
Rug Pull Detector
io.github.4hmetuyarPublished by GitHub account 4hmetuyarv0.2.1Updated Oct 24, 2026
Baselines an MCP server's tools and detects tool-definition changes after approval
Overview
Local MCP client that baselines another MCP server's tool definitions and flags later changes, catching rug pulls after approval.
- What you can do
- Baseline a target server's tools by connecting to it and storing a canonical hash and snapshot per tool
- Re-check a server later and diff its current tools against the stored baseline, reporting changed, added and removed tools
- Scan the live tool list for tool-poisoning patterns on every check, including first contact
- List every server that has a stored baseline
- Run the same baseline and check steps from the command line with SARIF output for CI or scheduled jobs
- When to use it
- Use it when you add third-party MCP servers and want to know whether a server silently changes a tool's description, schema or annotations after you approved it. Suited to periodic re-checks, pre-session checks, or CI gates on servers you already trust.
- Requirements
- Runs locally over stdio via npx. Needs Node.js and network access only if the target is a remote HTTP server. The target is specified with a stdio command, a URL, or an MCP-style JSON config plus server name. No accounts or API keys are declared; baselines are stored in a local directory.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Rug Pull Detector in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
@guardbee/mcp-rug-pull-detector
🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文 | 🇯🇵 日本語 | 🇰🇷 한국어 | 🇧🇷 Português | 🇪🇸 Español | 🇩🇪 Deutsch
[npm version] [npm downloads] [License: MIT]
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that connects live to another MCP server and detects an MCP rug pull — a server presenting one tool definition when you approve it, then silently serving a different one later.
Every other scanner in this monorepo reads source code or a config file once. This one is architecturally different: it's an MCP client. It spawns the target server (stdio) or opens a session with it (Streamable HTTP), calls the real tools/list RPC, and remembers what it saw — the same trust-on-first-use model an SSH client uses for host keys. A tool's description, input/output schema, or annotations changing between two calls to the exact same server is not something any static analysis of that server's source could ever catch, because the server may not have changed its source at all — it can decide server-side, at request time, what to tell which client.
Telemetry is off by default. With
GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields likecontent,tokenorpasswordare replaced with a placeholder. See@guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
The trust-on-first-use model
baseline_server connects once, fetches every tool's {name, description, inputSchema, outputSchema, annotations}, canonicalizes it (deep key-sorted JSON) and stores a SHA-256 hash plus the full snapshot — one JSON file per server under .guardbee/tool-baselines/.
Every check_server also runs the tool-poisoning catalog scan on the live tools/list, including the first time a server is seen and when no baseline is stored yet. A poisoned description does not wait for a second visit.
check_server connects again later — after a version bump, before every session, on a schedule, whatever cadence you choose — and re-fetches the same information. Any tool whose hash no longer matches is reported:
- critical — an existing tool's definition changed (
tool_definition_drift). This is the rug pull itself. The finding says exactly which field changed (description / input schema / output schema / annotations) with the before/after description text, becausedestructiveHint: true → falseis just as much a lie as a rewritten description — both change what a caller believes they're authorizing. - medium — a new tool appeared that wasn't in the baseline (
tool_added). Could be a legitimate release. Still worth a look — nothing stops a server introducing its dangerous tool only after the benign ones already earned trust. - low — a previously baselined tool is no longer offered (
tool_removed).
If no baseline exists yet, check_server captures one automatically and reports clean (pass autoBaseline: false / --no-auto-baseline to require an explicit baseline_server call first instead).
Features
- Real MCP client — not a mock, not a source-code heuristic. Speaks the actual protocol over stdio or Streamable HTTP to whatever server you point it at.
- Canonical hashing covers name, description, input schema, output schema, and annotations (
readOnlyHint,destructiveHint, ...) — a server can't dodge detection by only touching the fields a naive diff would skip. - Three ways to specify a target:
--stdio="command arg1 arg2",--url=<http-url>, or--config=<file> --server=<name>(reads anmcpServers-style JSON config directly — the same shape as a Claude Desktop config) - SARIF 2.1.0 output — CI/CD integration
- 28 tests: pure unit tests for hashing/diffing/storage, plus real stdio process-spawning integration tests against a fixture MCP server (not mocked) covering drift, addition, removal, and label isolation. End-to-end verified against
ai-code-scanner's own real, already-published MCP server — connected over genuine stdio JSON-RPC, baselined its 4 real tools, and confirmed a second check reports clean.
Quick Start
Claude Desktop / MCP Client
Then ask Claude to baseline a server you're about to add, and to re-check it periodically (e.g. "check this MCP server against its baseline before we use it today").
CLI (CI/CD or scheduled check)
MCP Tools
Configuration
No guardbee.yml section — the only persistent state is the baseline directory itself (.guardbee/tool-baselines/ by default, override with --baseline-dir).
Limitations (by design)
--stdiouses a simple whitespace split, not shell-quote parsing — a command/argument containing spaces will break. Use--config=<file> --server=<name>(reading a real JSON config with a properargsarray) for anything beyond a trivial command line.- Baseline identity is the
labelyou give it (or the command line / URL if you don't), not anything cryptographic about the server itself — renaming how you invoke a server starts a fresh baseline. Keep the label stable. - This detects drift in the tool list a server presents, not malicious behavior inside a tool call that was always there. It's the rug-pull defense, not a replacement for
mcp-server-auditorortool-poisoning-scanner— run all three. - Connecting to a stdio target means spawning whatever command you give it — the same thing every MCP client already does when you add a server to its config. Only point this at servers you intend to run.
Development
License
MIT — GuardBee
Feedback
Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.
Source: packages/rug-pull-detector/README.md at commit 040e072
Tools
0Version history
1- v0.2.1LatestSep 29, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts