@guardbee/mcp-agent-graph-auditor
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[License: MIT]
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server that builds a reachability graph across a multi-agent orchestration and finds transitive excessive agency — an agent that was never directly given a dangerous tool, but can still reach one through another agent it's allowed to delegate to.
mcp-server-auditor catches an MCP server whose own tool grants shell/eval/SQL access directly. ai-code-scanner catches a single agent's tool list containing execute_command. Both of those are one hop: agent → tool. Multi-agent frameworks add a second kind of edge — delegation, group chat, function-execution routing — and a "safe-looking" agent with only a web_search tool can become dangerous the moment it's allowed to hand work off to a coworker that holds a shell tool. That two-hop path is invisible to a scanner that only looks at one agent's own tool list at a time.
Telemetry is off by default. With GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1 it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields like content, token or password are replaced with a placeholder. See @guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
How the graph is built
- Extract. Framework-specific regex extractors pull agent/tool nodes and relationship edges out of the source:
has_tool (an agent's own toolset), delegates_to (CrewAI allow_delegation, LangGraph add_edge), group_member (AutoGen GroupChat co-membership — any member's output can be routed to any other by the manager), executes_via (AutoGen register_function's caller/executor split).
- Classify. Every tool node is checked against a name-based capability catalog (code execution, process execution, filesystem write, network, credentials access) — the same kind of heuristic
ai-code-scanner's excessive-agency pattern uses, just applied to a graph of tools instead of one server's tool list.
- Reach. A breadth-first search runs from every agent node. A capability tool reached via a straight
has_tool edge is a direct finding (still reported — useful even without a second agent in the picture). A capability tool reached only after crossing at least one delegates_to/group_member/executes_via edge is transitive — the finding this package exists for — and is always reported as critical, regardless of the tool's own base severity, because the agent holding it was never audited for it directly.
LangGraph is the most reliable target: add_node/add_edge calls are the orchestration graph in the source, no inference needed. CrewAI and AutoGen require inferring delegation from framework semantics (allow_delegation, GroupChat membership) rather than an explicit edge in the code, so treat those as heuristic — see Limitations below.
Features
- 3 frameworks: LangGraph (structural), CrewAI (heuristic), AutoGen/ag2 (heuristic)
- 7 capability rules across 5 categories (code-execution, process-execution, filesystem-write, network, credentials-access)
- Distinguishes direct (single-agent) from transitive (delegation-crossing) excessive agency — the transitive case is what no single-agent scanner in this monorepo catches
- Multi-hop aware — a 3+ agent delegation chain is found the same way a 2-agent one is
- SARIF 2.1.0 output — CI/CD integration (GitHub Code Scanning, etc.)
- Config file support via
guardbee.yml
- 31 unit tests, plus end-to-end verification against realistic fixtures for all three frameworks
Quick Start
Claude Desktop / MCP Client
CLI (CI/CD)
MCP Tools
Example
researcher never holds shell_tool — but allow_delegation=True plus co-membership in the same Crew as ops means it can hand work off to an agent that does. This scanner reports:
writer — no tools, no delegation — gets no finding at all.
Configuration (guardbee.yml)
Limitations (by design)
- Single-file scope. Each file's graph is extracted independently — Python variable references don't resolve across files. A
Crew(agents=[researcher, ops]) call will only connect to Agent(...) definitions found in the same file, even when scanning a whole directory.
- CrewAI/AutoGen extraction is heuristic, not a real Python parser — constructor bodies are captured with a bounded text window rather than exact paren-matching (the same tradeoff
ai-code-scanner's pattern-window matching makes), and it doesn't track reassignment, conditional agent construction, or dynamically built tool lists.
- AutoGen's
speaker_selection_method isn't modeled — GroupChat co-membership is always treated as a bidirectional reachability edge, which is the conservative (over-inclusive, not under-inclusive) assumption.
- Capability classification is name-based. A tool named
search_tool that secretly shells out internally won't be flagged; a tool named shell_tool_disabled will be. Review findings; don't take them as ground truth.
- Only Python source is scanned in v1 — LangChain/LangGraph's JS/TS API isn't covered yet.
Development
License
MIT — GuardBee
Feedback
Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.