Release Gate

io.github.VamsiSudhakaran1Published by GitHub account VamsiSudhakaran1v0.8.4Updated Nov 3, 2026

Pre-deploy security auditor for AI agent code — the risks generic SAST misses.

Overview

AI-generated overview

Release Gate is a local pre-deploy admission controller that turns AI agent evidence into a PROMOTE, HOLD or BLOCK decision for an assistant.

What you can do
  • Assemble an assurance case from a candidate release, its claims and the evidence supplied for it
  • Ingest and attribute external evidence such as evals, red-team results, SAST output, traces and human approvals
  • Scan agent code for risks like model output reaching eval or pickle, retrieved text reaching prompts, and uncapped loops
  • Evaluate the case against a declared methodology and resolution policy and return a verdict with exit codes
  • Report what was not assessed and list the evidence that would close each blocking or advisory item
  • Emit machine-readable JSON evidence packs and sealed, content-addressed cases
When to use it
Useful when a team ships AI agent code and wants a repeatable, auditable gate before deployment that combines scanner, evaluation, trace and approval evidence instead of relying on a single score. It suits CI pipelines and release reviews where someone must justify why a candidate was promoted, held or blocked.
Requirements
Runs as a local stdio process installed from PyPI as release-gate with the mcp extra, launched with release-gate-mcp. No account or config file is required to run. The environment variable RG_MCP_ALLOWED_ROOTS sets the directories the server may read, defaulting to the working directory. Python is needed for the package.
Before you install
The server reads files under the allowed roots, so set RG_MCP_ALLOWED_ROOTS narrowly; paths outside those roots are refused. It writes evidence packs, sealed cases and reports, and can sign evidence with keys you supply. Optional semantic verification sends evidence to a model or model panel, so evidence leaves the machine. A PROMOTE only means the declared policy was met, not that the release is safe.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Release Gate in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

release-gate

The independent admission controller for AI systems.

Release-Gate combines code-level agent risk, external evaluations, runtime traces, governance evidence, verification results and human approvals into an auditable PROMOTE / HOLD / BLOCK decision, without requiring teams to replace the tools that produced the evidence.

A PROMOTE means the candidate meets the declared release policy, with the evidence and the gaps the decision lists. It is never a statement that a release is safe.

[PyPI version] [License] [Benchmarks] [Security Policy]

text
 code-level agent risk     SARIF from your scanner, or release-gate's own ──┐ external evaluations      promptfoo, ProofAgent, red teams, eval harnesses ─┤ runtime traces            OpenTelemetry, Langfuse, Arize-Phoenix ───────────┤   one candidate state, verification results      tests, provers, model checkers ───────────────────┼─▶ one claim graph,      ─▶ PROMOTE / HOLD / BLOCK governance evidence       governance.yaml, the pinned AIBOM ────────────────┤   one declared policy      + the Admission Report human approvals           reviews and approvals of this exact candidate ───┘

Where it sits

Each of these answers a different question. Release-gate reads the others' results as attributed evidence and answers the last one.

ToolThe question it answers
LinterIs the code well written?
SASTDoes the code contain known vulnerability patterns?
GuardrailShould this live interaction be allowed?
EvaluatorHow did the agent behave in these tests?
ObservabilityWhat happened when the system ran?
Release-GateDoes the evidence establish that this exact candidate satisfies its release policy?

It does not re-run, re-grade or replace any of them. A promptfoo result stays promptfoo's, a scanner's finding stays the scanner's, and the Admission Report says which evidence release-gate produced itself and which it read from another tool. Its own agent-code scanner is one producer among them, not the product.

What a decision says

Meaning
PROMOTEthe candidate meets the declared release policy with the evidence listed, and the gaps listed are ones the policy accepts
HOLDsomething a person has to settle first, named, with the evidence that would settle it
BLOCKthe policy is violated: a failed check, a valid counterexample, a contradiction the policy blocks on

Unknown is never a pass. Every decision states what was not assessed, and evidence about another state of the release does not count for this one. The decision is deterministic from the declared policy and the evidence. Models can be asked to read evidence, and their readings never decide.

How it works

mermaid
flowchart LR  subgraph own["Release-gate's own checks"]    direction TB    o1["AST / taint scan"] ~~~ o2["PR diff"] ~~~ o3["governance"] ~~~ o4["trace validation"] ~~~ o5["loop sim, agent score"]  end  subgraph ext["Your tools"]    direction TB    e1["evals, red teams"] ~~~ e2["traces, SAST"] ~~~ e3["proofs, reviewers"]  end  sem["Semantic verifier<br/>bounded questions<br/>UNKNOWN on any failure"]  case["AssuranceCase<br/>claims, evidence, assumptions,<br/>contradictions, counterexamples,<br/>failed branches, coverage, independence"]  own --> case  ext --> case  sem -. "a reading, never a verdict" .-> case  case --> policy{"declared<br/>policy"} --> out["PROMOTE / HOLD / BLOCK"]

The invariant. Release-Gate may generate evidence, ingest evidence, normalize evidence, compare evidence, semantically interpret bounded evidence, and determine whether evidence satisfies policy. It must never pretend that one model, one scanner, one evaluator, one score, or one successful test establishes universal truth.

Each claim ends in one status, and the declared policy says which statuses admit:

mermaid
flowchart LR  ev["the evidence<br/>on one claim"] --> claim{"a claim"}  claim -- "a valid counterexample<br/>(outranks any support)" --> c["CONTRADICTED"]  claim -- "a bound proof, or two<br/>independent groups of checks" --> e["ESTABLISHED"]  claim -- "support short of that" --> s["SUPPORTED or<br/>PARTIALLY_SUPPORTED"]  claim -- "only support about<br/>another state" --> u["UNSUPPORTED"]  claim -- "inconclusive or unreadable" --> k["UNKNOWN"]  claim -- "nothing bears on it" --> n["NOT_ASSESSED"]

No score is an input, and copies of one test from one session count once. ARCHITECTURE maps each box to its code. tests/test_product_invariant.py executes every clause of the invariant.

Try it

bash
pip install release-gaterelease-gate assure your-run.jsonl        # no config file, no YAML, no account

That works on an OpenTelemetry trace, a Langfuse export, a promptfoo result, or release-gate's own record format: the shape is detected, not declared. You get a verdict, what a person has to look at, and what would resolve it.

In a pipeline, the release's claims and everything the pipeline produced decide together:

bash
release-gate assure release.jsonl --evidence evidence/ \  --methodology [email protected] --admission

Exit 0 PROMOTE, 10 HOLD, 1 BLOCK. CI templates cover GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins, CircleCI and Azure Pipelines.

Release-gate's own checks are evidence too. The --json of pr, verify, loop-sim and agent-score is read like any tool's. Here is a release that promotes on its own, plus one trace that called a tool its governance file forbids:

bash
# examples/evidence/first-party/verify.json was written by#   release-gate verify governance.yaml --trace trace.json --iteration 2 --cost 0.06 --jsonrelease-gate assure examples/agents/02-release-promoted.jsonl \  --evidence examples/evidence/first-party/verify.json \  --methodology [email protected] --admission
text
  Decision     BLOCK               BLOCK under [email protected] and rg-resolution@1: 2 blocking condition(s) established — RG-CONTRA-002 (contradictions, on rg-trace:run-2291); RG-VERIF-002 (claim_status, on rg-trace:run-2291)

The block comes from the failed trace check, not from the verifier's own ROLLBACK. That verdict is recorded and decides nothing.

Nothing to install first: drop a run into the browser demo — it runs this same engine, and its three sample runs are the files in examples/assurance/, byte for byte.

Or run the worked examples. In six tools, one release, one decision, five tools report good news and the decision still holds, for the reason it prints. Five agent runs cover an OpenTelemetry trace, a promptfoo eval, a destructive migration, a research swarm, and one that promotes:

bash
python examples/demo-admission/run_demo.pycd examples/agents && ./run-all.sh

What each one demonstrates →

The product's acceptance test is one more. One enterprise release, end to end admits AI-generated code whose tools move money, over every kind of evidence. It answers each question a release owner asks, and shows that no score, model judgment or test count outvotes the counterexample it contains:

bash
python examples/acceptance/run_acceptance.py

Three things a scanner or a score cannot do

1. It reduces machine work to a list a person can actually read

Two million records is not reviewable. A score over two million records is not reviewable either — it is one number standing in for a judgement nobody made.

Release-gate returns a bounded set of things that need a human, derived from which claims the decision actually rests on:

distinct producersrecords seenevidenceclaimsreaches a person
one agent, one action47601 item
10,248 workers10,2542,287,13310,2582,42013 items, 7 undroppable

Every figure in that table is measured by the test suite, not written here by hand — a claim that drifts from the implementation fails a test.

Criticality comes from reachability in the claim graph, never from volume — a claim one agent emitted once is exactly as load-bearing as one four hundred agents discussed.

And a shorter list is not a better case. That is a property in code that cannot return anything else, because the one dangerous way to read this table is that a smaller number is a win. It can equally mean detection got worse.

2. Every verdict says what it did not check

This is the part most tools skip. A pass that doesn't state its own coverage is indistinguishable from a pass that never looked.

WHAT WAS ASSESSED  [    assessed]  input_integrity: the input file was hashed by release-gate  [    assessed]  record_mapping: 6 of 6 record(s) mapped; 0 skipped  [NOT_ASSESSED]  execution_reconstruction: no execution graph was reconstructed  [NOT_ASSESSED]  replication: no verification attempt names a target  [NOT_ASSESSED]  adversarial_review: no verifier set out to disprove this

NOT_ASSESSED is a first-class answer, kept apart from "we looked and found nothing" everywhere in the engine. So is UNKNOWN, and so is a refuted check as against an unresolved one. Collapsing those is how a gap comes to read as a clean bill of health.

3. When it holds, it returns the work order

A gate that only says no is a nag. Each item comes with what would close it:

[BLOCK]    RG-ACT-001    'execution_reconstruction' is stated as NOT_ASSESSED             → supply the run's trace or tool-call log
[ADVISORY] RG-PROV-002   all evidence traces to a single producer             → add evidence from an independently-operated producer

That list is machine-readable (--json), so the next agent run can go and get the evidence rather than a human re-reading the case to work out what was missing.


What it will not tell you

Not that a release is safe. Not that a result is guaranteed correct. Not that the gate is unhackable — twenty attacks run against the engine itself and one is recorded NOT_DEFENDED with what bounds it instead. Not that a case is uncontested, that hallucinations are solved, or that an expert has been replaced: the output is a list of what needs a person.

Each refusal is a property in code that cannot return anything else. docs/POSITIONING.md names every one with the line that enforces it.


From Python

python
import release_gate as rg
case = rg.create_case(objective="Deploy generated migration", subject=migration)case.add_execution(trace)                       # the steps, or a native tracecase.add_verification(test_result, method="TEST_SUITE", outcome="PASSED",                      verifier="ci://pytest", against_subject=True)
decision = case.finalize()     # PROMOTE / HOLD / BLOCK, with its coverage attachedprint(decision.required_evidence)

The same four calls carry one agent's migration and a ten-thousand-worker research run. Not two products with a shared name — one code path: 346 engine functions are common to both, 87% of everything the single-agent path touches.


Configuration

Nothing is required to run. A methodology is what turns structure into a verdict — without one, release-gate reports everything structural it can see and holds, because "is this enough?" is a domain question and inventing an answer would be claiming a standard it does not have.

bash
release-gate assure --list-methodologiesrelease-gate assure run.jsonl --methodology [email protected]

One input, four yardsticks, four answers — each naming what it is missing:

methodologyverdictunmet
(none)HOLDMETHODOLOGY_REQUIRED
[email protected]BLOCKno execution record
[email protected]HOLDstructural findings only
[email protected]BLOCKmachine check, assumptions, independence

Organisation config (--config) layers your own standards on top and can only ever tighten. The methodology, the resolution policy (--resolution-policy: what it takes to establish a claim, what a counterexample does) and the organisation config together are the declared release policy a PROMOTE is measured against. Each is digested into the case.

📖 Full walkthrough: inputs, outputs, and what to configure →


What feeds the decision

The admission decision above is the product. These produce or carry its evidence, and each is documented in its own place:

External evidenceEvaluations, red teams, SAST, formal verification, reviews, behavioural evaluations and containment drills, each through one documented contract. Read and attributed, never re-run
Trace & eval ingestionOpenTelemetry · Langfuse · Arize-Phoenix · promptfoo read in place: no bespoke file, no new instrumentation
Agent code scanningRelease-gate's own evidence producer for code-level agent risk: AST and taint analysis of model output reaching eval/pickle, retrieved text reaching prompts, uncapped LLM loops. Measured on its own 93-case corpus
release-gate prOne verdict on what a pull request introduced: net-new agent risk only, inherited debt shown and never gated
Release-gate's other checksPR diff analysis (pr), trace validation (verify --trace), loop simulation (loop-sim) and the agent score (agent-score). Their --json is evidence assure --evidence reads like any producer's; their own verdicts and scores are recorded and decide nothing
Semantic verificationOptional. A model, or a panel of independent models, reads evidence the rules cannot. Its readings are recorded and never decide; disagreement goes to a person
Signed evidenceProducers sign their output (release-gate sign, DSSE / in-toto). assure --trusted-keys checks each signature against keys trusted for named producers, and does not read evidence whose signature fails
Deploy-time checkrelease-gate deploy-check compares what is running with the state the admission admitted. Anything not shown to match does not pass
Incidents and drillsA production failure becomes a counterexample that every later release must answer. A recorded kill-switch drill (containment/1) is the evidence behind "it can be paused"
Diversity-strict--resolution-policy diversity-strict@1: critical claims need two independent groups of checks, where a shared provider counts as one group, plus a check by someone other than the author
Evidence packsevidence-pack writes JSON, Markdown and HTML. The sealed case (--case-output) is content-addressed and verifiable. None of these is signed unless you sign it
GitHub Action · MCP servercommand: assure in the Action; pip install 'release-gate[mcp]'
BenchmarksThe scanner, the assurance layer and semantic providers, measured separately. The assurance corpus publishes no headline precision figure, because on most of its cases precision is not a meaningful thing to measure

Docs

Demo & integration walkthroughinputs, outputs, configuration
Positioningevery claim, and the line that enforces it
Architecturehow the engine is put together
Referencefull command and feature reference
Changelogrelease history
Contributing · Security

Development

bash
git clone https://github.com/VamsiSudhakaran1/release-gatecd release-gate && pip install -e '.[dev]'pytest -q

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

Source: README.md at commit 852d8e1

Tools

0
SourceWeft has not started this package in its sandbox yet, so its tools are not known.

Version history

1
  1. v0.8.4LatestSep 16, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts