a2a_get_started
Explains what A2A TrustGate is and how to activate this MCP server (no API key on this session yet).
Takes no parameters.

io.github.jysweePublished by GitHub account jysweev1.5.17Updated Nov 2, 2026
A2A TrustGate: 4-gate firewall that screens every AI-agent action before it runs. 50 tools.
The publisher's own server: Vips
A2A TrustGate screens AI-agent actions through a 4-gate firewall before they run and logs every decision to an exportable audit trail.
Web executable via SSE. Remote servers run from the web runtime once configured in a workspace.
Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or another agent — or into SourceWeft chat. The agent reads this server's install guide, shows you its publisher, endpoint and sign-in, and adds it to your client once you agree. Keys never go into a command.
Read https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.jyswee%2Fa2a-trustgate/install.md and connect the MCP server it describes to my client. Before changing any config, show me its publisher, endpoint and sign-in method and wait for my OK. Never put an API key in a command or in a file I would commit; ask me where it should come from.Add this to your client's mcpServers config.
{
"mcpServers": {
"a2a-trustgate": {
"type": "sse",
"url": "https://mcp.a2ainfrastructure.com/sse"
}
}
}[npm version] [EU AI Act] [OCSF audit] [MCP]
You put an AI agent in production. Now prove it's safe — to your auditor, your regulator, your board.
A2A TrustGate screens every action an agent takes before it runs, and writes the decision to an immutable, SIEM-ready audit trail. Not a policy document that says agents should behave — a control that stops the ones that don't, and the evidence to prove it.
Who it's for: compliance and risk teams putting AI into regulated production — financial services, healthcare, network operations, creative/IP rights, enterprise AI adoption, and research institutions. If someone can ask you "prove your AI is safe," this is the answer.
[a2a demo — screen an agent action in one command]
Agent proposes an action, the gate screens it, the decision lands in the audit trail — watch the full demo.
Most "AI governance" is a PDF that describes intentions. A2A produces evidence. Every screened action becomes a genuine OCSF Detection Finding — the same schema your SOC already ingests — with a tamper-evident content hash and the full decision reasoning:
EU AI Act deployer? Read the EU AI Act compliance reference — an article-by-article crosswalk (Art. 12 record-keeping, Art. 14 human oversight, Art. 26 deployer obligations) with citations to the official EUR-Lex text. The Regulation becomes generally applicable 2 August 2026.
Compliance you can prove starts with a control that actually stops things. Every action passes four gates before it's allowed to execute:
The firewall only ever tightens a decision — allow → review → block. A safe action stays fast; a risky one is stopped and recorded with the reason.
The whole control is a CLI (and an MCP server). Wrapping a risky step is one line, and exit codes make it scriptable:
Works with: Claude Code · Cursor · Cline · Windsurf · Aider · Codex · any MCP client.
The npm package is a2a-trustgate; the command is a2a.
Your key is issued immediately but returns 402 until you start your 7-day free trial ($0 today) —
a2a signupprints the activation link. Cancel before day 7 and you're never charged.
The eval call has a few knobs, and it's scriptable — wrap any risky step:
A2A screens the same way for everyone and produces the same audit trail — but the surface each team touches, and the framework they're measured against, is different. Pick yours.
Your agents run commands against routers, switches, and sites. A2A registers each device, enforces a per-device policy, and gives you a killswitch that stops every agent at once.
Watch the full clip: network-ops →
Multi-agent systems where one agent's output is another's input. A2A gives them scoped workspaces and HMAC-signed channels, so a rogue or injected message can't cross a boundary you didn't grant.
Watch the full clip: ai-agents →
Every decision — allowed or blocked, with reasoning — lands in an append-only log you can export for an auditor. OCSF-native Detection Findings, EU AI Act aligned.
Watch the full clip: regulated →
Register your catalogue, mint scoped licences, and every agent that reaches for an asset is checked against a rights log. Access is granted by licence, not by scraping.
Watch the full clip: creative →
Represent many rights holders? A distributor or aggregator holds one provider key and onboards every artist's repertoire in bulk — each work stamped with an ownerRef (the artist's stable id in your system) so reads and writes are hard-scoped per rights holder. The same integration works for one artist or a million.
Export your catalogue as CSV (CD Baby, DistroKid and most distributors already do), then:
A CD Baby-style CSV maps automatically — headers like Artist ID, Artist, Track Title, ISRC, TDM Opt-Out are recognised (override any column with --owner-ref-col / --isrc-col / --title-col):
portal-link mints a short-lived signed handoff URL, so you can embed a white-label rights portal straight into your own product — your brand, no A2A login, per-artist isolated. This is the drop-in pattern behind BandSaaS; the same one an aggregator embeds for its whole roster. licensee-link mints the mirror portal for an AI company (a licenseeRef) to browse the licensable catalogue and request scoped licences — the artist approves in their own portal, which issues a revocable licence. Both sides stay inside your product.
licensee-link drops a human into the portal. A licensee key is the credential the licensee's own agents authenticate with, so its usage is attributed to the licensee rather than borrowing the rights holder's key:
The key is hashed at rest and shown once. It carries no subscription of its own — your partner account being active is the entitlement, so it dies with it — and it may only POST /v1/evaluate with a licence key. Nothing else. That restriction is what makes it safe to hand to an outside company.
Because the licensee authenticates as itself, the access log records the consuming party alongside the rights holder:
Every evaluation — allowed and denied — meters back to you, the sponsoring partner, at your per-partner rate. A provable block is the product, so it costs the same evaluation.
The gates prove every action was screened. A work order proves the layer above: who authorised this work, under what authority, toward what outcome — and binds it to a signed, tamper-evident completion record. This is the enterprise governance layer, sitting directly on top of the 4-gate firewall.
Once authorised, the work order's scope grant becomes the ceiling of what the job may do — an action outside it is blocked at evaluation time, even if the agent's own role would allow it. The completion record is signed with a key only A2A can reproduce, so an auditor (or the accountable human) can re-verify the whole chain — directive → actions → gate verdicts → outcome — and detect any later tampering.
ChatGPT, Claude, Copilot are already in your building. Register each tool, screen what it's asked to do, and get one audit trail across all of them.
Watch the full clip: enterprise-ai →
Approvals, scope enforcement, and an exportable trail that maps to research-ethics and UKRI responsible-AI requirements. One URL for a researcher to connect, governance for the board.
Watch the full clip: university →
Generate a ready-made wrapper for the SDK you already use — the screen call is one line:
Prefer tools over a CLI? a2a ships an MCP server. Point Claude Code (or any MCP client) at it and your agent gets 49 native tools: evaluate, pipelines, workspaces, channels, devices, sites, catalogues, audit, approvals, admin. The whole platform.
For clients that use a JSON config (Cline, Cursor, Windsurf), pass your API key via the A2A_API_KEY environment variable. The MCP server runs outside your project directory, so it will not pick up .a2a/config.json:
No key yet? Start it without one: the server boots in onboarding mode and can guide signup, then add the key and restart.
No CLI at all? Claude Web, Claude Desktop, Raycast, or any hosted MCP client can connect straight to our remote server. Same 49 tools, same API key, nothing to install:
Setup guide: MCP quickstart.
ownerRef isolation + white-label portal links (distributors / aggregators)a2a mcp-serve) or fully remote (mcp.a2ainfrastructure.com)Pricing: every plan starts with a 7-day free trial — card required, $0 today, cancel any time before day 7 and you're never charged. The full 4-gate firewall, behavioral analysis and OCSF-shaped audit are on every plan; higher tiers add volume, webhooks, custom rules, dedicated sandboxes and SSO.
Verified education & research: Institutional $79/mo. Full pricing →.
API key resolution (first match wins):
--key flagA2A_API_KEY environment variable./.a2a/config.json (project-local)~/.a2a/config.json (global)a2a adminSelf-hosted or platform-operator deployments get a full ops suite behind a separate
superadmin key (A2A_SA_KEY / --sa-key — never a tenant API key): tenant lifecycle
(tenant-create --theme --password --verify, tenant-key mint), partner management
(partner-embed with incremental --frame-add/--frame-remove, brand config, secret
rotation), cross-tenant IP ops (catalogues, catalogue-restamp, catalogue-restore,
licences, licence-revoke, access-log), deck shares, partner provisions/usage, and
billing ops (subscriptions, invoices). Run a2a admin help for the full list.
Add to your CLAUDE.md, .cursorrules, .clinerules, .windsurfrules, or AGENTS.md:
An agent that can act is an agent that can act wrongly — and by the time you read the log, it's done. I wanted a gate in front of the action, not a report after it: deterministic where it can be, self-evaluating where it can't, and audited either way. It's early and I'm iterating fast — if something's rough or missing, tell us.
Proprietary — Tyga.Cloud Ltd. See LICENSE.
Source: README.md at commit cdad3af
Explains what A2A TrustGate is and how to activate this MCP server (no API key on this session yet).
Takes no parameters.
Create a new A2A TrustGate tenant and get an API key (shown once), unlocking all safety tools in this session immediately. Agent-first: only a short tenant slug is required — no email or password. A human must then add a card (secure Stripe checkout) at the returned paymentUrl to activate; /v1 calls return 402 until activated.
agenttenantIdrequireddescription90% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
Declare a license in the repository or the registry entry.

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a2a audit # recent decisions, allowed and blockeda2a audit export --format ocsf # OCSF Detection Findings — straight into your SIEMa2a audit export --format csv # hand a spreadsheet to an auditora2a eval "rm -rf ./build" # ✓ ALLOWED (exit 0)a2a eval "rm -rf /" # ✗ BLOCKED (exit 1) — filesystem destruction patterna2a eval "command" --context ctx # add decision context (exit 2 = needs review)npm install -g a2a-trustgate# Create a tenant (agent-first — human activates the key)a2a signup my-company --local
# Screen a command — exit 0 = allowed, 1 = blocked, 2 = needs reviewa2a eval "rm -rf ./build"# ✓ ALLOWED
a2a eval "rm -rf /"# ✗ BLOCKED: filesystem destruction pattern
# See plan, usage, limitsa2a status
# Full referencea2a --helpa2a eval "command" --gate2 self # self-evaluate (default)a2a eval "command" --gate2 skip # Gate 1 only (fast path)a2a eval "command" --pipeline ID # route through a named pipeline
if a2a eval "rm -rf ./build" --json 2>/dev/null; then rm -rf ./buildfia2a device add --name core-rtr-1 --host 10.0.0.1 --vendor ciscoa2a device policy DEVICE-ID --mode strict --require-approval --max 5a2a device lock DEVICE-ID # freeze a single devicea2a killswitch # freeze every agent, everywherea2a device import --file hosts.csv # bulk onboard (name,host,vendor,model,role,siteCode)a2a workspace create "research-swarm"a2a workspace WS-ID add-agent --name planner --role experta2a workspace WS-ID enforce --agent planner "command" # screen an agent's actiona2a channel create ops-busa2a channel CH-ID send "interface frozen — you're clear to build" # HMAC-signeda2a audit # recent decisionsa2a audit export --format ocsf # OCSF Detection Findings → your SIEMa2a audit export --format csv # hand to an auditor (csv/json)a2a approvals # human-in-the-loop queuea2a approve TASK-IDa2a reject TASK-ID "out of policy" # reason recorded in the traila2a catalogue create "The Back Catalogue"a2a catalogue licence create --catalogue CAT-ID --email [email protected] --scope reada2a catalogue access-log # who reached for what, and whether it was licenseda2a catalogue content-sources# One-time: get a provider key from your A2A partner account, thenexport A2A_API_KEY=a2a_provider_xxxxxxxx
# Preview the column mapping before writing anythinga2a ip-aggregator import repertoire.csv --dry-run
# Bulk-import the whole repertoire (idempotent — safe to re-run)a2a ip-aggregator import repertoire.csv
a2a ip-aggregator owners # every rights holder + work counta2a ip-aggregator works --owner-ref crosswinds # one artist's registered worksa2a ip-aggregator opt-out --owner-ref crosswinds --all # bulk AI/TDM opt-out (EU AI Act Art. 53)a2a ip-aggregator portal-link --owner-ref crosswinds # white-label artist portal — drop the artist in, no second logina2a ip-aggregator access-log --owner-ref crosswinds # the provable trail, per artist
# The licensee side (the AI company that wants to use the catalogue):a2a ip-aggregator catalogue # the licensable catalogue (opted-out works excluded)a2a ip-aggregator licensee-link --licensee-ref acme-ai # white-label licensee portal — browse + request a scoped licenceArtist ID,Artist,Track Title,ISRC,TDM Opt-Outcrosswinds,Crosswinds,All Good Things,USCGH1915861,truemidnight_owls,Midnight Owls,Neon Rain,GBK4Y2100017,falsea2a ip-aggregator licensee-key mint --licensee-ref acme-ai --name "Acme AI"a2a ip-aggregator licensee-key lista2a ip-aggregator licensee-key revoke <id> # dies immediately
a2a ip-aggregator usage # metered usage, by eventALLOW 2026-08-07T10:14:02 owner=crosswinds licensee=acme-ai summarise All Good ThingsDENY 2026-08-07T10:14:09 owner=crosswinds licensee=acme-ai reproduce All Good Things (Scope exceeded)# A named human raises a governed directive with RACI + a scope granta2a work-order create --ref WO-2026-0142 --title "Summarise Q3 catalogue" \ --directive "Summarise tracks in the Q3 batch for the licensing review" \ --accountable [email protected] --authority "licensing-review-ticket-88" \ --domain creative --scope "read,summarise.*"
# --domain applies your sector's profile: network-ops (change request), regulated# (work order / Art 4 decision record — authority required), creative (usage# authorisation), enterprise-ai (approved use), university (research protocol —# ethics ref required), ai-agents (mission). Add sector context with --meta# key=value, e.g. --meta grantRef=EPSRC-42 or --meta aiTools=copilot,chatgpt
a2a work-order authorise WO-... # human sign-off: DRAFT → AUTHORISED (Art. 14)a2a work-order attach WO-... TASK # attach the gated tasks that fulfil ita2a work-order complete WO-... --outcome "42 tracks summarised, 0 blocked"a2a work-order verify WO-... # re-derive the hashes — proves nothing was altereda2a work-order precedent "summarise catalogue for licensing" # what was authorised beforea2a ai-tools add "ChatGPT" --type chatbota2a ai-tools # every registered toola2a ai-tools update 0 --status pauseda2a eval "command" --context "grant-XYZ research pipeline"a2a approvals # ethics/governance queuea2a audit export --format csv # for the board or the fundera2a generate node # a2a-safety.jsa2a generate python # a2a_safety.pya2a generate anthropic # tool_use wrappera2a generate openai # tool_call wrapperclaude mcp add a2a -- a2a mcp-serve{ "mcpServers": { "a2a": { "command": "a2a", "args": ["mcp-serve"], "env": { "A2A_API_KEY": "a2a_your_key_here" } } }}URL: https://mcp.a2ainfrastructure.com/sseAuth: Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEYa2a login # store globally (~/.a2a/)a2a login --local # store per-project (./.a2a/) — add .a2a/ to .gitignorea2a config # show which config is active## A2A TrustGateThis project screens agent actions through A2A before they execute.Use the `a2a` CLI. Config is in .a2a/config.json (auto-loaded).If not configured: a2a login --local --key YOUR_KEY
Before running any risky command, screen it: a2a eval "the command" --json # exit 0 = run it, 1 = do not, 2 = needs review