enclave

io.github.AVGVSTVS96Published by GitHub account AVGVSTVS96v0.2.13Updated Nov 7, 2026

Your agent asks for a password by one-time link, not in chat, and uses it without seeing it.

VerifiedSTDIODesktop onlyDeveloper ToolsSecurity & Monitoring

Overview

AI-generated overview

Lets an assistant collect passwords, API keys, 2FA codes and passkeys from a person through a one-time link and use them without ever seeing the values.

What you can do
  • Request secrets: create a one-time link so the person types a password or key in their browser instead of in chat, then wait for it to be saved to a local vault.
  • Inspect the vault: list saved item names and field names, never values, optionally filtered by name or website.
  • Use secrets: run a command with vault secrets in its environment, with their values masked in the output, and read a current 2FA code from a totp field.
  • Sign in with passkeys: arm a saved passkey for one sign-in within five minutes, then click the site's passkey prompt.
When to use it
Useful when an agent needs credentials to finish a task and you want them kept out of the chat transcript and tool results, for example logging into a service, calling an API with a key, or supplying a 2FA code. It suits desktop and coding agents running on the same machine as the vault.
Requirements
Runs locally over stdio via npx, so Node.js is needed; no accounts or keys are required because a hosted relay is used by default. Optional environment variables: ENCLAVE_FROM (name shown on the page), ENCLAVE_HOME (vault location, default ~/.enclave) and ENCLAVE_RELAY (self-hosted relay URL). Passkey sign-in needs the project's Chrome extension installed on Linux, and clients with short tool timeouts must raise them for the long wait.
Before you install
The vault key file unlocks every stored item, so treat it like an SSH key. Whoever controls the relay serves the page that encrypts what you type, so a compromised relay could alter it; self-hosting avoids that trust. Anyone holding a link can answer it first, and links can claim any sender, so only answer requests you expected. An agent with shell access on the same machine could still read its own vault; this prevents accidental leaks, not a determined model. Secrets are stored on disk by…

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open enclave in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

[enclave]

Your AI agent needs your Netflix password. Instead of asking in chat, it sends you a link. You type the password (or your password manager fills it) and tap Send. It's locked in your browser before it leaves, so only your agent can open it. The agent keeps it in a vault of its own, next to 2FA codes and passkeys, and uses it later without seeing it.

[The enclave page in the ledger theme: hex is asking for Netflix, with email and password fields, a Send to hex button, and a ledger showing who holds the secret] [The same page in the field theme, on a full blue background]

hex   I need your Netflix login to finish this: https://moonlit-lynx-37.convex.site/k3Jd8vQ2…you   open it, type, tap Sendhex   saved Netflix: email, password

It works out of the box with a hosted relay. No accounts, no keys to set up, nothing for the person to install.

Set up your agent

Agents with a shell (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, OpenCode and 30 more) get it as a skill:

sh
npx skills add AVGVSTVS96/enclave

It runs enclave with npx, so there's nothing else to install.

Agents that use MCP get the same thing as tools. Add the server below, and add this line to the agent's instructions, because tools alone don't stop a model from asking in chat:

When you need a password, API key or other secret, ask for it with the enclave tools rather than in chat.

Claude Code
sh
/plugin marketplace add AVGVSTVS96/enclave/plugin install enclave@enclave

Or as MCP tools:

sh
claude mcp add enclave -- npx -y enclave-link mcp
Codex
sh
codex mcp add enclave -- npx -y enclave-link mcp

Codex stops a tool after 60 seconds by default, and wait_for_secret can wait 25 minutes, so add this under [mcp_servers.enclave] in ~/.codex/config.toml:

toml
tool_timeout_sec = 1800
Cursor, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, Cline, Roo Code, Kiro, Junie, Factory

They all take the same JSON:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "enclave": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "enclave-link", "mcp"] }  }}
AppWhere it goes
Cursor~/.cursor/mcp.json, or .cursor/mcp.json in a project
Claude DesktopSettings → Developer → Edit Config
Windsurf~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json
ClineMCP Servers → Configure MCP Servers
Roo Code.roo/mcp.json
Kiro~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json
JetBrains Junie~/.junie/mcp/mcp.json
Factory~/.factory/mcp.json
VS Code and GitHub Copilot

.vscode/mcp.json:

json
{  "servers": {    "enclave": { "type": "stdio", "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "enclave-link", "mcp"] }  }}
Gemini CLI
sh
gemini extensions install https://github.com/AVGVSTVS96/enclave
Grok Build
sh
grok mcp add enclave -- npx -y enclave-link mcp
OpenCode

opencode.json:

json
{  "mcp": {    "enclave": { "type": "local", "command": ["npx", "-y", "enclave-link", "mcp"] }  }}
Zed

In Zed's settings.json:

json
{  "context_servers": {    "enclave": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "enclave-link", "mcp"], "env": {} }  }}
OpenClaw, Hermes and other chat assistants

Assistants that talk to you through Telegram, Discord or WhatsApp should use the skill (npx skills add AVGVSTVS96/enclave), so the link reaches you in the chat. For MCP instead:

sh
openclaw mcp add enclave --command npx --arg -y --arg enclave-link --arg mcp

Hermes, in ~/.hermes/config.yaml:

yaml
mcp_servers:  enclave:    command: npx    args: ["-y", "enclave-link", "mcp"]    timeout: 1800
Goose

Run goose configure, choose Add Extension → Command-line Extension, enter npx -y enclave-link mcp, and set the timeout to 1800 seconds.

ChatGPT, Claude.ai and the Gemini and Grok apps can't use enclave yet: they run in the cloud, and the vault lives on the computer where the agent runs. Their desktop and coding-agent versions above work.

Your own code can use the TypeScript SDK; see SDK.

How it works

agent                          relay (Convex)                   person's browser─────                          ──────────────                   ────────────────makes a one-time key pairenclave ask ─── open ──────────▶  stores an empty request         ◀── link ───────────sends https://…/<id>#key=…  ──────────────────────────────────▶ opens the link                                                                 reads the key after #                                                                 (browsers never send it)                                                                 encrypts the answer                               stores encrypted bytes ◀───────── POST, onceenclave wait ◀── live update ───decrypts, saves to its vaultdeletes the request ────────▶  gone
  • The relay can't read anything. The key it would need never leaves the agent's computer. The public key travels in the part of the link after #, which browsers don't send to servers, so the relay doesn't even learn what was asked for.
  • Links work once and expire. The first answer wins, and the request is deleted as soon as the agent picks it up, or after 24 hours.
  • No polling. enclave wait holds a live Convex subscription and wakes up the moment the answer lands.

Using a secret without seeing it

sh
enclave run KEY="OpenAI API key/key" sh -c 'curl -s https://api.openai.com/v1/models -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY"'

run works like env, except the values come from the vault, and anywhere one shows up in the command's output it's replaced with [hidden KEY]. Quote the command so your own shell doesn't expand $KEY first.

To type a password into a login form, pipe it straight into whatever does the typing: enclave get Netflix password | <typer>. A field named totp holds a 2FA setup key, and enclave get GitHub totp gives its current 6-digit code.

Passkeys

A field named passkey holds a passkey, and the agent signs in with it in Chrome without ever seeing its key:

sh
enclave passkey GitHub    # then click the site's passkey sign-in

enclave passkey arms the passkey for one sign-in, for up to 5 minutes. When the site asks for a passkey, enclave's Chrome extension hands the request to enclave sign, which signs it inside the vault and disarms the passkey. The private key never leaves the vault: enclave get and enclave run refuse passkey fields.

A passkey keeps working in Proton Pass and enclave side by side.

Install the extension once per machine, with Google Chrome on Linux, from a clone of this repo at the release the vault runs. Every release is tagged v<version>. It's force-installed through Chrome's policy, so it loads in every profile:

sh
git clone https://github.com/AVGVSTVS96/enclave && cd enclavegit checkout "v$(enclave --version)"extension/install                   # signs with that release on this machine, through npx

or with a vault on another machine:

sh
git checkout "v$(ssh my-server enclave --version)"extension/install ssh my-server enclave sign

Bring your Proton Pass vault

sh
enclave import proton            # every vaultenclave import proton Work       # or just the ones you name

copies Proton Pass in through pass-cli: logins, 2FA, passkeys, notes, cards, SSH keys and custom fields, one item per Proton item, named by its title. Proton keeps everything. Run it again to bring in what changed: names stay the same, renames follow, items deleted in Proton leave enclave too, and anything you saved yourself is kept. A value you save over one of Proton's stays until that field changes in Proton.

2FA comes in as a totp field, so enclave get <name> totp gives the current code, and passkeys as a passkey field.

CLI

sh
npm install -g enclave-link      # or run any of these with npx -y enclave-link
CommandDoes
enclave ask <name> [field…]Prints a link asking for <name>. Fields default to password.
enclave wait <name>Waits for the answer and saves it. Exits 1 if the link expires first.
enclave run VAR=<name>/<field>… <command…>Runs a command with secrets in its environment, hidden in its output.
enclave get <name> <field>Prints a saved value, for a pipe or $(…).
enclave save <name> <field>Saves a value piped in, like a token the agent just made, without it passing through the chat.
enclave passkey <name> [field]Arms a saved passkey for the next sign-in on its site, through the extension.
enclave signSigns a passkey request (JSON on stdin) with an armed passkey. The extension runs it.
enclave import proton [vault…]Copies Proton Pass in through pass-cli: every vault, or the ones named.
enclave list [search]Saved names and their fields, never values. A search matches names and websites.
enclave rm <name>Deletes a saved item.
enclave mcpServes the tools below over MCP (stdio).

ENCLAVE_FROM sets the name the page shows ("hex is asking for…"), ENCLAVE_HOME sets where the vault lives (~/.enclave), and ENCLAVE_RELAY points at your own relay.

MCP tools

ToolDoes
request_secretMakes the link. If the client supports URL elicitation, it offers to open the link for the person right there; otherwise it gives the agent the link to send.
wait_for_secretReturns the moment the person taps Send, with the field names it saved.
run_with_secretsRuns a command with secrets in its environment and hides them in the output.
sign_in_with_passkeyArms a saved passkey for the next sign-in on its site, then returns so the agent can click sign in.
list_secretsNames and fields, never values, optionally only those matching a name or website.

There's no tool that returns a secret's value.

SDK

ts
import { vault } from "enclave-link"
const { url, wait } = await vault.ask("Netflix", ["email", "password"])// send url to the personawait wait()
await vault.run(["sh", "-c", 'curl -u "$EMAIL:$PASSWORD" https://example.com'], {  EMAIL: "Netflix/email",  PASSWORD: "Netflix/password",})

vault reads ENCLAVE_FROM, ENCLAVE_HOME and ENCLAVE_RELAY. For anything else, openVault({ from, home, relay, store }) makes one of your own. It also has get, list and remove, the same as the CLI.

Answers are saved to ~/.enclave by default. To keep them somewhere else, pass a store: any object with get, put, remove and names, like your own database. For a one-time answer that's never written to disk, keep it in memory:

ts
const answers = new Map()const oneTime = openVault({  store: {    get: async (name) => answers.get(name),    put: async (name, item) => void answers.set(name, item),    remove: async (name) => void answers.delete(name),    names: async () => [...answers.keys()],  },})

Security

The encryption is HPKE (RFC 9180) with X25519, HKDF-SHA256 and AES-128-GCM, built on the browser's own Web Crypto with no libraries, and tested against the RFC's test vectors. Answers are padded, so the relay can't even tell how long a password is.

The vault keeps each item encrypted in ~/.enclave/items, sealed to the vault's own key in ~/.enclave/key.json and bound to the item's name. The item files are safe to back up anywhere. The key is what unlocks them, so treat it like an SSH key.

What enclave can't protect against:

  • Whoever runs the relay sends you the page. Your browser downloads the page, including the code that locks your password, from the relay each time you open a link. What the relay stores can't be read, but if someone took over the relay's Convex account, they could change the page to copy what you type before locking it. The page's script is 128 lines in page/page.ts plus the encryption in src/hpke.ts, served as one file with a strict Content Security Policy, so you can read exactly what it runs. If you'd rather trust nobody's relay, host your own.
  • Anyone with the link can answer it first. They still can't read anything, but they could send a fake answer. If that happens, the page says "This link doesn't work anymore" when you open it.
  • Phishing. A link can say anyone is asking. Only send secrets to agents you asked for help.
  • An agent that wants to see a secret can. enclave keeps secrets out of the chat and out of tool results, and run hides their exact values in output. But an agent with a shell on the same computer could still read its own vault. enclave stops secrets from leaking by accident, not a model that's trying.

Host your own

The relay is a Convex app, so self-hosting is a few commands, on Convex's cloud or the open-source Convex backend:

sh
git clone https://github.com/AVGVSTVS96/enclave && cd enclavenpm installnpm run dev -- --once    # sign in to Convex and create your projectnpm run deploy

Then point agents at it with ENCLAVE_RELAY=https://<your-deployment>.convex.cloud.

Themes

The page comes in two themes, both following the system's light or dark mode:

  • ledger (the default): calm and white. A highlighter marks what's readable, and a small ledger shows who holds the secret: you, the relay, or your agent.
  • field: the whole screen is one color. After you send, a track shows where it went, and a used link turns gray.

Pick one, and optionally one color, when you deploy:

sh
ENCLAVE_THEME=field ENCLAVE_COLOR=#ff4a2e npm run deploy

ENCLAVE_COLOR is ledger's highlight or field's background, and text on it switches between white and ink to stay readable. To make your own theme, copy page/themes/ledger.css and point ENCLAVE_THEME at your file. A theme is plain CSS over the page's fixed markup, and any fonts or images it links to get built into the page, which loads nothing from anywhere else.

Develop

sh
npm run dev      # builds the page and runs a Convex dev deploymentnpm run check    # typecheck and testsnpm run build    # bundles the CLI, SDK and types into dist/npm version 0.3.0  # a release: sets every version, commits and makes the signed tag v0.3.0
PathWhat's there
convex/The relay: requests, rate limits and two HTTP routes, in 154 lines
page/The page people see and its two themes, built into one HTML file by scripts/page.ts
src/hpke.tsThe encryption, shared by the page and the agent
src/vault.tsask, wait, get, run and the rest of the SDK
src/mcp.tsThe MCP server
src/passkey.tsSigning a passkey sign-in
extension/The Chrome extension that sends passkey requests to enclave sign
src/proton.tsReading a Proton Pass vault, passkeys included
skills/enclave/The Agent Skill

License

MIT

Source: README.md at commit fac1e03

Tools

5

request_secret

Ask for a secret

Use this whenever you need a password, API key, 2FA key or other secret from the person, instead of asking in chat. It returns a one-time link; what they type there is locked in their browser for this vault. Then call wait_for_secret.

Parametersnamerequiredfields

wait_for_secret

Wait for a secret

Wait until the person sends the secret from request_secret, then save it to the vault. It returns the moment they tap Send. After 25 minutes it returns so you can call it again, and the link stays open for 24 hours.

Parametersnamerequired

run_with_secrets

Run a command with secrets

Run a program with saved secrets in its environment. Their values are replaced with [hidden VAR] in the output, so you can use a secret without seeing it. A "totp" field gives its current 2FA code. Example: {"command": ["sh", "-c", "curl -H \"Authorization: Bearer $KEY\" https://api.example.com/me"], "secrets": {"KEY": "Example/api key"}}

Parameterscommandrequiredsecretsrequired

sign_in_with_passkey

Sign in with a passkey

Let the browser sign in once with a saved passkey, in the next 5 minutes. Call it, then click the site's passkey sign-in: enclave's browser extension asks the vault to sign, and the passkey's key stays in the vault.

Parametersnamerequiredfield

list_secrets

List saved secrets

List what's saved in the vault: names and their fields, not their values. Check here before asking the person for something.

Parameterssearch

Version history

2
  1. v0.2.13LatestNov 4, 2026
  2. v0.2.6Nov 3, 2026

Score

90% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listedRequired15 pts
  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts