Identity AIops

io.github.AIops-toolsPublished by GitHub account AIops-toolsv0.12.0Updated Oct 30, 2026

Governed Keycloak + authentik identity ops: users, events, clients, MFA, RCA. 29 tools.

Overview

AI-generated overview

Audited AI operations for self-hosted Keycloak and authentik identity providers: inspect users, events and clients, run RCA analyses, and perform governed…

What you can do
  • Inspect realms and system settings, identity providers, and authentication or admin events
  • Search users, read details, counts, sessions, credentials, groups and lockout status
  • List OAuth clients, client details, per-client sessions and session statistics
  • Run analyses: login-failure root cause, stale-access audit, client misconfiguration audit, MFA coverage
  • Perform governed writes such as disable/enable user, revoke sessions, require password reset, update redirect URIs, rotate client secret
  • List and apply undo records for reversible writes
When to use it
For teams running their own Keycloak or authentik who want an assistant to investigate sign-in failures, audit dormant accounts and MFA gaps, check client configuration, and carry out small identity changes with an audit trail.
Requirements
Local Python package run via uvx or pipx, with uv on PATH for plugin installs. A configured target (base URL, realm) created with the init wizard. Keycloak needs a confidential client with service-account roles; authentik needs an API token. The master password for the encrypted secrets store must be supplied in the MCP env block as IDENTITY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD.
Before you install
Writes change real identity data: disabling users, revoking sessions, replacing redirect URIs and rotating client secrets. There is no read-only switch or approval gate; the risk tier is only a label, so limit the connecting account's roles. Credentials are stored encrypted locally, and audit and undo databases record parameters and prior state under the user's home directory. The README states it has not yet been run end to end against a live instance.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Identity AIops in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

Identity AIops

Audit availability: Real writes require a committed pending audit row and stop before contacting the platform if storage is unavailable. Reads and previews may continue with a warning; new audit rows store outcome summaries rather than full responses.

Governed AI-ops for self-hosted identity providers — Keycloak + authentik.

identity-aiops gives AI agents (and the humans supervising them) a safe, audited way to operate the identity plane of self-built and small/mid-size infrastructure: who can sign in, what failed and why, which OAuth clients are misconfigured, and who still has no second factor. It is built for teams running their own Keycloak or authentik who want agent-driven identity operations with receipts — every tool call is audited, and writes carry risk-tier labels with dry-run previews and undo tokens.

Verification status: modelled on the public Keycloak admin REST API and authentik API v3 and exercised against mocked responses; there is no recorded end-to-end run against a live instance yet. identity-aiops doctor is the fastest live check — see docs/VERIFICATION.md.

What it does

AreaTools
Realm / systemoverview, realm settings (brute-force protection, password/OTP policy), identity providers
Userslist/search, detail, count, sessions, credentials (MFA surface), groups, members, lockout status
Eventsauthentication events, admin/config-change events
Clientslist, detail, per-client sessions, session stats
Flagship RCAlogin_failure_rca — brute-force (spray/targeted) vs misconfigured client vs expired-credential storm vs lockout storm; stale_access_audit — dormant users, never-logged-in accounts, service accounts used interactively, orphaned sessions; client_misconfig_audit — wildcard/http redirect URIs, public clients with secrets, implicit flow, missing PKCE, password grant (ranked risk); mfa_coverage_analysis — coverage %, gap list
Governed writesdisable_user / enable_user (undo pair), revoke_user_sessions, require_password_reset (undo clears the flag), update_client_redirect_uris (undo replays the prior list), rotate_client_secret (masked priorState)

29 MCP tools: 21 reads (including the 4 analyses) + 6 governed writes + 2 undo tools (undo_list, undo_apply). The same tools work on both platforms — a per-target platform field selects the API shape (auth flow + resource paths).

Supported platforms

PlatformAPIAuth
keycloakAdmin REST API (/admin/realms/{realm}/...)OAuth2 client-credentials grant against /realms/{realm}/protocol/openid-connect/token; short-lived token auto-refreshed on 401
authentikAPI v3 (/api/v3/...)Long-lived API token (Bearer)

Platform notes: require_password_reset, rotate_client_secret, client_sessions, client_session_stats, and user_lockout_status are Keycloak-shaped (authentik has no equivalent endpoint — the tools return a teaching error there). authentik contributes the global session list used by the stale-access audit's orphaned-session check.

Missing a platform (Authelia, Zitadel, Ory...), an endpoint, or an analysis you need? 缺功能提 issue/PR 欢迎留言 — open an issue or PR at https://github.com/AIops-tools/Identity-AIops, feature requests welcome.

What this tool does, and does not, decide

It delivers identity-provider operations — reads and writes — accurately and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you connect it with: give the Keycloak service account (or authentik token) only the roles you want the agent to have — view-users / view-events / view-clients and no manage-* — and the writes fail at the server, the place that actually owns the permission.

So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure. The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.identity-aiops/audit.db, and reversible writes still capture their before-state (fetched, never guessed) and record a replayable inverse.

Each tool declares a risk_level, carried into the audit row as a descriptive tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was, say, a high-risk secret rotation. It is a label, not a gate.

Running a smaller / local model? See agent-guardrails.md — it lists the guardrails this tool now enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.

Quick start

As a Claude Code plugin

One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:

/plugin marketplace add AIops-tools/marketplace/plugin install identity-aiops@aiops-tools

The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with identity-aiops init — see below.

As an OpenClaw plugin

The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:

bash
openclaw plugins install clawhub:@zw008/identity-aiopsopenclaw skills info identity-aiops          # expect: Visible to model: yes

Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.

As a CLI or standalone MCP server

bash
uv tool install identity-aiops        # or: pipx install identity-aiops
identity-aiops init      # wizard: target + realm + credential (encrypted)identity-aiops doctor    # token acquisition + user-count probe per targetidentity-aiops overview  # one-shot estate summary

For Keycloak, create a confidential client with Service accounts roles enabled and grant its service account the realm-management roles you want the agent to have (start with view-users, view-events, view-clients; add manage-users / manage-clients only if you want the governed writes). For authentik, create an API token for a (least-privileged) admin user.

CLI surface: users (list/show/sessions/credentials + disable/enable/ revoke-sessions/require-reset), clients (list/show + set-redirect-uris/ rotate-secret), events, overview, doctor, secret, init, mcp. Write commands take --dry-run and always double-confirm; execution is delegated to the governed MCP twins so CLI writes land in the audit log too.

MCP configuration

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "identity-aiops": {      "command": "uvx",      "args": ["--from", "identity-aiops", "identity-aiops-mcp"],      "env": {        "IDENTITY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD": "<master password for secrets.enc>"      }    }  }}

env-block caveat: MCP clients launch the server with a minimal environment — variables from your shell profile are NOT inherited. Anything the server needs (IDENTITY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD, an alternate IDENTITY_AIOPS_HOME, IDENTITY_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY to attribute writes on the audit trail) must be set in the env block above.

Governance

Every MCP tool runs through the vendored governance harness (identity_aiops/governance/, zero external dependencies):

  • Audit — every call (including errors) lands in ~/.identity-aiops/audit.db with params, status, and risk level, plus any optional approver/rationale annotation. It records; it does not authorize.
  • Budget — per-session call/time budgets and a runaway breaker (IDENTITY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS, IDENTITY_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS, IDENTITY_RUNAWAY_MAX) — a safety backstop, not an authorization gate.
  • Risk tier — reads are low; containment/hygiene writes (disable_user, revoke_user_sessions, require_password_reset) are medium; access-granting or boundary-replacing writes (enable_user, update_client_redirect_uris, rotate_client_secret) are high. The tier is a descriptive label carried onto the audit row, not a gate — whether a write runs is the agent's judgement or the connecting account's permissions. IDENTITY_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY / IDENTITY_AUDIT_RATIONALE are optional annotations recorded when set, never required.
  • Undo — reversible writes capture the REAL prior state (fetched before mutating, never guessed) and record a replayable inverse descriptor in ~/.identity-aiops/undo.db. Irreversible writes (revoke_user_sessions, rotate_client_secret) record priorState only — the secret is stored masked, never in clear.
  • Sanitize — every string an IdP returns is folded through an injection-safe normaliser (bounded length, control characters stripped) before an agent sees it.
  • Secrets — credentials live Fernet-encrypted (scrypt-derived key) in ~/.identity-aiops/secrets.enc, never plaintext on disk; a legacy IDENTITY_<TARGET>_SECRET env var is honoured as fallback and identity-aiops secret migrate moves it in. TLS verification defaults ON.

Configuration

~/.identity-aiops/config.yaml (created by init):

yaml
targets:  - name: sso1    platform: keycloak    base_url: https://sso.example.com    realm: master    username: identity-aiops-agent   # the confidential client's client_id    verify_ssl: true  - name: ak1    platform: authentik    base_url: https://auth.example.com    verify_ssl: true

Set IDENTITY_AIOPS_HOME to relocate all state (config, secrets, audit, undo). IDENTITY_AIOPS_CONFIG points the MCP server at an alternate config file.

Development

bash
uv syncuv run pytest -quv run ruff check .

MIT License. Part of the AIops-tools line — governed AI-ops tooling for self-hosted infrastructure.

Source: README.md at commit 5e7d775

Tools

0
SourceWeft started this package once in an isolated sandbox, without credentials, to list its tools. That failed: the server did not start.

Version history

5
  1. v0.12.0LatestOct 30, 2026
  2. v0.11.0Oct 15, 2026
  3. v0.9.0Oct 15, 2026
  4. v0.8.5Sep 17, 2026
  5. v0.8.4Sep 16, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts