rekey

io.github.Ezra-BlackPublished by GitHub account Ezra-Blackv0.1.0Updated Nov 1, 2026

Rotate API keys across AWS, GitLab, Cloudflare, OpenAI & more. Secrets never reach the model.

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Server details

Identifier: io.github.Ezra-Black/rekey
Transport: STDIO
Runtime: Desktop only
Trust: Verified
Published: Oct 18, 2026

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Overview

AI-generated overview

Local CLI and MCP server that rotates API keys and tokens across providers, delivering new secrets to configured destinations without exposing them to the…

What you can do: List providers, check credentials and key-management access, and list keys (read-only, enabled by default)
Rotate a key, delivering the new secret only to consumers defined in the config file (requires --allow-rotate)
Retire or deactivate an old key, refusing the server's own login key (requires --allow-retire)
Secrets are never returned to the client; credentials come from the environment or saved logins
When to use it: Useful when you want an assistant to help with routine credential rotation across providers such as AWS, GitLab, Cloudflare, Datadog, npm, Docker Hub, OpenAI, Twilio or SendGrid, with new keys pushed into .env files, GitHub Actions secrets, AWS SSM, files or the OS keychain.
Requirements: Runs as a local process (cargo install rekey or prebuilt binaries) on macOS, Linux or Windows. Provider credentials come from environment variables (for example GITLAB_TOKEN, CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN, OPENAI_ADMIN_KEY) or saved logins in the OS keychain. Some providers need external CLIs: aws, npm, and gh for GitHub Actions secrets. Rotation tools must be enabled with --allow-rotate and --allow-retire.

Before you install

Rotation is destructive: atomic providers revoke the old token immediately and it cannot be undone, and --delete-old-now deletes the old key right after delivery. If all deliveries fail, the secret is written to a rescue file. The server holds admin-level credentials for the accounts it manages, so grant only the scopes you need and review the config's consumers before enabling rotate.

Installation

In SourceWeft

Open rekey in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

rekey

Rotate API keys and tokens across providers from one CLI: mint the new key, push it to everything that uses it, verify it, retire the old one. Includes an MCP server.

Only touches accounts you administer — every provider acts with your own credential.

CLI — rotate a GitLab token straight into a .env file:

[rekey rotating a GitLab token from the CLI]

MCP — Claude rotating the same token through rekey mcp; the secret never reaches the model:

[Claude rotating a GitLab token via the rekey MCP server]

Install

Prebuilt binaries for macOS, Linux and Windows: Releases.

Or with Rust (stable):

OS keychain support (macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service) is built in.

Quick start

Practice on a throwaway GitLab token first. Every command below is safe to copy; replace 28550311 with your own ids from step 3.

1. Make a throwaway token to rotate. In GitLab → Access tokens, create a token named kr-test (any scope).

2. Log in. Opens GitLab's token page with the name and api scope pre-filled. Click Create token, paste it back (input is hidden).

Checking with GitLab…✓ Logged in to GitLab as @you. Saved to your macOS Keychain.  rekey now works from any terminal — nothing to export.

Checking with GitLab…✓ Logged in to GitLab as @you. Saved to your macOS Keychain.  rekey now works from any terminal — nothing to export.

3. Find the key id.

4. Rotate it into a .env file. rekey shows the plan and waits for you.

Here's what will happen:  1. GitLab replaces "kr-test" with a new token and immediately revokes the old one. This can't be undone.  2. The new token is saved to KR_TEST_TOKEN in /tmp/kr-test.env.  3. rekey checks that the new token works.
Go ahead? [Y/n] y
Rotating kr-test…  · Rotating (provider revokes old token immediately)…  · Updating 1 consumer(s)…  · Verifying new token…  ✓ Rotated successfully.
New key id: 28550312Updated: KR_TEST_TOKEN in /tmp/kr-test.envOld token was revoked by the provider.

Here's what will happen:  1. GitLab replaces "kr-test" with a new token and immediately revokes the old one. This can't be undone.  2. The new token is saved to KR_TEST_TOKEN in /tmp/kr-test.env.  3. rekey checks that the new token works.
Go ahead? [Y/n] y
Rotating kr-test…  · Rotating (provider revokes old token immediately)…  · Updating 1 consumer(s)…  · Verifying new token…  ✓ Rotated successfully.
New key id: 28550312Updated: KR_TEST_TOKEN in /tmp/kr-test.envOld token was revoked by the provider.

5. Check and clean up.

Then delete kr-test in GitLab.

For real keys: run rekey rotate gitlab with no arguments — it lets you pick the key and destination and can save that to rekey.toml, so the next rotation is one command. In scripts/CI:

Commands

Command
`login [provider]`	Opens the provider's token page (GitLab: pre-filled), takes the pasted token, verifies it, saves it to the OS keychain. `--url` for self-hosted GitLab / Datadog site. No provider: show status.
`logout <provider>`	Remove saved credentials (doesn't revoke them).
`connect <provider>`	Check credentials and key-management access.
`list <provider>`	List keys. Column 1 is the id other commands take.
`rotate <provider> [id]`	Rotate one key.
`rotate-all <provider>`	Rotate every key that has a destination. Skips the key you're signed in with.
`retire <provider> [id]`	Deactivate (where supported) or delete an old key. `--delete` to delete a deactivated key.
`mcp`	MCP server on stdio.

Global: --config <path>, --no-input (fail instead of prompting). --yes skips confirmation. Omitted args are prompted for in a TTY. Flags go in any order. stdout carries only list output and --print-secret values; everything else is stderr.

Destinations

rotate refuses to start unless the new secret has at least one destination.

Flag	Destination
`--dotenv <path>[:VAR]`	Set `VAR` in a .env file. Default `VAR` per provider; AWS also writes `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`.
`--gh-secret <owner/repo>:<NAME>`	GitHub Actions secret via `gh` (stdin).
`--ssm <name>:<region>`	AWS SSM `SecureString` via `aws` (stdin).
`--secret-file <path>`	File, mode 0600.
`--secret-dir <dir>`	`rotate-all`: one 0600 file per key.
`--keychain`	OS keychain, service `rekey`.
`--print-secret`	stdout.

Repeatable flags: --dotenv, --gh-secret, --ssm. --delete-old-now deletes the old key right after the new one is delivered.

Config

./rekey.toml, then ~/.config/rekey/config.toml. Contains no secrets. Interactive rotate can write entries for you.

toml

[[keys]]provider = "gitlab"name = "ci-deploy"            # match on id, name and/or principalconsumers = [  { type = "dot_env_file", path = ".env", variable = "GITLAB_TOKEN" },  { type = "github_actions_secret", repo = "me/app", secret_name = "GITLAB_TOKEN" },]
[[keys]]provider = "aws"principal = "ci-user"         # IAM user; survives the new key idconsumers = [  { type = "dot_env_file", path = ".env", variable = "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", id_variable = "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID" },  { type = "aws_ssm_parameter", name = "/ci/aws", region = "us-east-1" },]

[[keys]]provider = "gitlab"name = "ci-deploy"            # match on id, name and/or principalconsumers = [  { type = "dot_env_file", path = ".env", variable = "GITLAB_TOKEN" },  { type = "github_actions_secret", repo = "me/app", secret_name = "GITLAB_TOKEN" },]
[[keys]]provider = "aws"principal = "ci-user"         # IAM user; survives the new key idconsumers = [  { type = "dot_env_file", path = ".env", variable = "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", id_variable = "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID" },  { type = "aws_ssm_parameter", name = "/ci/aws", region = "us-east-1" },]

Consumer types: dot_env_file, github_actions_secret, aws_ssm_parameter, file, keychain. Match on name/principal for providers that issue a new id per rotation. Relative paths resolve against the config file. Full example: rekey.toml.example.

Credentials

Lookup order: environment variable → saved login (rekey login) → prompt (TTY only, offers to save). Never taken as flags. Rotating the token rekey signs in with (GitLab, Cloudflare) updates the saved login. REKEY_DISABLE_KEYCHAIN=1 disables keychain reads/writes.

Providers

Provider	Style	Rotates	Credentials	Notes
`aws`	overlap	IAM access keys	`aws` CLI session, `AWS_PROFILE`	Max 2 keys per user; refuses if both exist. Old key → Inactive.
`gitlab`	atomic	Personal access tokens	`GITLAB_TOKEN` (`api` scope), `GITLAB_URL`, `GITLAB_TOKEN_EXPIRY_DAYS`
`cloudflare`	atomic	User API tokens	`CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN` (API Tokens: Edit)	Token id is stable.
`datadog`	overlap	API keys	`DD_API_KEY`, `DD_APP_KEY`, `DD_SITE`	No disabled state.
`npm`	overlap	Classic tokens	`npm` CLI session, `NPM_REGISTRY`	Parses CLI output; granular tokens unsupported.
`dockerhub`	overlap	Personal access tokens	`DOCKERHUB_USERNAME`, `DOCKERHUB_PASSWORD`	New token gets `repo:read`+`repo:write`.
`openai`	overlap	Org admin keys	`OPENAI_ADMIN_KEY`
`anthropic`	manual	—	`ANTHROPIC_ADMIN_KEY`	No create API; `rotate` prints Console steps, `retire` deactivates.
`twilio`	overlap	Standard API keys	`TWILIO_ACCOUNT_SID`, `TWILIO_AUTH_TOKEN`, `TWILIO_API_USER`
`sendgrid`	overlap	API keys	`SENDGRID_API_KEY`	Copies scopes from the old key.
`github-app`	ephemeral	Installation tokens	`GITHUB_APP_ID`, `GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH` or `GITHUB_APP_PRIVATE_KEY`	~1h tokens; nothing to revoke.

AWS needs the aws CLI, npm needs npm, --gh-secret needs gh.

Want another provider? Request it.

Rotation semantics

Style	Sequence	Failure handling
overlap	create → verify → deliver → deactivate old → (delete old)	Verify fails or all deliveries fail: new key deleted, nothing changed. Some deliveries fail: both keys stay live, exit 1.
atomic	rotate (old revoked by provider) → deliver → verify	Irreversible. All deliveries fail: secret written to `rekey-rescue-*.secret` (0600).
ephemeral	mint → verify → deliver	Old token expires on its own.
manual	—	Prints manual steps.

Without --delete-old-now, an old key with no disabled state stays active; the output gives the retire command. Exit code is non-zero whenever something needs attention.

MCP

Tool	Enabled by
`list_providers`, `check_connection`, `list_keys`	default	Read-only.
`rotate_key`	`--allow-rotate`	Delivers only to consumers in your config. No destination args.
`retire_key`	`--allow-retire`	Refuses the server's own login key.

Secret values are never returned to the client. Credentials come from the environment or saved logins. On macOS, allow Keychain access once after installing a new build.

Security

Secrets go to subprocesses via stdin, never argv.
Files rekey creates are 0600; existing .env permissions are kept; writes are atomic.
Secret values are printed only with --print-secret.
Report vulnerabilities privately via the repo's Security tab.

Contributing

New provider or feature: open an issue.
Code: see CONTRIBUTING.md. A provider is one file implementing the Connector trait.

Credits

Built by Ezra Black — ezrablack.dev.

License

MIT

Source: README.md at commit fe1ab58

Tools

SourceWeft has not started this package in its sandbox yet, so its tools are not known.

Version history

v0.1.0LatestOct 18, 2026

Score

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rekey

Overview

Installation

In SourceWeft

Other MCP clients

README

rekey

Install

Quick start

Commands

Destinations

Config

Credentials

Providers

Rotation semantics

MCP

Security

Contributing

Links

Credits

License

Tools

Version history

Score