Archytan Lite MCP gate

io.github.High-ArchyTech-SolutionsPublished by GitHub account High-ArchyTech-Solutionsv2.8.0Updated Oct 29, 2026

Puts an MCP tool server behind Archytan Lite: each tool call is authorized and spent before it runs.

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Overview

AI-generated overview

A local gate that sits between an MCP host and a tool server, authorizing and spending a single-use capability for every tool call before forwarding it.

What you can do
  • Authorize and forward tool calls: each tools/call is checked against an Archytan Lite policy, its signed receipt verified, and a single-use capability redeemed before the call reaches the tool server
  • Hide and refuse unmapped tools: tools/list shows only tools mapped in the config, and calls to other names, plus resources, prompts, completions and tasks, are refused
  • Map tools to policy actions: a config file assigns each tool an action, resource type and the argument(s) that name the resource, including multi-argument ids joined with slashes
  • Keep the host from widening scope: roots declared by the host are removed, so the server keeps the folders given in its command
  • Relay both MCP protocol…
When to use it
Use it when an agent should reach a tool server only through a policy that decides which actions it may take on which resources, and when you want refused calls returned to the model as readable tool errors. It is aimed at setups that already run an Archytan Lite gate service and want the gate to be the only path between agent and tools.
Requirements
A local binary or MCP bundle (macOS, Linux, Windows on amd64), or a Go build. A running Archytan Lite gate service with capabilities on, a credential-bound caller token file made with the service's callergen, and the service's Ed25519 receipt-signing public key. Configuration is given through ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_URL, ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_CALLER_TOKEN_PATH and ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX, plus an mcp-gate.json naming the tool server and tool mappings.
Before you install
The gate holds the agent's credential, read from the file named by ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_CALLER_TOKEN_PATH; plain http is accepted only to loopback. It authorizes and forwards calls that may write or delete data, so policy scope matters: arguments not named in the resource id do not narrow anything. It only governs tools reached through it, and an agent with its own shell can start the server directly. macOS builds are not notarized, so quarantine may need clearing.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Archytan Lite MCP gate in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

archytan-mcp-gate

[M8ven Score]

archytan-mcp-gate sits between an MCP host (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, an IDE agent, your own agent) and an MCP tool server. Before any tool call reaches the server, an Archytan Lite gate service has to authorize it. The MCP gate checks the signed receipt for that decision and spends a single-use capability, and only then forwards the call. A call the policy doesn't allow comes back to the agent as a tool error it can read, and never reaches the server.

This repository is the MCP gate's source, under the Apache License 2.0. The Archytan Lite gate service it talks to is a separate product, distributed as a signed container image; its quickstart is in archytan-lite-community.

How it works

The host launches the MCP gate in place of the tool server, and the MCP gate launches the server itself, so it becomes the only path between the agent and its tools. For every tools/call it:

  1. asks the Archytan Lite gate service to authorize the action the call maps to, on the resource the call names;
  2. verifies the receipt the service returns: its fields must hash to the signed intent hash, the signature must be the service's key, and the receipt must describe exactly this call;
  3. redeems the single-use capability that came with the ALLOW;
  4. forwards the call to the tool server.

If any step fails, the call is refused and the server never sees it. The agent never holds anything that could skip these steps: the MCP gate holds the agent's credential, and the agent only ever speaks MCP.

Requirements

  • An Archytan Lite gate service with capabilities on (ARCHYTAN_LITE_CAPABILITIES=on). The tests run against version 2.7.0, the first whose policy can scope a role to named resources.
  • A credential-bound caller for the agent, made with the service's callergen. The MCP gate never sends a role; the agent's role is whatever its credential holds.

Install

Download the binary for your platform from this repository's releases. SHA256SUMS covers every binary and is signed by the workflow that built them, with cosign keyless signing:

sh
cosign verify-blob SHA256SUMS --bundle SHA256SUMS.cosign.bundle \  --certificate-identity-regexp '^https://github.com/High-ArchyTech-Solutions/archytan-mcp-gate/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@refs/tags/v' \  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.comsha256sum -c SHA256SUMS --ignore-missing

Or build it yourself with Go:

sh
go install github.com/high-archytech-solutions/archytan-mcp-gate/v2/cmd/archytan-mcp-gate@latest

Each release also attaches archytan-mcp-gate.mcpb, an MCP bundle for hosts that install them, and lists it in the MCP Registry as io.github.High-ArchyTech-Solutions/archytan-mcp-gate. The host asks for four things: an mcp-gate.json that names the tool server in its server field (see Configure), the gate service's URL, the agent's token file and the service's public key. The bundle carries the builds for macOS and Linux on amd64 and arm64, and for Windows on amd64, which Windows on Arm runs under emulation. SHA256SUMS covers it too. The macOS builds aren't notarized by Apple, so macOS may refuse to run one that arrived through a browser until you clear its quarantine (xattr -d com.apple.quarantine <file>).

Configure

Map each tool you want the agent to have to a policy action in mcp-gate.json. resource_id_arg names the argument that identifies the resource the call acts on:

json
{  "version": 1,  "agent_uid": "agent-invoices",  "tools": {    "delete_invoice": { "action": "invoice.delete", "resource_type": "invoice", "resource_id_arg": "invoice_id" },    "read_invoice":   { "action": "invoice.read",   "resource_type": "invoice", "resource_id_arg": "invoice_id" }  }}

Then point the host at the MCP gate instead of the tool server. The same mcpServers entry works in Claude Desktop's claude_desktop_config.json and a project's .mcp.json:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "invoices": {      "command": "archytan-mcp-gate",      "args": ["--config", "/etc/archytan/mcp-gate.json", "--", "node", "/opt/invoice-server/index.js"],      "env": {        "ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_URL": "https://gate.internal:8421",        "ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_CALLER_TOKEN_PATH": "/etc/archytan/agent-invoices.token",        "ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_PUBLIC_KEY_HEX": "<the gate service's receipt-signing public key>"      }    }  }}
VariableMeaning
ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_URLBase URL of the Archytan Lite gate service. Plain http is accepted only to loopback, because every request carries the agent's credential.
ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_CALLER_TOKEN_PATHFile holding the agent's caller token.
ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_PUBLIC_KEY_HEXThe service's Ed25519 receipt-signing public key, in hex. Receipts signed by any other key are refused.

The tool server can be named in mcp-gate.json instead of after --, which suits a host or bundle that only lets you pass a config file:

json
{  "version": 1,  "agent_uid": "agent-invoices",  "server": { "command": "node", "args": ["/opt/invoice-server/index.js"] },  "tools": {    "read_invoice": { "action": "invoice.read", "resource_type": "invoice", "resource_id_arg": "invoice_id" }  }}

The host's entry is then "args": ["--config", "/etc/archytan/mcp-gate.json"]. The command runs exactly as written and inherits the MCP gate's environment, the same as after --. Name the server in one place: with a server in the config and a command after --, the MCP gate refuses to start rather than pick one.

mcp-gate.json is read as strictly as host messages are. An unknown field, a key that repeats or differs only in case at any depth, and text that isn't valid UTF-8 or escapes an unpaired surrogate all stop the MCP gate at startup, so a second server can't quietly decide which program runs.

A resource named by several arguments

Some tool servers name the resource a call acts on with more than one argument. GitHub's MCP server takes owner and repo separately, and its write tools add a branch. List them in resource_id_args instead of resource_id_arg, and the MCP gate joins their values with / into the resource id it sends:

json
"get_file_contents": { "action": "repo.read", "resource_type": "repo", "resource_id_args": ["owner", "repo"] },"push_files": { "action": "repo.push", "resource_type": "repo_branch", "resource_id_args": ["owner", "repo"], "resource_id_path_arg": "branch" }

A push_files call with owner acme, repo web-shop and branch feature/login is authorized as acme/web-shop/feature/login. With Archytan Lite 2.7.0's grants, the policy can then scope the agent's role:

json
{ "action": "repo.read", "grants": [{ "roles": ["repo_agent"], "resource_ids": ["acme/web-*"] }] },{ "action": "repo.push", "grants": [{ "roles": ["repo_agent"], "resource_ids": ["acme/web-*/feature/**"] }] }

The agent can read the acme/web-* repositories and push to their feature/ branches. A push to main, or to another owner's repository, is refused.

  • Each resource_id_args value must be a single name. A value containing / or \ is refused, because joined with the others it would name a different resource: owner a/b with repo c reads the same as owner a with repo b/c, and only the MCP gate knows which argument a segment came from.
  • resource_id_path_arg is joined last and may span several segments, like a branch name. There's at most one, since two values with separators in them could be split more than one way.
  • Every listed argument must be there as a non-empty string. A missing one is refused, never left out of the id: a tool that fills in a default, such as the default branch, would act on a resource the id doesn't name. Numbers and other types are refused too.
  • The joined id is then Archytan Lite's to judge. Under a rule scoped by resource it refuses .., empty segments and characters outside its grammar before any grant is matched, so feature/../main doesn't reach main.
  • Write patterns in the tool's own casing. Lite compares exact bytes and a grant only allows, so a variant such as ACME/web-shop is refused.

Scope each tool at the level its id actually names. An argument left out of the id doesn't narrow anything: push_files takes a files array, so scope it by repository and branch, never by file path, and get_file_contents takes an optional ref and a sha that overrides it, so scope reads by repository. Branch scoping covers only the tools that take a branch; merging a pull request into main is merge_pull_request, which names a pull request number, so give it an action of its own.

An MCP gate older than 2.8.0 refuses to start with a config that uses resource_id_args, rather than ignore it.

What it does on the wire

  • Tools the policy doesn't cover are hidden and refused. tools/list shows the agent only mapped tools, and a call to any other name is refused without reaching the service or the server. resources/*, prompts/*, completion/*, tasks/* and unknown methods are refused, and those capabilities are removed from what the server advertises.
  • The host can't widen the server's scope. MCP roots let a host tell a server which folders to work in, and servers that honour them (the reference filesystem server, for one) swap their configured folders for the host's list. Behind the MCP gate, the folders you give the server in its command are the ones it keeps: the gate removes roots from what the host declares, answers or refuses a server's request for roots, and drops roots change notifications.
  • Both protocol generations pass. The MCP gate relays the initialize handshake and MCP 2026-07-28: server/discover, requests that carry their own capabilities, input_required round trips for elicitation and sampling, and subscriptions/listen, narrowed to tool list changes. Each round of a call that stops to ask the user something is authorized and spent on its own, since each is a call the server may act on.
  • A message that reads two ways is refused. JSON parsers disagree on an object whose keys repeat or differ only in case, and on text that isn't valid UTF-8 or escapes an unpaired surrogate. A host message like that is refused before anything is authorized or forwarded, so the MCP gate and the server always agree on the call that was decided.
  • Refusals read as tool results. A refused call comes back as a tool result with isError set and a plain explanation the model can act on.
  • The agent's trace reaches the decision. A W3C traceparent in a tool call's params._meta is passed to the service, so its log lines and version 2 receipt carry the agent's trace id. Trace context never changes a decision.
  • Calls run in the order the agent issued them, while pings, notifications and cancellations are never held up behind them.
  • Cancellation is honoured at every step. Cancelled before the capability is redeemed: nothing is spent or executed. Cancelled after forwarding: the cancellation is relayed to the server, the only party that can still stop it.
  • The tool server doesn't outlive the MCP gate. When the gate exits it closes the server's input, then asks the server to stop, then forces it. On Windows the server also runs in a job object, so it's stopped even if the gate itself is killed. Elsewhere a killed gate leaves the server to exit at the end of its input, as MCP stdio servers do.

Tested with

Host or serverThrough the MCP gate
MCP TypeScript client SDK 2.3.1, initialize handshakeWorks
Same SDK, auto negotiationWorks. Reaches a server's MCP 2026-07-28 support, and falls back to initialize when the server predates it
Same SDK, pinned to 2026-07-28Works with a 2026-07-28 server. With an older server it fails at connect, as the SDK intends
Same SDK, reusing a cached discovery resultWorks, and the host's roots still don't reach the server
MCP TypeScript server SDK 2.3.1 (both protocol generations)Works with every client mode above
@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem 1.0.0 (initialize only)Works, and keeps its configured folder

What it doesn't cover

  • It protects what the agent reaches through it. Make it the only path: list the tool server only through the MCP gate's entry, and give the server's own credentials to that entry alone. An agent with a general-purpose shell can still start the server by hand, and Claude Code and Claude Desktop give Claude a shell and file tools of their own. For them, locked-workspace makes a workspace where the MCP gate's tools are the only way to the paths you protect.
  • The policy decides which actions the agent may take on which resources. Within an allowed action, the server's own arguments and configuration set its reach, including any argument the resource id doesn't name.
  • It governs tools. Resources, prompts and completions don't pass.

Security

Report vulnerabilities privately, as SECURITY.md describes. Past advisories are listed there, including GHSA-9ff5-c4g4-rx92, fixed in 2.5.1 and 2.6.0.

Build and test

sh
go test ./...

The tests in testing/mcpgate drive the real binary between a scripted host, a fixture tool server and a real Archytan Lite gate service. By default they run the published, signed service image with Docker. To use local binaries instead, set ARCHYTAN_LITE_BIN and ARCHYTAN_LITE_KEYGEN_BIN. Without either, they skip and say why; CI sets ARCHYTAN_MCP_GATE_E2E_REQUIRED=1 so they can't pass by skipping.

Contributions are welcome; see CONTRIBUTING.md.

License

Apache License 2.0; see LICENSE and NOTICE. The Archytan Lite gate service is licensed separately.

Source: README.md at commit 1527d1a

Tools

0
SourceWeft has not started this package in its sandbox yet, so its tools are not known.

Version history

2
  1. v2.8.0LatestOct 29, 2026
  2. v2.7.0Oct 21, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts