
Proxykey
org.proxykeyPublished by proxykey.orgOfficial publisherv1.0.0Updated Oct 24, 2026
Issue, rotate and revoke scoped API-key passes for 25+ providers — the agent never sees a real key
Overview
Proxykey lets an assistant manage revocable virtual API-key "passes" for 25+ providers through a credential vault, without ever seeing the real keys.
- What you can do
- List providers and stored secrets (metadata only, never values)
- Create, rotate, revoke and delete passes, including pending passes for keys a human has not entered yet
- Update pass limits, IP binding mode and expiry, and reset IP learning
- Inspect per-pass request logs and usage statistics
- Get a link for a human to enter a provider key in the panel
- When to use it
- Use it when an agent needs to call third-party APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, Telegram and others) but should not hold the real credentials, or when you want per-pass IP binding, rate limits, revocation and request logs for agent access.
- Requirements
- Remote Streamable HTTP endpoint at mcp.proxykey.org; a free account at the proxykey panel (GitHub OAuth or email magic link); an MCP token created in the panel's MCP section, sent as an Authorization bearer header. Real provider keys are entered by a human in the panel, not by the agent.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Proxykey in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Connect Authorization token credentials. They are stored privately and never shown on public pages.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Web executable via Streamable HTTP. Remote servers run from the web runtime once configured in a workspace.
Use with an agent
Paste this prompt into Claude Code, Codex, Cursor or another agent — or into SourceWeft chat. The agent reads this server's install guide, shows you its publisher, endpoint and sign-in, and adds it to your client once you agree. Keys never go into a command.
Read https://sourceweft.com/mcp/org.proxykey%2Fproxykey/install.md and connect the MCP server it describes to my client. Before changing any config, show me its publisher, endpoint and sign-in method and wait for my OK. Never put an API key in a command or in a file I would commit; ask me where it should come from.Other MCP clients
Add this to your client's mcpServers config.
{
"mcpServers": {
"proxykey": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>"
}
}
}
}README
proxykey MCP server
Issue, rotate and revoke API-key passes from your AI agent — without the agent ever seeing a real key.
proxykey is a credential vault and proxy: your real API keys (OpenAI,
Anthropic, Telegram, Stripe, 25+ providers) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM
and never leave the server. Apps and agents use revocable virtual keys —
passes (vlt_…) — with per-pass IP binding, rate limits and full request
logs. This MCP server lets an agent manage those passes.
- Website: https://proxykey.org/en/
- Panel: https://app.proxykey.org
- Docs: https://app.proxykey.org/docs.html
- MCP endpoint (Streamable HTTP):
https://mcp.proxykey.org/mcp
Why give an agent this instead of a key
Anything that enters a model's context can leak — through logs, traces or prompt injection. With proxykey the agent gets a tool, not a secret:
- the agent can create / rotate / revoke / inspect passes;
- a "read the real key" operation does not exist in the toolset;
- only a human can enter the original key, in the panel;
- a leaked pass is a non-event: wrong IP → 403, over limit → 429, revocation is one click and doesn't touch the original.
Quick start
- Sign in at https://app.proxykey.org (GitHub OAuth or email magic link, free).
- Open MCP → create a token (
mcp_…). - Connect your client:
Claude Code
Claude Desktop / Cursor (mcp.json)
Tools (13)
The proxy itself
Point your client at the proxy and use the pass as the API key — only the host and the key change:
Streaming (SSE), request bodies and headers pass through unchanged.
Telegram bots keep their URL shape (/p/telegram-bot/<pass>/getMe).
Full reference: https://app.proxykey.org/docs.html
Security model (short version)
- Secrets: AES-256-GCM envelope encryption, decrypted in memory per request, never logged, never returned by any API after creation.
- Pass tokens and MCP tokens are stored hashed (SHA-256).
- MCP surface cannot create or read secret values, or toggle body logging — those stay human-only in the panel.
- Request logs contain metadata only — no auth headers, no key material.
Source: README.md at commit 4587eee
Tools
0Version history
1- v1.0.0LatestSep 16, 2026
Score
85% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 daysRequired25 pts
- Auth declaredRequired10 pts
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts