[FSV — finds what checklists miss. An animated radar sweep lights up a dangling CNAME, an orphaned bucket, an SPF include that no longer exists, an XSS leading to session theft and an exposed source map.]
[CI]
[Python 3.11+]
[40 modules]
[MCP server]
[detection only]
[tests]
[license: MIT]
Web security scanner for the problems nobody is watching — dangling DNS & subdomain takeover, orphaned cloud buckets,
compromised script CDNs, SPF includes that expired, debug mode left on, secrets in your JavaScript, end-of-life software,
and the attack paths that turn small findings into a real compromise.
Runs as a CLI, a dashboard, an MCP server for AI agents, and a CI step.
MCP in 30 s ·
See it work ·
What it finds ·
Attack paths ·
Install ·
Usage ·
CI ·
FSV & ZAP ·
Limits ·
Docs ·
Contact
⚠ Authorized use only
FSV is a security assessment tool. Use it only against systems you own or are explicitly authorized in writing to test. Scanning systems without permission is illegal in most jurisdictions. Every entry point (web, CLI, MCP, CI) requires you to confirm authorization, and a shared deployment can additionally require proof of control of the target before any payload is sent (docs/DEPLOYMENT.md).
Connect your AI assistant in 30 seconds
Point Claude, Cursor or VS Code at FSV and ask it to review your site. The assistant asks you to confirm
authorization, runs a passive check, then a full scan, leads with attack paths and hands you paste-ready fixes.
No install at all: with uv, point any MCP client at uvx fsv mcp
({ "command": "uvx", "args": ["fsv", "mcp"] }). FSV is listed in the
official MCP Registry as io.github.twayst0/fsv.
Then, in the assistant: “Use the security_review prompt on https://my-shop.example — I own it.”
MCP tools & prompt
Prompt security_review(target, server) — the guided, authorization-first workflow above.
Scan results carry an attack_paths section so the agent leads with what matters. The server is tested
end to end over stdio (tests/test_mcp_stdio.py).
See it work
[Animated terminal replay: fsv scan against the demo site prints Risk F 100/100, three critical findings including a hard-coded Stripe key and an XSS attack path, an orphaned bucket, an exposed actuator endpoint, then `fsv fixes` prints nginx configuration.]
That output is real — a scan of the deliberately vulnerable demo site that ships in this repo. Reproduce it in a minute:
The cloud_storage check asks Amazon S3 whether the demo's bucket exists — that one request goes to AWS (read-only). Skip it with --no-external.
What it finds that checklists miss
Plenty of tools tell you a header is missing. The incidents that actually hurt organisations — including very well-run ones — are quieter, and they live where nobody is looking.
[Six detection cards: dangling DNS record, orphaned bucket used as a script source, SPF include of a domain that no longer exists, exposed source map with a masked key, end-of-life PHP and jQuery, and an XSS plus non-HttpOnly cookie attack path.]
Details, and every false-positive guard: docs/DETECTIONS.md.
Attack paths
Real compromises are rarely one bug — they're two or three "medium" problems that line up. Scanners rate each in isolation, so the combination stays invisible until someone writes the incident report. FSV reads its own findings (sending nothing more) and, where a chain is actually present, adds a finding that names the links, tells the story step by step, and states the cheapest single fix that breaks it. If a link is triaged away, the chain steps aside automatically.
[Animated chain: reflected XSS reads a session cookie that lacks HttpOnly, leading to account takeover. A '+HttpOnly' badge lands on the second link and the chain turns green: chain broken.]
Dashboard
[The FSV dashboard after scanning the demo site: risk grade F, 100/100, counts per severity, and an Attack paths panel explaining two chains step by step with a 'Break the chain' recommendation for each.]
[The OWASP Top 10 breakdown and the findings list with the Stripe key finding expanded: description, masked evidence, remediation and references.]
Liquid-glass UI with a live stepper (survives a page reload), the attack-path panel, OWASP breakdown, per-host risk trend, sort / module filters, bulk triage, one-click re-scan, keyboard navigation, scan comparison, and one-click export — reports or paste-ready fixes. Light and dark themes; no third-party requests.
Features
- Finds the pages first — besides links: robots.txt, sitemaps, routes leaked by debug pages, and API paths quoted in your JavaScript; action-like paths are never requested.
--seed for anything else.
- A badge for your README —
fsv badge <scan_id> writes a dated grade badge (FSV security | A · 2026-10-25); regenerate it from CI.
- Fix packs — turn findings into nginx / Apache / Caddy / Express / DNS configuration (
fsv fixes <scan> nginx). Only what was actually found; CSP is emitted report-only.
- Notifications —
--notify <webhook> (or FSV_WEBHOOK_URL) posts the grade and the worst findings to Slack, Discord or your own endpoint. Evidence is never included.
- CI-ready —
fsv.toml, baselines (gate only on new findings), --fail-on, SARIF for GitHub code scanning, and a ready-made GitHub Action.
- Triage that sticks — false positive / accepted risk / fixed / confirmed, stored per host by stable fingerprint, re-applied to later scans, excluded from the score. Diff any two scans; per-host trend.
- Evidence over guesses — exposure checks validate content (a
.git/HEAD must look like one; an SPA that answers 200 to everything produces nothing). Every finding has a confidence, a CWE, an OWASP Top 10 (2021) category, impact and remediation.
- Honest failure — a crashing module is counted, explained and logged; a target that never answered is flagged, not graded "clean".
- Safe by construction — secrets masked at the source; cloud-metadata/link-local never reachable, loopback/RFC 1918 optionally blocked, on every lookup and redirect hop; dashboard CSRF/DNS-rebinding guard and token auth.
- Extensible — a module is one class; drop a file in
~/.fsv/plugins or ship an entry-point package (docs/WRITING_MODULES.md). Bring your own JS-library advisories and EOL dates.
- Fast & polite, hard to stall — async engine, shared HTTP client with cache, request coalescing, token-bucket rate limit, retries, size cap, time limit with partial results. A hanging endpoint costs one timeout per scan, not one per module; every response regex is linear-time. Tested against hostile local servers (redirect loops, 20 MB bodies, hangs, catch-all SPAs).
- Five report formats — Markdown (OWASP-grouped), JSON, self-contained HTML, SARIF 2.1, CSV.
- Local-first — results in a local SQLite file; the only optional third-party calls are listed in DEPLOYMENT.md.
Install
From source: git clone https://github.com/twayst0/fsv && cd fsv && ./install.sh (or pip install -e .).
Requires Python 3.11+. Docker: see docs/DEPLOYMENT.md (docker compose up).
Usage
CLI reference
In CI
SARIF is uploaded to GitHub code scanning; the HTML report and log are attached as an artifact.
FSV and OWASP ZAP
ZAP is the right tool for deep testing of an application's inputs — use it. FSV looks at what surrounds the
application, where typical DAST scans don't go, and the two work well side by side:
Modules (40)
FSV ships 40 modules — 34 passive, 6 active. Run fsv modules for the live list.
The full catalogue (or run fsv modules)
↗ contacts hosts other than the target (skip with --no-external). passive = sends no crafted payloads. Profiles: passive (only passive modules), balanced (default), aggressive (higher rate/concurrency), deep (wider crawl, hidden-parameter discovery, larger exposed-file list, more payload shapes — slower), full (everything in deep, then exhaustive: 1000+ URLs at depth 6, ~600 guessed paths, backup copies, boolean SQLi, 160 parameter names — slowest).
How it works
[Pipeline: crawl, 32 modules, aggregate by fingerprint, correlate into attack paths, triage per host, report — shared by CLI, dashboard, MCP agents and the GitHub Action.]
One engine, four front doors. Address policy and proof of control live in the engine, so every front door gets them; request guard and token auth belong to the web server. See docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.
Configuration (environment variables)
Limits — what FSV is not
- It reads HTML; it does not execute JavaScript, so content that only exists after client-side rendering isn't discovered.
- Active checks cover common reflected classes with benign markers. It is not a replacement for a penetration test, SAST or an SCA pipeline.
- The JS-advisory and end-of-life tables are curated snapshots — cross-check with OSV / endoflife.date for anything important, and extend them with the files above.
- DNS checks are only as good as the resolver (
fsv doctor tests it). A resolver that can't answer produces no DNS findings, not bad ones.
- Findings carry a confidence; tentative ones are hints. Triage them, and tell us about false positives — they're the most useful bug reports.
Documentation
Detections · Architecture · Writing modules · Deploying safely · Security policy · Contributing · Changelog
The animated SVGs and screenshots above are generated from a real scan: scripts/build_readme_assets.sh --screenshots.
Contact
twayst0 (tways) — author and maintainer
Questions, collaboration and licensing enquiries are welcome by email or Discord.
License
MIT — free to use, modify and share, for anyone, including commercially. Keep the copyright and licence
notice. Copyright © 2026 twayst0. See LICENSE.
Disclaimer
This software is provided "as is", for lawful, authorized security testing only.
The authors accept no liability for misuse or damage. Always obtain written
permission before testing any system you do not own.