Arcaeon Adapter

io.arcaeonPublished by arcaeon.iov0.2.0Updated Oct 24, 2026

MCP stdio proxy that logs the tool-call seam to the ledger without the agent's cooperation

VerifiedSTDIODesktop onlyDeveloper ToolsSecurity & Monitoring

Overview

AI-generated overview

A local stdio proxy that sits between an MCP client and server, logging every tool call to a hash-chained ledger without the agent's cooperation.

What you can do
It wraps any MCP server command and forwards JSON-RPC byte-for-byte, writing one hash-chained row per tools/call: which tool, digests of arguments and result, ok or error, and duration. It also records session begin/end, initialize, and tools/list events, and logs calls that never receive an answer. By default it stores digests rather than payloads; a --raw option embeds the payloads. The resulting log can be verified with the companion arcaeon-ledger CLI, which names the exact line where a chain breaks.
When to use it
Use it when you want an automatic, tamper-evident record of everything crossing one MCP seam, rather than relying on the agent to log its own actions. It is meant for auditing or review of a wrapped MCP server's tool calls. It only covers the seam it is wrapped around, not other tools or direct network calls.
Requirements
Runs as a local process on the user's machine (desktop only, stdio transport). Install via pip (arcaeon-adapter, optionally arcaeon-ledger). No accounts, API keys, environment variables, or headers are declared, and it makes no network calls at runtime. It is configured by wrapping an existing MCP server command with a --ledger path.
Before you install
The ledger path should be kept separate from any ledger the wrapped server writes. The --raw option embeds raw argument and result payloads in the log, which may include sensitive prompts or data; it is off by default. Anyone who controls the configuration can remove the wrapper, and actions that bypass the proxy are not recorded.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Arcaeon Adapter in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

arcaeon-adapter

arcaeon-ledger proves a record wasn't altered. It can't prove the record is complete — because the agent decides what to write. This moves the pen.

arcaeon-adapter is a stdio proxy that sits between an MCP client and an MCP server. It forwards JSON-RPC byte-for-byte, and on every tools/call it writes one hash-chained row to its own ledger: which tool, digests of the arguments and the result, ok or error, how long it took.

It runs in its own OS process. The agent is not consulted, cannot skip it, and cannot see it.

pip install arcaeon-adapter arcaeon-ledger

Wrap any MCP server's command — one line of config, zero code:

json
{ "mcpServers": {    "ledger": {      "command": "python",      "args": ["-m", "arcaeon_adapter", "--ledger", "seam.log.jsonl", "--",               "python", "-m", "arcaeon_ledger.mcp_server", "--log", "agent.log.jsonl"]    }} }

Or straight from a shell:

python -m arcaeon_adapter --ledger seam.log.jsonl -- <your mcp server command...>

What lands in the log

Real rows, from wrapping arcaeon-ledger's own MCP server (the ledger logging itself through the ledger), trimmed for width. Captured on adapter 0.1.0 with ledger 0.5.7; a current run stamps the installed versions in seam_impl and ledger_backend:

json
{"evt":"session_begin","seam":"mcp-stdio","seam_impl":"arcaeon-adapter/0.1.0", "session":"25eda195-70e8-45cb-9035-be9f61cfc759","seq":1, "server":"arcaeon_ledger.mcp_server","ledger_backend":"arcaeon-ledger/0.5.7", "command":["python","-m","arcaeon_ledger.mcp_server","--log","agent.log.jsonl"], "command_digest":"sha256:json-c14n:v1:ec06bd01…","raw_payloads":false, "ts":"2026-08-19T14:18:08Z","chain":"0081ec1fe5d98395192f595e553b4133"}
{"evt":"tools_list","seq":3,"tools":["ledger_append","ledger_verify"],"tool_count":2, "tools_digest":"sha256:json-c14n:v1:b85c9fce…","status":"ok", …}
{"evt":"tool_call","seq":4,"tool":"ledger_append","rpc_id":"3", "args_digest":"sha256:json-c14n:v1:cfb2bb50…", "result_digest":"sha256:json-c14n:v1:ba037f70…", "status":"ok","ms":144, …}
{"evt":"session_end","seq":6,"reason":"child_exit","exit_code":0, "rows_before_end":5,"calls":2, …}

In that same run, the wrapped server's own log — the diary it keeps when the agent remembers to call ledger_append — had one row. The seam log had six. That difference is the entire product.

fieldwhy it's there
evttool_call, session_begin, session_end, mcp_initialize, tools_list
seamalways "mcp-stdio" — the provenance tier. A separate process saw this at the protocol level. A downstream verifier reads this field to tell infrastructure-grade capture from a cooperative in-process callback the agent could simply not call.
session / seqone proxy process = one session; seq is a dense total order within it. session_begin + session_end bracket the run so a reviewer can pair a session's start and end.
args_digest / result_digestsha256:json-c14n:v1:<hex> — self-describing, so a stranger holding only the row can reproduce the computation.
status / msok / error / unanswered, and wall-clock duration. error covers both a JSON-RPC error and a result carrying isError: true.

Digests, not payloads, by default. The row proves which bytes crossed the seam without keeping them. An audit log that quietly becomes a copy of every prompt and every result is a liability, not an asset — and a person-free core is much easier to retain for years. --raw embeds the payloads for deployers who own that risk; the digests stay either way.

A call that never gets an answer still gets a row (status: "unanswered"). Otherwise "kill the server mid-call" would be a way to make an action leave no trace at the seam, which is the exact hole this exists to close.

Verify it

The seam log is an ordinary arcaeon-ledger file:

python -m arcaeon_ledger.cli verify seam.log.jsonl

Edit a row, delete one, reorder them — every later link breaks and verify names the exact line.

The honest limit

An adapter on one seam logs that seam completely — and nothing else. An agent can still act around it: a direct HTTP call, an un-wrapped MCP server, a shell command never crosses this proxy and never hits this ledger. The second-set-of-books problem does not go away; no logging layer can force total honesty. What the adapter guarantees is narrower and real: everything that crossed the instrumented seam is in the record, automatically, and the record proves itself. Honesty is forced at the seams, not everywhere — not a lock, a neighborhood.

Specifically blind to:

  • your harness's built-in tools (Bash, file edits, web fetch) — they never touch MCP
  • any MCP server you did not wrap
  • HTTP the agent makes natively
  • the model's reasoning, which is not an action and leaves no wire trace
  • frames larger than --max-frame (relayed fine; counted and reported in session_end as oversize_frames_unlogged, never a silent gap)

And on compliance, plainly: this does not make anyone compliant with anything. Regulations like the EU AI Act's Art. 12 place duties on a provider or deployer, and duties land on people, not libraries. What this is: a mechanism that makes recording at one seam automatic rather than voluntary, which is a thing you would otherwise have to build. Retention policy, log semantics, risk classification, and every other obligation remain yours. Anyone selling you a package that "makes you compliant" is selling you a story.

Whoever controls the config can also remove the wrapper. That is the same class of limit every logging layer has, and it is stated here rather than in a footnote.

Fidelity is the P0 property

A proxy that corrupts, reorders, or delays a customer's JSON-RPC is worse than no proxy at all. So the design puts fidelity ahead of observation, structurally:

  • Bytes are forwarded first, observed second, from a copy. A parsing defect here cannot alter or withhold traffic; the worst it can do is produce a wrong row.
  • Raw binary end to end. No text mode anywhere — on Windows that would rewrite \n as \r\n and silently alter every frame.
  • No reframing, ever. We never parse a frame and re-emit it. The classic proxy bug is json.dumps(json.loads(frame)): semantically identical, byte-different.
  • One thread per direction, so ordering within a direction is the OS's.
  • The child's stderr is inherited, not piped. Its diagnostics land exactly where they did unwrapped, and the proxy itself prints nothing on an honest run.
  • Malformed frames are relayed untouched and not logged. A server that prints a stray line to stdout keeps working; we don't guess, because a guess in an audit record is fiction.
  • The child's exit code is the proxy's exit code.

This is tested by running a scripted client against a synthetic MCP server directly, then through the proxy, and requiring the two stdout streams to be identical bytes — including a 4 MB frame spanning ~64 pipe reads, unicode, embedded CRLF, malformed lines, a notification with no id, and a final frame with no trailing newline.

Prove the checks can fail

python -m arcaeon_adapter.selftest

An instrument that has never failed proves nothing. Every case runs GREEN on a clean fixture, then mutates and requires the same check to go RED — with a no-op guard in between, because a mutation that changes nothing proves nothing either. Output abridged (two header lines and the tail of each PASS line cut; the drop_byte length differs by a byte or two between runs):

PASS passthrough_fidelity GREEN: 2001202 bytes identical byte-for-byte through the proxyPASS passthrough_fidelity RED on reserialize: corruption detected (length 2001202 vs 2001097)PASS passthrough_fidelity RED on drop_byte: corruption detected (length 2001202 vs 2001168)PASS one_row_per_call GREEN: 5 tools/call frames -> 5 tool_call rows, 9 rows total, seq 1..9PASS one_row_per_call RED on log_on_request: count check caught 10 rows for 5 callsPASS unanswered_call_logged GREEN: unanswered `quiet` call rowed with args_digest boundPASS unanswered_call_logged RED on no_flush: dropping the shutdown flush loses the rowPASS tamper_detected GREEN: seam log verifies (ok=True, rows=9)PASS tamper_detected RED on edited args_digest: first_break='line 4: chain mismatch'PASS digest_recipe_frozen GREEN: 3 frozen json-c14n:v1 vectors reproduce exactlyPASS digest_recipe_frozen RED on unsorted_keys: drifted canonicalizer produces a different digest
ALL CHECKS PASSED — and every one was observed failing on its own defect.

The fidelity mutations are injected into the real relay, not a mock, so what's proven is that the comparison would catch a regression in the shipping code path.

Options

--ledger PATH      seam ledger (required). Keep it SEPARATE from any ledger the                   wrapped server writes: one file, one writer, clean provenance.--server NAME      label for the wrapped server in every row (default: derived                   from the command — `-m pkg.mod` reads as "pkg.mod", not "python")--session ID       session id (default: a fresh uuid4 per proxy process)--raw              embed raw argument and result payloads. Off by default.--max-frame BYTES  frames larger than this are relayed but not logged (default 64 MiB)

Install and dependencies

Stdlib only at runtime. arcaeon-ledger is the intended writer and is what makes a row provable — but it is not a hard dependency, on purpose: this gets wrapped around somebody else's working MCP server by editing one line of config, and a missing package must never be why their server fails to start. Without it, rows are written by a byte-compatible fallback and session_begin says so in ledger_backend, so a reviewer never has to guess which writer produced a chain. (That byte-compatibility is asserted in the test suite, not just claimed here.)

No network calls at runtime. Ever.

pytest -q                            # 146 testspython -m arcaeon_adapter.selftest   # the mutation harness

Status

v0. Works, tested, dogfooded on our own MCP server. Deliberately not yet built: --authority stamping, --bind-inputs artefact binding, --auto-pin witness publication, and harness-hook / HTTP-gateway seams. See CHANGELOG.md.

MIT.

Source: adapter/README.md at commit 4aaceaf

Tools

0
SourceWeft has not started this package in its sandbox yet, so its tools are not known.

Version history

2
  1. v0.2.0LatestSep 23, 2026
  2. v0.1.4Sep 23, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts