Cloud Pathfinder

io.github.Baneado98Published by GitHub account Baneado98v0.1.0Updated Oct 24, 2026

IaC attack-path auditor: finds internet-to-crown-jewel chains in Terraform/CFN/K8s.

Overview

AI-generated overview

A hosted IaC attack-path auditor that lets an assistant trace internet-to-crown-jewel chains in Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes and similar templates.

What you can do
Audit infrastructure-as-code: submit a map of files or a single source blob and get a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict, risk score and counts of attack paths, crown jewels and misconfigurations, with formats auto-detected per file and analyzed together across AWS, GCP and Azure resources and Kubernetes manifests. Compare two states: diff a before and after tree to see which internet-to-crown-jewel chains a change introduces, eliminates or aggravates, with a gate verdict. Request SARIF 2.1.0 output for GitHub code scanning, with code flows anchored to file and line. Deep results, when paid for, add full multi-hop chains, per-hop file:line evidence, IAM privilege-escalation reachability
When to use it
Use it when reviewing infrastructure-as-code and you want to know whether a declared configuration actually connects the public internet to data stores, secrets or admin roles, rather than just flagging single misconfigured resources. It suits pull-request gating and pre-merge review of Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, CDK, Pulumi or Bicep changes.
Requirements
A remote MCP endpoint; the README also documents an npm client that is only a thin HTTP caller, so analysis always runs on the hosted service and nothing works offline. No key is needed for the free tier, which is rate-limited to 30 requests per hour per IP. Deep analysis is opt-in and paid: a prepaid key sent as an Authorization Bearer header or the CLOUD_PATHFINDER_KEY variable, or per-call USDC payment over x402.
Before you install
Your infrastructure-as-code text is sent to a third-party hosted service; the README says it is processed in memory and not stored or logged, but it does leave your machine. Deep chains, evidence and remediation require payment, either a prepaid key or per-call USDC settled on Base, so costs can accrue. Findings are heuristic static analysis of declared templates, not a live cloud assessment, and should be treated as leads rather than guarantees.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Cloud Pathfinder in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Web executable via Streamable HTTP. Remote servers run from the web runtime once configured in a workspace.

Use with an agent

Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or another agent — or into SourceWeft chat. The agent reads this server's install guide, shows you its publisher, endpoint and sign-in, and adds it to your client once you agree. Keys never go into a command.

Read https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.Baneado98%2Fcloud-pathfinder/install.md and connect the MCP server it describes to my client. Before changing any config, show me its publisher, endpoint and sign-in method and wait for my OK. Never put an API key in a command or in a file I would commit; ask me where it should come from.

Read the install guide the agent follows

Other MCP clients

Add this to your client's mcpServers config.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cloud-pathfinder": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

README

cloud-pathfinder 🛰️

[License: MIT] [MCP Registry] [npm] [Pay] [SARIF]

Attack-path auditor for Infrastructure-as-Code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, CDK, Pulumi, Bicep/ARM. Not a linter. It parses your IaC into a resource graph, resolves cross-resource (and cross-file) relationships, and searches for the multi-hop chains from the public internet to your crown jewels (data stores, secrets, admin). It returns a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict and the concrete route an attacker would walk.

Example chain it finds: open security group (SSH 0.0.0.0/0) → EC2 instance-profile role → iam:PassRole privilege escalation to admin → S3 exfiltration

Available as an MCP server (Claude, Cursor, any MCP agent) and a pay-per-call x402 API (autonomous AI agents with a wallet).


🔐 Privacy & data model (read this first)

Sending your IaC to a third party is sensitive — so here is exactly what happens:

  • Your IaC is never stored and never logged. Every audit runs in memory on the hosted service and is discarded when the response is sent. No database of your templates, no retention, no analytics on file contents.
  • What is sent: only the IaC text you pass (the files map or source blob). Nothing is read from your machine, your cloud account, or your credentials — cloud-pathfinder never touches a live cloud (see "honest limits" below). There are no cloud keys to provide because it analyzes the declared templates only.
  • Free tier vs deep tier — both run server-side, here's why and what differs:
    • The thin npm client ships zero analysis logic (no graph engine, no IAM privesc knowledge base). It is a pure HTTP caller. So even the free verdict + counts are computed on the hosted service, then your IaC is dropped. This is the honest tradeoff that keeps the moat off your machine — we say so plainly rather than claim a fake "100% local" mode.
    • Deep analysis is strictly opt-in (deep: true, behind payment). Only then are the full chains, file:line evidence and remediation returned. You send the same IaC either way — nothing extra leaves your machine for the deep tier.

Hosted service: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app — all analysis runs server-side. This npm package is a thin MCP client: it sends the IaC text to the hosted endpoint and renders the verdict. No analysis logic ships to your machine.


⚡ How it works (30 seconds)

  1. Your MCP agent calls audit_iac_attack_paths { files: { "main.tf": "..." } }.
  2. The thin client POSTs the IaC text to https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app.
  3. The hosted engine builds a typed resource graph, runs a BFS from an INTERNET node to every data store / secret / admin sink, and resolves IAM privilege-escalation reachability along each hop — in memory.
  4. The IaC is discarded; nothing is persisted.
  5. The deep tier returns every full chain with per-hop file:line evidence; the free tier returns the verdict, score and counts.

The npm tarball contains only the HTTP caller — so nothing, free or deep, runs offline. Without the server it degrades to a clear network error.


🆚 Why this isn't a linter (and why a local one can't replace it)

A linter flags resources one at a time: "this SG is open", "this role is broad". cloud-pathfinder reasons about how those facts connect — work a per-file local tool structurally cannot do:

CapabilityLocal lintercloud-pathfinder
Flag one open SG / one broad role✅✅
Graph — which SG attaches to which instance, which role it assumes, what it reads❌✅
Reachability BFS internet → crown jewel, full multi-hop chain + file:line❌✅
IAM privilege-escalation KB (20+ primitives: PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion…)❌✅
Multi-cloud — AWS / GCP / Azure in one graph❌✅
Choke-point analysis (the one hop that, fixed, cuts the most paths)❌✅
Diff mode — what a PR INTRODUCES / ELIMINATES / AGGRAVATES❌✅
Kubernetes LB/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin SA → Secret❌✅
SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning (inline chains on the Security tab)❌✅
  • 🔗 Graph, not lint. Builds a typed resource graph and resolves the real relationships across files and clouds.
  • 🧭 Reachability search. BFS from INTERNET to every data store / secret / admin sink, returning the full multi-hop chain with per-hop file:line evidence.
  • 👑 IAM privilege-escalation knowledge base. Knows AWS managed-policy permissions and 20+ privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole+RunInstances, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachRolePolicy, SSM SendCommand, UpdateFunctionCode, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy…).
  • ☸️ Kubernetes attack surface. LoadBalancer/NodePort exposure → privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork pods, cluster-admin ServiceAccounts, and mounted Secrets.

Formats are auto-detected per file and analyzed together — mix .tf, CloudFormation .yaml/.json and Kubernetes manifests in one call.


🚀 Quickstart — add it to your MCP client

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "cloud-pathfinder": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "cloud-pathfinder-mcp"] }  }}

No key needed for the free tier. Restart your client and the audit_iac_attack_paths + diff_attack_paths tools appear. (Remote server: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp.)

Tool: audit_iac_attack_paths

jsonc
{  "files": {    "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" \"web\" { ingress { ... cidr_blocks = [\"0.0.0.0/0\"] } } ...",    "k8s.yaml": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\n..."  }  // or: "source": "<a single IaC blob>", "filename": "main.tf"}

Example — input → output

audit_iac_attack_paths { "files": { "main.tf": "<SG open to 0.0.0.0/0 on 22 +                          EC2 with instance-profile role that can s3:* + iam:PassRole>" } }
→ FREE:  verdict: BREACHABLE · risk 86/100 · 1 attack path · 1 crown jewel · 3 misconfigs
→ DEEP (deep:true):  verdict: BREACHABLE   PATH #1 (internet → admin):     [1] INTERNET → aws_security_group.web   (main.tf:4  — ingress 22 from 0.0.0.0/0)     [2] → aws_instance.app                  (main.tf:19 — attaches sg web)     [3] → aws_iam_role.app_role             (main.tf:31 — instance profile)     [4] → iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances   (privesc → launch instance as admin role)     [5] → s3:* on aws_s3_bucket.data        (main.tf:52 — exfiltration sink)   CHOKE POINT: tighten main.tf:4 ingress → cuts this entire path.   FIX: restrict ingress CIDR; split the role; add a permissions boundary.

The free tier returns the verdict, risk score, and the counts (how many attack paths, crown jewels and misconfigurations). The deep tier returns every full chain with hops, file:line evidence, privilege-escalation reachability and remediation.

Tool: diff_attack_paths — the CI/CD gate

Give it the IaC before and after a change (a PR's base and head trees) and it reports exactly what the change did to your attack surface: which internet→crown-jewel chains it INTRODUCES, which it ELIMINATES, and which it AGGRAVATES — with an INTRODUCES_BREACH / REDUCES_RISK / NEUTRAL / MIXED verdict.

jsonc
{  "before": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 10.0.0.0/16..." } },  "after":  { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 0.0.0.0/0..." } }  // deep: true → full introduced/eliminated chains + before→after exploitability + which choke points now matter}

A per-file linter or a single-state scan cannot answer this: it needs the full graph

  • privesc reachability on both states and a semantic cross-state path match. HTTP: POST /diff (free, counts only) / POST /pro/diff (deep).

Free HTTP API

http
POST /auditContent-Type: application/json
{ "files": { "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" ..." } }

Rate-limited to 30 requests/hour/IP. For unlimited/commercial/deep use, call /pro/audit.

Input formats: Terraform / OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Kustomize, Pulumi (TS/JS/Python), Bicep/ARM, and AWS CDK — both the synthesized cdk.out/*.template.json and the un-synthed CDK program (TypeScript + Python), so a CI gate runs on the PR diff before cdk synth.


SARIF 2.1.0 → GitHub code scanning

Add ?format=sarif (or { "format": "sarif" }) to /audit, /pro/audit, /diff or /pro/diff to get SARIF 2.1.0 you can upload to GitHub code scanning — every attack chain shows up inline on the PR's Security tab.

  • Each chain is one SARIF result with a codeFlow (a step-through walk: internet → SG → instance role → privesc → S3), anchored to the IaC file:line, plus security-severity/CVSS so the badge colors correctly.
  • The diff SARIF only fails the check on introduced/aggravated routes (error-level); eliminated/eased land as note.
  • The free tier returns a redacted-but-schema-valid SARIF (counts only — no chains, no code-flows, no route file:line); the full code-flows are premium.
yaml
# .github/workflows/cloud-pathfinder.yml (sketch)- run: curl -s -X POST "$CPF/pro/diff?format=sarif" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \       --data @payload.json -o cloud-pathfinder.sarif- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3  with: { sarif_file: cloud-pathfinder.sarif }

💳 Unlock /pro — two ways to pay (dual-pay)

The deep /pro/audit returns the full attack chains, per-hop evidence, privilege-escalation analysis and remediation. Two payment lanes coexist:

LaneForHow
💳 Card (Stripe)Humans / teamsBuy a prepaid key at /pro/checkout, then send Authorization: Bearer <key> (or set CLOUD_PATHFINDER_KEY).
🪙 x402 (USDC)AI agents with a walletPay $0.30 per call automatically. Settles on Base. No signup, no key.
http
POST /pro/audit          # 402 (shows BOTH lanes) → pay → result

What it catches (selected)

ClassDetail
Public → role → dataOpen SG on a sensitive port (SSH/RDP/DB) → instance role that can read S3/Dynamo/RDS/Secrets → exfiltration
IAM privilege escalationiam:PassRole+ec2:RunInstances, iam:CreatePolicyVersion, iam:AttachRolePolicy, ssm:SendCommand, wildcard * on *, and ~15 more
Public data storespublicly_accessible = true RDS, world-open buckets
KubernetesLoadBalancer/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin ServiceAccount → Secret
CloudFormation!Ref/!GetAtt intrinsics resolved; ManagedPolicyArns/inline policies analyzed

How it stays honest

The premium engine and knowledge base never ship in the npm package — the published client is a thin renderer that calls the hosted analysis service. The free tier is genuinely useful (verdict + counts); the deep chains, evidence and privesc analysis are server-side behind payment.

Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC, not a live cloud assessment. It reasons over what the templates declare (no runtime SCP/permissions-boundary/condition evaluation). Treat findings as prioritized leads, not a guarantee.

MIT · github.com/Baneado98/cloud-pathfinder

Source: README.md at commit 0ab62b7

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Version history

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  1. v0.1.0LatestSep 16, 2026

Score

85% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 daysRequired25 pts
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  • Tools listedRequired15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

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