vibatchium

[vibatchium]

vibatchium

The browser layer for an always-on box. Many logged-in identities, running unattended, all at once — on real Chrome, with stealth on by default, and with a security model for letting an AI near the credentials.

One daemon, N persistent Chrome sessions, a vb CLI and an MCP server. Self-hosted, free, Apache-2.0.

pipx install 'vibatchium[all]'patchright install chromevb setup                     # register the MCP server + agent skill (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor)vb explore https://example.com

Is this for you?

That last row is the whole wedge. Supervised agents hand control back to you at every login wall and CAPTCHA; a library leaves the fleet — sessions, budgets, crash recovery, credentials — for you to build. vibatchium is that fleet layer.

How it compares

As of 2026-10-06, from each project's own README, source and release notes (the MCP-cost row is our own measurement¹). Rows where we lose are included on purpose.

_{¹ bytes/4 of tools/list plus server instructions, measured over stdio. Clients without tool search load every tool: vb mcp --caps min is 12 tools, ~3.8k tokens. bladebro's own README says ~1.9k.}

Where the others are genuinely better: CloakBrowser's engine-level patches go deeper than any CDP-level layer can — and vb start --browser-binary will drive a Chromium build you bring. bladebro has a stealth benchmark number and we don't; until we do, read our stealth claims as measured on scoreboards, below, not on production walls. Both run on more operating systems.

What only vibatchium does

1. A fleet of logged-in identities on one box. Each session is its own Chrome and profile, with its own proxy, timezone and GPU node, and — opt-in with vb persona set — its own screen and window, because by default every headless session on one machine reports the same 800×600 screen. vb fleet-check measures how alike your sessions still look. They run in parallel on one daemon that keeps them alive: a crashed renderer is relaunched on the same profile, parked sessions have their renderers stopped and thawed on the next call, leases stop two agents clobbering one session, and goals give a task a step/spend/time budget that survives a daemon restart.

vb --session alice start && vb --session alice go https://x.com      # log in once, stays logged invb --session bob   start && vb --session bob   go https://x.comvb --session alice act "open notifications" & vb --session bob extract & waitvb fleet-check --sessions alice,bob                                  # how twinned are they?

2. Credentials an agent can use but never see. The vault fills a password or a live TOTP code into the page without the value reaching the model's context, a screenshot or a log — and only into the site it belongs to. Over MCP, a prompt-injected agent can't type your GitHub password into a lookalike page, can't read it back with value or eval while it sits in the field, and can't edit the vault or pull a code. An agent with a shell is the operator — the CLI has deliberate escape hatches — so give agents MCP, not Bash, if that boundary matters to you.

printf %s "$GH_PASSWORD" | vb secret set github.com password --stdinprintf %s "$GH_TOTP_SEED" | vb secret set github.com totp-seed --stdinvb --session work fill @e7 --use-secret github.com:passwordvb --session work fill @e9 --use-secret github.com:totpvb wait-email-code github.com      # operator CLI: polls IMAP and prints the code; refused over MCP

3. Page text is treated as untrusted. Every session scans the page text it returns for instructions aimed at the agent and flags them by default; wrap fences them off and redact removes them. Caller-supplied file paths are confined too, so an injected agent can't upload ~/.ssh or write into .git/hooks.

4. A browserless lane on the same identity. vb fetch reuses a session's cookies and proxy with Chrome's TLS fingerprint and client hints — JSON endpoints behind your login at curl speed, and it tells you when it can't match the browser. vb search finds URLs with no API key and no per-session budget.

vb --session work fetch https://api.example.com/v1/mevb search "site reliability postmortem" -n 20 --urls

Status: alpha, active development. 2,331 tests green in CI (Linux, Python 3.11–3.14). Coding agents: read AGENTS.md first — the one-call recipes and the traps worth skipping.

_{Detector scores quoted below (bot.sannysoft, CreepJS, Cloudflare cold-launch) are manual observations, not CI-asserted — no test in the suite gates on them, and they are only as current as the last hand-run. The generated block under Measured scores is the one to trust.}

Install

pipx install vibatchium             # core: browse / extract / screenshot / N parallel sessionspipx install 'vibatchium[all]'      # + fetch/search lanes, credential vault, VLM read, REST shim                                    #   (or pick extras: [fetch], [secrets], [llm], [rest])patchright install chromevb setup                            # register MCP + an auto-discoverable skill (idempotent)vb install                          # report which optional lanes are available

On a uv venv (no pip), add an extra with uv pip install --python <venv>/bin/python curl_cffi. Bleeding edge from master: pipx install 'git+https://github.com/trueoriginlabs/vibatchium#egg=vibatchium[all]'.

Install as a skill / plugin

vb setup wires up the agents on this machine. To pull just the agent skill into any agent skills.sh supports (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Copilot, …), or to install skill + MCP server as one Claude Code plugin:

npx skills add trueoriginlabs/vibatchium                  # skill only, any agent
/plugin marketplace add trueoriginlabs/vibatchium         # Claude Code: skill + `vb mcp`/plugin install vibatchium@vibatchium

Both still need the vb CLI on PATH (pipx install 'vibatchium[all]') — the skill drives it and the plugin's MCP server is vb mcp. On Claude Code, pick the plugin or vb setup, not both, or you register the server twice. The skill file is generated from vibatchium/setup_cmd.py; edit there and run python scripts/sync_skill.py.

Quick start

vb explore https://example.com                      # one call: text-first, auto-closesvb research --target https://example.com \          # parallel fan-out, N intents  --intent "pricing model" --intent "customers" --intent "tech stack"

Real Chrome vs fake Chrome

A wave of "headless browser for AI agents" tools rebuild the browser from scratch (Rust + V8, no Blink/Skia) to hit tiny memory and sub-100ms page loads. The catch is structural: with no rendering engine, they can't produce a real device's fingerprint — they synthesize one. And synthetic fingerprints don't hold still.

vibatchium drives real Google Chrome, so its fingerprints are real — and, more to the point, stable. The single test that separates the two is fingerprint stability across navigations. Run the same canvas + WebGL probe on two pages in one session:

_{¹ Chrome's own software renderer (SwiftShader) by default — still a coherent, deterministic Chrome value, not a stub. A hardware-GPU string (e.g. ANGLE (Intel …)) needs the opt-in --gpu flag.}

A real device returns the same fingerprint every page load; a fingerprint keyed off Date.now() does not — and that inconsistency is exactly what lie-detection fingerprinters (CreepJS and friends) flag. Measured: vibatchium's canvas hash and WebGL readback are byte-identical across navigations, and CreepJS reported 0 % stealth-tampering (no synthetic-environment signatures) when last run by hand. That figure is not regression-tested — treat it as an observation, not a guarantee.

This is not a claim of invisibility. The moat is fingerprint authenticity, not hiding that a browser is automated — vibatchium still reads as headless on the headless-specific tells (see Honest limits), and real-GPU WebGL (--gpu) is opt-in. But real, consistent fingerprints pass the consistency tier that synthetic ones fail by construction — and that tier is what stands between you and a login wall.

Multi-session in 10 lines

vb session new workvb --session work startvb --session work go https://github.com           # log in by hand oncevb session new bankingvb --session banking startvb --session banking go https://bank.example.comvb --session work click @e3 &                     # truly parallel —vb --session banking fill @e5 hi &                # separate Chromes, no cookie bleedwaitvb session list

Active-session resolution: --session FLAG → $VIBATCHIUM_SESSION env → ~/.config/vibatchium/active-session → default. Cap via VIBATCHIUM_MAX_SESSIONS=8 (default 8).

Multi-agent: shared sessions vs a private daemon

On one shared daemon, sessions are isolated in state (separate Chromes and profiles, no cookie bleed) but not automatically in fingerprint — on one box they report the same screen and, without --gpu --node, the same software GPU unless you set a vb persona; vb fleet-check measures it. They also share the host: the session count budget, the memory, and the blast radius of an OOM or a daemon bounce. Two models, pick per trust level:

• Cooperating agents (your own fleet): the shared daemon is right — just give each concurrent agent a unique --session name so stateful flows don't collide on default. vb session lease coordinates a shared name.
• A private blast radius: a per-agent daemon on its own socket + HOME — separate profiles/config/state, its own session budget, zero contact with the shared daemon. vb daemon start --isolated prints the XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ HOME to export for subsequent calls; vb mcp --isolated runs the MCP server on its own private daemon directly. vb daemon reap cleans up abandoned ones. (Same UID = same trust domain — this bounds blast radius, not a security boundary between distrusting tenants; for that, separate UIDs/containers.)

Resource governance. The session cap bounds process count, not bytes. On a shared box, set VIBATCHIUM_SESSION_RAM_FLOOR_MB to refuse a new launch when free memory is low (a portable admission belt). For a hard ceiling, run the daemon under a cgroup — systemd-run --user --scope -p MemoryMax=4G vb daemon start puts the daemon and all its Chromes in one cgroup sharing the limit: an aggregate daemon-wide cap (not per-renderer), and a breach OOM-kills inside the scope, which can include the daemon. It's the only non-racy memory bound, so size it for the whole fan-out.

Idle CPU. Parked sessions can't burn cores either: the daemon SIGSTOPs a launched session's renderer processes after VIBATCHIUM_IDLE_FREEZE_AFTER seconds with no verb (default 90) and thaws them on the next call, so an idle WebGL / animation page drops to zero CPU without a teardown (default on; VIBATCHIUM_IDLE_FREEZE=0 disables).

Freezing rather than closing is a deliberate trade, and it cuts both ways. playwright-mcp's --idle-timeout (v0.0.81, 1 h default for headless) closes an idle browser: that reclaims its memory, and its persistent profile keeps the cookies, but the open tabs and in-page state are gone, and the next call pays a cold launch. A frozen session keeps its resident memory and resumes on the next verb with its tabs, page state and login intact — which is the behaviour a long-lived authenticated session mid-flow needs. Memory is bounded by the other two levers above, the RAM floor and the cgroup, rather than by teardown.

Stealth tiers — what clears what

Stealth is a ladder, not a boolean. Pick the lowest tier that clears your target (higher tiers cost more setup / a visible browser / a manual login). vibatchium does not claim cold-launch defeat of behavioral walls — those need a real human-driven session, and attach-mode is the honest answer.

Architecture caveat. Every tier below was measured on x86-64 Linux. Patchright has a known open arm64 / Apple-Silicon detection gap, so these results should not be assumed to carry to an ARM host. If you run there, measure before you rely on it.

Measured scores

vb evals run --update-readme writes measured numbers into the block below, so what we publish is generated rather than asserted. It is empty until someone runs it — an empty block is honest; a number with no run behind it is not.

Run on x86-64 Linux, 25 Aug 2026, Chrome 150, --gpu (real render node). Pass --gpu yourself: headless Chrome falls back to SwiftShader when the GPU path doesn't take, and software GL is itself a detection signal, so numbers measured without it are a floor rather than what a GPU-backed deployment gets.

Read these honestly — two of the three are bad.

• sannysoft 100 is the floor everyone in this category clears; it is not a differentiator.

• creepjs 44 is mediocre. CreepJS is an adversarial lie-detector: it cross-checks main-thread against worker-thread claims and grades confidence, so a middling score means our environment is coherent but not indistinguishable.

• brotector 10 is poor, and we know exactly why. The signal firing is UA_Override / HighEntropyValues.empty, and our own de-Headless fix causes it. Measured on Chrome 150, headless, same profile, with and without the --user-agent flag we set to strip HeadlessChrome:

  	architecture	bitness	uaFullVersion	UA string
  without the flag	x86	64	150.0.7871.114	says HeadlessChrome
  with the flag	empty	empty	empty	says Chrome

  Passing an explicit UA makes Chrome stop deriving high-entropy client hints, so we trade a UA-string tell for a UA-CH-emptiness tell. It is not fixed: the obvious repair (Emulation.setUserAgentOverride with userAgentMetadata) is target-scoped and would reintroduce a main-vs-worker mismatch that is a stronger tell than either leak alone. Publishing this rather than dropping the target is the point — a suite that only reports its wins is marketing.

• nodriver scores identically to patchright on all three. The escalation tier buys nothing measurable on static scoreboards; its case rests on the automation-protocol axis these targets don't probe. An earlier run had nodriver slightly ahead on creepjs (50 vs 44) — but that run silently denied it the GPU while patchright got a real one, so it was scoring from behind. Once both arms get a real renderer the difference disappears. Worth knowing before reaching for the tier: upstream has not published since nodriver 0.50.3 (2026-05-13), so what the >=0.50.0,<1.0 pin resolves to is now several months old. The rung still works; it is no longer moving.

What these do and don't cover. These are fingerprint scoreboards — the static axis. Through 2026 the major anti-bot vendors moved to session-lifetime behavioural scoring, which none of these targets measure, and which we have not measured against any commercial vendor. Treat a good score here as evidence about environment coherence only.

For the behavioural axis itself, vb oracle run is a self-hosted probe: it drives a page with humanize off then on and grades trajectory curvature, dwell, keystroke cadence and scroll dynamics against a human-plausible band (vb oracle record captures a real-operator baseline; literature defaults until you do). It measures our model of human rather than a named vendor — but it turns "we humanize" into a measured on/off delta, and it's honest about the one axis synthetic input can't reach: CDP input emits no raw-pointer / coalesced events, which only attach-mode against real hardware closes.

Escalation ladder when a wall trips: headless → --headed → humanize on → --backend nodriver → attach-mode after a manual login. Patchright's CDP-layer patches apply in all tiers, including attach (connect_over_cdp).

The fetch verb is an orthogonal fast-path, not a tier: once you're past a wall in the browser, vb fetch reuses that session's cookies+proxy to hit JSON/API endpoints at TLS-fingerprint-correct speed — but it runs no JS, so it can't clear a JS challenge itself.

Captures — 2× screenshots of states you had to click to reach

vb --session shots start --scale 2          # devicePixelRatio 2 (1–4, persisted; --scale 1 clears)vb --session shots go https://example.comvb --session shots click @e3                # open the modal…vb --session shots screenshot -o card.png   # …then capture it at 2560×1600                                            # (2× the 1280×800 pin; vb viewport W H to resize)

The default session captures one image pixel per CSS pixel, so a crop meant for a retina asset lands at half the resolution it needs. chrome --force-device-scale-factor=2 --screenshot is faithful but can't click, so it can never capture a modal, a hover, or a logged-in view. --scale does both.

It's a capture posture, not a browsing one. Chromium only takes deviceScaleFactor at context creation and Playwright refuses it alongside no_viewport, so a scaled session pins a viewport and emulates device metrics — screen == viewport, and start says so with screen_coherent: false. Don't point a scaled session at a Cloudflare/DataDome wall; browse on a normal one and scale a separate session for the picture. Cold start only (scale_pending on a live session), Patchright only (scale_ignored on nodriver), and max_screenshot_px is denominated in device pixels — at 2× a tall page truncates at half the CSS height. Details in AGENTS.md, under Retina / 2× captures.

Search — find the URL, not just read it

Reading a walled page is only half a research loop; the other half is discovery, and search engines are anti-bot walled like everything else. vb search runs the SERP over the same curl_cffi lane — no browser, no session, no API key, and no per-session call budget to run out of mid-run.

vb search "playwright stealth detection" -n 5vb search "cdp leak" --site github.com -n 20vb search "postmortem" --urls | xargs -I{} vb fetch --no-cookies {}

Engines are tried as a ladder (ddg → ddg-lite → bing) until one answers, because reachability moves: the endpoint serving results now may rate-limit (HTTP 202) on the next call. --json returns an attempts array naming every engine that declined and why, and a reason separating all engines are walled from the web has nothing — different problems, different fixes, and the CLI exits non-zero only for the first.

It never reuses session cookies (a SERP needs no login, and attaching one deanonymises the request), which is why it gets its own search cap instead of riding on fetch. No date filter is exposed on purpose: DuckDuckGo's mislabels article dates badly enough to corrupt a timeline. Engines rate-limit per IP — see proxies, below.

Proxies — per-request egress on both stealth lanes

Egress is the axis most people get wrong, so it gets stated precisely rather than implied. Both curl_cffi lanes take --proxy scheme://[user:pass@]host:port:

vb fetch --no-cookies https://api.example/v1 --proxy http://user:pass@gw:12323vb search "site reliability postmortem" -n 20 --proxy http://user:pass@gw:12323vb --session work proxy set http://user:pass@gw:12323    # or per-session, for the browser

Measured, not asserted — same box, same command, only --proxy differing:

Four things worth knowing:

• Unset means direct, and that is enforced. The daemon hands libcurl an explicit empty proxy, which is the only value that stops it reading HTTP(S)_PROXY / ALL_PROXY out of the environment it was spawned with. A long-lived daemon inherits whatever shell first started it, so without this a stray HTTPS_PROXY would silently reroute every request while the response claimed direct egress. (It did, until 0.19.0 — see the changelog.)
• It matters most for search. Engines rate-limit per IP, so a wide research fan-out from one address is the fastest way to push every query onto the last rung of the engine ladder. The response reports proxied: true|false so you can tell which IP a thin result set came from.
• The proxy address is SSRF-guarded like the target URL, with --allow-internal to opt in to a proxy on your own LAN. An unguarded proxy reaches internal services and returns their response bodies, not just connection errors.
• A bad proxy is an error, never a fallback. Silently egressing from the host IP when you asked for a specific one is worse than failing, because the whole point of asking was that the host IP must not be used. Proxy URLs are redacted from the verb log; responses carry the boolean, never the URL.

With a browser session, vb proxy set also wires the WebRTC leak guard — a tunnelled HTTP request still leaks the real IP via STUN without it.

Attach mode — the practical Cloudflare workaround

For DataDome / Kasada / hardened auth that walls cold-launch automation:

google-chrome --remote-debugging-port=9222 \              --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled \              --user-data-dir=/tmp/cdp-profile &# log into the walled site by handvb attach http://localhost:9222vb go https://target.example.com        # now reads as your real browser

Patchright's CDP-layer stealth still applies over connect_over_cdp — attach mode gets the same protocol-level patches as cold launch, plus your real-browser fingerprint and any cookies from the manual login.

Launch flags are yours on this tier. On cold launch the backend supplies --disable-blink-features=AutomationControlled for you. Attach connects to a Chrome that is already running, so nothing vibatchium does can add a launch flag after the fact — if you started Chrome without it, that tell is present for the whole session. Include it in the command above.

--remote-debugging-port is an open door. It grants full browser control to any process on the machine, and a page you visit can probe localhost to discover it. Use it on a machine you trust, and close Chrome when you're done.

Security model

vibatchium is built to drive real logins from an untrusted agent loop, so the threat model is "a credential must never reach the model, a screenshot, or a log":

• Encrypted vault. Passwords and TOTP secrets live in an XSalsa20-Poly1305 vault keyed from the OS keyring or VIBATCHIUM_SECRETS_KEY. A resolved secret never appears in logs, HAR captures, the observe cache, or any agent-visible response field (grep-tested in CI).
• Secrets are never rendered in the clear. fill --use-secret masks the field in the page (-webkit-text-security), applied before the value is written, so every path that turns the viewport into bytes — the screenshot verb, the 5 fps live-view stream, and VLM vision_* calls that ship the frame to a model — captures dots, not the value. The mask fails closed (no write if it can't be confirmed), covers password fields so a show-password toggle can't unmask, and the accessibility snapshot returned by map / diff_map strips masked values so the secret can't leak into the model's context as text either.
• Secrets are origin-bound. fill --use-secret github.com:password only writes into a document on that site — https, github.com or a subdomain, judged by the frame that owns the field (so an iframe can't borrow the top page's origin) — or into the entry's explicit origins list. Anywhere else it refuses before the secret is resolved, so a prompt-injected agent can't type your password into a lookalike page. Framed login pages, about:blank frames and pages the agent already ran eval in are refused too; while the secret sits in a field, value / eval are refused so it can't be read back; and the write uses the field's own value setter, never focus + keyboard, so page script can't redirect it. If the field is swapped mid-fill, it's cleared and the call fails. The escape hatches (--allow-cross-origin, two daemon env vars) are shell-only; MCP refuses them, along with vault edits and secret totp.
• Live-view is authenticated. The WebSocket requires a per-server token and rejects foreign-Origin connections (the CSWSH class), and driving the page is a separate token from watch-only — a read-only link can be shared without handing over the keyboard. Binds 127.0.0.1 by default (--insecure-public to override).
• Scraped content is marked untrusted. MCP verbs that return page-derived text carry openWorldHint, so a host can taint the output against prompt injection instead of treating a scraped page as instructions; pure probes are readOnlyHint and mutating verbs (stop, secret_delete, storage_restore) are destructiveHint.
• REST shim. Without --caps, the bearer token grants every verb including eval, secret_*, and file-writing verbs — local-code-equivalent, so always pass --caps=... in hosted mode. All vibatchium-written files are 0600; directories 0700.

Honest limits

• 5+ concurrent sessions = 1-2GB RAM. Each persistent-context Chrome is ~200-400MB. Bump cap with VIBATCHIUM_MAX_SESSIONS=8.

• Vision spend cap is process-wide. N fan-out agents share one daily/lifetime budget.

• Init scripts don't work on patchright backend. chrome.runtime stays undefined — accepted trade for stealth wins.

• Login walls (X, LinkedIn) require attach mode. Cold-launch fan-out can't defeat sites requiring authenticated sessions.

• Synthetic input has a CDP coordinate signature. Every click/type/hover/scroll rides Playwright over CDP Input.dispatchMouseEvent/dispatchKeyEvent (pageX==screenX, no CoalescedEvents). Patchright patches the JS-context leaks, not the Input domain, and humanize on improves trajectory/timing realism but does not change the per-event signature. Behavioral walls that fingerprint it (DataDome/Kasada/HUMAN) want attach-mode against a real headful Chrome you drive — OS-level synthetic input (CDP-Patches) is headful + active-tab only and doesn't fit a headless, N-parallel daemon.

• fetch is a static-fingerprint lane, not a browser. The curl_cffi fetch verb matches Chrome's JA3/HTTP2 but runs no JavaScript — it clears TLS-fingerprint gates, not DataDome/Kasada/Turnstile JS challenges. Fall back to go for those.

• Single daemon = single point of failure. No HA built in.

• Behavioural detection now targets the humanizer directly. Cloudflare's 2026 bot-detection work names mathematically ideal Bézier cursor paths and superhuman click precision as tells. humanize improves on nothing-at-all, but it is a pointer-trajectory model, not a physiological one — and it is off by default, which on a behaviourally-scored site is the louder of the two states.

• One burned profile can taint every account that shares it. Vendors now link device telemetry across sessions and accounts. Use one profile per account, never share a profile between identities, and don't reuse a profile that has already been challenged.

• The fetch and search lanes are outside prompt-injection scanning. The scanner covers page-content verbs (text, html, extract, map, …). SERP titles and fetched bodies are third-party text going straight into an agent's context and are not scanned today. Treat them as untrusted input.

• Cloudflare's 2026-09-15 default is policy, not detection. For new domains and free-plan zones, Cloudflare now blocks Training and Agent crawlers by default on ad-monetized pages. It targets crawlers that declare themselves (user-agent or Web Bot Auth signature), so it doesn't change what a real Chrome session looks like — but the fingerprint and behavioural scoring above is a separate axis that moves independently of anything announced in a blog post.

Updating

vb update                  # upgrade + bounce the daemon + refresh the agent skillvb update --version 0.19.0   # or pin a specific version

vb update detects how vibatchium was installed (pipx, uv tool install, a pip-less uv venv, or pip with a PEP-668 --break-system-packages fallback), stops the running daemon so the next command loads the new code, and rewrites the agent skill / docs blocks so a coding agent is actually told about the verbs the new version ships (--no-restart / --no-setup opt out). Manual equivalent:

pipx upgrade vibatchium    # or: uv tool upgrade vibatchium / pip install -U vibatchiumvb shutdown                # bounce the daemon — it serves old code until you dovb setup                   # refresh the agent skill + docsvb --version               # confirm

The daemon-restart step is the one people miss: the long-running daemon keeps serving the old version until it's bounced. vb update does it for you; if you upgrade by hand, run vb shutdown (the next vb call auto-respawns the new version). Optional features upgrade via pipx install 'vibatchium[all]' --force.

Running from a git checkout

git pull updates the source; whether it updates what vb actually runs depends on the install, and two of the three ways it can fail are silent:

vb --version && git describe --tags   # do they agree? if not, the install COPIED                                      # the source — reinstall editable:                                      #   uv pip install -e '.[all]'vb status                             # warns when the daemon predates the source                                      # ("stale_code") — bounce with `vb shutdown`

A version-string compare cannot catch a checkout: git pull changes the code without changing __version__. vb status compares the daemon's boot time against the newest source file instead, and vb update bounces the daemon only when it is provably behind — so it never drops live sessions for nothing.

New cap buckets need a re-register

The MCP server's --caps list is frozen into your agent's config at first registration, so a bucket added by a later release (0.19.0 added search) stays invisible no matter how many times you upgrade. Re-running vb setup reports the drift but deliberately won't overwrite a --caps you set by hand:

vb setup                              # reports any cap drift, changes nothingvb setup --force --caps lean,search   # apply it — exposes `vb search` as a tool

Restart the agent session afterwards: the MCP tool list is read once, at start.

Server modes

REST capability gating: vb serve --caps=core,nav,input,vision restricts the HTTP surface the same way mcp --caps does. Without it, REST grants local-code-equivalent access (eval + secret_* + file-writing verbs all exposed) — safe for localhost dev, not for hosted/multi-tenant.

Documentation

• AGENTS.md — coding-agent contract (Codex / Cursor / Claude Code)

Authorized use

vibatchium is built to drive sessions you own, with your credentials, on your machine — your accounts, your employer's, or a client's with their written permission. It is a tool for automating access you already have.

That boundary is not a formality, though the law around it moved in 2026. A US district court had granted a preliminary injunction against an AI agent that accessed password-protected pages through the user's own logged-in account, holding that the user's permission is not the platform's authorization. On 4 August 2026 the Ninth Circuit vacated that injunction and remanded (Amazon.com Services, LLC v. Perplexity AI, Inc., No. 26-1444, published), concluding that the operator had not "accessed" the plaintiff's computers under the CFAA at all — "it was the user who accessed [them], with the help of [the] AI agent." The California CDAFA claim failed for the same reason.

Read that narrowly. It decides who accessed a computer, not whether evading a technical block is access "without authorization"; the panel never reached circumvention. A vacated preliminary injunction on remand is not a merits ruling, and it leaves contract, terms-of-service, trespass and copyright theories entirely untouched. What it does support is the shape of the tool: the browser runs on your machine, under your login, and the reasoning leaned on exactly that — no operator computer ever touched the other side's servers.

Scraping a site's public pages, evading a wall you have no account behind, or automating an account whose terms forbid it remain decisions you are making, and the consequences are yours.

Check the terms of the site you are automating. If you are acting for someone else, get it in writing.

License

Apache-2.0 core. Every default-install extra is permissive too — the fetch lane's curl_cffi is MIT. The only copyleft option is the opt-in nodriver backend (AGPL-3.0) — consult licensing before integrating it commercially. Nothing GPL/AGPL ships in the base install or [all].