
Identity AIops
io.github.AIops-toolsPublished by GitHub account AIops-toolsv0.12.0Updated Oct 30, 2026
Governed Keycloak + authentik identity ops: users, events, clients, MFA, RCA. 29 tools.
Overview
Audited AI operations for self-hosted Keycloak and authentik identity providers: inspect users, events and clients, run RCA analyses, and perform governed…
- What you can do
- Inspect realms and system settings, identity providers, and authentication or admin events
- Search users, read details, counts, sessions, credentials, groups and lockout status
- List OAuth clients, client details, per-client sessions and session statistics
- Run analyses: login-failure root cause, stale-access audit, client misconfiguration audit, MFA coverage
- Perform governed writes such as disable/enable user, revoke sessions, require password reset, update redirect URIs, rotate client secret
- List and apply undo records for reversible writes
- When to use it
- For teams running their own Keycloak or authentik who want an assistant to investigate sign-in failures, audit dormant accounts and MFA gaps, check client configuration, and carry out small identity changes with an audit trail.
- Requirements
- Local Python package run via uvx or pipx, with uv on PATH for plugin installs. A configured target (base URL, realm) created with the init wizard. Keycloak needs a confidential client with service-account roles; authentik needs an API token. The master password for the encrypted secrets store must be supplied in the MCP env block as IDENTITY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Identity AIops in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
Identity AIops
Audit availability: Real writes require a committed
pendingaudit row and stop before contacting the platform if storage is unavailable. Reads and previews may continue with a warning; new audit rows store outcome summaries rather than full responses.
Governed AI-ops for self-hosted identity providers — Keycloak + authentik.
identity-aiops gives AI agents (and the humans supervising them) a safe,
audited way to operate the identity plane of self-built and small/mid-size
infrastructure: who can sign in, what failed and why, which OAuth clients are
misconfigured, and who still has no second factor. It is built for teams
running their own Keycloak or authentik who want agent-driven identity
operations with receipts — every tool call is audited, and writes carry
risk-tier labels with dry-run previews and undo tokens.
Verification status: modelled on the public Keycloak admin REST API and authentik API v3 and exercised against mocked responses; there is no recorded end-to-end run against a live instance yet.
identity-aiops doctoris the fastest live check — seedocs/VERIFICATION.md.
What it does
29 MCP tools: 21 reads (including the 4 analyses) + 6 governed writes + 2 undo
tools (undo_list, undo_apply). The
same tools work on both platforms — a per-target platform field selects the
API shape (auth flow + resource paths).
Supported platforms
Platform notes: require_password_reset, rotate_client_secret,
client_sessions, client_session_stats, and user_lockout_status are
Keycloak-shaped (authentik has no equivalent endpoint — the tools return a
teaching error there). authentik contributes the global session list used by
the stale-access audit's orphaned-session check.
Missing a platform (Authelia, Zitadel, Ory...), an endpoint, or an analysis you need? 缺功能提 issue/PR 欢迎留言 — open an issue or PR at https://github.com/AIops-tools/Identity-AIops, feature requests welcome.
What this tool does, and does not, decide
It delivers identity-provider operations — reads and writes — accurately and
records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed to
happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you
connect it with: give the Keycloak service account (or authentik token) only
the roles you want the agent to have — view-users / view-events /
view-clients and no manage-* — and the writes fail at the server, the place
that actually owns the permission.
So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure.
The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over
MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in
~/.identity-aiops/audit.db, and reversible writes still capture their
before-state (fetched, never guessed) and record a replayable inverse.
Each tool declares a
risk_level, carried into the audit row as a descriptive tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was, say, a high-risk secret rotation. It is a label, not a gate.
Running a smaller / local model? See agent-guardrails.md — it lists the guardrails this tool now enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.
Quick start
As a Claude Code plugin
One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:
The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the
package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the
code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with identity-aiops init — see below.
As an OpenClaw plugin
The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:
Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is
fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so
uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports
Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.
As a CLI or standalone MCP server
For Keycloak, create a confidential client with Service accounts roles
enabled and grant its service account the realm-management roles you want the
agent to have (start with view-users, view-events, view-clients; add
manage-users / manage-clients only if you want the governed writes). For
authentik, create an API token for a (least-privileged) admin user.
CLI surface: users (list/show/sessions/credentials + disable/enable/
revoke-sessions/require-reset), clients (list/show + set-redirect-uris/
rotate-secret), events, overview, doctor, secret, init, mcp.
Write commands take --dry-run and always double-confirm; execution is
delegated to the governed MCP twins so CLI writes land in the audit log too.
MCP configuration
env-block caveat: MCP clients launch the server with a minimal environment — variables from your shell profile are NOT inherited. Anything the server needs (
IDENTITY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD, an alternateIDENTITY_AIOPS_HOME,IDENTITY_AUDIT_APPROVED_BYto attribute writes on the audit trail) must be set in theenvblock above.
Governance
Every MCP tool runs through the vendored governance harness
(identity_aiops/governance/, zero external dependencies):
- Audit — every call (including errors) lands in
~/.identity-aiops/audit.dbwith params, status, and risk level, plus any optional approver/rationale annotation. It records; it does not authorize. - Budget — per-session call/time budgets and a runaway breaker
(
IDENTITY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS,IDENTITY_MAX_TOOL_SECONDS,IDENTITY_RUNAWAY_MAX) — a safety backstop, not an authorization gate. - Risk tier — reads are
low; containment/hygiene writes (disable_user,revoke_user_sessions,require_password_reset) aremedium; access-granting or boundary-replacing writes (enable_user,update_client_redirect_uris,rotate_client_secret) arehigh. The tier is a descriptive label carried onto the audit row, not a gate — whether a write runs is the agent's judgement or the connecting account's permissions.IDENTITY_AUDIT_APPROVED_BY/IDENTITY_AUDIT_RATIONALEare optional annotations recorded when set, never required. - Undo — reversible writes capture the REAL prior state (fetched before
mutating, never guessed) and record a replayable inverse descriptor in
~/.identity-aiops/undo.db. Irreversible writes (revoke_user_sessions,rotate_client_secret) record priorState only — the secret is stored masked, never in clear. - Sanitize — every string an IdP returns is folded through an injection-safe normaliser (bounded length, control characters stripped) before an agent sees it.
- Secrets — credentials live Fernet-encrypted (scrypt-derived key) in
~/.identity-aiops/secrets.enc, never plaintext on disk; a legacyIDENTITY_<TARGET>_SECRETenv var is honoured as fallback andidentity-aiops secret migratemoves it in. TLS verification defaults ON.
Configuration
~/.identity-aiops/config.yaml (created by init):
Set IDENTITY_AIOPS_HOME to relocate all state (config, secrets, audit,
undo). IDENTITY_AIOPS_CONFIG points the MCP server at an alternate
config file.
Development
MIT License. Part of the AIops-tools line — governed AI-ops tooling for self-hosted infrastructure.
Source: README.md at commit 5e7d775
Tools
0Version history
5- v0.12.0LatestOct 30, 2026
- v0.11.0Oct 15, 2026
- v0.9.0Oct 15, 2026
- v0.8.5Sep 17, 2026
- v0.8.4Sep 16, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
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- Auth declared10 pts
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- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts