Draugr

dev.draugrPublished by draugr.devv0.170.0Updated Nov 8, 2026

Security scanning for AI agents: SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, DAST, ranked by real risk.

Overview

AI-generated overview

Draugr runs established security scanners over your project and returns findings ranked by real risk, so an assistant can tell you what to fix first.

What you can do
  • Run security scans over a project described in a committed descriptor file, covering dependency flaws, committed secrets, code patterns, infrastructure settings, container images, licenses, live-app probing, headers, TLS, Kubernetes and cloud benchmarks, blocklists and image provenance.
  • Rank findings by priority (P1-P4) that weighs exposure and criticality, not just scanner severity.
  • Compare a change against its base and report only newly added or fixed findings.
  • Produce reports in SARIF, JSON, Markdown, HTML or JUnit, plus SBOMs and suppressions with reasons.
  • Discover repositories or Kubernetes images to draft the descriptor file.
When to use it
Use it when you want an AI coding assistant to check a change or a release for security problems and tell you which findings actually matter for your application, rather than dumping raw scanner output. It also suits teams that gate pull requests on new high-priority findings.
Requirements
Runs as a local process on the user's machine (desktop only, stdio transport), installed as an MCP bundle; the underlying Draugr CLI and its scanners must be installed, with scanner provisioning pinned and verified. A committed descriptor file describes the project. No accounts, API keys or environment variables are declared.
Before you install
Scans that go beyond reading the checkout, such as probing a live host or sending data to third parties, are said to ask first, but review what each enabled control does. Some controls send data to external services and carry their own licenses and terms. Findings are written to report files, and CI integration can post comments and fail builds. A passing verdict does not mean the software is secure.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Draugr in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

Draugr

Know which security findings to fix first, across the scanners you already run. SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC and containers, every finding ranked by exposure, criticality, exploitability and, for Go, reachability.

[CI] [OpenSSF Scorecard] [OpenSSF Best Practices] [Latest release] [License]

Describe your app in one file, and Draugr hands back the findings in the order to fix them.

Every application carries problems nobody put there on purpose: a library that turned out to have a hole in it, a password committed by accident, a server setting that leaves a door open. Draugr finds them, works out which ones actually matter for your app, and answers the question you are really asking before a release, is this safe to ship?

It runs the established open-source scanners for you, Trivy, Semgrep, Gitleaks and others, so there is nothing to choose between, wire up, or read five of. You describe what you built, once, in one file: where the repositories are, what images it builds, what it exposes, what infrastructure it runs on. Draugr picks the checks that apply, runs the right tool for each, and produces evidence you can hand to somebody else. Bring the scanners you already pay for, or use the open-source defaults.

Findings are ranked, not listed. A scanner's "critical" describes a flaw in the abstract, how bad it could be at its worst, anywhere. The same flaw is act-now in the service strangers can reach and backlog in the internal tool three people use, and no scanner can tell those apart because the difference is in the file you wrote, not in the code. And draugr diff gates a pull request on new findings only, so inheriting two hundred existing ones does not block every change.

Quickstart · See it in action · What it checks · In your pipeline · Documentation · What Draugr doesn't promise · Security

See it in action

[A draugr scan of the demo sandbox: a FAIL verdict, the four priority bands, the two controls that ran with their priority counts, what each was measured against, a per-component verdict, the signals that raised findings and what reachability analysis concluded, an accepted risk, then the ranked findings. The fifth is jQuery 1.8.3, marked as being on CISA's exploited catalog, and the seventh as deprecated.]

Priority (P1–P4) is not severity. Severity says how bad a flaw is at its worst, anywhere. Priority weighs that against how exposed and how important the part of your app it sits in is, which no scanner can work out, because it is not in the code.

draugr-dev/draugr-demo is a deliberately vulnerable app wired to Draugr: every control lights up, findings land in the repo's Security → Code scanning tab, and its example pull requests show the new-vs-fixed diff.

Quickstart

bash
curl -fsSL https://draugr.dev/install.sh | sh

Installs to ~/.local/bin, no sudo, and installs nothing if the archive fails verification. The script is readable in the repo; a download by hand, the GitHub CLI and go install are in the install guide.

bash
draugr init            # describe this project in a draugr.saga.yamldraugr tools install   # fetch the scanners it needs, pinned and verifieddraugr scan            # scan what the descriptor describes

tools install takes its answer from the descriptor beside it, so a small service gets three scanners rather than every one Draugr can provision. --all when you are preparing a machine for several projects.

Then describe what you actually ship:

yaml
project: my-apprelease:  version: "1.0"config:  controls:    images:      enabled: truecomponents:  - name: web    images:      - image: alpine:3.19
bash
draugr scan draugr.saga.yaml            # console summary; exits non-zero on faildraugr scan draugr.saga.yaml -o out/    # also writes report.json + results.sarifdraugr scan draugr.saga.yaml --format markdown   # or html, junit, json, sarif

Your editor already knows this file. Draugr's JSON Schema is registered with SchemaStore, so any *.saga.yaml gets completion, hover docs and typo warnings on open with nothing to configure.

Or let discovery write the descriptor for you:

bash
draugr survey github repos --org my-org -o draugr.saga.yamldraugr survey k8s images --namespace prod -o draugr.saga.yaml

Full walkthrough: quickstart.

Setting it up on a real repository? Reply to the pinned discussion with what the repository is and which scanners you run, and we'll write the descriptor with you, including the exposure and criticality that take judgment.

What it checks

Each control is backed by a tool Draugr executes rather than bundles, so every scanner stays under its own license, and you can swap it.

ControlLooks forBy default
scaknown flaws in the libraries you depend onTrivy, Grype and Mend opt-in
secretspasswords and keys committed by accident, history includedGitleaks
sastpatterns in the code you wrote that let somebody inSemgrep, gosec opt-in for Go
iacsettings that leave a door open, in Terraform, Kubernetes and DockerfilesTrivy
imageswhat is baked into your container imagesTrivy, Grype opt-in
licensesterms attached to code you did not writeTrivy
dastproblems only visible from outside a running appNuclei, authenticated, and from an OpenAPI spec
headershow your site answers a browsernative
tlscertificates and encryptionnative
kubernetesyour Kubernetes cluster, against the CIS benchmarksnative, kube-bench opt-in
cloudyour cloud account as it is, against the CIS benchmarksProwler
threatswhether anything you talk to is on a public blocklistabuse.ch URLhaus
provenancewhether an image is signed by the builder you expectSigstore cosign

Every scanner, what it sends and whose terms it carries: integrations catalog.

Alongside them: content-hash caching, an SBOM per repository and image, KEV/EPSS enrichment, per-control gate thresholds, and suppressions that stay in the report with the reason someone gave rather than disappearing.

In your pipeline

The first-party GitHub Action installs Draugr, and with tools: true the scanners the descriptor needs. On a pull request it compares the head with the base, posts the findings the change adds and fixes as one comment, and fails on a new P1 finding. On a push to main it runs the full scan, fails on any P1 finding, and sends every finding to the Security tab as one Draugr tool.

yaml
name: Securityon:  push:    branches: [main]  pull_request:permissions:  contents: read  pull-requests: write          # the pull-request comment  security-events: write        # the Security tab, on a pushjobs:  draugr:    runs-on: ubuntu-latest    steps:      - uses: actions/checkout@v4        with:          fetch-depth: 0          # the comparison needs the base commit      - id: draugr        uses: draugr-dev/draugr@v0   # pin @vX.Y.Z for reproducible CI        with:          saga: draugr.saga.yaml          tools: true             # provision the scanners the controls need          fail-on-new: P1         # fail a pull request on a new P1 finding      - if: always() && github.event_name == 'push'   # even when the gate fails        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3        with:          sarif_file: ${{ steps.draugr.outputs.sarif }}

Save it as .github/workflows/draugr.yml and commit it with the draugr.saga.yaml that draugr init wrote. The upload needs code scanning, which public repositories have and private ones get with GitHub Advanced Security; without it, delete the last step. To block a merge on a failing run, make the draugr check a required status check in the branch's protection rule or ruleset.

GitHub Actions · Code scanning: findings in the Security tab · GitLab: an include, GitLab's own report formats, a sticky merge-request comment · Azure Pipelines: a step template

From an AI coding assistant. Ask one to check a change and it will, using whatever scanner it finds over a scope it chose. draugr mcp serves Draugr over the Model Context Protocol so it reads your committed descriptor instead. A scan that does more than read the checkout, such as probing a live host or sending data to a third party, asks you first.

bash
claude mcp add draugr -- draugr mcp

See use Draugr from an AI coding assistant.

[Glama score for the Draugr MCP server]

Documentation

Documentation index →

What Draugr doesn't promise

A passing verdict means the controls you configured found nothing they were looking for. It is not a statement that your software is secure. It is silent about anything your descriptor does not declare, controls you did not enable, and whatever the underlying scanners miss. License findings are information, not legal advice. Draugr is provided under Apache-2.0 without warranty.

The details, including whose terms the scanners carry and your responsibility for authorization when scanning live endpoints: scope and disclaimer.

Security & supply chain

A security tool should hold itself to what it checks. Draugr does:

  • Standard output. Every finding is normalized to SARIF 2.1.0 (OASIS), so results flow into GitHub / GitLab / Azure DevOps code scanning and any SARIF-aware tool.
  • Signed releases and provenance. Release archives' checksums.txt is keyless-signed with cosign (Sigstore) into a checksums.txt.sigstore.json bundle, and each release publishes SLSA build-provenance attestations (gh attestation verify …); verify before installing (recipe).
  • SBOMs. A Syft SBOM is published for every release archive.
  • Verified tooling. draugr tools install fetches scanners pinned by SHA-256 and, where the upstream signs them, verifies the cosign signature too, and cosign itself is installable, so verification is self-sufficient.
  • We scan ourselves. Draugr runs its own scan on every pull request to this repository, static analysis included (Semgrep and gosec through the sast control, and gosec again in golangci-lint), and the findings are in the repository's Security tab. Supply-chain posture is tracked on the OpenSSF Scorecard.
  • Report a vulnerability. See SECURITY.md.

Development

Requires Go 1.26+. make build builds ./bin/draugr; make gate runs the full local gate (fmt, vet, lint, race tests with coverage and govulncheck). See CONTRIBUTING.md.

License

Draugr is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.

Source: README.md at commit 07356ba

Tools

0
SourceWeft started this package once in an isolated sandbox, without credentials, to list its tools. That failed: the package type cannot run in the sandbox.

Version history

47
  1. v0.168.0Nov 7, 2026
  2. v0.166.3Nov 6, 2026
  3. v0.166.2Nov 6, 2026
  4. v0.166.1Nov 4, 2026
  5. v0.166.0Nov 3, 2026
  6. v0.165.6Nov 3, 2026
  7. v0.164.0Nov 1, 2026
  8. v0.163.0Nov 1, 2026
  9. v0.162.2Nov 1, 2026
  10. v0.162.0Oct 31, 2026
  11. v0.161.0Oct 30, 2026
  12. v0.160.0Oct 30, 2026
  13. v0.159.0Oct 29, 2026
  14. v0.155.1Oct 26, 2026
  15. v0.154.2Oct 25, 2026
  16. v0.154.1Oct 18, 2026
  17. v0.154.0Oct 18, 2026
  18. v0.153.0Oct 18, 2026
  19. v0.152.0Oct 17, 2026
  20. v0.151.0Oct 11, 2026
  21. v0.150.0Oct 8, 2026
  22. v0.149.1Oct 6, 2026
  23. v0.149.0Oct 6, 2026
  24. v0.148.0Oct 6, 2026
  25. v0.147.0Oct 5, 2026
  26. v0.146.0Oct 5, 2026
  27. v0.145.0Oct 4, 2026
  28. v0.144.0Oct 3, 2026
  29. v0.143.1Oct 2, 2026
  30. v0.143.0Oct 2, 2026
  31. v0.142.2Oct 1, 2026
  32. v0.142.0Oct 1, 2026
  33. v0.141.0Sep 30, 2026
  34. v0.139.0Sep 29, 2026
  35. v0.138.0Sep 28, 2026
  36. v0.136.0Sep 27, 2026
  37. v0.135.1Sep 27, 2026
  38. v0.135.0Sep 26, 2026
  39. v0.134.0Sep 25, 2026
  40. v0.132.0Sep 24, 2026
  41. v0.131.1Sep 23, 2026
  42. v0.130.0Sep 22, 2026
  43. v0.129.0Sep 22, 2026
  44. v0.128.0Sep 21, 2026
  45. v0.127.0Sep 18, 2026
  46. v0.126.0Sep 18, 2026
  47. v0.125.0Sep 16, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts