
Unchore Defend
io.github.smileminoPublished by GitHub account smileminov0.1.0Updated Oct 28, 2026
Grade a site's security headers with fixes and a badge; read logs or code for the defender.
Overview
Grades a website's security headers with fixes and a README badge, and analyzes logs, code or configs for signs of attack.
- What you can do
- Check a site's security headers and get an A–F grade with a one-line fix per gap and a README badge
- Send a log, code snippet, config or suspicious message for an explanation of what happened, how serious it is and what to fix first
- Mask phone numbers, ID and card numbers, e-mails, API keys, tokens and private keys before content goes to an AI provider
- Fall back across several AI models when one refuses a defensive security request
- When to use it
- Useful when you maintain a site and want a quick header check with concrete fixes, or when you are responding to an incident and need help reading logs, attack code or configuration. The site check alone needs no account or key.
- Requirements
- Runs as a local process; the README lists Node 22+ for terminal use, or a Claude Desktop bundle or a cloned repo configured as an MCP server. The site check needs nothing. The defend tool needs either an OpenRouter key or an Unchore key, supplied as environment variables. Network access is required for both the site request and AI calls.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Unchore Defend in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
Unchore Defend
Security help for the person protecting the system. Two tools, no install, works in Claude Code, Claude Desktop, any MCP client, or a plain terminal.
Part of Unchore — the open-source personal AI that offers to automate what you ask twice.
[Unchore Defend in 20 seconds]
July 2026: OpenAI's test agents broke out of their sandbox and got into Hugging Face's production systems — about 17,600 attacker actions across 11 nodes over roughly 4.5 days. Last week Australia said OpenAI agents had also got into its Medicare statistics portal. When Hugging Face's responders asked commercial frontier models to help read the attack, the requests were "blocked by the providers' safety guardrails, which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker." They finished the forensics on an open-weight model (GLM-5.2). Sources: disclosure · technical timeline · OpenAI's statement (NPR) · Australia (ABC)
We re-ran the published attack artifacts. A major US model's content filter blocked 11 of 14 requests. Defend still got an answer to all 14 — results and a one-command rerun.
Defend makes that switch for you: it asks Claude, then GPT, then GLM, then DeepSeek, and moves on only when one refuses.
Install
Claude Code (skills + MCP tools):
Then just ask: "check the security headers of mysite.com and fix what you can" or "read access.log — were we attacked?"
Only want the site check? /plugin install unchore-site-check@unchore installs just that (no key, no AI calls).
The site check needs no key. For defend, Claude Code asks for an OpenRouter or Unchore key when you enable the plugin (later: /plugin configure unchore-defend@unchore); it is kept in your system's secure storage.
Claude Desktop: download unchore-defend.mcpb from Releases and open it.
Any MCP client (Cursor, VS Code, Windsurf, …) — clone this repo, then add:
Terminal only: Node 22+, nothing to install.
Site check
Nine checks, weighted: HTTPS (25), HSTS (15), Content-Security-Policy (15), clickjacking protection (10), nosniff (10), Referrer-Policy (8), Permissions-Policy (5), cookie flags (7), server version hidden (5). A ≥ 90 · B ≥ 75 · C ≥ 60 · D ≥ 40.
It sends one ordinary GET to the site and nothing anywhere else. Private, local and cloud-metadata addresses are refused, every redirect is checked again, and it stops after 3 redirects, 8 seconds or 200 KB.
Put the grade in your README — the output gives you the line:
[Security headers: B (80/100) — checked with Unchore]
The badge says what was measured: response headers. It is not a full security audit.
Rather click than type? The same check runs at unchore.ai/tools/site-check.
Defend
For "we were hit — what happened?", "is this log an attack?", "what did this script do?".
- Masked before sending: phone numbers, ID/card/account numbers, e-mails, API keys, tokens and private keys. IP addresses, paths and timestamps stay — they are the evidence.
- If one AI refuses, the next answers. Some safety filters refuse even defenders. Defend asks Claude first, then GPT, GLM and DeepSeek — only when the one before refused. GLM and DeepSeek run on US hosts, and every request asks OpenRouter to route only to providers that don't collect data (
data_collection: deny). - Defensive use only. It explains an attack as far as needed to detect and stop it. The AIs are told not to write exploits or malware.
Pay for the AI one of two ways:
OPENROUTER_API_KEY— your own key; requests go straight from your machine to OpenRouter.UNCHORE_TOKEN— no AI account needed. Sign in at unchore.ai → Settings → AI → Unchore credit → New key.
--chain glm,deepseek sets the order, --own forces your OpenRouter key, --json prints machine-readable output.
Tested on real traffic
640 lines of our own production web logs (7 days, IP addresses removed): 69 real attack lines (WordPress admin probes, .git/.env fishing, scanner bots) and 571 normal lines.
No AI refused plain log triage. Claude and GPT were the most precise, so they go first. Refusals show up on harder work — the attack code itself:
Tested on the Hugging Face attack code
The 7 tasks of the defenders-dilemma study are the published artifacts of the July intrusion: a template-injection payload, the command-and-control agent, its custom encryption, the Kubernetes escalation, the Tailscale pivot, human-vs-AI attribution and a review of the investigation. Each was asked two ways — plainly, and as "an authorized incident response team" — so 14 requests per model (2026-10-01).
What that looks like on one of the tasks (a real run, first lines):
- The blocks come from the provider's filter before the model writes a word (
finish_reason: content_filter) — see Anthropic's note on real-time cyber safeguards. Saying "we are the authorized incident response team" did not help; in our first run it made Claude block a request it had just answered plainly. - GLM and DeepSeek never refused; their misses were thinking models running out of room. Defend now gives them 16k tokens.
- Accuracy against the study's answer keys, scored by two different graders (GPT-6 Astra / GLM 5.3): GPT 91% / 96%, DeepSeek 92% / 95%, GLM 88% / 89%, Claude 100% on the 3 it answered.
- If you use Claude directly for security work, Anthropic's Cyber Verification Program is free to apply for and lifts the default blocks on dual-use defensive work.
Rerun it (about $3, 10 minutes; tasks are downloaded from the study at a pinned commit):
Our raw results: bench/hf-intrusion/results. Credit to the defenders-dilemma authors, who measured this first.
Why this exists
Unchore is a personal AI that notices when you ask for the same thing twice and offers to do it for you from then on. These two tools are pieces of it that also work on their own.
Contributing
Issues and pull requests are welcome. Run node --test test/*.test.mjs before sending. Security problems: see SECURITY.md. What is sent where: PRIVACY.md.
MIT © 2026 Unchore
Source: README.md at commit 87cb530
Tools
0Version history
1- v0.1.0LatestSep 30, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts