list_files
List files in the allowed folder.
Takes no parameters.

io.github.techsaurabh-394Published by GitHub account techsaurabh-394v1.5.0Updated Nov 16, 2026
File server whose delete tool asks a human first (elicitation or one-time token), with audit log.
The publisher's own server: actions.world
MCP Safe Actions's local MCP server; no sign-in required; STDIO; 2 tools.
No AI overview yet: these facts come from the registry entry and the server itself.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
[mcp-safe-actions: human approval for destructive MCP tools]
[CI] [101 tests passing] [100% line coverage] [TypeScript strict] [MIT]
[Image] Star this repo if it saves you from a bad tool call · [Buy me a coffee]
Your AI agent should not be able to delete a file, send an email or drop a table just because it decided to.
mcp-safe-actions is a small TypeScript library for people who build MCP servers (Model Context Protocol). Wrap a dangerous tool once and it does nothing until a human approves. The model cannot approve its own action.
delete_file("../../important"). "Please ask first" in a prompt is a request, not a control.This library packages that pattern once, with a test suite that proves the safety rules, instead of rebuilding it in every server.
It also ships a small file server where deleting needs a human OK. Add it to your MCP client config:
Tools: list_files and delete_file (asks you first). Set AUDIT_LOG to keep a JSONL log. Listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.techsaurabh-394/mcp-safe-actions.
Published on npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/mcp-safe-actions
You also need @modelcontextprotocol/sdk (1.17+) and zod (you probably have both). Node 18+.
Replace server.registerTool(...) with registerConfirmedTool(server, ...) and split the work into preview (describe, don't change anything) and execute (runs after approval):
The tool is listed with destructiveHint: true and a description telling the model to wait for the user.
Claude Desktop (claude_desktop_config.json), using the included example server and a throwaway folder:
Claude Code: claude mcp add files -- node /absolute/path/to/mcp-safe-actions/dist/examples/files-server.js
Run npm run build first. Then ask the assistant to delete a file in the test folder. You should see either an approval prompt (clients with elicitation) or a preview with a token and a question from the assistant (clients without). The file must still exist until you say yes.
[Flow: model calls, server previews, human approves, action executes, audit logged]
Client supports elicitation (best case):
Client without elicitation (token fallback):
What the tests prove, among other things: a declined prompt never runs the action; a model-supplied token cannot skip the human prompt; tokens are single-use, expire, and only work for the same tool and arguments; two simultaneous uses of one token run the action exactly once; a prompt that times out or crashes fails closed; secret argument values never reach the audit log; the example server blocks path traversal and symlink escapes.
Details and an honest note about a weak test the mutation check caught: docs/TESTING.md.
Be clear-eyed:
mode: "elicit".execute() should re-check state that may have changed since.Full threat model: docs/SECURITY-MODEL.md.
For a screen-control tool, click(element_id) is harmless or a payment depending on the element. Give the tool a resolve function that looks the element up, and a gate for the labels you never want unattended:
The screen can change between approval and execution (a dialog opens, a list re-sorts), so resolve runs a second time right before execute. If the resolved context is different from the one the human approved, nothing runs, the audit log gets a context-changed event, and the model is told to ask again. A failed second lookup also refuses. In the token flow the token is bound to the resolved target as well. By default every returned field is compared; set pinFields: ["label", "role", "url"] to leave out volatile ones like coordinates.
Rules, all fail closed: a gate match always asks a human, even if autoApprove says yes. If resolve throws, rejects or returns anything other than a plain object (for example undefined for an unknown element), the call is never auto-approved. The approval prompt shows the resolved target (target label: Buy now) so the person sees what they are approving. Labels can be misleading (a button called "Continue" can submit a payment), so treat the gate as a first filter and also resolve the destination (url) for irreversible actions.
confirm_token is a reserved input name. More in docs/USAGE.md, including how to test your own tools with an in-memory client.
Add the same safety net to your own server's repo:
test/helpers.ts in this repo shows how to simulate a human who approves, declines, or never answers.
mode: "channel" + webhookApprover (point it at a service that can reach Slack or a dashboard)autoApprove lets low-risk calls run, everything else still asks a humanresolve looks up what a call targets (e.g. the label behind click(element_id)) and gate forces a human decision for labels like buy / delete / sendresolve runs again right before execute and the call is refused if the target changed after approvalIssues and PRs welcome: CONTRIBUTING.md. Any change to approval logic needs a test showing the action does not run without approval, and npm run mutation must still pass.
If this helped you ship a safer agent, please [Image] star the repo, share it, or buy me a coffee:
MIT. See LICENSE. Copyright (c) 2026 Saurabh Pathak.
Saurabh Pathak · AI Engineer & Full-Stack Developer
GitHub ·
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[email protected]
Source: README.md at commit 4add76f
List files in the allowed folder.
Takes no parameters.
Permanently delete one file from the allowed folder. DESTRUCTIVE: the user must approve before anything happens. Describe the action to the user and wait for their answer.
pathrequiredconfirm_token90% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
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{ "mcpServers": { "safe-files": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "mcp-safe-actions"], "env": { "FILES_DIR": "/path/to/folder" } } } }npm install mcp-safe-actionsimport { rmSync, statSync } from "node:fs";import { McpServer } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/mcp.js";import { StdioServerTransport } from "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk/server/stdio.js";import { z } from "zod";import { registerConfirmedTool, fileAudit } from "mcp-safe-actions";
const server = new McpServer({ name: "files", version: "1.0.0" });
registerConfirmedTool(server, { name: "delete_file", description: "Permanently delete one file.", inputSchema: { path: z.string() },
// What WILL happen. Must not change anything. Be specific. preview: ({ path }) => ({ summary: `Permanently delete "${path}" (${statSync(path).size} bytes)`, details: ["This cannot be undone."], }),
// Runs only after the user approved. Re-check anything that could have changed. execute: ({ path }) => { rmSync(path); return { content: [{ type: "text", text: `Deleted ${path}` }] }; },
audit: fileAudit("./audit.jsonl"), // optional});
await server.connect(new StdioServerTransport());git clone https://github.com/techsaurabh-394/mcp-safe-actions.gitcd mcp-safe-actionsnpm installnpm run demo # prints both approval flowsnpm test # 101 tests{ "mcpServers": { "files": { "command": "node", "args": ["/absolute/path/to/mcp-safe-actions/dist/examples/files-server.js"], "env": { "FILES_DIR": "/absolute/path/to/test-folder", "AUDIT_LOG": "/absolute/path/to/audit.jsonl" } } }}sequenceDiagram participant M as AI model participant S as Your MCP server participant H as Human (client UI) M->>S: delete_file("report.pdf") S->>S: preview() builds the plan, nothing changes S->>H: Approval prompt: delete report.pdf? H-->>S: Approve or decline alt Approved S->>S: execute() and audit log S-->>M: Deleted report.pdf else Declined or no answer S-->>M: User did not approve. Nothing changed. endsequenceDiagram participant M as AI model participant S as Your MCP server participant H as Human (in chat) M->>S: delete_file("report.pdf") S-->>M: Nothing changed yet. Plan + one-time token M->>H: Shows plan, asks to go ahead H-->>M: Yes M->>S: delete_file("report.pdf", confirm_token) S->>S: token valid, unused, same arguments, not expired S->>S: execute() and audit log S-->>M: Deleted report.pdfregisterConfirmedTool(server, { name, title?, description, inputSchema, // like server.registerTool preview(args) => { summary, details? }, // no side effects execute(args) => CallToolResult, // after approval risk?: "destructive" | "write", // default "destructive" (sets annotations) mode?: "auto" | "elicit" | "token", // default "auto" approvalTimeoutMs?: number, // default 5 minutes; a timeout means "not approved" approver?: (req) => boolean | Promise<boolean>, // required for mode "channel" resolve?(args) => { label?, role?, url?, ... }, // optional: look up what the call actually targets, before the policy runs pinFields?: string[], // optional: which resolved fields must be unchanged right before execute (default: all) gate?: { pattern: RegExp, fields?: string[] }, // optional: if the resolved context matches, autoApprove is skipped autoApprove?(args, plan, context) => boolean, // optional: exactly `true` skips the prompt for low-risk calls store?: new ApprovalStore({ ttlMs, maxPending }), audit?: (event) => void | fileAudit(path), annotations?, // override tool annotations});registerConfirmedTool(server, { name: "click", inputSchema: { element_id: z.string() }, /* preview, execute ... */ resolve: ({ element_id }) => screen.describe(element_id), // { label: "Buy now", role: "button", url } gate: { pattern: /\b(buy|pay|delete|send|grant|allow)\b/i, fields: ["label"] }, autoApprove: (_args, _plan, ctx) => ctx?.role === "button", // only reached if the gate did not match});flowchart LR A[Push or pull request] --> B[CI] B --> B1[Build and 101 tests on Node 18, 20, 22] B --> B2[Demo runs end to end] B --> B3[Coverage report] B --> B4[Mutation check: 42 deliberate bugs] B --> B5[SVG diagrams valid] C[Tag v*] --> D[Release] D --> D1[Tests] D1 --> D2[GitHub Release with notes] D2 --> D3[npm publish with provenance, only if enabled]# .github/workflows/ci.ymlname: CIon: [push, pull_request]jobs: test: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - uses: actions/setup-node@v4 with: { node-version: 22, cache: npm } - run: npm ci - run: npm test # include a test that the dangerous tool does NOT run without approval