system_status
Report host, CPU, memory, and uptime for this machine.
Takes no parameters.

io.github.fitzyracing1Published by GitHub account fitzyracing1v0.1.0Updated Oct 30, 2026
Permission-gated superuser (sysadmin) MCP agent with enterprise guardrails and audit.
Permission-gated sysadmin MCP server that lets an assistant run shell commands, inspect system state and act on GitHub, with approvals and audit logging.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
A permission-gated superuser agent exposed over the Model Context Protocol (MCP). It gives an AI agent real system-administration powers on this machine — running shell commands, checking system state, and acting on GitHub — while wrapping every action in guardrails: a dangerous-command denylist, a human-approval gate for risky operations, least-privilege GitHub access, an append-only audit log, and Cisco AI Defense runtime inspection of every tool call and response.
The design goal is the version of a "superuser agent" you can actually ship: powerful, but safe, auditable, and compatible with enterprise guardrails.
Landing site: https://fitzyracing1.github.io/super-landing/ (source: fitzyracing1/super-landing). The previous Pages site in this repo is preserved at tag
site-v1/ branchsite-archive.
An agent that can do anything as root is a liability, not a product. Buyers
(and marketplace security reviews) expect scoping, approvals, and an audit
trail. So capabilities here always pass through a single choke point — the
Guard — which enforces, in order:
approval_required_at (default
MEDIUM) needs an explicit confirm=true from a human.human owner -> agent -> tool -> action -> outcome.This mirrors the enterprise model: your app owns scoping + approvals + local audit; Cisco AI Defense provides runtime threat inspection at the MCP layer; Cisco Duo Agentic Identity provides per-tool-call authorization tied to an accountable human owner; and Stripe turns metered tool calls into revenue.
Duo follows a "Duo decides, the gateway enforces" model. This agent registers as
a non-human identity, authenticates via the OAuth 2.1 client-credentials
grant (with an RFC 8707 resource indicator), and authorizes every tool call
either by matching the tool's required scope against what Duo granted, or by
calling an explicit Duo decision endpoint. Set DUO_ENABLED=true plus
DUO_TOKEN_URL / DUO_CLIENT_ID / DUO_CLIENT_SECRET (see .env.example). When
Duo is not configured, calls are allowed but flagged governed: false; in
enforce mode authorization errors fail closed.
Each authorized, successful tool call emits a Stripe meter event
(v2 billing meter events API), so the agent can be sold per-action. Configure a
meter in Stripe, then set STRIPE_ENABLED=true, STRIPE_API_KEY,
STRIPE_CUSTOMER_ID, and STRIPE_METER_EVENT_NAME. Per-tool weights let
higher-risk actions cost more. Billing is best-effort: metering failures are
logged and never block or fail the tool call (results are annotated
billed: true|false).
* run_command is LOW risk only when its base command is in
command_allowlist; otherwise HIGH (requires confirm=true).
Not yet on PyPI. Install straight from git:
From a clone:
Requires Python 3.10+.
Copy .env.example to .env (or use a YAML file — see superuser.example.yaml)
and set values. Key settings:
SUPERUSER_HUMAN_OWNER — the human accountable for the agent's actions.SUPERUSER_APPROVAL_AT — risk threshold for the approval gate (LOW…CRITICAL).AI_DEFENSE_* — Cisco AI Defense credentials/mode (see below).DUO_* — Cisco Duo Agentic Identity authorization (see below).STRIPE_* — Stripe usage-based billing (see below).GITHUB_TOKEN, GITHUB_ALLOWED_REPOS, GITHUB_ALLOW_WRITES — least-privilege GitHub.For a full console-value → env-var mapping for all three services, see
docs/INTEGRATIONS.md.
Install the SDK (pip install 'superuser[security]') and provide credentials:
AI_DEFENSE_INSPECTION_API_KEY.agentsec.protect() auto-patches LLM + MCP clients):
set AI_DEFENSE_API_MODE_LLM_ENDPOINT + AI_DEFENSE_API_MODE_LLM_API_KEY,
or point AI_DEFENSE_AGENTSEC_CONFIG at an agentsec.yaml
(see agentsec.example.yaml).AI_DEFENSE_MODE: enforce (block), monitor (log only), or off.If the SDK is not installed or no credentials are set, the agent still runs but
every result is annotated protected: false / UNPROTECTED — the gap is never
silent. In enforce mode, inspection errors fail closed (the call is
blocked); in monitor mode they fail open (logged, allowed).
With no keys set the server still runs: Duo and Stripe are off by default, and Cisco AI Defense runs unprotected (clearly flagged) if the SDK/keys are missing.
Example client config (stdio):
.env / *.yaml config files out
of version control (already in .gitignore).Apache-2.0.
This project is free, and its license stays as is. Support it through GitHub Sponsors:
Source: README.md at commit b223270
Report host, CPU, memory, and uptime for this machine.
Takes no parameters.
Report disk usage per mounted partition.
Takes no parameters.
List top processes. sort_by is 'memory' or 'cpu'.
limitsort_byRun a shell command on this machine. Non-allowlisted commands are HIGH risk and require confirm=true. Commands matching the dangerous-command denylist are always rejected, and every call is inspected by Cisco AI Defense and written to the audit log.
commandrequiredconfirmtimeoutGet metadata for an allowlisted repo (e.g. 'owner/name').
reporequiredList issues for an allowlisted repo.
reporequiredlimitstateComment on an issue/PR. Write action: requires confirm=true and GITHUB_ALLOW_WRITES.
bodyrequiredreporequiredconfirmissue_numberrequiredReport the agent's guardrail configuration and Cisco AI Defense status.
Takes no parameters.
80% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
Declare a license in the repository or the registry entry.
pip install "superuser @ git+https://github.com/fitzyracing1/Super.git"pip install "superuser[all] @ git+https://github.com/fitzyracing1/Super.git" # + Cisco AI Defense + Stripe SDKspip install -e . # core agent (Duo authz uses requests; no extra dep)pip install -e '.[security]' # + Cisco AI Defense SDK (cisco-aidefense-sdk)pip install -e '.[billing]' # + Stripe SDK (usage-based billing)pip install -e '.[all]' # security + billingpip install -e '.[dev]' # + pytest / ruff# Validate configuration and print guardrail/Cisco status, then exit:superuser --check
# Start the MCP server (stdio transport, for MCP clients like Cursor/Claude):superuser# or: python -m superuser{ "mcpServers": { "superuser": { "command": "superuser", "env": { "SUPERUSER_HUMAN_OWNER": "[email protected]", "AI_DEFENSE_MODE": "enforce", "AI_DEFENSE_INSPECTION_API_KEY": "..." } } }}pytest