
Draugr
dev.draugrPublished by draugr.devv0.170.0Updated Nov 8, 2026
Security scanning for AI agents: SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, DAST, ranked by real risk.
Overview
Draugr runs established security scanners over your project and returns findings ranked by real risk, so an assistant can tell you what to fix first.
- What you can do
- Run security scans over a project described in a committed descriptor file, covering dependency flaws, committed secrets, code patterns, infrastructure settings, container images, licenses, live-app probing, headers, TLS, Kubernetes and cloud benchmarks, blocklists and image provenance.
- Rank findings by priority (P1-P4) that weighs exposure and criticality, not just scanner severity.
- Compare a change against its base and report only newly added or fixed findings.
- Produce reports in SARIF, JSON, Markdown, HTML or JUnit, plus SBOMs and suppressions with reasons.
- Discover repositories or Kubernetes images to draft the descriptor file.
- When to use it
- Use it when you want an AI coding assistant to check a change or a release for security problems and tell you which findings actually matter for your application, rather than dumping raw scanner output. It also suits teams that gate pull requests on new high-priority findings.
- Requirements
- Runs as a local process on the user's machine (desktop only, stdio transport), installed as an MCP bundle; the underlying Draugr CLI and its scanners must be installed, with scanner provisioning pinned and verified. A committed descriptor file describes the project. No accounts, API keys or environment variables are declared.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Draugr in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
Draugr
Know which security findings to fix first, across the scanners you already run. SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC and containers, every finding ranked by exposure, criticality, exploitability and, for Go, reachability.
[CI] [OpenSSF Scorecard] [OpenSSF Best Practices] [Latest release] [License]
Describe your app in one file, and Draugr hands back the findings in the order to fix them.
Every application carries problems nobody put there on purpose: a library that turned out to have a hole in it, a password committed by accident, a server setting that leaves a door open. Draugr finds them, works out which ones actually matter for your app, and answers the question you are really asking before a release, is this safe to ship?
It runs the established open-source scanners for you, Trivy, Semgrep, Gitleaks and others, so there is nothing to choose between, wire up, or read five of. You describe what you built, once, in one file: where the repositories are, what images it builds, what it exposes, what infrastructure it runs on. Draugr picks the checks that apply, runs the right tool for each, and produces evidence you can hand to somebody else. Bring the scanners you already pay for, or use the open-source defaults.
Findings are ranked, not listed. A scanner's "critical" describes a flaw in the abstract,
how bad it could be at its worst, anywhere. The same flaw is act-now in the service strangers can
reach and backlog in the internal tool three people use, and no scanner can tell those apart because
the difference is in the file you wrote, not in the code. And draugr diff
gates a pull request on new findings only, so inheriting two hundred existing ones does not
block every change.
Quickstart · See it in action · What it checks · In your pipeline · Documentation · What Draugr doesn't promise · Security
See it in action
[A draugr scan of the demo sandbox: a FAIL verdict, the four priority bands, the two controls that ran with their priority counts, what each was measured against, a per-component verdict, the signals that raised findings and what reachability analysis concluded, an accepted risk, then the ranked findings. The fifth is jQuery 1.8.3, marked as being on CISA's exploited catalog, and the seventh as deprecated.]Priority (P1–P4) is not severity. Severity says how bad a flaw is at its worst, anywhere. Priority weighs that against how exposed and how important the part of your app it sits in is, which no scanner can work out, because it is not in the code.
draugr-dev/draugr-demo is a deliberately vulnerable app wired to Draugr: every control lights up, findings land in the repo's Security → Code scanning tab, and its example pull requests show the new-vs-fixed diff.
Quickstart
Installs to ~/.local/bin, no sudo, and installs nothing if the archive fails
verification. The script is readable in the
repo; a download by hand, the GitHub CLI and go install are in the install
guide.
tools install takes its answer from the descriptor beside it, so a small service gets three
scanners rather than every one Draugr can provision. --all when you are preparing a machine for
several projects.
Then describe what you actually ship:
Your editor already knows this file. Draugr's
JSON Schema is registered with
SchemaStore, so any *.saga.yaml gets completion, hover docs and
typo warnings on open with nothing to configure.
Or let discovery write the descriptor for you:
Full walkthrough: quickstart.
Setting it up on a real repository? Reply to the pinned discussion with what the repository is and which scanners you run, and we'll write the descriptor with you, including the exposure and criticality that take judgment.
What it checks
Each control is backed by a tool Draugr executes rather than bundles, so every scanner stays under its own license, and you can swap it.
Every scanner, what it sends and whose terms it carries: integrations catalog.
Alongside them: content-hash caching, an SBOM per repository and image, KEV/EPSS enrichment, per-control gate thresholds, and suppressions that stay in the report with the reason someone gave rather than disappearing.
In your pipeline
The first-party GitHub Action installs Draugr, and with tools: true the scanners the descriptor
needs. On a pull request it compares the head with the base, posts the findings the change adds and
fixes as one comment, and fails on a new P1 finding. On a push to main it runs the full scan,
fails on any P1 finding, and sends every finding to the Security tab as one Draugr tool.
Save it as .github/workflows/draugr.yml and commit it with the draugr.saga.yaml that
draugr init wrote. The upload needs code scanning, which public repositories have and private ones
get with GitHub Advanced Security; without it, delete the last step. To block a merge on a failing
run, make the draugr check a required status
check
in the branch's protection rule or ruleset.
GitHub Actions · Code scanning: findings in the Security tab · GitLab: an include, GitLab's own report formats, a sticky merge-request comment · Azure Pipelines: a step template
From an AI coding assistant. Ask one to check a change and it will, using whatever scanner it
finds over a scope it chose. draugr mcp serves Draugr over the Model Context
Protocol so it reads your committed descriptor instead. A scan
that does more than read the checkout, such as probing a live host or sending data to a third
party, asks you first.
See use Draugr from an AI coding assistant.
[Glama score for the Draugr MCP server]
Documentation
- Quickstart: install, first scan, first survey, CI
- Concepts: the descriptor, controls, scanners, the verdict
- Saga schema · CLI reference: every field, every flag
- Integrations catalog: every scanner, with licenses and terms
- Contributing · Changelog
What Draugr doesn't promise
A passing verdict means the controls you configured found nothing they were looking for. It is not a statement that your software is secure. It is silent about anything your descriptor does not declare, controls you did not enable, and whatever the underlying scanners miss. License findings are information, not legal advice. Draugr is provided under Apache-2.0 without warranty.
The details, including whose terms the scanners carry and your responsibility for authorization when scanning live endpoints: scope and disclaimer.
Security & supply chain
A security tool should hold itself to what it checks. Draugr does:
- Standard output. Every finding is normalized to SARIF 2.1.0 (OASIS), so results flow into GitHub / GitLab / Azure DevOps code scanning and any SARIF-aware tool.
- Signed releases and provenance. Release archives'
checksums.txtis keyless-signed with cosign (Sigstore) into achecksums.txt.sigstore.jsonbundle, and each release publishes SLSA build-provenance attestations (gh attestation verify …); verify before installing (recipe). - SBOMs. A Syft SBOM is published for every release archive.
- Verified tooling.
draugr tools installfetches scanners pinned by SHA-256 and, where the upstream signs them, verifies the cosign signature too, and cosign itself is installable, so verification is self-sufficient. - We scan ourselves. Draugr runs its own scan on every pull request to this repository,
static analysis included (Semgrep and gosec through the
sastcontrol, and gosec again ingolangci-lint), and the findings are in the repository's Security tab. Supply-chain posture is tracked on the OpenSSF Scorecard. - Report a vulnerability. See SECURITY.md.
Development
Requires Go 1.26+. make build builds ./bin/draugr; make gate runs the full local gate (fmt,
vet, lint, race tests with coverage and govulncheck). See CONTRIBUTING.md.
License
Draugr is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.
Source: README.md at commit 07356ba
Tools
0Version history
47- v0.168.0Nov 7, 2026
- v0.166.3Nov 6, 2026
- v0.166.2Nov 6, 2026
- v0.166.1Nov 4, 2026
- v0.166.0Nov 3, 2026
- v0.165.6Nov 3, 2026
- v0.164.0Nov 1, 2026
- v0.163.0Nov 1, 2026
- v0.162.2Nov 1, 2026
- v0.162.0Oct 31, 2026
- v0.161.0Oct 30, 2026
- v0.160.0Oct 30, 2026
- v0.159.0Oct 29, 2026
- v0.155.1Oct 26, 2026
- v0.154.2Oct 25, 2026
- v0.154.1Oct 18, 2026
- v0.154.0Oct 18, 2026
- v0.153.0Oct 18, 2026
- v0.152.0Oct 17, 2026
- v0.151.0Oct 11, 2026
- v0.150.0Oct 8, 2026
- v0.149.1Oct 6, 2026
- v0.149.0Oct 6, 2026
- v0.148.0Oct 6, 2026
- v0.147.0Oct 5, 2026
- v0.146.0Oct 5, 2026
- v0.145.0Oct 4, 2026
- v0.144.0Oct 3, 2026
- v0.143.1Oct 2, 2026
- v0.143.0Oct 2, 2026
- v0.142.2Oct 1, 2026
- v0.142.0Oct 1, 2026
- v0.141.0Sep 30, 2026
- v0.139.0Sep 29, 2026
- v0.138.0Sep 28, 2026
- v0.136.0Sep 27, 2026
- v0.135.1Sep 27, 2026
- v0.135.0Sep 26, 2026
- v0.134.0Sep 25, 2026
- v0.132.0Sep 24, 2026
- v0.131.1Sep 23, 2026
- v0.130.0Sep 22, 2026
- v0.129.0Sep 22, 2026
- v0.128.0Sep 21, 2026
- v0.127.0Sep 18, 2026
- v0.126.0Sep 18, 2026
- v0.125.0Sep 16, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts