Queryshield

io.github.bch1212Published by GitHub account bch1212v1.0.1Updated Oct 24, 2026

Secure SQL proxy for AI agents — NL→SQL, AST safety, per-agent RLS, audit log.

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Overview

AI-generated overview

A secure SQL proxy that lets an assistant ask enterprise databases questions in plain English or pre-built SELECT statements.

What you can do
QueryShield sits between an AI agent and a customer database. The agent calls query_database with a natural-language question or query_database_sql with a pre-built SELECT, and the proxy translates, validates and executes it. Validation is AST-based: only SELECT is allowed, stacked statements and denied functions are rejected, and a LIMIT is required. Per-agent row-level security applies schema and table whitelists plus injected WHERE filters, and get_audit_log returns recent attempts for the calling agent.
When to use it
Use it when an assistant needs read-only access to a production or internal SQL database but should not hold connection strings or be trusted to write. It suits teams that want per-agent scoping, row filters and an audit trail over agent database access.
Requirements
Runs as a local stdio process installed from the PyPI package queryshield-mcp. It needs the QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY environment variable, an agent API key issued by QueryShield, and optionally QUERYSHIELD_BASE_URL to override the default endpoint. The QueryShield service itself needs its own deployment with an Anthropic key, a database URL and a vault key.
Before you install
The agent API key is a secret passed via QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY and should be scoped to one agent. Queries are sent to the QueryShield service, which forwards them to the configured database and uses an external model for natural-language translation, so data leaves the local machine. The service is commercial, with paid tiers. Audit logging stores metadata only, not row contents.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open Queryshield in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

QueryShield

[tests]

Agent security suite. QueryShield is the lead product: a secure SQL proxy and a named credential vault, one qs_ API key, one Stripe customer, and this docs site.

Agents call a single endpoint in plain English (or structured SQL). QueryShield:

  1. Translates natural language → SQL via Claude with prompt caching.
  2. Validates every query at the AST level — only SELECT is allowed, no stacked statements, no forbidden functions, LIMIT required.
  3. Applies per-agent row-level security: schema/table whitelists and WHERE clause injection.
  4. Executes against the customer DB and returns rows.
  5. Logs every attempt to an append-only audit table — metadata only, never row contents.

Agents never see connection strings.

The credential vault stores other secrets (API tokens the agent is allowed to use). It is the AgentVault product, folded into this service. Permission patterns decide which names an agent can read. Database connection strings stay in a separate encrypted store and are not readable through the vault.

Free tier / funnel: InjectShield scans untrusted text for prompt injection. It stays in its own repository (bch1212/injectshield) and its own API (api.injectshield.dev). Start there, then create one QueryShield workspace when an agent needs a database or a vault. Docs: injectshield.dev/docs. Suite page on this service: /suite.


Quickstart

bash
pip install -r requirements.txtcp .env.example .env# Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DATABASE_URL, and VAULT_KEY in .env (see below).# Do not commit .env. QueryShield reads secrets from the environment only.
python -m queryshield.start

Generate a Fernet key for VAULT_KEY once and never lose it. Credential encryption and session signing both require VAULT_KEY (or SESSION_KEY for cookies). If it is unset, those operations fail instead of using a built-in key:

bash
python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"

End-to-end flow (curl)

bash
# 1) Boot a tenant. Returns the admin API key — copy it.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/tenants?name=Acme
# 2) Register the customer DB. Connection string is encrypted at rest.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/databases \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "alias": "prod",    "db_type": "postgresql",    "connection_string": "postgresql://READER:[email protected]:5432/app",    "allowed_tables": ["users", "orders"]  }'
# 3) Provision a scoped agent (different from admin) for your AI app.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/agents \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{ "name": "reporting", "tenant_id": "<tenant>" }'
# 4) Set the agent's RLS policy.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/policies \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "agent_id": "<agent>",    "database_alias": "prod",    "allowed_tables": ["users", "orders"],    "row_filters": { "users": "tenant_id = 42" }  }'
# 4b) Store a named credential and let one agent read it.#     The value is write-only on this call. Empty permissions grant nothing.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/credentials \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "name": "openai_key",    "provider": "openai",    "value": "YOUR_SECRET"  }'
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/agents \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "name": "writer",    "tenant_id": "<tenant>",    "credential_permissions": ["openai_*"],    "budget_daily": 5  }'
# The agent uses the same qs_ key it uses for /v1/query.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/vault/get/openai_key \  -H 'X-API-Key: qs_...'
# 5) The agent queries.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/query \  -H 'X-API-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "database_alias": "prod",    "query": "how many active users do we have?",    "mode": "nl",    "max_rows": 10  }'

MCP integration

Listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.bch1212/queryshield.

Install the client:

bash
pip install queryshield-mcp

Then drop this into your Claude Desktop / Cursor / agent config:

json
{  "queryshield": {    "command": "queryshield-mcp",    "env": { "QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY": "qs_..." }  }}

Source for the standalone PyPI package lives in packages/queryshield-mcp/.

For MCP directory evaluators such as Glama, the repository root also includes a slim Dockerfile that launches the published queryshield-mcp stdio server for tool introspection. The container does not need QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY for MCP initialization/tool discovery; the key is only required when a discovered tool is actually invoked against a QueryShield API tenant.

MCP integration (legacy)

Drop this into any MCP-aware client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, custom agents):

json
{  "queryshield": {    "command": "python",    "args": ["-m", "queryshield.mcp_server"],    "env": {      "QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY": "qs_...",      "QUERYSHIELD_BASE_URL": "https://api.queryshield.io"    }  }}

Tools exposed:

  • query_database(database_alias, question, max_rows) — natural-language
  • query_database_sql(database_alias, sql, max_rows) — pre-built SELECT
  • list_credentials() — names this agent may read
  • get_credential(name, cost) — one permitted secret, same API key
  • get_audit_log(limit) — recent attempts for the calling agent

The PyPI package queryshield-mcp picks up the vault tools on its next release. Until then, python -m queryshield.mcp_server from this repo already exposes them.


Security model

ThreatDefense
Agent crafts a DROP TABLEsqlglot AST refuses non-SELECT
Agent sneaks ; and a second statementparser rejects len(statements) > 1
Agent uses pg_sleep, xp_cmdshell, ...function deny-list at the AST node level
Agent reads tables outside its scopeRLS schema + table whitelist
Agent reads other tenants' rowsrow_filters injected via AST .where()
Connection string leaks via stack tracesFernet-encrypted, never returned in any API
Agent reads a secret it was not grantedfnmatch permissions; empty list fails closed
Vault audit becomes the secretcredential access log stores metadata only
Audit log becomes the data exfil vectoronly metadata is stored — never rows
VAULT_KEY rotationre-encrypt rows under new key (script-driven)

safety.py is the single most important module. Every additional check that lands there should ship with a test in tests/test_safety.py.


Pricing

TierMonthlyDatabasesCredentialsQueries / monthNotes
InjectShieldfree———prompt-injection funnel, separate site
Starter$5003251,000,000
Pro$1,5001010010,000,000audit export
Enterprise$3,500unlimitedunlimitedunlimitedSSO, SIEM webhook

QueryShield tiers are one Stripe customer. InjectShield sign-up stays on injectshield.dev until that billing is folded in. Targets $32.5K MRR @ 15 customers (10 Pro + 5 Enterprise).


Deploy

The repo is Railway-ready. python -m queryshield.start is the entrypoint (reads PORT via os.getenv, since Railway exec's the start command without a shell). Provision Postgres + (optionally) Redis from Railway's marketplace and the rest is env vars.

railway up

/health is the liveness check. /ready returns 503 if the control-plane DB is unreachable.


Tests

bash
pip install pytestpython -m pytest tests/

102 tests cover the original safety, RLS, proxy, and HTTP suites plus the credential vault (encryption, qs_ key hashing, permission checks, budgets, tenant isolation, and the column migration for existing databases) and fail-closed VAULT_KEY / SESSION_KEY checks. The original cases:

  • AST safety (24 cases — direct DDL, comments, encoded keywords, multiple statements, forbidden functions, missing LIMIT)
  • RLS engine (6 cases — whitelist enforcement, WHERE injection, conjunction with existing predicates)
  • Proxy end-to-end against a SQLite "customer DB" (5 cases — happy path, blocked DML, RLS row filtering, table whitelist, cache hit)
  • HTTP integration via FastAPI TestClient (7 cases — full provisioning → query flow, scoped agent with RLS, auth failures)

Source: README.md at commit 462a237

Tools

0
SourceWeft has not started this package in its sandbox yet, so its tools are not known.

Version history

1
  1. v1.0.1LatestSep 16, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts