
Marketnow
site.marketnowPublished by marketnow.sitev1.14.2Updated Oct 24, 2026
68k+ security-audited MCP skills + free agent trust layer: signed ATC cards, tool gating, audits.
Overview
Local MCP server providing trust and security tools for AI agents: credential verification, revocation checks, and tool-surface fingerprinting.
- What you can do
- The npm package marketnow-mcp runs a local MCP server with 15 trust and security tools. It verifies Agent Trust Cards and other credential formats through a Universal Trust Schema, checks revocation status, and fingerprints an MCP server's tool list to detect added, removed, or changed tool descriptions. It also offers domain reputation checks and security scanning rules for MCP configurations.
- When to use it
- Use it when you want an assistant to verify agent credentials, check whether a trust card or signing key has been revoked, or detect tool-poisoning and rug-pull changes in another MCP server's tool surface. It suits teams that need client-side trust checks against local credentials.
- Requirements
- Node.js, installed via npm as marketnow-mcp or run with npx. Runs locally over stdio; no accounts, API keys, or environment variables are declared. Some tools may reach public endpoints such as the provider's trust API or Sigstore's transparency log.
Installation
In SourceWeft
- Open Marketnow in the dashboard and add it to a workspace.
- Enable the server for the chats that should use its tools.
Desktop only via STDIO. STDIO servers start a local process, so they need the SourceWeft desktop host.
Other MCP clients
Follow the launch instructions in the repository.
README
Universal Trust Adapter (UTA)
Repo ecosystem (one owner per concern, split 2026-09-26): this repo owns the ATC protocol — the v3.0 RFC draft (
spec/), the UTS schema, the 36-vector conformance corpus (uta-monorepo/vectors/), the reference implementation (uta-monorepo/), format adapters, plugins, and the Stranger Manifesto. Product code (mcp-server, npmmarketnow-mcp,atc-sdk, integrations) lives inalicelabs-llc/MARKETNOW; the live marketplace (site, catalog data, data pipelines, Vercel deploys of marketnow.site) lives ineddyflores100-lang/marketnow.
The USB-C of agent trust.
[M8ven] [npm downloads] [npm version] [GitHub release] [license] [conformance] [Rekor anchored] [mcpservers.org]
UTA translates between ALL trust credential formats used by AI agents via a canonical Universal Trust Schema (UTS).
Like Zapier connects applications, UTA connects trust standards.
Built by Edison Flores & Alejandro Flores at AliceLabs LLC (Wyoming, USA).
🔌 Use it now — verify any agent for $0.01 (x402, no account, no key)
The reference verifier is live and fail-closed: Base mainnet (eip155:8453, PayAI facilitator) and
Base Sepolia (eip155:84532, x402.org facilitator — zero-cost testing) at the same $0.01/verify · $0.08/batch.
Any x402 client pays per call (USDC, exact scheme) — no signup, no API key. If the revocation check
cannot be reached, the verdict is DENY: it never degrades to "probably fine".
🏛 Where this is listed & reviewed (all verifiable)
- mcp.so — listed (maintainer-confirmed 2026-10-16)
- Glama MCP — rated A (remote-capable, maintenance A)
- x402scan — indexed via the official
npx agentcash registerflow (openapi source, 2 resources) - gold-402 — merged (Gate PASSED ×2)
- awesome-agent-native-services — merged
- Spec under public review: scope-binding §5.2 reached rev 4 after seller-side and second-implementation
review by x402 core contributors (commit
bcb53028).
🤝 Contributing — Hacktoberfest 2026
Real, spec-linked good first issues are open and review is async-in-writing:
Read the Stranger Manifesto first: we merge vectors and receipts, not vibes.
⚡ Verify our claims — the stranger test (30 seconds)
Every trust claim in this repo is re-derivable by a stranger, from live public URLs, with no account and no trust in our endpoints:
Exercised in production, receipts public: we rotated our CA key mn-ca-002 → mn-ca-003 on 2026-09-08 after private-key material was found committed to a public repository (exposure confirmed; no third-party misuse observed). Revocation published same-day, postmortem public: https://marketnow.site/security/incidents/2026-09-08. Three Rekor log entries (logIndex 2762061972, 2764017355, 2764479676) anchor the digests, and the published npm tarball's tar layer rebuilds byte-exact from source (sha256 519d406a…).
🌐 The Stranger Manifesto — 13 languages
Trust that requires membership is not trust. It's a guest list.
Ten build rules for stranger-verifiable agent trust — read it in your language (every version anchored to the same live receipts):
English · Español · Português · Français · Deutsch · Italiano · Русский · 日本語 · 中文 · 한국어 · हिन्दी · العربية · Türkçe
Markdown sources: manifesto/ — one file per language, same content, same receipts.
Rendered right here on GitHub; the marketnow.site/manifesto/ pages ship with the next site deploy.
🌍 Visa & Mastercard article — 14 languages
"Visa has a Trusted Agent Protocol. Mastercard has Verifiable Intent. Here's the layer neither one gives you."
- English — canonical, full version
- العربية
- Deutsch
- Español
- Français
- हिन्दी
- Bahasa Indonesia
- Italiano
- 日本語
- 한국어
- Português
- Русский
- Türkçe
- Tiếng Việt
- 中文
🌍 Global Trust Series (multi-language, 2026-09-08)
The 2026 gray-market quota trust crisis, documented — plus the receipts-based fix:
- English — You Paid an AI Reseller — Then the Rules Changed Mid-Cycle
- 中文 — 你买的 AI 合租/中转被改规则或跑路?开发者自保清单
- Русский — Оплатили AI-подписку через посредника — а правила изменились посреди цикла?
- Español — Pagaste por Claude o Cursor a un revendedor ¿y las reglas cambiaron a mitad del ciclo?
- Sourced timeline (EN) — The 2026 AI Quota Gray-Market Trust Crisis — A Sourced Timeline
- Series index · Verify a trust card: https://marketnow.site/verify
🆕 What's new — v5.1 (revocation that answers + tool fingerprinting)
Release v5.1 — roadmap items 1 & 5 (commit 7fb7db6a, Rekor anchor #4):
- ATC Revocation + Transparency Log (MNR-CRL-1.0) — a signed, append-only revocation registry for Agent Trust Cards and CA keys. The
/api/trust?action=revocationpage used to promise an OCSP responder that returned 404; nowGET /api/ocsp?card_id=…/?kid=…answers for real: VALID / EXPIRED / REVOKED / SUPERSEDED / UNKNOWN, with PERMIT/DENY recommendation, fail-closed semantics, and the CRL signature embedded so any client can verify the signed layer independently (GET /api/crl). Seeded with real events — 3 superseded ATCs + themn-ca-002key compromise (2026-09-08). - Cryptographic Tool Fingerprinting (TFP-1.0) — the OWASP MCP Cheat Sheet control "verify tool descriptions haven't changed", as an MCP tool: SHA-256 over the RFC 8785 JCS canonical form of each tool + a manifest fingerprint for the whole
tools/listsurface + drift reports (added / removed / changed) against pinned manifests. The core defense against tool poisoning and rug-pull redefinitions. - MCP endpoint v1.15.0 (9 public remote tools — discovery/trust surface) and npm
[email protected](15 local trust/security tools) — remote surface and package surface are different by design: the endpoint exposes public discovery over the live catalog, the package runs client-side against local credentials. The npm package also fixed the brokenrepository.directorylink and upgraded the MCP SDK (DNS-rebinding advisory resolved;npm auditclean). - Interceptor v1.1.0 (
@marketnow/cline-trust-plugin, npm) — revocation gate (fail-closed, 5-min TTL) + per-server tool-surface pinning/verification. - Sentinel semgrep rules v2 — 29 rules: +tool-poisoning (MCP-TP), +exfiltration chains (MCP-EX), +multi-step attack chains (MCP-AC, roadmap v5.4 preview), +stale-trust caching (MCP-RR).
- Rekor anchor #4 (logIndex 2771735480) — the revocation registry itself is anchored in Sigstore's public log; the revocation history is third-party-checkable end-to-end.
v1.3.3 — the receipts release (previous)
Stranger-verifiable trust evidence:
- Rekor transparency anchors (entries #1–#3) — result digests committed to Sigstore's public append-only log; 9 local checks against live third-party data (run the stranger test above)
- Exercised CA key rotation —
mn-ca-002→mn-ca-003(key material found in a public repo; exposure confirmed, no third-party misuse), revocation published same-day — postmortem, verifiers fail-safe inside the window - Reproducible build —
agent-trust-card's tar layer rebuilds byte-exact from source (the.tgzis anchored by digest; the tar layer by rebuild) - New failure vectors —
premature-atc(credential accepted before verification completes),expired-atc(key no longer valid at verify time), stage scoring, published generator CA - Conformance v1.3.3 — 14 public vectors · 24 checks + 10 mutants (runner-under-test) · versioned digests
v1.2.0 — Domain Reputation Endpoint (previous)
Domain Reputation Endpoint (/api/reputation) — UTA now answers a second class of trust
question. The Universal Trust API verifies credentials; this endpoint answers
"can I trust this domain before I show it to a human or act on it?"
- Spec:
api/reputation-spec.md· v1.2 engine, stable - Reference implementation:
api/reputation.ts— one file, zero dependencies, hosting-neutral (Node 18+, Deno, Bun, Cloudflare Workers, any edge runtime) - Verdicts:
trusted(95) ·unknown(55) ·caution(35) ·risky(8) — deterministic, transparent reasons, free & keyless, CDN-cacheable 24h - Client parity: identical engine runs in the browser (ProdIntel
services/sourceTrust.ts) — badges render instantly offline, get server-confirmed when reachable - First consumer in production: ProdIntel source safety gate
- v1.2 engine fix: shortener matching is now exact-host/subdomain — v1.1 substring
matching wrongly scored
riskymarketplaces containingt.coinside<name>.com(walmart.com, target.com, homedepot.com, flipkart.com). Cache consumers should key on v1.2.
Code lives in this repo (GitHub is the single source of truth). Deployment is bring-your-own-host.
ATC Versions in this repo
UTA supports TWO versions of ATC (Agent Trust Card):
ATC v3.0 supersedes ATC v2.0 (which itself was the basis for the simpler ATC/1.0 SDK). A v2.0 ATC remains valid; v3.0 verifiers accept v2.0 credentials and treat them as having a single signature.
🚀 Quick install
📊 Project stats
📦 Packages
🛡️ 5 Anti-ban download channels
- NPM Registry — primary, independent of GitHub
- jsDelivr CDN — free global CDN, mirrors NPM automatically
- unpkg CDN — alternative CDN, also mirrors NPM
- marketnow.site — AliceLabs-owned origin server
- GitHub org —
alicelabs-llc/universal-trust-adapter(this repo)
🔢 Taxonomy — which count belongs to which system
Three different counts coexist in this ecosystem. They are not three ways of counting the same thing:
If a surface says "8-layer audit" anywhere, it is stale — the Sentinel pipeline is 12 stages grouped into 10 audit layers (L1–L9). ATC's "8" is the count of required verification controls (10 total). UTA's number is formats, not layers.
📐 Open-Core Architecture
🧪 Try it
🧬 Test vectors
ATC/1.0 (5 frozen): MARKETNOW repo → docs/atc-spec/test-vectors/ — 5 fixtures with canonical JCS bytes per vector + SHA-256 + Ed25519 signature.
ATC v3.0 (36 vectors): uta-monorepo/vectors/ — 8 positive + 17 negative + 5 mutation + 6 cross-language, plus a prompt-injection corpus. MANIFEST with per-vector expected outcomes.
The test CA keypair is intentionally published (including private key) for cross-language reproducibility.
⚠️ TEST ONLY — this private key is intentionally public. It MUST NEVER be trusted in production.
ca-test-2exists so any stranger can regenerate and re-sign the conformance vectors in any language. Signatures underca-test-2prove conformance-suite behavior — nothing else. Production CAs (mn-ca-003) are separate keys, never published, and their lifecycle is auditable in the revocation registry and the 2026-09-08 incident postmortem.
🛰️ Live x402 endpoint (production)
The UTA Trust API is LIVE and payable with x402 (USDC, base-sepolia) — no API keys, no accounts, no signups:
Any x402 client works (x402-fetch, x402-requests, or your own EIP-3009 signer). The edge
verifier is a faithful port of the reference scorer semantics (JCS signed subtree, pinned trust
anchors, two-sided validity window, active-status check) and scores 14/14 on the ATC/1.0
conformance vectors. verify + settle run against the x402 facilitator — no settlement, no 200.
📋 Specs & docs
- ATC/1.0 Spec: MARKETNOW repo →
docs/atc-spec/SPEC.md - ERC-8004 crosswalk:
docs/crosswalks/erc-8004-atc-v1.md— Trustless Agents identity ↔ ATC/1.0 verification - ATC v3.0 RFC Draft:
spec/RFC-ATC-v3-Draft-00.md - UTS v1:
spec/UTS-v1.md·spec/uts-v1.json - Domain Reputation API spec:
api/reputation-spec.md - Universal Trust API spec:
api/trust-api-spec.md - Threat model (STRIDE + MITRE ATLAS):
uta-monorepo/threat-model/THREAT_MODEL.md - Architecture:
docs/ARCHITECTURE.md - License matrix (all components): https://marketnow.site/licensing
- CA incident postmortem 2026-09-08: https://marketnow.site/security/incidents/2026-09-08
- Contributing:
CONTRIBUTING.md - Security policy:
SECURITY.md
🌐 Community
- GitHub Discussions: discussions
- Dev.to: @edison_flores_6d2cd381b13 — 194 articles
- Issues: Report a bug
- Email: [email protected]
📄 License
Author: Edison Flores · Email: [email protected] · Website: https://marketnow.site
Company: AliceLabs LLC (Wyoming, USA)
License
Dual-licensed under MIT OR Apache-2.0, at your option — free for any use, including commercial use. This repo and all MarketNow npm packages (marketnow-mcp v1.14.0+, agent-trust-card v1.4.0+, @marketnow/*) ship dual-licensed: see LICENSE-MIT and LICENSE-APACHE. Trademarks ("MarketNow", "UTA", "ATC") are reserved by AliceLabs LLC — see NOTICE.
Source: README.md at commit 14cb52d
Tools
0Version history
2- v1.14.2LatestSep 22, 2026
- v1.14.1Sep 21, 2026
Score
50% of the applicable checks met
How complete this listing is, computed from the registry entry, the endpoint and public sources. Not a rating of the server and not a statement that it is safe or working today: reachability is a dated check, and no installs or reviews go into the score.
- Reached in the last 30 days25 pts
Keep the endpoint answering the MCP handshake; SourceWeft probes it every 30 days.
- Auth declared10 pts
Declare the credential headers in the registry entry, or keep the endpoint answering the probe so its auth can be classified.
- Tools listed15 pts
Answer tools/list without a credential, or ship a package that starts in a sandbox without one.
- DescriptionRequired15 pts
- Logo10 pts
- Documentation15 pts
- License10 pts