
MCP Safety Warden
io.github.gautamvarmadatlaPublished by GitHub account gautamvarmadatlav1.6.0Updated Nov 8, 2026
MCP proxy adding security scanning, behavioral profiling, risk gating, and safe tool call execution.
Overview
A local MCP proxy that wraps other MCP servers with security scanning, behavioral profiling, risk gating and guarded tool-call execution.
- What you can do
- Register, inspect and list wrapped MCP servers, refresh their tool profiles and detect schema or tool-list drift
- Profile tools by effect class, destructiveness and risk tags, with latency, failure-rate and retry-policy stats
- Assess risk before a call, execute calls through gating with safer alternatives, and set permanent allow/block policies
- Run security audits of servers and their GitHub source, including injection, secret and composition-risk checks
- Explore a risk graph across servers, tools, findings and agent clients, and export it as JSON or Mermaid
- Discover MCP client configs on disk and onboard the servers found in bulk
- When to use it
- Useful when an assistant connects to third-party or untrusted MCP servers and you want a gatekeeper that screens tool metadata, arguments and outputs, or when you want to audit a server's source and behavior before letting it run.
- Requirements
- Python 3.10 or later, installed locally via pip; at least one MCP server to proxy (stdio, SSE or streamable_http). An LLM API key (Anthropic, OpenAI or Gemini) is recommended, or a local Ollama model passed explicitly; without one it runs in rule-based-only mode. Optional keys: SNYK_TOKEN, MCP_SCANNER_API_KEY, MCP_SCANNER_LLM_API_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, MCP_DB_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Configuration is via environment variables.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open MCP Safety Warden in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
MCP safety warden is a proxy server that wraps any MCP server and adds behavioral profiling, security scanning, risk gating, and safe execution to its tools.
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Contents
- Overview
- Prerequisites
- Installation
- Configuration
- MCP Integration
- CLI Reference
- Auxiliary Integrations
- Development
- Testing
- Further reading
[!IMPORTANT] MCP security is an active research area. Recent surveys catalog a lot of protocol-specific threat categories spanning tool poisoning, prompt injection, rug-pull attacks, supply chain compromise, credential exfiltration, and composition attacks across the full server lifecycle. See Securing the MCP (OpenReview), Landscape & Threats (arXiv), When MCP Servers Attack (arXiv), and MCP-38 Taxonomy (arXiv).
Overview
Use as a proxy to add safety gating to any MCP server, or point it at a server you don't own and run a full security audit without making a single tool call.
[Two operating modes]
Fig 1. Two operating modes: proxy and audit
Behavioral profiling: Effect class, retry safety, destructiveness. LLM-assisted (Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Ollama) with rule-based fallback. Observed stats (latency p50/p95, failure rate, output size) updated after every proxied call.
Security scanning: mcpsafety+ five-stage pipeline (Recon, Planner, Hacker, Auditor, Supervisor). Cisco AI Defense (AST/YARA). Snyk (metadata analysis). Kali and Burp Suite integrations enrich the pipeline with real network data and HTTP-layer probes. Source code scanning from GitHub with entropy, AST, taint flow, and rug-pull detection.
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Fig 2. mcpsafety+ five-stage pipeline, triggered when you run a full security audit on any MCP server
Safe execution: Argument scanning (20+ attack categories, LLM second-pass). Two-layer output injection scanning. Risk gating with alternatives and per-tool policies. Drift detection on every call and standalone check.
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Fig 3. Safe execution pipeline: the five checks every proxied tool call passes through
CLI: 24 subcommands, interactive risk menu, --json flag on every command, --yes for CI.
What it detects
- Prompt injection: tool outputs trying to hijack the agent: role hijacking, jailbreaks, fake system prompts, instruction overrides. Detects 11 obfuscation techniques including Unicode lookalikes, zero-width characters, and base64-encoded payloads.
- Malicious tool metadata: descriptions containing injection strings, hardcoded secrets, suspicious download URLs, tool impersonation (shadowing), direct financial execution, system service modification, and untrusted external dependencies. Backed by 19 Snyk checks.
- Argument injection: 20+ attack categories checked on every tool call before the call is forwarded: SSRF to cloud metadata endpoints (AWS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba), path traversal, credential file access (.aws, .ssh, .kube, .env), command injection, SQL/NoSQL/LDAP/XPath injection, XXE, template injection (SSTI), CRLF, null byte, deserialization payloads (Java, Python pickle, PHP, .NET), Windows UNC/ADS attacks, and base64-obfuscated variants of all of the above.
- Source code risks: fetches the server's GitHub source and runs 6 analysis layers: entropy scanning for hardcoded secrets, AST taint flow tracking (parameter to dangerous sink), description-vs-implementation mismatch, Bandit and Semgrep SAST, and LLM cross-function reasoning. Supports Python and TypeScript/JavaScript.
- Rug-pull and drift: stores a SHA-256 hash of the server's source on first scan and alerts if it changes. Catches description swaps, schema changes, and tool removal live on every call via a per-call drift guard.
- Behavior anomalies: classifies every tool by effect class, destructiveness, and 7 risk tags: credential exposure, arbitrary execution, data exfiltration, filesystem access, lateral movement, privilege escalation, and prompt injection surface.
- Composition attacks: analyzes tool sets for chaining risks: IDOR chains, read-write pairs, auth flow exploitation, write-then-execute sequences, and data accumulation + exfiltration paths across multiple tools.
- Network and host risks: when Kali Linux MCP is registered: open ports, running services, OS fingerprint via nmap. When Burp Suite MCP is registered: HTTP-layer active probing and blind SSRF via out-of-band callbacks.
- Credential exposure in outputs: redacts secrets from tool responses before storage. Injection-flagged responses are quarantined and never returned to the calling agent - stored under a run ID for forensic review.
- CVE research and Arxiv findings: the mcpsafety+ Auditor stage cross-references discovered capabilities against known vulnerabilities and recent security research.
Prerequisites
- Python 3.10 or later
- At least one wrapped MCP server to proxy (stdio, SSE, or streamable_http)
- Recommended: an LLM API key (Anthropic, OpenAI, or Gemini)
Without a key the wrapper operates in rule-based-only mode: lower confidence tool classification, regex-only injection scanning, no alternatives in the risk gate, no mcpsafety+ pipeline. For a fully local setup, run Ollama, set OLLAMA_MODEL, and pass --provider ollama explicitly (Ollama is not auto-detected).
[!NOTE] stdio servers that require local setup (
stdioservers that need local configuration before starting - missing config files, credentials, data directories, or OS-specific dependencies) cannot be inspected by the wrapper - tool discovery will fail and 0 tools will be stored. You can still run a full source-code security scan without spawning the server by passing--github-urltoscan/onboard, or thegithub_urlparameter tosecurity_scan_server. The mcpsafety+ pipeline will fetch and analyze the source directly from GitHub.sseandstreamable_httpservers are not affected.
Installation
With all optional extras:
Or specific extras:
From source:
The SQLite database is created automatically on first run in the platform user data directory (~/.local/share/mcpsafetywarden/ on Linux, ~/Library/Application Support/mcpsafetywarden/ on macOS, %APPDATA%\mcpsafetywarden\ on Windows). Override with MCP_DB_PATH.
Credential protection (automatic, no action required)
Secret values passed to register_server or onboard_server (Bearer tokens, API keys in headers or env) are automatically detected and replaced with opaque cref_ identifiers before anything touches the model context. The real credential is stored encrypted in the database and resolved silently at connection time. The model, conversation history, and logs only ever see cref_<id>.
Optional: at-rest encryption for stored credentials
Set the printed key as MCP_DB_ENCRYPTION_KEY before starting the server. This encrypts both server credentials and cref_ values at rest.
Configuration
All configuration is via environment variables.
Security note: Never commit API keys or the encryption key. The wrapper strips its own secrets from child process environments before spawning stdio servers.
MCP Integration
Connecting with Claude Desktop
Add the wrapper to claude_desktop_config.json:
Register each server with the wrapper before use:
For a mandatory gateway setup where all tool calls must go through the wrapper, see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md.
Available MCP tools
See docs/TOOLS.md for the full tool reference.
CLI Reference
24 subcommands covering all 25 MCP tools. Every command supports --json for machine-readable output and --yes / -y to skip confirmation prompts.
See docs/CLI.md for the full reference with flags and examples.
Auxiliary Security Tool Integrations
Kali Linux MCP, Burp Suite MCP, and Snyk each integrate automatically once registered. Kali enriches the Recon stage and ping_server with real nmap/traceroute data. Burp adds raw HTTP probing, out-of-band callbacks, and proxy evidence. Snyk analyses tool metadata for injection strings, tool shadowing, hardcoded secrets, and 16 other checks.
See docs/INTEGRATIONS.md for setup instructions.
Development
Install in editable mode:
Run the server and observe logs:
Every module uses logging.getLogger(__name__). The server does not call logging.basicConfig itself - configure logging in your entry point before importing.
Testing
Set an LLM API key to include LLM-assisted tests; without one they are skipped automatically. See docs/TESTING.md for step-by-step verification of classification, injection scanning, risk gating, and policy enforcement.
Further reading
Contributing
See CONTRIBUTING.md for code standards and pull request guidelines.
License
Apache License 2.0. See LICENSE for details.
Source: README.md at commit 4d182fd
Tools
0Version history
21- v1.5.9Nov 4, 2026
- v1.5.8Oct 29, 2026
- v1.5.3Oct 26, 2026
- v1.5.2Oct 25, 2026
- v1.5.1Oct 24, 2026
- v1.5.0Oct 19, 2026
- v1.4.36Oct 17, 2026
- v1.4.34Oct 15, 2026
- v1.4.33Oct 15, 2026
- v1.4.32Oct 15, 2026
- v1.4.31Oct 13, 2026
- v1.4.29Oct 13, 2026
- v1.4.27Oct 12, 2026
- v1.4.26Oct 12, 2026
- v1.4.25Oct 11, 2026
- v1.4.24Oct 11, 2026
- v1.4.23Oct 4, 2026
- v1.4.22Oct 4, 2026
- v1.4.21Oct 3, 2026
- v1.4.20Sep 30, 2026
- v1.4.18Sep 16, 2026
Score
40% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts
Declare a license in the repository or the registry entry.