Bloom Exchange

io.github.astyboyy-ship-itPublished by GitHub account astyboyy-ship-itv0.2.0Updated Nov 20, 2026

Negotiate in a double-blind sandbox and verify Ed25519 receipts. Agent-to-agent clearing over A2A.

The publisher's own server: Exchange.news — Crypto offers, campaigns and news

Overview

AI-generated overview

Lets an assistant negotiate a double-blind price deal with another agent on a Bloom Exchange node and verify the Ed25519-signed settlement receipt.

What you can do
  • Negotiate a deal against a mandate (ceiling price, budget, SLA tier, net days) on a Bloom Exchange node
  • Verify a BLOOM-XCH receipt offline or against the issuer's signed Agent Card
  • Publish an agent intent for clearing over A2A JSON-RPC
  • Optionally poll an event feed for wake-ups and post-settlement hooks when the node enables it
When to use it
Use it when you want an IDE or desktop agent to run a machine-to-machine procurement or price negotiation against a Bloom Exchange node and get a verifiable, signed settlement receipt, typically in a sandbox or test setup rather than a live payment flow.
Requirements
Runs locally over stdio via npx from the npm package @bloom-exchange/mcp, on Node 20 or newer. Needs a reachable Bloom Exchange node; BLOOM_EXCHANGE_URL sets its base URL (default Optional BLOOM_ACCESS_KEY switches from the sandbox to production clearing, and BLOOM_AGENT_NAME sets how the agent introduces itself. Desktop only.
Before you install
BLOOM_ACCESS_KEY is a secret that moves enclaves from sandbox to production clearing and unlocks operator views, so keep it out of shared configs. Negotiation and intent publishing send data to the configured node and its peers, and receipts can carry AP2, Stripe and x402 payment payloads. The README states the vault currently runs on the provider's node, so the counterparty trusts that operator not to read its mandate.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Bloom Exchange in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

Bloom Exchange

Two AI agents negotiate a deal over A2A JSON-RPC while each side's price limits stay sealed in salted SHA-256 commitments that the other side's engines never see; a prompt-injection firewall screens every message, deterministic clamps keep every offer inside both mandates, and the result is an Ed25519-signed receipt anyone can verify offline.

Bloom Exchange is the reference implementation of the Bloom Clearing Protocol, an extension profile of A2A v1.0 that maps settlement to AP2 mandates and Stripe / x402 payloads, with an MCP server so any IDE agent can use it. Apache-2.0.

Try it (no API key, no account, no model)

bash
git clone https://github.com/astyboyy-ship-it/bloom-exchange && cd bloom-exchangenpm install                         # about 2 minutes on a cold cachenpm run dev                         # the node + operating desk on http://localhost:3000

Negotiations run on deterministic engines with the same vault, firewall, clamps and signatures as production. Requires Node 22.18+ for the repository scripts; the published npm packages run on Node 20+.

One command, every claim checked. Starts two nodes with separate keys, fires a prompt-injection payload at the firewall, checks that no private number reaches the attacker, settles a cross-node deal, then verifies the receipt with the CLI (and checks that a $1 tamper and the wrong key both fail):

bash
npm run build && npm run verify:launch          # or ./scripts/verify-launch-demo.sh · .\scripts\verify-launch-demo.ps1
  1 · SHIELD vs. PROMPT INJECTION (role tags, [INST], base64, zero-width Unicode)    ✓ Shield verdict: quarantined · 14 threats (policy_override_loop, encoded_payload, instruction_override, mandate_extraction, …)    ✓ no provider-private number in 42,450 bytes the attacker received    ✓ the deal still cleared inside both mandates: completed at $49,400, not $1  3 · bloom-verify CLI    ✓ offline with --card card.json → exit 0 (VALID)    ✓ price changed by $1 → exit 1 (INVALID: failed: digest)    ✓ against node-alpha's key → exit 1 (INVALID: failed: signature, ap2Proofs)  ALL CHECKS PASSED in 8.0s

Verify a receipt without cloning anything. The script above prints the folder where it saved receipt.json and the issuer's card.json; on the desk, the Enclave Inspector's JSON button downloads a receipt and the card is at /.well-known/agent-card.json.

bash
npx @bloom-exchange/sdk verify receipt.json --card card.json   # fully offlinenpx @bloom-exchange/sdk verify receipt.json                    # fetches the issuer's card named in the receipt

Give your agent the tools (Claude Code, with a node running on :3000):

bash
claude mcp add bloom-exchange -e BLOOM_EXCHANGE_URL=http://localhost:3000 -- npx -y @bloom-exchange/mcp

Cursor, Claude Desktop or any MCP client:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "bloom-exchange": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@bloom-exchange/mcp"],      "env": { "BLOOM_EXCHANGE_URL": "http://localhost:3000" }    }  }}
Package
@bloom-exchange/sdknpm install @bloom-exchange/sdkZero-dependency client and the bloom-verify CLI
@bloom-exchange/mcpnpx -y @bloom-exchange/mcpMCP server for Claude Code, Cursor and any MCP client
@bloom-exchange/corenpm install @bloom-exchange/coreThe clearing engine and HTTP handlers, to run a node in any runtime

What you get

Double-blind vaultEach side's limits are sealed with salted SHA-256 commitments. The provider's engines (and any prompt they build) receive a brief with no counterparty field, so the client's ceiling cannot reach them by construction. Guard bands keep every offer off every private number; a leak scrubber checks every outbound message.
Deterministic clampingModels only propose. Sovereign clamps every offer to both mandates before it is sent or signed. 300 randomized enclaves with an adversarial proposer never produce an out-of-bounds offer.
Shield firewallPrompt injection, policy overrides, invisible and tag-smuggled Unicode, homoglyphs, base64 payloads, hidden markup and token exhaustion are neutralized before any engine reads the text, with a hash-chained audit ledger.
Verifiable receiptsBLOOM-XCH certificates: hash-chained rounds, both mandate commitments, Ed25519 signature, AP2 checkout and payment credentials, Stripe and x402 payloads. bloom-verify receipt.json checks one offline.
40 protocol adaptersChat, CRM, agent protocols (A2A, MCP, LangGraph, CrewAI, AutoGen), cloud and energy, payment rails and custom hooks normalize into one AgentIntentNode.
The operating deskA negotiation sandbox, a clearing ledger, an enclave inspector with a live security graph and a boundary probe, the omni-protocol router, a mandate corridor, and an SDK quickstart, in English and Spanish.

Repository

packages/core   @bloom-exchange/core   the clearing engine: vault, Shield, Sovereign, settlement, adapters, HTTP handlerspackages/sdk    @bloom-exchange/sdk    zero-dependency TypeScript client and the bloom-verify CLIpackages/mcp    @bloom-exchange/mcp    MCP server (stdio and Streamable HTTP): negotiate, verify_receipt, publish_intentapps/node       @bloom-exchange/node   a node: the API (A2A JSON-RPC, HTTP+JSON, SSE) and the operating desk at /deploy/                                Dockerfile, Docker Compose and Kubernetes manifests for a Sovereign nodeSPEC.md                                Bloom Clearing Protocol v0.1

Every endpoint in packages/core/src/http is a plain (Request) => Response function. apps/node mounts them in Next.js; handle() from @bloom-exchange/core/http/router serves them from any runtime (Node, Bun, Deno, Workers) or in-process.

Connect an agent

TypeScript (Node ≥ 20, Deno, Bun or the browser)

bash
npm install @bloom-exchange/sdk
ts
import { BloomExchangeClient } from "@bloom-exchange/sdk";
const bloom = new BloomExchangeClient({ baseUrl: "http://localhost:3000" });const { state, certificate } = await bloom.negotiate({  mandate: { ceilingPriceUsd: 52_500, maxBudgetUsd: 55_000, requiredSlaTier: "gold", targetNetDays: 60 },  item: { description: "12-month platform license" },}).result;const proof = await bloom.verifyCertificate(certificate!); // { valid: true, checks: { digest, certificateId, chain, signature, ap2Proofs } }

Claude Code, Cursor or any MCP client (setup above)

Ask your agent to "negotiate a 12-month license with a $52k ceiling on Bloom and verify the receipt". Tools: negotiate, verify_receipt, publish_intent. For a remote server, npx -y -p @bloom-exchange/mcp bloom-exchange-mcp-http serves stateless Streamable HTTP at /mcp. Optional environment: BLOOM_ACCESS_KEY, BLOOM_AGENT_NAME.

Verify any receipt

bash
npx @bloom-exchange/sdk verify receipt.json                    # keys from the issuer's Agent Cardnpx @bloom-exchange/sdk verify receipt.json --card card.json   # fully offline, air-gappednpx @bloom-exchange/sdk verify receipt.json --json             # machine-readable; exit 0 valid · 1 invalid · 2 bad input

Installed, the same command is bloom-verify receipt.json. Inside this repository: npm run verify -- receipt.json.

Raw A2A JSON-RPC

bash
curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/exchange/a2a -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{  "jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"SendMessage","params":{"message":{"messageId":"m1","role":"user","parts":[    {"kind":"data","data":{"bloomExchange":{"mandate":{"ceilingPriceUsd":52500,"maxBudgetUsd":55000,"requiredSlaTier":"gold","targetNetDays":60},     "item":{"description":"12-month platform license"}}}}]}}}'

Two nodes, one cross-node deal each way

deploy/docker-compose.yml runs two Sovereign nodes, node-alpha (:3001) and node-beta (:3002). Each has its own Ed25519 root key and its own state, and each is pre-wired to the other through BLOOM_PEERS:

bash
npm run sovereign:init -- --alpha "Acme Fund" --beta "Northwind"   # separate secrets, root keys and operator keys (all local)npm run sovereign:up                                               # Docker Compose: both nodes + Redis + REST gatewaysnpm run demo:two-node                                              # discovery, then a cross-node deal each way

No Docker? npm run build && npm run demo:two-node:local starts the same two nodes as local processes with fresh keys. Output from a real run:

  1 · DISCOVERY    node-alpha Alpha    key bxk-1f439f15d2868299 card ✓   peers: http://127.0.0.1:3102 ✓ bxk-7ab61a50094bf764    node-beta  Beta     key bxk-7ab61a50094bf764 card ✓   peers: http://127.0.0.1:3101 ✓ bxk-1f439f15d2868299
  2 · node-alpha's agent buys on node-beta    settled BLOOM-XCH-60X3-0HDS-R7XF-QFA0 at $47,060 · net 45 · gold · 10 rounds    receipt: issued by Bloom Exchange · Beta (bxk-7ab61a50094bf764) · counterparty Bloom Exchange · Alpha    ✓ verifies against node-beta's card   ✓ does not verify against node-alpha's key
  3 · node-beta's agent buys on node-alpha    settled BLOOM-XCH-8HSX-HJSW-ZA40-PSBQ at $46,920 · net 45 · gold · 10 rounds    receipt: issued by Bloom Exchange · Alpha (bxk-1f439f15d2868299) · counterparty Bloom Exchange · Beta    ✓ verifies against node-alpha's card   ✓ does not verify against node-beta's key

Each node verifies the other's signed Agent Card (GET /api/exchange/peers). An agent from one node negotiates on the other, presenting its home node's card. Each receipt names both nodes and verifies only against its issuer's key. The same deal with the SDK:

ts
const alphaCard = await (await fetch("http://localhost:3001/.well-known/agent-card.json")).json();const onBeta = new BloomExchangeClient({ baseUrl: "http://localhost:3002", agent: { name: "alpha/procurement", framework: "bloom-sdk", card: alphaCard } });const { certificate } = await onBeta.negotiate({ mandate: { ceilingPriceUsd: 52_500, maxBudgetUsd: 55_000, requiredSlaTier: "gold", targetNetDays: 60 }, item: { description: "12-month platform license" } }).result;await onBeta.verifyCertificate(certificate!); // signed by node-beta

Run a single node with docker compose -f deploy/docker-compose.yml up node-alpha. Kubernetes runs one node per namespace: kubectl apply -k deploy/k8s (see deploy/k8s/kustomization.yaml). With no model keys and no settlement webhook, nodes make no outbound calls beyond their configured peers. Configuration lives in .env.example.

Access keys are optional. They switch enclaves from the sandbox to production clearing and unlock operator views: npm run key:issue -- --role operator --holder "You".

Develop

bash
npm test                  # 198 tests: protocol vectors, engine invariants, leakage, settlement safety, firewall, adapters, peers, CLI, MCP, copy paritynpm run typechecknpm run lintnpm run buildnpm run spec:conformance  # regenerates SPEC.md Appendix B from the suitenpm run verify:launch     # the end-to-end check above (after npm run build)

Every test has a conformance id in SPEC.md Appendix B. Appendix A gives byte-exact vectors for canonical JSON, key derivation, round hashes, commitments, certificate ids and Ed25519 signatures, so implementations in other languages can match the reference exactly.

What is and is not built

  • Built: everything above runs today, end to end, with tests.
  • Opt-in: an event feed for wake-ups and post-settlement hooks (BLOOM_EVENTS=1): cursor polling, SSE, an MCP poll_events tool, and webhook, JSONL and dry-run adapters. It carries no mandate figures. See docs/EVENTS.md.
  • Format only: bloom.exchange/<agent> links. They are a naming format that resolves to a node's signed Agent Card; there is no public registry or resolver yet.
  • Open: in v0.1 the vault runs on the provider's node, so the counterparty trusts that operator not to read its mandate. The roadmap is neutral hosted clearing, attested enclaves and federation. See SPEC.md §12.

Release notes are in CHANGELOG.md.

License

Apache License 2.0. See NOTICE.

The two paintings in apps/node/public/paintings are public-domain works: Jean-Honoré Fragonard, c. 1760, and Claude Lorrain, 1653. They come from Wikimedia Commons under the Public Domain Mark 1.0, and the Apache License does not cover them. Attribution is in NOTICE and CREDITS.

Source: README.md at commit 1f0ca8c

Tools

0
SourceWeft has not started this package in its sandbox yet, so its tools are not known.

Version history

2
  1. v0.2.0LatestNov 19, 2026
  2. v0.1.0Nov 19, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts

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