hush

io.github.omarei-omotoPublished by GitHub account omarei-omotov0.13.2Updated Oct 24, 2026

Team secrets your AI agent can use but never read: encrypted in the repo, value-blind tools.

VerifiedSTDIODesktop onlyDeveloper ToolsSecurity & Monitoring

Overview

AI-generated overview

A local MCP server that gives an AI coding agent value-blind access to team secrets kept encrypted inside the repository, so it can use keys without reading or,

What you can do
Give the assistant tools that use encrypted secrets from a repo vault without exposing their values, so it can run commands and workflows that need keys while staying value-blind. Manage the vault: initialize it, import existing .env secrets as named sets, and commit it to the repository. Handle team access: add or remove teammates, with removal re-keying the vault and re-sealing every value. Run processes with secrets injected into that one process only, never onto disk or into the shell. Scan agent config files and saved transcripts for plaintext keys, with an option to move found keys into the vault.
When to use it
For solo developers or small teams who keep API keys in .env files and want a coding agent to use those keys without the values entering its context window or transcripts. A fit when you want encrypted secrets committed to git with per-person access and no account, server or subscription. Not intended for dynamic credentials, leasing, expiry or an audit log others cannot edit.
Requirements
Runs as a local process on the user's desktop; Windows support is in beta. Install from npm (Node 22.6 or later) or as a single binary for macOS, Linux and Windows. No account, server or shared password is needed; the git repository is the backend.
Before you install
Early, pre-1.0 software with one author that has not had an external security review. It handles API keys and other secrets: the vault is encrypted but the tooling is unproven, so treat it as a risk for production credentials. Removing a teammate re-encrypts and re-seals every value. The README asks that vault-reading flaws be reported privately rather than as public issues.

Installation

In SourceWeft

  1. Open hush in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
  2. Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.

Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.

Other MCP clients

Follow the launch instructions in the repository.

README

[hush]

Envelope-encrypted team secrets your AI agent can use but never read.

[CI] [npm] [node] [license] [runtime deps] [OpenSSF Best Practices]

You keep your API keys in a .env file. It is plaintext, every process you launch can read it, and the day you pointed an AI coding agent at the repo it went into the agent's context window — and from there, wherever transcripts go.

hush fixes that without a server, an account, or a shared password. Your secrets live encrypted inside the repo itself. hush npm run dev puts them in that one process and nowhere else. Your coding agent gets tools that can use a key but never read one. A teammate gets access with one command, and removing them re-encrypts everything. Zero dependencies; one npm install.

bash
hush init acme                  # a vault in .hush/vault.json — commit ithush add .env --as "Dev"        # your existing secrets, now encrypted, as a set called devhush npm run dev                # injected into the process, never onto diskhush team add sam hush_pk_1xM…  # commit; sam can decrypt. no invite email.hush team rm sam                # re-keys the vault, re-seals every value

[A .env file goes into a hush vault; what is committed is ciphertext; hush run gives the program the key and prints [redacted:FAL_KEY]]

[!IMPORTANT] Status: early. This works and is heavily tested, but it is pre-1.0, it has one author, and it has not had an external security review. The crypto is a standard construction (age's, rebuilt on node:crypto) rather than anything invented here, and there is a differential test suite against an independent reimplementation — but that is not the same as someone qualified having looked at it. docs/REVIEW-SCOPE.md is the brief for the review it needs.

Development happens on macOS; Linux is covered by CI. Windows is in beta: your key is kept with DPAPI, approvals are a native Windows dialog, hush run npm … works through npm.cmd, secret files get owner-only ACLs, and there is a PowerShell hook — a Windows CI job checks those paths, but it has not had much real use yet. Fingerprint approval (Windows Hello) is not there yet. Tell me what broke if you try it somewhere unusual.

Found a way to read a vault you should not? Please report it privately rather than opening an issue.

Install

One file, no Node needed — macOS, Linux (glibc and musl), and Windows (beta):

bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/omarei-omoto/hush/main/scripts/install.sh | shbrew install omarei-omoto/tap/hush
powershell
irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/omarei-omoto/hush/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iexscoop install https://github.com/omarei-omoto/hush/releases/latest/download/hush.json

The installer refuses a binary whose sha256 is not the one in the release's SHA256SUMS, checks its build-provenance attestation too when the GitHub CLI is signed in, and installs to ~/.local/bin without sudo. To check a download by hand: gh attestation verify hush-darwin-arm64 --repo omarei-omoto/hush.

Or from npm, with Node ≥ 22.6:

bash
npm install -g @omarei/hush

From a clone there is no build step — Node ≥ 22.18 runs the TypeScript directly (on 22.6–22.17, run npm run build first):

bash
git clone https://github.com/omarei-omoto/hush.gitcd hush && node src/cli.ts --help
Why the published package ships compiled output

Node will not strip TypeScript types for anything under node_modules, so an installed copy cannot run src/. The tarball ships JavaScript in dist/ (built by npm run build, run automatically by prepack). The hush command decides by where it lives, not by what exists: under node_modules it runs dist/; in a checkout (including one npm linked) it runs src/, so a stale build can never shadow your edits. Still zero runtime dependencies.

Quick start

bash
cd your-projecthush start

That is the whole thing. It looks for your keys, gets them in, asks whether an AI assistant will be near them, and offers to run your project. A few questions, nothing you have to know already. Run it again any time: it picks up whatever is left, and hush setup shows where you are.

Or let your coding agent set it up. Paste this into Claude Code, Codex or Cursor:

Set up hush in this project. Run hush setup --json and follow it: run each step's command as written, ask me in the chat for anything marked "choice", and for anything marked "person", run it and wait for me. Never open a .env file or ask me for a key in the chat.

Anything that needs you, such as a new key or deleting a .env, asks you on your own screen, not in the chat. More in Setting up.

Prefer to see every step yourself? The same thing, by hand:

bash
hush init                    # creates your key + a vault, safe to commithush add .env --as "Dev"     # what you already have, encrypted, as a set called devrm .env                      # you don't need it any moregit add .hush && git commit -m "encrypted secrets"

From now on, put hush in front of whatever you run:

bash
hush npm run dev             # anything after hush runs with the secrets injectedhush dev                     # or: find package.json and run its dev script

Secrets exist in that process's environment and nowhere else. Not on disk, not in your shell, not in your scrollback.

Then a quick checkup of what is already out there:

bash
hush scan --agents           # plaintext keys in your agents' config files; --fix moves them into hushhush scan --transcripts      # your keys in agents' saved conversations (read-only)

Agents on other machines (a server, a devcontainer) can use keys that stay on yours: hush on a tailnet.

Why this exists

.env files have quietly become the worst artifact in your repo. They are plaintext, they are readable by every process you launch, and they are now routinely slurped into an LLM's context — researchers caught a coding agent uploading whole repos with .env credentials verbatim and unredacted.

The existing tools each cover part of this:

What it gets rightWhat it costs you
SOPS / ageper-recipient crypto, real revocationno idea agents exist; YAML and key juggling
secretctlthe agent storyexplicitly single-user
dotenvx / nevr-envencrypted file in gitone key for the whole team, so no real revocation
1Password CLI + MCPreal vault, real hardware, real audit, agent accessan account and a subscription for everyone on the team
Doppler / Infisical + MCPproper secrets management, agent accessa server to run or seats to buy

hush is the local, free, no-account option, not a replacement for the last two. If your team already pays for 1Password or Doppler, their MCP servers do what hush does with better hardware and a real audit trail — use them. hush is for the solo developer and the small team who want age's security model and an agent that cannot read a value, with nothing to sign up for and nothing to deploy: the git repo is the backend.

Where the line is: the moment you need dynamic credentials, leasing, expiry, or an audit log someone else cannot edit, you have outgrown a file in git. hush will not get you there and does not pretend to. Full comparison in RESEARCH.md.

Documentation

Everything else is in the guide — on GitHub under docs/guide, or as a site at tryhush.dev.

Contributing

Very welcome, especially: running it somewhere I cannot (Linux, Windows, a YubiKey I do not own), finding a way to get a value out that should not come out, or telling me where it confused you.

Security problems do not go in issues. Open a private advisory instead.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

Source: README.md at commit 47b1c22

Tools

0
SourceWeft has not started this package in its sandbox yet, so its tools are not known.

Version history

6
  1. v0.13.2LatestOct 18, 2026
  2. v0.13.1Oct 14, 2026
  3. v0.12.0Oct 5, 2026
  4. v0.11.1Oct 4, 2026
  5. v0.10.0Oct 1, 2026
  6. v0.9.0Sep 30, 2026

Score

50% of the applicable checks met

How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.

  • Reached in the last 30 days25 pts

    Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.

  • Auth declared10 pts

    Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.

  • Tools listed15 pts

    Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.

  • DescriptionRequired15 pts
  • Logo10 pts
  • Documentation15 pts
  • License10 pts