
hush
io.github.omarei-omotoPublished by GitHub account omarei-omotov0.13.2Updated Oct 24, 2026
Team secrets your AI agent can use but never read: encrypted in the repo, value-blind tools.
Overview
A local MCP server that gives an AI coding agent value-blind access to team secrets kept encrypted inside the repository, so it can use keys without reading or,
- What you can do
- Give the assistant tools that use encrypted secrets from a repo vault without exposing their values, so it can run commands and workflows that need keys while staying value-blind. Manage the vault: initialize it, import existing .env secrets as named sets, and commit it to the repository. Handle team access: add or remove teammates, with removal re-keying the vault and re-sealing every value. Run processes with secrets injected into that one process only, never onto disk or into the shell. Scan agent config files and saved transcripts for plaintext keys, with an option to move found keys into the vault.
- When to use it
- For solo developers or small teams who keep API keys in .env files and want a coding agent to use those keys without the values entering its context window or transcripts. A fit when you want encrypted secrets committed to git with per-person access and no account, server or subscription. Not intended for dynamic credentials, leasing, expiry or an audit log others cannot edit.
- Requirements
- Runs as a local process on the user's desktop; Windows support is in beta. Install from npm (Node 22.6 or later) or as a single binary for macOS, Linux and Windows. No account, server or shared password is needed; the git repository is the backend.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open hush in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
Envelope-encrypted team secrets your AI agent can use but never read.
[CI] [npm] [node] [license] [runtime deps] [OpenSSF Best Practices]
You keep your API keys in a .env file. It is plaintext, every process you
launch can read it, and the day you pointed an AI coding agent at the repo it
went into the agent's context window — and from there, wherever transcripts go.
hush fixes that without a server, an account, or a shared password. Your
secrets live encrypted inside the repo itself. hush npm run dev puts them
in that one process and nowhere else. Your coding agent gets tools that can
use a key but never read one. A teammate gets access with one command, and
removing them re-encrypts everything. Zero dependencies; one npm install.
[!IMPORTANT] Status: early. This works and is heavily tested, but it is pre-1.0, it has one author, and it has not had an external security review. The crypto is a standard construction (age's, rebuilt on
node:crypto) rather than anything invented here, and there is a differential test suite against an independent reimplementation — but that is not the same as someone qualified having looked at it. docs/REVIEW-SCOPE.md is the brief for the review it needs.Development happens on macOS; Linux is covered by CI. Windows is in beta: your key is kept with DPAPI, approvals are a native Windows dialog,
hush run npm …works throughnpm.cmd, secret files get owner-only ACLs, and there is a PowerShell hook — a Windows CI job checks those paths, but it has not had much real use yet. Fingerprint approval (Windows Hello) is not there yet. Tell me what broke if you try it somewhere unusual.Found a way to read a vault you should not? Please report it privately rather than opening an issue.
Install
One file, no Node needed — macOS, Linux (glibc and musl), and Windows (beta):
The installer refuses a binary whose sha256 is not the one in the release's
SHA256SUMS, checks its build-provenance attestation too when the GitHub CLI is
signed in, and installs to ~/.local/bin without sudo. To check a download by
hand: gh attestation verify hush-darwin-arm64 --repo omarei-omoto/hush.
Or from npm, with Node ≥ 22.6:
From a clone there is no build step — Node ≥ 22.18 runs the TypeScript directly
(on 22.6–22.17, run npm run build first):
Why the published package ships compiled output
Node will not strip TypeScript types for anything under node_modules, so an
installed copy cannot run src/. The tarball ships JavaScript in dist/ (built
by npm run build, run automatically by prepack). The hush command decides
by where it lives, not by what exists: under node_modules it runs dist/; in
a checkout (including one npm linked) it runs src/, so a stale build can
never shadow your edits. Still zero runtime dependencies.
Quick start
That is the whole thing. It looks for your keys, gets them in, asks whether an
AI assistant will be near them, and offers to run your project. A few questions,
nothing you have to know already. Run it again any time: it picks up whatever
is left, and hush setup shows where you are.
Or let your coding agent set it up. Paste this into Claude Code, Codex or Cursor:
Set up hush in this project. Run
hush setup --jsonand follow it: run each step's command as written, ask me in the chat for anything marked "choice", and for anything marked "person", run it and wait for me. Never open a.envfile or ask me for a key in the chat.
Anything that needs you, such as a new key or deleting a .env, asks you on
your own screen, not in the chat. More in
Setting up.
Prefer to see every step yourself? The same thing, by hand:
From now on, put hush in front of whatever you run:
Secrets exist in that process's environment and nowhere else. Not on disk, not in your shell, not in your scrollback.
Then a quick checkup of what is already out there:
Agents on other machines (a server, a devcontainer) can use keys that stay on yours: hush on a tailnet.
Why this exists
.env files have quietly become the worst artifact in your repo. They are
plaintext, they are readable by every process you launch, and they are now
routinely slurped into an LLM's context — researchers caught a coding agent
uploading whole repos with .env credentials verbatim and
unredacted.
The existing tools each cover part of this:
hush is the local, free, no-account option, not a replacement for the last two. If your team already pays for 1Password or Doppler, their MCP servers do what hush does with better hardware and a real audit trail — use them. hush is for the solo developer and the small team who want age's security model and an agent that cannot read a value, with nothing to sign up for and nothing to deploy: the git repo is the backend.
Where the line is: the moment you need dynamic credentials, leasing, expiry, or an audit log someone else cannot edit, you have outgrown a file in git. hush will not get you there and does not pretend to. Full comparison in RESEARCH.md.
Documentation
Everything else is in the guide — on GitHub under docs/guide, or as a site at tryhush.dev.
- Using it — Sets · Coming from another tool · Several keys for one service · Running things · Credentials that are a file · The app · The shell hook (including Nushell)
- Checking config — What a value should look like · Finding what a codebase needs
- Agents — Connecting your agent · What your agent gets · Adding a key off-transcript · Approvals · Policy
- Your team — Adding someone · Only some sets · Removing someone · Membership changes · Merging · CI · After someone leaves
- Hardening — The security ladder · Touch ID · Hardware keys
- Reference — Commands · How the crypto works · What hush does not do · The approval relay · Architecture · Hardware unlock
- Trust — SECURITY.md (threat model, reporting) · Review scope · Red team · Every defect found · RESEARCH.md
Contributing
Very welcome, especially: running it somewhere I cannot (Linux, Windows, a YubiKey I do not own), finding a way to get a value out that should not come out, or telling me where it confused you.
- CONTRIBUTING.md — how to set up, and the bar for a change
- docs/ARCHITECTURE.md — how it fits together, and the tests that hold it
- Development — running the suite, the fuzzers and the binary
- CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md — Contributor Covenant 2.1
- SECURITY.md — threat model, and how to report a vulnerability
- docs/AUDIT.md — every defect found so far, and what changed
Security problems do not go in issues. Open a private advisory instead.
License
MIT — see LICENSE.
Source: README.md at commit 47b1c22
Tools
0Version history
6- v0.13.2LatestOct 18, 2026
- v0.13.1Oct 14, 2026
- v0.12.0Oct 5, 2026
- v0.11.1Oct 4, 2026
- v0.10.0Oct 1, 2026
- v0.9.0Sep 30, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts