
segment-mcp
io.github.katekrugerPublished by GitHub account katekrugerv0.1.2Updated Nov 3, 2026
Read-first MCP server for Twilio Segment: routing, stale sources, delivery health, governance.
Overview
Read-only MCP server for Twilio Segment that answers which destinations receive which events, which sources are stale, and where delivery or governance is…
- What you can do
- Audit event routing across destinations and sources
- Trace a single event name to where it goes and whether anything governs it
- Find stale sources and distinguish dead instrumentation from new ones
- Check whether a destination is silently failing delivery
- Find ungoverned sources or ones letting unplanned events through
- Each tool composes several Segment Public API calls into one structured answer
- When to use it
- Useful when you administer a Segment workspace and want an assistant to answer routing, staleness, delivery-health and governance questions without clicking through many screens. It suits audits and troubleshooting rather than making changes, since it ships no write tools.
- Requirements
- Runs locally over stdio, installed from PyPI with uvx (Python/uv). Needs a Segment workspace on Team or Business tier, a Public API token in SEGMENT_API_TOKEN minted by a Workspace Owner, and SEGMENT_REGION set explicitly to us or eu. Startup fails if the token, region or tier is wrong. Network access to the Segment API.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open segment-mcp in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
segment-mcp
A read-first MCP server for Twilio Segment. Answers which destinations get which events, which sources are dead, and which are governed by nothing — the questions nobody can answer without clicking through forty screens.
Read-only by default
SEGMENT_MCP_MODE defaults to read, and every tool this server ships
today is a read. Shipping with zero write tools is a feature, not a
limitation — see BUILD-PLAN.md §2. write and admin modes exist in
the tier model (src/segment_mcp/modes.py) for when gated writes land;
right now there is nothing for them to unlock.
What this refuses to do — permanently, not "for now"
POST /regulations and POST /regulations/sources/{id} — workspace-scoped,
irreversible deletion or suppression of user data across every source —
are unreachable in every mode, with no configuration path to enable
them. Three independent things enforce this: the mode-authorization
layer refuses it before even checking the current mode, the API client
refuses to send the request before it reaches the network, and no tool
this server registers references it in any form.
This isn't a gate waiting for the right permission level. It's a line, because these endpoints accept an array of subjects and one malformed or hallucinated call can permanently delete thousands of profiles with no undo. Full reasoning: docs/what-this-refuses-to-do.md.
Quick start
Requires a Segment workspace on Team or Business tier and a Public API token (see Prerequisites below).
Point an MCP client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, etc.) at it over stdio. The server refuses to start — loudly, with a clear message — if the token, region, or workspace tier isn't right; see Startup checks.
The five tools
Each composes several Public API calls into one structured answer, not a raw endpoint dump:
Prerequisites
- Team or Business tier. The Public API is not available on Free or Add-on plans. There is no workaround, and the server's startup checks fail with a clear message rather than a raw 403 if your workspace doesn't qualify.
- A Public API token. Only a Workspace Owner can mint one: Segment App → Workspace Settings → Access Management → Tokens → Create Token → Public API (not Config API).
Region configuration
There is no default — you must set this explicitly. An EU workspace whose API calls are pointed at the US endpoint doesn't error; it just silently returns nothing, which is a far worse failure mode than a crash. This server's startup checks call the API once with your configured region and fail loudly if the token doesn't actually belong to it, naming the region that does.
Startup checks
All fatal — the server refuses to start rather than fail confusingly on the first tool call:
SEGMENT_REGIONis set and one ofus/eu.SEGMENT_API_TOKENis present and actually authenticates against that region.- The workspace's tier supports the Public API — a Free-tier workspace gets a clear "requires Team or Business tier" message, not a raw 403.
Modes
read— every tool above. No mutation reachable, at any mode.write— would add Tier 3 replace-semantics changes (none shipped yet), each echoed back for confirmation before executing.admin— would add Tier 2 deletes (none shipped yet), gated behind a typed confirmation naming the exact resource — not justconfirm=true.
See src/segment_mcp/modes.py for the full tier model and
docs/what-this-refuses-to-do.md for
what stays out of scope regardless of mode.
Profile API — a separate, higher trust tier
The Profile API returns PII on named individuals — traits, external IDs, event history, and identity links for a specific person. This is the most privacy-sensitive read anywhere in this server's surface, so it is walled off from everything else:
- A separate credential,
SEGMENT_PROFILE_TOKEN— never the mainSEGMENT_API_TOKEN. Also requiresSEGMENT_PROFILE_SPACE_ID(your Unify Space ID, not your workspace ID). - Explicit opt-in. If
SEGMENT_PROFILE_TOKENis unset, no profile tool is registered — the capability doesn't exist for that server instance. - Every lookup is logged — collection, id_type, and the caller —
before the request is even sent, via
client/profile_api.py'ssegment_mcp.profile_apilogger. The log records that a lookup happened and which profile, as a truncated SHA-256 digest of the lookup key, never the raw identifier — this client never logs the raw identifier itself, and it silenceshttpx's own request-URL log process-wide at construction so the identifier doesn't leak that way either, since the Profile API puts it in the URL path. The digest cannot be reversed back to the identifier, but repeated lookups of the same profile are still correlatable across log lines for auditing. - Lookups are case-sensitive. The wrong case returns an empty result, not an error — this client lowercases every lookup value at its boundary and logs a warning when it had to.
No profile-lookup MCP tool is wired into server.py yet — this is the
client and trust-boundary machinery a future tool will be built on, per
BUILD-PLAN.md's v0.2 scope.
Development
See CONTRIBUTING.md and AGENTS.md.
See also
Every project here shares one idea: a GTM system should refuse to act on data it cannot verify.
campaign-preflight — the same refusal to coerce missing evidence into a pass. insufficient_data is its own state in both.
pipeline-waterfall — downstream of this. Reconciles the bookings and pipeline waterfall, and fails the build rather than reporting a bridge that does not tie out.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
Source: README.md at commit 22d531d
Tools
0Version history
1- v0.1.2LatestSep 16, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts