
AsItIs
io.github.Katta041Published by GitHub account Katta041v0.3.0Updated Oct 27, 2026
Read-only MCP server for markdown and agent steering files: read, outline, lint, context budget.
Overview
Read-only MCP server that lets an assistant read, outline, lint and budget markdown and AI agent steering files such as CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md and SKILL.md.
- What you can do
- Read markdown files exactly as stored, with encoding, line-ending, whitespace and hash details, paged for large files
- Outline headings with line numbers, skipping frontmatter and fenced code
- Lint steering files for frontmatter, length limits, broken links, invisible characters, hidden instructions, duplicates and cross-file drift
- Estimate the context tokens each agent loads every session, per file and per tool
- List steering files grouped by when they load, and propose mechanical fixes as a diff marked safe or review
- When to use it
- Useful when you maintain agent instruction files and want an assistant to check them for bloat, contradictions, hidden or invisible text and vendor length limits without risking edits. Also fits CI or pre-commit linting of the same files through the bundled command-line tool.
- Requirements
- Local process run with npx from the npm package; Node 22.13 or later. Start it with an absolute --root folder it may read (repeatable, or via ASITIS_MCP_ROOT). No account, API key or network access needed. Pin the package version rather than using latest.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open AsItIs in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
@asitis/mcp
Read-only MCP server for markdown and AI agent steering files. From AsItIs, the markdown editor that never rewrites your file. MIT licensed. Source, issues and the Claude Code plugin: github.com/Katta041/asitis-agent-tools.
It gives your coding agent six tools to read, outline, lint, budget and suggest fixes for CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, GEMINI.md, SKILL.md, subagents, commands, rules, Cursor .mdc rules, Copilot instructions and memory files, without being able to change any of them. The same package has an asitis command for CI and pre-commit.
- No writes. There is no write, patch or delete tool, and no write code in the package.
- No network. No telemetry, no update check, no remote calls. It speaks MCP over stdio only.
- Your folder only. It reads only markdown files under the folder (or folders) you start it with, plus its own
.asitisrc.jsonand the root.gitmodules, unless a call asks for the opt-in skill or config scan.
Install
Requires Node 22.13 or later. Always pin the version; never use @latest in an agent config. MCP clients start servers outside your project, so give --root as an absolute path.
Check that it runs:
Claude Code
Run this in your project folder:
Or install the Claude Code plugin, which adds a byte-clean editing skill, /asitis:md-lint, /asitis:md-budget and an optional guard hook, and runs this server under Node's permission model:
Claude Desktop
~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json on macOS, %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json on Windows:
Cursor
.cursor/mcp.json in the project (or ~/.cursor/mcp.json):
If your Cursor version does not expand ${workspaceFolder}, use an absolute path. The server refuses a root that still contains ${...} rather than guessing.
VS Code
.vscode/mcp.json in the project (Copilot agent mode). VS Code uses the servers key, not mcpServers:
Codex (CLI, IDE and desktop)
~/.codex/config.toml:
Gemini CLI
.gemini/settings.json in the project (or ~/.gemini/settings.json):
Hardened: Node's permission model
Run the file directly under Node's permission model so Node itself denies writes and child processes (and network access on Node 25 and later):
In a client config, command is node and every other word goes in args, in the same order. Replace $(npm root -g) with the folder that command prints, because configs do not run shell commands.
If a desktop app cannot find npx or node, use its full path (run which npx, or where npx on Windows) as the command.
CLI and CI
The package also has an asitis command for scripts, CI and pre-commit. It lints the same way as lint_steering and exits 0 (clean), 1 (findings at or above --fail-on, default error), 2 (something you can fix, one line on stderr) or 3 (a bug in asitis).
Formats: text, json, sarif (the standard report format GitHub code scanning reads) and github (pull request annotations). With github, only errors and warnings become annotations; add --annotate-notes to annotate notes as well. It never writes a file; --fix-preview prints a diff and you decide whether to apply it. asitis lint --help and asitis budget --help list each command's options.
That run exits 0: with the default --fail-on error only errors fail the build. Planted invisible or bidirectional characters, and hidden comments that tell the agent to ignore instructions, hide something, run a command or reach for secrets, are errors, so they fail the build by default. Pass --fail-on warning to fail on warnings too.
GitHub Action. Runs the bundled CLI with no npm install and puts findings on the pull request:
pre-commit. Lints only the staged steering files:
docs/ci.md covers the Action's inputs and SARIF upload, lefthook, husky and GitLab CI. Every flag and exit code is in docs/cli-contract.md.
Config
Put an .asitisrc.json at the project root. Everything is optional:
A typo stops the run with the file, line and a suggestion (.asitisrc.json line 2: unknown key "rulez" (did you mean "rules"?)).
To silence one finding, put a comment above it with the rule id: <!-- asitis-disable-next-line duplicate-rule -- the two sections are alternatives -->, or asitis-disable-file for the whole file. The reason after -- is optional; when you give one it is carried into the JSON and SARIF output. The rule id is the word after the severity in each finding, and docs/rules/ lists them all. Security rules (hidden instructions, invisible characters, the sec-* rules) cannot be silenced by a comment, since a comment is exactly what an attacker would add; turn them off in .asitisrc.json or a baseline, where it shows in review. For an existing repo, asitis lint --format json --write-baseline > .asitis-baseline.json and then --baseline .asitis-baseline.json reports only new findings.
Every rule has a page with examples: docs/rules/.
Tools
Every tool is annotated readOnlyHint: true, destructiveHint: false, openWorldHint: false. Tool results carry no link to asitis.app unless you ask for one: with --footer (or ASITIS_MCP_FOOTER=1) the first result of each session ends with one line, Edit these files without rewriting them: https://asitis.app/?ref=mcp, and later results and errors do not repeat it. --no-footer is still accepted and changes nothing. Results are text only. Pass --structured (or set ASITIS_MCP_STRUCTURED=1) to also get each result as JSON in structuredContent, for scripts. It is off by default because Claude Code 2.1 gives the model the JSON instead of the text when both are present, which drops the untrusted-content notice and, for read_markdown, the file text.
Vendor limits checked, with sources in src/limits.ts:
Privacy
- The server and the CLI make no network connections and have no network code. They collect nothing and send nothing.
- They never write, rename or delete a file, and create no temp files. Fixes come back as a diff; applying one is up to you or your assistant.
- By default only markdown steering files,
.asitisrc.jsonand, when a relative link is missing, the root.gitmodules(to tell a submodule that is not checked out from a broken link) are read. Skill scripts are read only when you passinclude: ["skills"](or--include skills), and.claude/settings.json,.mcp.json,.cursor/mcp.json,.vscode/mcp.jsonand.gemini/settings.jsononly withinclude: ["config"], which also reads thename,homepageandrepositoryof the rootpackage.jsonandpyproject.tomlso the project's own MCP server and install script are recognised..claude/settings.local.jsonneedsconfig-local.~/.claude.jsonis never read. Values from settings files are never echoed: findings name the key, and anything shaped like a secret is redacted. - It logs one start-up line to stderr (version and root folder), never file content.
- What your assistant does with results is up to your assistant. Tool results go into the model's context, so they reach whichever AI provider your assistant uses. That is your assistant's network traffic, not ours.
Security model
- Root confinement. Every path is resolved with
realpathand must stay inside a root given at start-up.../traversal, absolute paths outside the root and symlinks (file or folder) that resolve outside are refused. Symlinks that resolve inside a root are followed, so a CLAUDE.md that links to AGENTS.md or a linked.claude/skillsfolder is checked where the agent sees it. The filesystem root and your home folder are refused as roots unless you pass--allow-broad-root. - Markdown only, unless you opt in. By default only
.md,.mdc,.markdown,.mdx,.cursorrules,.windsurfrulesand.clinerulesare read, plus.asitisrc.json(at most 64 KB).include: ["skills"]adds the scripts inside skill folders (up to 1 MB each; other files there are read for their first 4 bytes only, to spot binaries), andinclude: ["config"]adds the agent settings and MCP config files listed under Privacy..env*, anything in.git/ornode_modules/,~/.claude.jsonand every other file are always refused, including through a symlink that points at them. A repo's.asitisrc.jsoncannot turn these scans on in the MCP server; only the call (or the CLI flag) can.@importsof other files are counted from their size, never read. Nothing that is read is ever run. - Bounded work. Files over 16 MB are refused (
--max-file-mb), results are capped, every tool call has a 20 s budget, and every scanner is linear time. The test suite runs 32 adversarial 10 MB inputs (unclosed comments, bracket and backtick storms, 2,000-character import tokens, invalid UTF-8 and more) through every tool under a 3 s per-call budget. - Untrusted content.
read_markdownlabels file content as data, not instructions, and reports hidden instructions and invisible characters up front. This does not stop a model from obeying text it reads; it makes the text visible. - Stronger sandbox, optional. Run the server under Node's permission model so the runtime itself forbids writes and child processes (and network access on Node 25 and later). The Hardened setup under Install shows how; the Claude Code plugin does this by default.
Known limits
- Token counts are local approximations (about 4 characters per token for English), not any vendor's tokenizer.
- A hardlink inside the root to a file elsewhere is read like any other file (reads only).
- A symlink swapped into a parent folder between the check and the open is a narrow race; the final path component is opened with
O_NOFOLLOWand checked by inode. - On Windows, junctions, case-folded paths, 8.3 short names,
\\?\and\\.\device prefixes, UNC paths and trailing dots or spaces are judged on the real path and tested. Alternate data streams (notes.md:stream) and reserved device names (CON,NUL.md) are refused outright.
Options
ASITIS_MCP_ROOT (folders separated by :, or ; on Windows) ASITIS_MCP_FOOTER=1 and ASITIS_MCP_STRUCTURED=1 work as environment variables. Add a second --root for a memory folder that lives outside the project, for example ~/.claude/projects/<project>/memory.
Mistakes print one line and exit with code 2, for example:
Package
The package is two files, the server dist/asitis-mcp.mjs and the CLI dist/asitis.mjs (built with esbuild, minified), with zero runtime dependencies and no install scripts. The MCP SDK (pinned to 1.31.0), zod and yaml are bundled in; their licences are in dist/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md. The release workflow in this repository (.github/workflows/release.yml) publishes with npm provenance, so a version it publishes shows a provenance attestation on npmjs.com and can be checked with npm audit signatures. Versions up to 0.2.4 were published by hand, without provenance.
License
MIT. Changes are listed in the changelog. Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub security advisories.
Source: packages/mcp/README.md at commit 0923dc1
Tools
0Version history
4- v0.3.0LatestOct 15, 2026
- v0.2.5Oct 14, 2026
- v0.2.4Oct 14, 2026
- v0.2.3Oct 14, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts
