
Mission — Trust Graduation Gate
io.github.gomissionPublished by GitHub account gomissionv0.1.4Updated Oct 24, 2026
Trust Graduation gate: Claude can do real work once Mission decides what it is allowed to do.
Overview
Mission's experimental MCP interception adapter that classifies proposed tool calls and holds consequential ones with an exact-action binding before a wrapped…
- What you can do
- Intercept and classify proposed tool calls from wrapped child MCP servers, holding high-risk or low-confidence calls before they reach the provider.
- Record an advisory exact-action hold and local review receipt in local mode.
- Write receipts containing action class, requesting child, target, SHA-256 input commitment, constraints, expiry and nonce.
- Install and verify Claude Desktop configuration, with dry-run and JSON report options.
- Expose a binding bridge that maps a held receipt into an external approval host and executor.
- When to use it
- Use it when you want a gate in front of MCP servers whose tools can send, change or delete things, so consequential calls are held for an exact, reviewable authorization instead of being executed on a chat message. It is a beta, experimental component, not a finished approval system.
- Requirements
- Node.js 20 or newer for the npm package, run via npx or installed locally. Claude Desktop for the installer workflow. Remote mode requires an explicitly configured, authenticated remote service; the legacy public endpoints are retired. Optional settings include MISSION_DONT_WRAP, MISSION_WORKSPACE, MISSION_LOCAL_URL or MISSION_LOCAL_PORT.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Mission — Trust Graduation Gate in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Web executable via Streamable HTTP. Remote servers run from the web runtime once configured in a workspace.
Use with an agent
Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or another agent — or into SourceWeft chat. The agent reads this server's install guide, shows you its publisher, endpoint and sign-in, and adds it to your client once you agree. Keys never go into a command.
Read https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.gomission%2Fmcp/install.md and connect the MCP server it describes to my client. Before changing any config, show me its publisher, endpoint and sign-in method and wait for my OK. Never put an API key in a command or in a file I would commit; ask me where it should come from.Other MCP clients
Add this to your client's mcpServers config.
{
"mcpServers": {
"mission-trust-graduation-gate": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://claude.gomission.io/mcp/"
}
}
}README
@gomission/mcp
Mission’s open MCP interception adapter for exact-action authority.
It has one narrow job: sit before a wrapped MCP provider, classify a proposed tool call, and hold consequential calls with an immutable Trust Graduation action binding. Low-risk calls may pass through. A chat message saying “approve” is never treated as authority.
Status: experimental beta. Apache-2.0. Zero runtime dependencies.
Prove the boundary first
Requirements: Node.js 20 or newer.
The command uses a fake email provider and prints one machine-readable
DEMO_RESULT. It proves that:
- the consequential provider function was called zero times;
- the hold contains an exact action and input hash;
- changing the reviewed input changes the commitment;
- chat text grants no execution authority.
This proves interception, not completed authorization or production adoption.
The portable grant/replay proof lives in @trust-graduation/core:
The three primitives
The MCP adapter implements the pre-provider hold. It does not mint a trusted Mission Key and it cannot resume a held call. A trusted approval host and executor must validate and atomically consume the matching key. The experimental A2A continuation is published at:
https://trustgraduation.org/extensions/a2a/action-authorization/v1
MCP Hold to Exact Provider Execution
The package root exposes the stable, zero-dependency binding bridge used by an external approval host and executor:
The bridge verifies binding integrity and maps the intercepted identities, target, constraints, expiry, and nonce into the core executor shape. The core then re-hashes the actual provider input, authenticates and atomically consumes the Key, calls the provider, and writes result-linked evidence. Mutation or replay never reaches the provider.
For a generated adapter and objective provider-call counters:
With both packages installed, the included compatibility proof is:
The MCP proxy still never resumes a held call merely because chat says "approve". This bridge is for the separately authenticated approval host and provider-bound executor.
Install for Claude Desktop
The installer inspects the existing Claude Desktop MCP configuration:
- if it finds consequential MCP servers, it selects
--wrap; - otherwise it selects
--local, an advisory exact-binding demonstration; - it never auto-selects the hosted read-only mode.
Restart Claude Desktop after installation, then verify:
verify probes modern MCP with server/discover and tools/list, falling back
to the initialize-era protocol for older endpoints. Add --json for a
machine-readable report or --no-probe to inspect configuration only.
Modes
Choose explicitly when needed:
Useful flags:
--workspace <path>— store local receipts in an existing workspace.--dry-run— print the configuration change without writing it.--force— create configuration even when Claude Desktop is not detected.--remote-url <url>— override the hosted endpoint.MISSION_DONT_WRAP="name1,name2"— exclude selected MCP children.
Exact hold contract
For a consequential wrapped call, the adapter writes a local receipt containing:
- action class;
- privacy-preserving local workspace identifier;
- requesting MCP child;
- target when one can be inferred;
- SHA-256 input commitment;
- one-execution constraints;
- expiry and nonce;
- SHA-256 commitment over the complete binding.
Receipts are written atomically with owner-only file permissions. The adapter never stores the raw workspace path inside the binding. A local argument summary remains in the receipt for human review, so treat the receipt directory as sensitive workspace data.
MCP compatibility
Preferred protocol: 2026-07-28.
- stateless per-request
_metawith client capabilities; - mandatory
server/discover; - one JSON-RPC message per HTTP POST; modern batches and client notifications fail closed;
- HTTP binding for
MCP-Protocol-Version,Mcp-Method, andMcp-Name; - protocol-defined
HeaderMismatchand unsupported-version errors; resultType: "complete"and cache metadata;- initialize-era compatibility for
2025-11-25and2024-11-05.
The authority manifest is advertised through MCP discovery under the
experimental mission-authority/v1 capability.
Security boundary
The adapter does not claim:
- that a model or chat UI authenticated the principal;
- that a review receipt is an approval grant;
- exactly-once behavior at an external provider;
- independent conformance or production validation;
- global trust in an agent.
Use @trust-graduation/core to create and validate exact grants. The executor
must authenticate the grant issuer, re-bind the actual provider input, atomically
consume the key, invoke the provider at most once, and reconcile unknown
provider outcomes.
Open-core boundary
Free and open:
- this MCP adapter;
@trust-graduation/coreand its schemas;@gomission/mission-schemasconformance vocabulary;- the A2A exact-action authorization extension;
- Mission Lite’s local focus app.
Commercial Mission may provide managed policy, trusted approval surfaces, hosted audit/receipt operations, organization controls, support, and provider integrations. Product entitlements never grant action authority.
Links
- Protocol: https://trustgraduation.org/
- A2A extension: https://trustgraduation.org/extensions/a2a/action-authorization/v1
- Mission: https://gomission.io/
- Source: https://github.com/gomission/mcp
License
Apache-2.0. Mission names and logos are trademarks; the code license does not grant permission to imply endorsement.
Workspace isolation in 0.3.0-beta.3
The local chat bridge no longer assumes that port 8814 belongs to the selected workspace. An explicit absolute MISSION_WORKSPACE and explicit loopback MISSION_LOCAL_URL (or MISSION_LOCAL_PORT) are required even for the workspace identity probe. Redirects are rejected. Chat forwarding remains unavailable until the desktop provides a supported workspace-scoped authentication handoff; no query is sent by this release. Local advisory holds and receipts continue to work.
The legacy gomission.io/mcp/ and claude.gomission.io/mcp/ endpoints are retired. They are not an alternative authentication path.
Source: README.md at commit 997cdd0
Tools
0Version history
1- v0.1.4LatestSep 16, 2026
Score
85% of the applicable checks met
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- Tools listedRequired15 pts
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