rustunifimcp

[mechub mark]

rustunifimcp

Enterprise MCP server for UniFi Network — curated tools, scoped access, audited change control
a mechub project — sovereign network-security automation

rustunifimcp is the UniFi Network member of the mechub MCP server family. It does for UniFi what rustjunosmcp does for Junos and rustpanosmcp does for PAN-OS: a curated, scoped, audited MCP surface over one vendor's management API.

It is built mecmcp-native — no local authentication, transport, audit, policy, inventory, or change-control code at all. All of that comes from mecmcp, the shared Rust foundation. What is written here is the UniFi resource model, the tool surface, and the workflows. Nothing else.

UniFi is the first vendor in the family with no candidate configuration at all — no staging area, no commit, no on-box validation. Junos and PAN-OS have candidate/commit; Proxmox and Security Director have server-side task semantics to bind an approval to. UniFi has immediate REST writes against live configuration and nothing else, which makes it the real test of whether mecmcp-changeset generalises beyond the two vendors that produced it.

Status

In production. The dependency on the legacy server is retired.

rustunifimcp v0.5.0 serves the full surface — reads, workflows, operational actions, and change control — from LXC 981 over TLS, under two-person control. The unifi-mcp-legacy registration is gone; nothing routes to the Python server any more.

LXC 980 itself is untouched and still running. It is tagged notmechub;protected and was never ours to modify: retiring the dependency never meant acting on the guest. It remains as a rollback path — re-adding its registration restores the old surface — and stopping or destroying it is a separate decision for its owner.

Parity against the legacy surface is recorded in docs/PARITY-AUDIT.md: of 33 legacy tools in the usage window, 31 are covered and verified against the live controller, one is built but unverified (execute_port_action, reachable as unifi_device_action action=port_action — PoE power-cycle only, behind --allow-direct-commit, and not exercised live because it would disrupt a switch port in use), and one is an accepted gap (set_device_port_overrides — no verified write route on 10.5.67).

Minimum supported controller version

Minimum supported version: UniFi Network Application 10.5.67 / UniFi OS Server 5.1.37

This server requires a UniFi Network controller running at least version 10.5.67 (Network Application) or 5.1.37 (UniFi OS Server). These versions include the 2026 CVSS 10 security fixes (SAB-062, SAB-064, SAB-066/067) that this project depends on for secure API access.

The minimum version is verified against the rustunifimcp test rigs and fixture sets. Running against an older controller version may result in missing endpoints or unhandled API drift.

What it replaces

The homelab runs enuno/unifi-mcp-server (Python / FastMCP). It is a capable API client with two problems this project exists to fix.

Tool sprawl. Its registry auto-registers every public async function in src/tools/ by reflection — 205 functions across 37 modules become roughly 270 MCP tools. Nobody chose that number. rustunifimcp targets 22: typed read primitives over a resource enum, a change-control lifecycle, scoped operational actions, and four workflows that earn their names. Every one of the 22 does real work end to end — none is advertised and then refuses or returns an empty result on every call.

No MCP-layer security. It listens on plain HTTP with no bearer token, no scopes, no audit trail, and no rate limiting. Anything that can reach the port has unrestricted write access to the controller. rustunifimcp inherits the full mecmcp security layer instead.

Tool catalog

The read primitives, the collapsed surface behind unifi_list_resources and unifi_get_resource. Every kind is projected through the allowlist or scan documented in rustunifimcp-core::redact before it reaches the model — see Design highlights below.

firewall_rule, port_forward, and static_route (MEC-509) are the legacy (non-zone-based) ruleset, port forwarding rules, and static routes — read-only for now; no write route exists for them through unifi_stage_change. subject=event reaches the controller's event log.

unifi_backup_action (MEC-516) wires list and trigger: list returns the controller's retained backups, capped at 100 entries with a truncated marker like every other list-shaped tool; trigger starts a new backup. download and validate are not offered at all (MEC-505: removed from the action enum rather than advertised and refused) — both would need to move a raw .unf file rather than JSON, which this server does not yet support. restore is refused permanently; restoring a backup overwrites the entire configuration, so it goes through the change-set lifecycle instead.

Run with Docker (stdio)

The catalog-friendly stdio invocation replaces the image's HTTP CMD with --transport stdio. Put controllers.json (shape: packaging/examples/controllers.example.json) and the controller API key file in etc/, and give the container a writable state/ directory for change sets and the audit HMAC key. Both must be owned by the image's UID/GID 65532:65532, files at mode 0600:

mkdir -p etc state# etc/controllers.json  -> "api_key_file": "/etc/unifimcp/api.key"# etc/api.key           -> the controller API keysudo chown -R 65532:65532 etc statesudo chmod 0700 etc statesudo chmod 0600 etc/controllers.json etc/api.key
docker run --rm -i \  -v "$PWD/etc:/etc/unifimcp:ro" \  -v "$PWD/state:/var/lib/unifimcp" \  ghcr.io/mechubsec/rustunifimcp:latest \  --transport stdio

stdio carries no caller identity, so change-set approval and the direct-commit tools are refused; use the streamable-HTTP setup in docs/HOW-TO-SETUP-DOCKER.md for two-person change control.

Design highlights

Three API surfaces, each labelled. UniFi's supported Integration API is far narrower than what the controller can actually do, so the private /api/s/ and /v2/api/ routes stay in — but every endpoint carries its tag in code, and the private ones are gated behind an explicit per-controller allow_private_api flag in controllers.json, not a token scope. A supported-only deployment is a real, runnable configuration that a controller upgrade cannot silently break.

Change control adapted honestly. UniFi has no candidate configuration and no commit. The change-set lifecycle is implemented with client-side pre-image capture, local validation, sequential apply, and best-effort rollback — and the tool descriptions say so. An operator approving a UniFi change set is not getting commit-confirmed semantics, and the server does not pretend otherwise. unifi_approve_change_set requires a human approver: the server passes the caller's token actor_type through to mecmcp, which refuses any approval from an agent or unattributed (stdio) caller — only actor_type: human can approve. Mint the approver's token with rustunifimcp token add ... --actor-type human. actor_type is a claim the operator makes at mint time, not something the server proves; a token tagged human but handed to an LLM agent defeats the gate.

Multi-controller. Controllers live in an inventory registry rather than environment variables, so one instance can front several and a token can be scoped to a subset.

HTTP defaults are metered, not open. Per-IP and per-token request rates, concurrent session counts, and body-size limits are all enforced by default (LimitsConfig::default()); every limit is also a CLI flag (see rustunifimcp --help), so an operator can tune them without a fork. An unauthenticated /healthz (process up) and /readyz (no dependency checks configured, so "ready" tracks "up") are always mounted. /metrics is off by default (--enable-metrics) and, when enabled, restricted to loopback callers.

License

Licensed under MIT.