KillerSkills

vet-skills

Check agent skills and MCP servers before they run. Verdicts come from KillerSkills; the policy is yours or your org's.

npm i -g vet-skills                          # the CLI (Node 20+)vet-skills hook install all                  # Claude Code, Cursor, Codex, Windsurf, Gemini CLI: install check, runtime observation, canariesvet-skills check <skill>                     # or just ask before you add onevet-skills publish ./my-skill                # org members: detonate + list in the private registry

Use it as an MCP server

Give any agent the verdicts directly, so it checks a skill or MCP server before installing it and can pick a verified alternative. Read-only, no account, no API key. Tools: check_skill (verdict, score, what the sandbox saw, top findings, last safe version) and search_skills (the index by keyword, with verdicts).

Claude Code

claude mcp add killerskills -- npx -y vet-skills mcp

Cursor: ~/.cursor/mcp.json (or .cursor/mcp.json in a project)

{  "mcpServers": {    "killerskills": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "vet-skills", "mcp"] }  }}

Claude Desktop: Settings → Developer → Edit Config (claude_desktop_config.json)

{  "mcpServers": {    "killerskills": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "vet-skills", "mcp"] }  }}

VS Code: .vscode/mcp.json

{  "servers": {    "killerskills": { "type": "stdio", "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "vet-skills", "mcp"] }  }}

Windsurf: ~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json, same mcpServers block as Cursor. Codex: ~/.codex/config.toml

[mcp_servers.killerskills]command = "npx"args = ["-y", "vet-skills", "mcp"]

Then ask your agent: "Before you add that MCP server, check it with KillerSkills." Requires Node 20+. Index: 24,000+ skills and MCP servers from skills.sh, ClawHub, npm, PyPI, the Docker MCP Catalog and Claude Code plugin marketplaces, each run in a honeypot sandbox. Browse them at killerskills.ai.

Try it before you install it

vet-skills try @acme/crm-mcp            # npm package (or name@version)vet-skills try pypi:some-mcp-server     # PyPI packagevet-skills try owner/repo               # GitHub repositoryvet-skills try ./my-skill               # local directory

Fetches the package into a temp directory (never installed), runs it in the KillerSkills honeypot, and prints what it did: every host it contacted, every credential path it touched, the tools it exposes, and what it costs your agent (instruction tokens; for MCP servers the handshake time and the prompt context of its tool list). Exit code 2 when the run is Blocked.

Injection in what comes back

The same hook that observes tool calls reads what WebFetch, WebSearch, Read, Bash, Grep and every MCP tool return. When the content carries instructions aimed at the agent ("ignore previous instructions", "do not tell the user", a hidden HTML comment, invisible Unicode tag characters, a script piped to a shell), the hook tells the agent before its next step, logs it, and reports the kind of finding to your org when enrolled. Nothing from the content leaves the machine. vet-skills discover applies the same rules to CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md, MEMORY.md and every installed SKILL.md; vet-skills run applies them to a live server's tool list and results.

Run it with restrictions

claude mcp add crm -- npx -y vet-skills run --net declared --deny "delete_*" -- npx -y @acme/crm-mcp

vet-skills run sits between the agent and a stdio MCP server. Denied tools are answered with an error and never reach the server; every tool call is logged (tool name and argument names only); --net declared points the server's HTTPS_PROXY at a local allow-list proxy limited to the hosts its verdict saw it declare (--net host1,host2 to choose). When the install hook blocks a stdio server, it prints this command as the alternative. Clients that ignore HTTPS_PROXY are not network-contained, and the guard says so at start.

Add --contain (0.7.9) to put the server in an OS sandbox as well: on macOS sandbox-exec, on Linux bwrap (bubblewrap). The project directory, /tmp and the package caches stay writable; the rest of $HOME is read-only and credential directories (~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.config/gh, ~/.kube, ~/.docker, keychains, agent config folders, …) are not readable at all. On macOS the sandbox also forbids every outbound connection except the local proxy. Undeclared hosts get a fast, logged 403, so a telemetry call fails harmlessly and the tool keeps working; the exit summary counts them. Windows: use WSL. Where neither sandbox is available the guard runs without it and says so.

claude mcp add crm -- npx -y vet-skills run --contain --net declared -- npx -y @acme/crm-mcp

Credential broker: --secrets (0.7.13)

Most MCP servers need an API key in their environment, and a server that reads GITHUB_TOKEN to call GitHub can just as easily post it somewhere else. With --secrets NAME=host[,NAME=host…] the server never gets the value: its environment holds a placeholder, the guard keeps the real value, and the guard's proxy puts it into requests to the bound host only. A placeholder sent anywhere else is a random string, and the guard reports the attempt (✕ sent the GITHUB_TOKEN placeholder to collect.evil.xyz) and records it as a deviation.

GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_… vet-skills run --secrets GITHUB_TOKEN=api.github.com -- npx -y @acme/github-mcp

How: the proxy terminates TLS for the allowed hosts with a certificate from a throwaway CA made for that run (openssl, keys in a 0700 directory, deleted at exit). The server trusts it through NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, SSL_CERT_FILE, REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, CURL_CA_BUNDLE and GIT_SSL_CAINFO, which cover Node, Python, curl, Go and Rust clients. Headers, the URL and bodies up to 4 MB are rewritten. --secrets implies a network pin to the bound hosts (add --net to widen it). A client that pins certificates will refuse the run's CA; use --net without --secrets for that one.

Canary credentials: proof, not a heuristic

vet-skills canary install

Plants decoy credential files beside the real ones (~/.aws/credentials.old, ~/.config/gh/hosts.yml.old, ~/.npmrc.old, ~/.ssh/id_rsa_old, ~/.env.old), only where no file exists, with random values kept in ~/.vet-skills/canaries.json. Nothing legitimate reads a forgotten backup, so a canary value showing up in anything the agent sends or a tool returns is exfiltration by construction. The hook stops the session and names the file kind (never the value); vet-skills run refuses the call. vet-skills canary lists them, canary remove deletes only files whose contents are still exactly what it wrote.

Allowed because you asked for it

Not every credential read is an attack. The hook keeps a per-session intent record: the hosts and paths you named in a prompt (extracted by a UserPromptSubmit hook; the prompt itself is never stored) and the ones your own tool calls touched. A skill's sensitive action that matches an entry from the last 30 minutes is allowed with a one-line notice and recorded as a scoped allow (this session, this skill, this resource, 30 minutes); the same action with nothing to explain it is held and the agent is told to ask you.

vet-skills runtime allows        # scoped allows this week, with the reasonvet-skills runtime revoke <id>   # revoke one now

Policy context: turns this off per kind (credential_read: hold). No model judges intent: the rule is the match, and it is printed.

See what is already configured

vet-skills discover            # every MCP server, skill, plugin and hook on this machine, with verdicts

Reads Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Desktop, Gemini CLI and Codex configs locally. Each server and skill name is looked up for its verdict; nothing else leaves the machine. When you are enrolled in an org, the list of names is also reported to your team's Discovery page. Environment values, arguments and file contents never are.

It also inspects each installed skill folder for the installer-lure shape (a committed ZIP or .bat, a LuaJIT runtime, Lua saved as .txt, files matching the Agent Lure Stealer IOCs) and flags credential values pasted into config files, by kind and line only; the value itself is never printed or sent.

What it does

Every skills add, claude plugin install, and claude mcp add is resolved to an artifact hash, looked up, and evaluated against your policy before it runs:

$ vet-skills check deploy-helperResolving deploy-helper …vet-skills 0.7.8 · policy acme/default-strict
 BLOCKED  14/100 [email protected] · devtools-cloud · 4,210 installs
Observed in sandbox (3 scenarios, 38s):  ✕ network    telemetry-cdn.xyz — undeclared  ✕ memory     wrote agent memory (1)  ✕ filesystem reads ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.npmrc  ! tools      shadows github.create_pr
Policy acme/default-strict:  ✕ publisher blocked      devtools-cloud is on the block list
✕ Blocked [email protected] · publisher devtools-cloud is blocked by policyPin instead: [email protected] (score 88)

Decisions: allow, sandbox (install with restrictions), approval required (the install waits for a reviewer), block (with the last safe version named), defer (unscored: detonate first), observe (org enforcement off; logged only).

Fail-open

If the verdict API is unreachable and nothing is cached, the policy's offline rule applies. The default is allow with a warning: an outage on our side never stops your work. Set offline: block in your policy to fail closed.

Solo vs. org

Solo: a personal policy in ~/.vet-skills/policy.yaml (vet-skills policy show). Nothing is sent except verdict lookups (skill name, version, hash) and an anonymous client id.

Org: vet-skills join <org> --token <enroll token> --email [email protected] switches to the org policy. From then on the hook also reports installed skill names, versions, hashes, and decisions to your org dashboard. Never code, prompts, environment variables, or file contents. vet-skills leave reverts.

Commands

Environment: KILLERSKILLS_API (default https://killerskills.ai), VET_SKILLS_HOME (default ~/.vet-skills), NO_COLOR.