Mcp Config Auditor

io.github.GuardBeePublished by GitHub account GuardBeev0.9.0Updated Nov 3, 2026

Scans Cursor/Claude/Windsurf/VS Code MCP configs for unpinned versions, secrets, typosquats

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Overview

AI-generated overview

Audits MCP client configs and agent SKILL.md files on a machine for unpinned packages, secrets, typosquats, wildcard auto-approve and shadow MCP servers.

What you can do
  • Scan MCP client config text or a single config file for unpinned packages, secrets, typosquats, wildcard auto-approve and unauthenticated remote endpoints
  • Scan agent SKILL.md files for unrestricted allowed-tools, instruction overrides, credential file reads and literal secrets
  • Scan a directory for mcp.json, mcp_config.json, claude_desktop_config.json and SKILL.md, and compare skill names for collisions
  • Compare a supplied tool inventory across servers to detect tool shadowing, confusable names and redirects
  • Discover installed servers in well-known host config paths and flag ones missing from an organization allowlist
  • List the host config paths checked and the available check patterns with…
When to use it
Useful when you want an assistant to review the MCP setup on a developer machine or fleet before trusting it: checking configs for risky launchers, embedded credentials or over-broad auto-approval, auditing agent skills, or finding servers installed outside an organization allowlist.
Requirements
Runs locally over stdio, typically via npx with the published npm package. No account, API key or environment variable is required for scanning. Optional features need a GuardBee dashboard workspace key in GUARDBEE_API_KEY for uploads, and an allowlist file for shadow-MCP discovery. Network access is needed to download the MCP Index unless the cache is used offline.
Before you install
Scanning is read-only and does not start servers, but the optional upload sends an inventory to the GuardBee dashboard, including host name, OS and OS user name unless the user is excluded. Telemetry is off by default and can be enabled with GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY, which sends tool names, durations and short parameter values such as file paths. Configs and skills may contain credentials; reported matches are redacted, but review what leaves the machine.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Mcp Config Auditor in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

@guardbee/mcp-config-auditor

🇬🇧 English | 🇹🇷 Türkçe | 🇨🇳 中文 | 🇯🇵 日本語 | 🇰🇷 한국어 | 🇧🇷 Português | 🇪🇸 Español | 🇩🇪 Deutsch

[npm version] [npm downloads] [License: MIT]

An MCP server that audits the MCP client config on a machine: Cursor mcp.json, Claude Desktop claude_desktop_config.json, Windsurf mcp_config.json, and VS Code mcp.json.

mcp-server-auditor reads an MCP server's source. This package reads the config that decides which servers an agent will run. It does not start those servers and it does not send the config anywhere.

Telemetry is off by default. With GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1 it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields like content, token or password are replaced with a placeholder. See @guardbee/mcp-telemetry.

Claude ──► mcp-config-auditor ──► mcp.json  (or host-wide discover)              │              ├─ Unpinned package     (npx -y pkg, @latest)              ├─ Typosquat            (one edit from a known server package)              ├─ Secret in env/args              ├─ autoApprove "*"              ├─ Remote HTTP without auth              ├─ Cross-server shadowing (when you pass a tool inventory)              ├─ Agent SKILL.md (allowed-tools, body, lookalike names)              └─ Shadow MCP discover  (OWASP MCP09 — host paths + org allowlist)

Checks

PatternSeverityOWASPWhat it means
unpinned_packagehighMCP04:2025A launcher (npx, uvx, pnpm, yarn, bunx, pipx) runs a package with no major.minor.patch pin
unpinned_container_imagehighMCP04:2025docker run / podman run starts an image by tag, not by @sha256: digest
typosquat_packagecriticalMCP04:2025The package name is one edit from a known MCP server package
secret_in_envcriticalMCP01:2025A credential-shaped value or a sensitive key with a long literal
secret_in_argscriticalMCP01:2025A token on the command line
auto_approve_wildcardcriticalMCP02:2025autoApprove / alwaysAllow is * or true
cleartext_remotehighMCP07:2025A non-loopback http:// URL
unauthenticated_remotehigh/mediumMCP07:2025A non-loopback URL with no Authorization / API-key header and no token env var
cross_server_tool_shadowhighMCP03:2025The same tool name on two servers
confusable_tool_namecriticalMCP03:2025Homoglyph or one-edit tool names across servers
cross_server_tool_redirecthighMCP03:2025A description tells the model to call another server's tool
skill_unrestricted_shellcriticalMCP02:2025allowed-tools includes bare Bash, shell, or *
skill_unrestricted_writehighMCP02:2025allowed-tools includes Write or Edit with no path limit
skill_instruction_overridecriticalMCP06:2025The skill tells the model to ignore prior instructions
skill_covert_instructioncriticalMCP06:2025The skill tells the model to hide its behavior from the user
skill_secret_file_readcriticalMCP01:2025The skill tells the model to read .ssh, .env, or a similar file
skill_at_secret_refcriticalMCP01:2025An @ reference inlines a credential path
secret_in_skillcriticalMCP01:2025A literal token is written in the skill file
skill_name_shadowhighMCP03:2025Two SKILL.md files use the same name
skill_confusable_namecriticalMCP03:2025Two skill names differ only by a lookalike character
shadow_mcp_serverhighMCP09:2025discover — server installed on the host but not on the org allowlist
allowlist_not_configuredmediumMCP09:2025discover ran without an allowlist
unreviewed_mcp_serverlowMCP09:2025Server seen during discover with no allowlist yet
mcp_server_drift_across_clientsmediumMCP09:2025Same server key maps to different packages/URLs in two clients
mcp_index_grade_below_minimumhigh (F: critical)MCP04:2025--min-grade — the server's GuardBee MCP Index grade is below the minimum

Loopback URLs (localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1) are not remote findings. Placeholder values (${API_KEY}, changeme) are not secrets. Reported secret matches are redacted. Bash(git diff:*) is a command allowlist and is not an unrestricted shell. Read alone is not flagged.

Quick start

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "guardbee-mcp-config-auditor": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@guardbee/mcp-config-auditor"]    }  }}
bash
npx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor scan .cursor/mcp.json --fail-on=high --format=sarif > results.sarifnpx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor inventory ./tool-inventory.jsonnpx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor discover --allowlist=./mcp-allowlist.json --fail-on=high

GuardBee MCP Index grades

--grades (on scan <file> and discover) shows the GuardBee MCP Index grade of every configured server: an A–F trust grade for each server in the official MCP Registry, rebuilt weekly from its published package. The grade comes from the shipped code (the GuardBee scanners), known vulnerabilities and malware (OSV), Sigstore build provenance and maintenance signals; the rubric is public and versioned. --min-grade=C also reports every server graded below C (mcp_index_grade_below_minimum, so --fail-on can gate on it).

bash
npx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor discover --min-grade=C#   A  filesystem  npm:@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem  graded @modelcontextprotocol/[email protected]#   D  notes       npm:notes-mcp                                graded [email protected] (the config runs the latest version)#   –  internal    local command: not a registry package

The whole index is downloaded (and cached for a day in ~/.guardbee/mcp-index.json) and searched on this machine, so no server or package name is sent anywhere. --offline uses the cache only; --index-url= points at another copy. Local commands, remote URLs and servers outside the official registry have no grade and are never findings.

Shadow MCP discover (MCP09)

Walks well-known Cursor / Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Windsurf / VS Code / Gemini CLI / Cline / Zed paths on this machine and compares every installed server to an organization allowlist. Does not start servers. Claude Code's per-project servers (projects["<path>"].mcpServers in ~/.claude.json) are listed under claude-code:<path>; Zed's context_servers and JSON with comments are understood.

Inventory. --format=json adds an inventory: for every server its client, config path, name, transport, command and arguments, npm/PyPI package with version and whether it is pinned, URL, the names of its env variables and headers, auto-approve, and the findings for it. It never holds a secret: env and header values are left out, argument values after --token/--api-key-style flags, KEY=value pairs, provider tokens and passwords in connection strings are [redacted], and URLs lose their credentials and query values. --format=text prints the same list; --format=sarif the findings.

Fleet. FLEET.md has Jamf, Intune, systemd and CI recipes. --allowlist-from-dashboard checks against the organization allowlist admins manage in the dashboard (merged with --allowlist when both are given), and --grades adds MCP Index grades to the uploaded inventory.

Organisation-wide. --upload sends the inventory to the GuardBee dashboard (GUARDBEE_API_KEY, a workspace key with the gateway.write scope), which keeps the latest inventory per machine; run it from your device-management tool or a login script. The machine's host name, OS and OS user name are included — --no-user leaves the user out.

bash
GUARDBEE_API_KEY=gb_… npx @guardbee/mcp-config-auditor discover --allowlist=./mcp-allowlist.json --upload --fail-on=none

Allowlist JSON:

json
{  "names": ["filesystem", "github"],  "packages": ["@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "@guardbee/mcp-secret-scanner"],  "hosts": ["mcp.example.com"]}

Or lines: name:filesystem, package:@scope/pkg, host:mcp.example.com, or a bare server name.

A directory scan opens mcp.json, mcp_config.json, claude_desktop_config.json, and SKILL.md. Pass a file path to scan any other name. A file named SKILL.md is audited as an agent skill. Same-name and lookalike skill findings appear on a directory scan, because one file cannot see the others.

guardbee.yml:

yaml
mcp-config-auditor:  fail-on: high  max-files: 5000  exclude:    - "fixtures/"

Tool inventory shape:

json
{  "servers": [    { "name": "github", "tools": [{ "name": "create_issue", "description": "Open an issue" }] }  ]}

Shadowing needs that inventory because a client config does not list tools. rug-pull-detector can collect a live tools/list; this package compares several of those lists.

Feedback

Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.

Source: packages/mcp-config-auditor/README.md at commit 8cc1e03

Tools

8

scan_config_text

Scan an MCP client config JSON string (Cursor mcp.json, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, or VS Code) for unpinned packages, secrets, wildcard auto-approve, unauthenticated remote endpoints, and typosquats.

Parameterslabelcontentrequired

scan_file

Scan one MCP client config file, or a SKILL.md agent skill when the file has that name.

Parameterspathrequired

scan_skill_text

Scan one agent SKILL.md (YAML frontmatter plus body) for unrestricted allowed-tools, instruction override, credential file reads, and literal secrets. Name collisions across skills require a directory scan.

Parameterslabelcontentrequired

scan_directory

Find mcp.json, mcp_config.json, claude_desktop_config.json, and SKILL.md under a directory and audit each one. A directory scan also compares skill names. Does not start any MCP server.

ParameterspathrequiredexcludemaxFiles

scan_inventory

Detect cross-server tool shadowing from an inventory of tool catalogs. Pass the tool names and descriptions already collected from each installed server. This tool does not connect to those servers.

Parametersinventoryrequired

discover_shadow_mcp

OWASP MCP09:2025 — discover MCP client configs in well-known host paths (Cursor, Claude Desktop, Windsurf, VS Code, Claude Code) and flag servers that are not on an organization allowlist (Shadow MCP). Does not start any MCP server.

ParametershomeallowlistincludeContentAudit

list_host_config_paths

List the well-known MCP client config paths this auditor checks during shadow (MCP09) discovery on the current OS.

Parametershome

list_patterns

List the MCP config, agent skill, shadow-MCP discovery, and cross-server shadowing checks, with their OWASP MCP Top 10 tags.

Takes no parameters.

Version history

6
  1. v0.9.0LatestNov 1, 2026
  2. v0.8.1Oct 30, 2026
  3. v0.7.0Oct 29, 2026
  4. v0.6.2Oct 22, 2026
  5. v0.6.1Oct 22, 2026
  6. v0.5.0Oct 14, 2026

Score

90% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listedRequired15 pts
  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts