Petra Security

Petra Security MCP Server

Read-only MCP server for Petra Security's public REST API, for AI assistants and the WYRE Conduit gateway. Petra detects and investigates Microsoft 365 account compromises (BEC, session hijacks). This server exposes its incidents, failed attacks, posture reports, tenants, usage and billable users.

Authentication

A Petra Admin creates an API key at app.petrasecurity.com under Settings > API Keys. The full key is shown only once, so store it in a secrets manager immediately. Full Members can see the key list but cannot create keys.

Every request goes to https://api.petrasecurity.com with Authorization: Bearer <key> and a User-Agent header (Petra returns 403 without one). The host is fixed and cannot be changed by request headers or tool arguments.

Petra rate-limits each route to 10 requests per minute. A 429 comes back as a tool error that names the Retry-After-public-api wait. To spare that budget, successful responses are cached in memory per API key (keyed by a SHA-256 of the key) for 60 seconds, and /v1/failed-attacks for 5 minutes. Identical concurrent requests share one upstream call.

Configuration

Copy .env.example and set the variables below. The stdio transport reads PETRA_API_KEY and does not use CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET.

/health and /healthz stay unauthenticated and do not read credentials.

HTTP authentication

With MCP_TRANSPORT=http and CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET set, every /mcp request must include X-Gateway-S2S. The check is verifyS2sHeader in src/s2s-verify.ts: the header value is t=<unix seconds>,v1=<hex>, where the hex is HMAC-SHA256 of the literal string t=<unix seconds> keyed with CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET (64 lowercase hex characters). The timestamp must be within 300 seconds of the server clock. A missing or invalid header is HTTP 401, before vendor credentials are read. An empty secret refuses to start unless MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1. A known placeholder (replace-with-a-real-secret, your-s2s-secret, changeme, change-me, placeholder, secret, example, replace-me, s2s-secret, any case) refuses to start even with that flag, so a copied example cannot forge the header.

TS=$(date +%s)SIG=$(printf 't=%s' "$TS" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" -hex | awk '{print $NF}')curl -sS http://127.0.0.1:8080/mcp \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \  -H "X-Gateway-S2S: t=${TS},v1=${SIG}" \  -H "X-Petra-Api-Key: $PETRA_API_KEY" \  -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/list"}'

In AUTH_MODE=gateway, /mcp also requires X-Petra-Api-Key. That header is the only credential source for the request. A request without it returns 401 and does not fall back to PETRA_API_KEY in the process environment.

AUTH_MODE=env still requires a valid X-Gateway-S2S header, then uses PETRA_API_KEY from the environment.

Request limits

• HTTP request bodies are capped at 256 KiB (262144 bytes). After the X-Gateway-S2S check (and, with AUTH_MODE=gateway, the X-Petra-Api-Key presence check) passes, a Content-Length above the cap returns 413 with a JSON-RPC error; bodies without Content-Length are capped by the MCP SDK transport. Unauthenticated requests still get 401 first.
• tools/call arguments are capped at 10,000 elements (every array item and object key at any depth). Larger inputs return an isError tool result and are never dispatched.

These limits address CVE-2026-111768 / GHSA-46jr-4wx8-v453 (memory exhaustion during validation) and GHSA-f897-62hf-6gxq (no request body / batch cap).

Tools

Every tool is a GET, annotated readOnlyHint: true and destructiveHint: false. Where a tool takes tenantId, either the Petra tenant ID (e.g. ZZk90t, from petra_list_tenants or the app.petrasecurity.com/tenant/<id> URL) or the Microsoft tenant ID works.

Tenants and billing

• petra_list_tenants - every client tenant with Petra and Microsoft tenant IDs, onboarding date and paused flag (GET /v1/tenants). Optional nameContains and includePaused filters.
• petra_get_usage - organization-wide billing snapshot per tenant: service, billable status, licensed and billable users, prorating, first billable date, plus totals (GET /v1/usage). Optional asOf, includePaused (set false so paused tenants don't inflate counts) and billableStatus.
• petra_list_billable_users - billable users for one tenant with UPN, mail, enabled flag and license SKUs (GET /v1/billable-users). Petra documents only the Petra tenant ID here, so a Microsoft tenant ID is resolved through /v1/tenants first. Optional enabledOnly.

Security events

• petra_list_incidents - M365 compromise incidents, newest first, with user, remediation status, live flag, dwell time and phishing email (GET /v1/incidents). Omit tenantId for all tenants. startDate and limit (1-500) go to Petra; remediationStatus, liveOnly, userPrincipalName and includePhishingEmail are applied locally after the limit.
• petra_get_incident - one incident by ID. Petra has no single-incident route, so this searches the newest 500 (pass tenantId to reach older ones in a tenant).
• petra_get_failed_attacks - blocked-attack summary for one tenant: total, by country, daily by attack type, and most-targeted users (GET /v1/failed-attacks). Defaults to the last 30 days.
• petra_list_posture_reports - M365 posture reports: score and grade, control rollup, Global Admin review, top risks and every check with its suggested fix (GET /v1/posture-reports). Latest per tenant by default. Optional includeChecks: false for a compact view.

Scope

This server covers the first five tools StackJack ships for Petra (petra_list_tenants, petra_get_usage, petra_list_billable_users, petra_list_incidents, petra_get_failed_attacks), with the same names, and adds petra_get_incident and petra_list_posture_reports.

Petra's public API has no write, remediation, pause or scan-trigger routes, so there is nothing to gate. GET /v1/usage-xlsx is left out on purpose: it returns a binary spreadsheet and needs a separate Multi-MSP API key.

The request and response shapes come from Petra's published OpenAPI spec (/docs/api-reference/openapi.json). Tests mock the API, and nothing has been tested against a live Petra key yet.

Development

npm installnpm run buildnpm testnpm run lint   # tsc --noEmit

Docker

The image listens on 0.0.0.0 inside the container (MCP_HTTP_HOST) and defaults to AUTH_MODE=gateway. Startup still refuses to run without a real CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET. Publish the port on loopback. In gateway mode, the Petra key arrives on each request as a header and is not read from the environment.

docker build -t petra-mcp .docker run \  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \  petra-mcp

Compose refuses to start when CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET is unset, defaults AUTH_MODE to gateway, publishes 127.0.0.1:8080:8080, and does not set PETRA_API_KEY or env_file:

CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" docker compose up

Single-tenant HTTP (AUTH_MODE=env) still requires the S2S secret, then uses PETRA_API_KEY:

docker run \  -e CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET="$CONDUIT_S2S_SECRET" \  -e AUTH_MODE=env \  -e PETRA_API_KEY=... \  -p 127.0.0.1:8080:8080 \  petra-mcp

Local HTTP without a secret is development-only. It binds 127.0.0.1 (including when MCP_HTTP_HOST is localhost or ::1) and logs a warning. A non-loopback MCP_HTTP_HOST makes startup exit. The container image sets MCP_HTTP_HOST=0.0.0.0, so the bypass inside Docker also needs -e MCP_HTTP_HOST=127.0.0.1. Do not publish that port off loopback.

MCP_TRANSPORT=http MCP_ALLOW_INSECURE_DEV=1 npm run start:http