
Cork
io.github.WYRE-AIPublished by GitHub account WYRE-AIv1.0.1Updated Oct 27, 2026
MCP server for Cork's cyber-insurance API for MSPs.
Overview
Read-only MCP server for Cork's cyber-insurance API for MSPs, exposing clients, risk and compliance, vulnerabilities, warranties and invoices to an assistant.
- What you can do
- List clients with warranty status, integration tenants and recent Cork Cyber Scores, plus their devices, email domains, inboxes and score history
- Review risk and compliance: policy violations and risk events, notification settings, event types, and CVEs with CVSS/EPSS/KEV details or grouped by product
- Inspect integrations: available and connected integration types, and devices, tenants and users observed from an integration
- Look up warranties, billing invoices and their line items, and distributor partner sub-accounts
- Check software installer history, available packages and one-time RMM setup instructions, and identify the authenticated user
- When to use it
- Useful for MSP or distributor staff who want an assistant to answer questions about client coverage, cyber scores, compliance events, vulnerability exposure and billing without opening the Cork admin UI. It is a read-only reporting surface, not a tool for changing anything in Cork.
- Requirements
- Runs as a local stdio process (Docker image ghcr.io/wyre-ai/cork-mcp, or built from source with npm). Needs a Cork API key generated in Cork's Admin UI, supplied via the CORK_API_KEY environment variable in env mode, or per request via the X-Cork-Api-Key header in gateway mode. Optional settings: AUTH_MODE, MCP_TRANSPORT, LOG_LEVEL, and CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET for HTTP sidecar auth. Network access to Cork's API.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Cork in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
Cork MCP Server
MCP server for Cork's cyber-insurance API for MSPs - clients and their warranty/coverage status, Cork Cyber Score history, risk & compliance events, software vulnerabilities (CVE/CVSS/EPSS/KEV), connected integrations, invoices, distributor partners, and software-installer metadata - for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway.
Authentication
Cork authenticates with a static Bearer API key, generated in Cork's Admin UI (Settings -> API). Cork's OpenAPI spec also documents an OAuth2 flow for their own remote MCP server, but the underlying credential is the same API key - this connector never performs an OAuth dance, it only ever holds a live bearer key, sent as Authorization: Bearer <key> to Cork's API. In gateway mode the key arrives per-request via the X-Cork-Api-Key header; in local/stdio mode it's read once from CORK_API_KEY.
Configuration
Request limits
- HTTP request bodies are capped at 256 KiB (262144 bytes). After the
X-Gateway-S2Scheck (and, in gateway mode, theX-Cork-Api-Keypresence check, both 401) passes, aContent-Lengthabove the cap returns 413 with a JSON-RPC error; bodies withoutContent-Lengthare capped by the MCP SDK transport. Unauthenticated requests still get 401 first. tools/callarguments are capped at 10,000 elements (every array item and object key at any depth). Larger inputs return anisErrortool result and are never dispatched.
These limits address CVE-2026-111768 / GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (memory exhaustion during validation) and GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq (no request body / batch cap).
Tools
Clients
cork_get_clients- list clients with warranty status, integration tenants, and recent Cork Cyber Scores.cork_get_client_devices- list devices observed for a client across all connected integrations.cork_get_client_domains- list email domains observed for a client.cork_get_client_inboxes- list email inboxes observed for a client.cork_get_client_score_history- list a client's full Cork Cyber Score history, newest first.
Risk & Compliance
cork_get_compliance_events- list policy violations and risk events detected for a client's assets.cork_get_compliance_notification_settings- list notification/alerting rules for compliance events.cork_get_compliance_event_types- list all compliance event types with descriptions and cure periods.cork_get_software_vulnerabilities- list individual CVEs with CVSS/EPSS/KEV details.cork_get_software_vulnerability_summary- get a rollup of CVEs grouped by software product.
Integrations - read-only subset
cork_get_available_integrations- list integration types that can be connected to Cork.cork_get_connected_integrations- list integrations connected to Cork.cork_get_integration_devices- list devices observed from an integration.cork_get_integration_tenants- list customer tenants observed from an integration.cork_get_integration_users- list users observed from an integration.
Warranty
cork_get_warranties- list active cyber warranty packages.
Invoice
cork_get_invoices- list billing invoices.cork_get_invoice_line_items- list billed line items for an invoice.
Distributor - read-only subset
cork_get_partners- list partner sub-accounts managed by this distributor.
Software Installer - read-only subset
cork_get_installer_history- list past software install attempts.cork_get_software_packages- list software packages available to install.cork_get_installer_setup- get one-time RMM setup instructions for software installs.
Who
cork_who_am_i- get information on the authenticated user.
Scope
This is a deliberately narrow, read-only, non-credential-exposing v1 surface, hard-scoped to exactly 23 of Cork's 31 operations (29 documented paths). Every tool is classified isAdmin: true in the Conduit gateway given the sensitivity of insurance/risk/compliance data. Roughly a third of Cork's full API is write- or secret-exposing; none of it is implemented here, by design, not by oversight:
Hard-excluded (credential-exposing) - never implemented:
GET /integrations/{uuid}/credentials(get-integration-credentials) - returns the integration's raw stored third-party secrets (credentials: {...}).
Hard-excluded (bulk raw-data exfiltration, excluded out of caution alongside credentials):
GET /integrations/{uuid}/raw-data(get-integration-raw-data) - returns a presigned download URL (10-minute expiry) to a client's full raw synced integration data. Not a credential return, but a bulk-data-exfiltration vector gated by "requires distributor privileges" in Cork's own spec. Flagged explicitly for review in the wiring PR rather than silently included.
Hard-excluded (provisioning/mutation) - never implemented:
POST /distributor/partners(provision-partner) - provisions a new Partner account.POST /integrations(connect-integration) - connects a new integration and immediately begins syncing data.PATCH /integrations/{uuid}(update-integration) - updates an integration's name and/or credentials.DELETE /integrations/{uuid}(delete-integration) - deletes an integration.POST /integrations/{uuid}/resync(resync-integration) - manually triggers a data refresh.POST /software/installer/install(install-software) - dispatches a real software install to a real managed endpoint through the client's RMM. A genuine remote-software-provisioning action.
They can be added as a follow-up if there's demand, after a deliberate scope decision - not by default.
Credential scope
This connector's own code is read-only by construction — the underlying API key is not. Cork's own documentation states API key permissions are linked to the user who creates them; no read-only or restricted-scope key type is documented. Two separate claims, kept at different confidence levels:
- Structurally verified (checked directly, stated with full confidence): this connector's own code makes zero write/delete/resync/provisioning calls, and never calls the credentials or raw-data endpoints. Every function in
client.tscalls one of the 23 documented read operations above — no wildcard/passthrough call anywhere insrc/. - Vendor-documented, not independently verified (hedged deliberately): Cork's own docs do not describe any narrower or read-only API key type. A key generated by a full-access Cork user can very likely reach the write/delete/credentials/raw-data operations this connector excludes — this has not been tested against a live key, and WYRE found no vendor-offered way to restrict it further at the credential level.
Do not read this connector, or this README, as having established the underlying API key is itself restricted — only that this connector's own code never attempts anything beyond its 23 read operations.
Development
Docker
Source: README.md at commit 3f0372c
Tools
0Version history
2- v1.0.1LatestOct 22, 2026
- v1.0.0Sep 20, 2026
Score
40% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts
Declare a license in the repository or the registry entry.