24690McpHub add                 # writes ~/.McpHub-acme/config.jsonMcpHub oauth login stripe  # token stored under Keychain service McpHub-acmeMcpHub install             # LaunchAgent com.soflution.mcphub.acme

A named instance never imports the servers declared in your editors, refuses the main port (24680), and its token is rejected by the main daemon (and the other way round). Point the editor of that client's workspace at it with the same variables:

json
"McpHub": {  "command": "node",  "args": ["/path/to/McpHub/client/index.js"],  "env": { "MCPHUB_INSTANCE": "acme", "MCPHUB_PORT": "24690" }}

MCPHUB_HOME and MCPHUB_VAULT_SERVICE override the folder and the Keychain service. Sandboxed servers of every instance are denied all ~/.McpHub* folders. Automatic start of a named instance is supported on macOS and Linux.


🧭 How it works

[Architecture: AI clients, the McpHub pipeline, local and remote servers]

  1. Your editor connects once to the McpHub daemon (Streamable HTTP, SSE or stdio).
  2. The agent sees three tools: mcphub_search (BM25 search over every tool), mcphub_call (run one tool) and mcphub_run (code mode).
  3. Each call is authenticated, filtered by the client profile, checked against the tool pins and permissions, then routed to the right server, which is started on demand and stopped when idle.
  4. Local servers run under the macOS sandbox with a minimal environment; remote servers are reached directly over HTTP with OAuth tokens kept in the Keychain.
  5. Every call lands in the audit log.

Token savings

[Tool definitions: 1,054,593 tokens directly, 918 tokens through McpHub]

Wiring dozens of MCP servers straight into an editor loads every tool schema into every conversation. On the setup above (35 servers, 928 tools) that is over a million tokens, more than any context window. McpHub replaces it with three small tools and loads a schema only when the agent actually needs it.


🧠 Code mode

[Without code mode: 25 round trips. With mcphub_run: one call]

For multi-step or bulk work, the agent sends a short JavaScript program with mcphub_run:

js
const projects = await mcp.call("supabase", "list_projects", {});const unhealthy = projects.filter(p => p.status !== "ACTIVE_HEALTHY");return unhealthy.map(p => p.name);
  • mcp.call(server, tool, args) returns the tool result, mcp.search(query) finds tools, console.log is captured.
  • The program runs in a separate Node.js process (22.13 or newer) started with --permission: no files, no network, no subprocesses, inside a macOS sandbox.
  • Its only way out is mcp.call, which goes through every McpHub guard (permissions, quarantine, profiles, audit).
  • Limits: settings.codeMode → { "timeoutSecs": 60, "maxCalls": 100 }, output capped at 1 MB.

🛡️ Security

[Eight layers of security]

MCP servers are third-party programs, often fetched on the fly with npx -y package@latest, running with your permissions. McpHub treats them accordingly.

Locked local API
  • /mcp, /sse, /message and every /api/* route require Authorization: Bearer <token> (a 256-bit random token in ~/.McpHub/auth-token, mode 600).
  • Requests whose Host is not 127.0.0.1, localhost or [::1] are refused (DNS rebinding), as are requests with a foreign Origin. No CORS headers: a web page cannot call the hub.
  • The dashboard opens through a one-time link (McpHub dashboard) and keeps a per-session secret, never the main token.
Secrets in the macOS Keychain
bash
McpHub vault set GITHUB_TOKEN      # masked prompt, stored in the KeychainMcpHub vault migrate               # move an existing secrets.env into the Keychain

config.json only holds ${GITHUB_TOKEN} references. Each server process starts with a minimal environment (system variables, its own env, and the names listed in inheritEnv), so no server ever receives the secrets of the others.

Tool pinning and poisoning detection

The first time McpHub sees a server, it records a SHA-256 fingerprint of every tool (name, description, input and output schemas, annotations) in ~/.McpHub/tool-pins.json. If a server later changes a definition (a "rug pull"), the tool is quarantined: hidden from the catalog and refused on call, until you check it:

bash
McpHub pins status                  # what is quarantined and whyMcpHub pins approve SERVER [TOOL]   # accept the new definitionMcpHub pins scan                    # scan every cached tool, read-only

Descriptions and schemas are scanned for invisible Unicode and classic injection phrases ("ignore previous instructions", "do not tell the user", ~/.ssh/id_rsa, mcp.json...). New tools appearing on an approved server are held back too.

json
"settings": { "toolSecurity": { "pinning": "block", "scan": "block", "newTools": "block" } }

With "pinning": "off" (or "warn"), changed definitions are accepted automatically but scanned again: a new description that trips the scan is still blocked when scan is block.

Automatic review of new tools ("newTools": "auto"). Instead of holding back every new tool, McpHub accepts a new tool on its own when it fits the server, and quarantines it when:

  • its name breaks the server's naming convention (a sync_data tool on a server whose tools all start with fl_);
  • it brings a sensitive capability the server did not have: a text parameter for a password, secret or API key, a code or command parameter on a tool that runs it, or a webhook / callback / upload URL. Capabilities are read from the tool's name and parameters, not from what its description mentions;
  • its description shares almost no vocabulary with the rest of the server;
  • with "requireSignedCommits": true, the server runs from a local git checkout whose last commit is not signed by a trusted key (git log --format=%G?). A hijacked GitHub account can push code, but cannot sign it with a key that only lives on your machine.
json
"settings": { "toolSecurity": { "pinning": "off", "scan": "block", "newTools": "auto", "requireSignedCommits": true } }

There is no pop-up: blocked tools are listed under securityAlerts in mcphub_status and mcphub_bootstrap, so the agent tells you at the start of the next conversation, and a call to a blocked tool returns the reason. McpHub pins simulate replays the filter on every cached tool, as if each were new, to check it would not hold back legitimate tools.

Server isolation (macOS sandbox)
json
"settings": { "sandbox": "shield" }

shield runs every local server under sandbox-exec. Servers keep working normally but cannot read or write SSH and GPG keys, cloud and GitHub credentials, browser profiles and cookies, Claude/Cursor configs, shell profiles, LaunchAgents or McpHub's own files, and cannot run security, launchctl, osascript or open. A secret file that a server references in its own env or args (an App Store .p8 key, for example) stays readable.

Per server: "sandbox": false, "strict" (no writes outside temp folders and caches), or { "mode": "strict", "network": false, "allowWrite": ["~/data"], "allowExec": ["open"] }.

bash
McpHub sandbox                 # effective isolation of every serverMcpHub sandbox show supabase   # the generated profile

The sandbox is a strong barrier against credential theft by a compromised package, not a full container.

Permissions, confirmations and audit
json
"permissions": {  "default": "allow",  "rules": [    { "server": "supabase", "tool": "delete_*", "action": "deny", "reason": "production" },    { "server": "stripe", "tool": "*", "action": "confirm" }  ]}
  • deny blocks a tool, confirm asks a human first through a native macOS dialog that the agent cannot answer. autoClassify: true applies confirm to every destructive tool (by name and by the MCP destructiveHint annotation).
  • McpHub policy test SERVER TOOL shows which rule applies.
  • McpHub audit --tail 50 shows the last calls, with secrets redacted, in ~/.McpHub/audit.jsonl (rotated).

🌐 Remote servers and shared OAuth

json
"sentry":  { "url": "https://mcp.sentry.dev/mcp" },"aqara":   { "url": "https://agent.aqara.com/open/mcp", "headers": { "Authorization": "Bearer ${AQARA_API_KEY}" } }

Remote servers are reached directly over Streamable HTTP, without an mcp-remote process per server. McpHub implements the MCP authorization spec: discovery (RFC 9728 and 8414), dynamic client registration, PKCE, resource indicators, automatic refresh, HTTPS only, tokens bound to the server URL and stored in the Keychain.

bash
McpHub oauth status            # connection state of every remote serverMcpHub oauth login sentry      # sign in through the browser, onceMcpHub oauth logout sentryMcpHub oauth migrate --apply   # convert "npx mcp-remote URL" entries, keeping their tokens

📊 Dashboard

Run McpHub dashboard (a one-time link opens your browser).

[Servers]

Servers: status, tools, enable or disable in one click

[Tools]

Every indexed tool, searchable

[Metrics]

Calls, errors and latency per server

  • Add, edit, enable and disable servers
  • Live logs with filters
  • Rebuild the tool cache in one click
  • Real token savings counter
  • One-click diagnosis of a failing server

📚 Library

The Library tab of the dashboard is the official MCP Registry inside McpHub: search thousands of servers, read a trust score, click Add.

  • Search runs locally. The first time you open the Library, McpHub downloads the catalog once in the background (the popular servers from the GitHub MCP Registry come first, in a few seconds; the full official catalog follows) into ~/.McpHub/registry-cache/. After that, it only fetches what changed, at most once a day. Search is instant and works offline.
  • Zero weight for your agent. The catalog lives in the dashboard and on disk. It adds no tool definition to the agent's context and nothing stays in memory between searches.
  • Trust score before you install (0 to 100), with the detail of every point:
    • verified publisher: the registry checks the namespace (a GitHub account or a DNS domain), McpHub checks that it publishes its own code;
    • popularity and activity: GitHub stars, last update, archived repositories;
    • permission scan: secrets requested, plain HTTP endpoints, privileged Docker options, bundle integrity hash, unpinned versions, and what the server can do (run commands, touch files, a browser, payments...).
  • One-click add for every kind of server: remote (Streamable HTTP), npm (npx), Python (uvx), Docker, .NET (dnx) and .mcpb bundles (downloaded, SHA-256 checked, extracted outside ~/.McpHub).
  • Secrets go to the Keychain, never to config.json. A secret you already have (GITHUB_TOKEN...) is reused.
  • Remote servers sign in with McpHub's native OAuth (one click on Sign in), tokens in the Keychain.
  • New servers inherit every guard: shield sandbox for local code (Docker keeps its container), tool pinning and description scan on first contact, quarantine on change, audit log, permissions and profiles.

From the terminal: McpHub registry search postgres, McpHub registry info NAME, McpHub registry install NAME, McpHub registry sync.

Your agent installs what it needs

No new tool is added for this (about 30 tokens in total). When mcphub_search finds nothing, the agent can call:

text
mcphub_call  server=mcphub  tool=registry_search   arguments={"query": "postgres"}mcphub_call  server=mcphub  tool=registry_install  arguments={"name": "io.github.acme/postgres-mcp"}

The server is installed with the same guards, its tools are indexed right away, and the call is audited. An agent never handles secrets: when a server needs one, the agent asks you to finish in the dashboard. Control it in settings.registry:

json
"registry": { "agentInstall": "trusted", "minTrust": 60 }

agentInstall: "trusted" (default, only servers whose trust score reaches minTrust), "any" or "off".


🐧 Linux servers and sync

McpHub runs the same way on a Linux server, for example next to an agent running on a VPS:

bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Soflutionltd/McpHub/main/get.sh | bashsudo apt install bubblewrap   # sandboxMcpHub install                # systemd --user service
  • Sandbox with bubblewrap: same policy as on macOS. Every secret folder (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.McpHub...) is replaced by an empty folder in memory, every secret file by an empty file; strict mode makes the whole system read-only except temporary folders, caches and allowWrite.
  • Secrets in ~/.McpHub/secrets.env, mode 600, hidden from sandboxed servers. McpHub vault set NAME works the same.

Move your setup from one machine to another without any plaintext secret:

bash
McpHub sync export mcphub.sync.json --secrets   # on the MacMcpHub sync import mcphub.sync.json --secrets   # on the server

The export is a portable config.json: every secret is a ${NAME} reference (plain values that look like tokens are taken out of the copy), and home paths become ${HOME}/.... With --secrets, the values travel too, encrypted with a passphrase (scrypt, then ChaCha20-Poly1305). Without the passphrase the file only reveals secret names. On import, servers whose program is missing on that machine are imported disabled, and decrypted secrets go to the Keychain (macOS) or secrets.env (Linux). For scripts, set MCPHUB_SYNC_PASSPHRASE.


⚙️ Configuration

Everything lives in ~/.McpHub/config.json and is hot-reloaded while the daemon runs.

json
{  "servers": {    "supabase": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@supabase/mcp-server-supabase"],      "env": { "SUPABASE_ACCESS_TOKEN": "${SUPABASE_ACCESS_TOKEN}" },      "tools": { "exclude": ["delete_*", "pause_project"] },      "toolDescriptions": { "list_projects": "List my Supabase projects" }    },    "github": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"], "readOnly": true },    "sentry": { "url": "https://mcp.sentry.dev/mcp" }  },  "settings": {    "mode": "discover",    "sandbox": "shield",    "toolSecurity": { "pinning": "block", "scan": "block", "newTools": "block" },    "permissions": { "default": "allow", "rules": [] },    "profiles": {      "cursor": { "servers": ["supabase", "git*"], "excludeTools": ["supabase/execute_sql"] },      "review": { "readOnly": true }    },    "codeMode": { "timeoutSecs": 60, "maxCalls": 100 },    "idleTimeout": 300  }}

Per-server options

OptionEffect
tools.include / tools.excludeglob lists of tools to expose or hide
readOnly: trueonly tools that read (readOnlyHint, or a read verb such as get, list, search)
toolDescriptionsrewrite a tool description shown to agents
sandboxfalse, "shield", "strict" or an object (see Security)
inheritEnvdaemon variables passed to this server by name
poolnumber of instances for parallel calls
url, headers, authremote server over HTTP (auth: "oauth" or "none")

Profiles per client

Profiles decide what each client may see and call: servers and excludeServers (globs), excludeTools ("server/tool" globs) and readOnly. Select one with http://127.0.0.1:24680/mcp/<profile>, /sse?profile=<profile>, or MCPHUB_PROFILE=<profile> in stdio mode.

Modes

  • discover (default): the agent sees mcphub_search, mcphub_call and mcphub_run.
  • passthrough: every tool is exposed directly as server__tool (full visibility, higher token cost).

🧰 CLI

bash
McpHub serve              # HTTP daemon (Streamable HTTP /mcp, SSE /sse, dashboard)McpHub stdio              # stdio mode for editors that spawn the processMcpHub install            # start at login · McpHub uninstallMcpHub generate           # start every server and index its toolsMcpHub status | doctor    # configuration, cache and health diagnosticsMcpHub search "send email"McpHub dashboard          # open the dashboard (one-time link)McpHub logs               # follow the daemon logMcpHub add                # interactive server wizardMcpHub vault ...          # Keychain secrets: status, list, set, get, rm, migrateMcpHub registry ...       # Library: search, info, install, uninstall, syncMcpHub sync ...           # export / import to another machine, secrets encryptedMcpHub oauth ...          # remote servers: status, login, logout, migrateMcpHub pins ...           # tool pinning: status, approve, reset, scanMcpHub sandbox [show S]   # server isolationMcpHub policy test S T    # which permission appliesMcpHub audit --tail 50    # recent callsMcpHub update [--check]   # install the latest signed release now (automatic otherwise)McpHub version | help
Publishing a release (maintainers)

Bump version in Cargo.toml, merge, then push the tag vX.Y.Z (only admins can create v* tags). The Release workflow builds every binary, signs and notarizes the macOS ones, bundles the client, signs latest.json and publishes; the MCP Registry workflow then builds the Claude Desktop extension from .mcp/, attaches it and publishes to the MCP Registry. Its secrets live in the release environment, reachable only from v* tags; the signing key and the certificate are also kept in 1Password (scripts/ci-signing-secrets.sh refreshes the certificate when it is renewed).

Something wrong with a version already out?

bash
gh workflow run release.yml --ref vX.Y.Z -f action=pause    # nobody else receives itgh workflow run release.yml --ref vX.Y.Z -f action=resume   # back to the gradual rolloutgh workflow run release.yml --ref vX.Y.Z -f action=full     # everyone now (urgent fix)

Installations never go back to an older version: to undo a release, publish a fixed one with a higher number.

Files: ~/.McpHub/ (config, cache, pins, audit log, token; ~/.McpHub-<name>/ for a named instance) and ~/Library/Logs/McpHub/<server>.stderr.log (each server's error output).


❓ FAQ

Does it work with any MCP server?

Yes: any stdio server (command + args) and any Streamable HTTP server (url). Tool annotations, output schemas, paginated tool lists and protocol versions up to 2026-07-28 are relayed.

What happens when an editor restarts?

Nothing: the daemon keeps running, servers stay warm, and the editor reconnects to the same URL.

Will the sandbox break my servers?

shield only removes access to secrets and to a few programs that could escape it; regular servers keep working. Servers that need the whole machine (a shell tool like desktop-commander) are left outside by default, and any server can opt out with "sandbox": false.

Why does macOS ask for permissions after an update?

macOS remembers permissions per signing identity. make install signs with your Developer ID when available; the prebuilt binary is signed by SOFLUTION LTD. Ad-hoc builds get a new identity on every build, so macOS asks again.

How do I uninstall?
bash
McpHub uninstallrm ~/.local/bin/McpHubrm -rf ~/.McpHub

[McpHub logo]
MIT License · Made by SOFLUTION LTD

Source: README.md at commit b521f25

Tools

0
SourceWeft started this package once in an isolated sandbox, without credentials, to list its tools. That failed: the package type cannot run in the sandbox.

Version history

3
  1. v5.11.0LatestOct 31, 2026
  2. v5.10.0Oct 29, 2026
  3. v5.9.1Oct 26, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts