
Valta
io.github.Billionaire664Published by GitHub account Billionaire664v0.1.2Updated Oct 24, 2026
Financial governance for AI agents — spend gates and audit trail exposed as MCP tools.
The publisher's own server: Valta
Overview
Valta is a local MCP server that exposes Valta's hosted spend-gate and audit-trail API, letting an assistant check wallet balances, request or proxy spend, and,
- What you can do
- Read wallet balances, limits, wallets, agents, policies and the hash-chained audit trail of spend decisions. Request spend authorization, create wallets with limits, transfer USDC between your own agent wallets, and freeze or unfreeze an agent's wallet. Create spending policies with daily and per-transaction caps. Run agents and check the status of agent runs. Route real outbound calls to Stripe, Serper or Polygon through a spend-gated proxy and list the resulting receipts.
- When to use it
- Use it when an assistant needs to work with Valta's financial governance for AI agents: checking balances and limits, requesting or gating spend, managing wallets and policies, or reviewing an audit trail. The proxy tool is the only one that enforces a check in code, and only for the services Valta has wired up.
- Requirements
- Runs locally over stdio, typically via npx or a global npm install, so Node.js is needed. A Valta account and an API key from the Valta dashboard, supplied as the VALTA_API_KEY environment variable. Network access to Valta's hosted API.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Valta in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
valta-mcp
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for Valta — financial governance for AI agents. Exposes Valta's spend gate and audit trail as MCP tools, so any MCP-compatible client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, and others) can call them directly.
What this is — and isn't
This server is a thin wrapper over Valta's real, hosted REST API. It does not implement any spend logic, limits, or hashing itself — every tool call here is a pass-through to https://valta.co/api/v1/..., where the actual enforcement (spend gate, audit chain) happens. This repo is the protocol adapter, not the enforcement engine.
Important, read before relying on this for anything security-sensitive: most of these tools are advisory, not enforcing. A tool description telling a model "call this before spending" is guidance, not a guarantee. valta_request_spend, for example, only governs spend that routes through it — it does not intercept or prevent spending that happens through some other tool, API, or webhook the agent has independent access to.
One tool is different: valta_proxy_request. Instead of asking the model to check in before spending elsewhere, this one is the spend — the agent declares an outbound call's cost and routes the actual call through Valta, which checks it against wallet limits and only makes the real request (using your own stored credential) if approved. If it's blocked, the real provider is never contacted at all. This is a genuine, code-level guarantee, not an honor system — but only for the specific services Valta has wired up for proxying (currently: Stripe, Serper, Polygon). Any spend that happens through a channel other than this proxy — the agent's own separate API key, a webhook, a tool this server doesn't know about — is outside what any of these tools can see or stop. See Design notes below.
Install
Or run directly without installing:
Configuration
Get an API key at valta.co/dashboard → Settings → API Keys → Create key.
Add to your MCP client's config (e.g. Claude Desktop's claude_desktop_config.json):
Tools
Every tool's description in src/index.ts states plainly what it enforces and what it doesn't — read those before wiring this into anything that touches real money.
Design notes
Why there's no "non-bypassable system prompt." An earlier draft of this project considered shipping a system-prompt instruction block claiming to make spend gating "non-bypassable." That claim doesn't hold up, for two reasons:
- MCP servers don't control the host's system prompt. Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, and other hosts each own their own system prompt. An MCP server provides tools and, in some cases, a limited
instructionsfield — it cannot inject a binding, universally-enforced rule into the conversation. - A system prompt is a request to the model, not a code-level constraint. Even where a host does surface server instructions, an agent can still be prompt-injected, jailbroken, or simply routed through a different tool entirely that doesn't call this server at all. Claiming otherwise would be exactly the kind of gap this project exists to close — trusting the model to self-police is the failure mode Valta's spend gate was built to avoid in the first place.
What actually provides a guarantee, and what doesn't. There are now two different levels of enforcement in this server, and it matters which one a given tool gives you:
- Spend authorized by calling
valta_request_spendis genuinely checked against real limits, server-side — but only if the agent chooses to call it first. The gap is spend that happens through some other channel the agent has access to. - Spend routed through
valta_proxy_requestis checked before the real call is made at all — there's no step where the agent could skip the check and still have the payment go through, because the payment-triggering call and the check are the same action. That closes the gap described above, but only for the services this server has wired up for proxying (Stripe, Serper, Polygon as of this writing) — extending it to a new service means adding real credential-handling logic for that provider's specific auth scheme, not flipping a config flag.
If a use case needs a hard guarantee for a service not yet listed above, that service needs to be added to Valta's proxy gate first — open an issue or a PR.
License
MIT.
Source: README.md at commit fe0b1bd
Tools
0Version history
1- v0.1.2LatestSep 16, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts