LinkedIn Content Planner

app.theona由 theona.app 发布官方发布者v0.1.0更新于 Nov 2, 2026

Draft, revise and review LinkedIn posts; a human approves each one before it goes live.

已验证Streamable HTTP可网页运行效率与工作流沟通与协作

概览

AI 生成的概览

面向 LinkedIn 内容流水线的远程 MCP 服务器:助手可起草、修改并提交帖子,经人工审核后才发布。

可以做什么
  • 创建、列出、读取、编辑、改期、删除帖子并变更其状态
  • 查看版本历史、比较差异并回滚到旧版本
  • 提交帖子进入审核流程并查看审核记录
  • 添加、列出和解决审核评论
  • 通过内联 base64 或签名上传票据附加文件,并列出附件
  • 渲染预览,并管理帖子生命周期事件的 Webhook
适用场景
适合让智能体按计划或在对话中起草并反复修改 LinkedIn 帖子,而由人在网页界面中审核、评论并批准或要求修改后才发布,流程类似合并前的代码评审。
运行要求
远程 Streamable HTTP 端点 /mcp;需要 OAuth 2.1(PKCE 与动态客户端注册)。无法运行 OAuth 的客户端可由已登录用户创建长期访问密钥,并以 Authorization Bearer 头发送。清单未声明任何环境变量或请求头。
安装前请注意
服务器会写入和删除工作区中的帖子、评论与 Webhook,工具调用会改动已存内容。访问密钥长期有效、仅显示一次,并以创建者身份访问单个工作区,需谨慎保存与撤销。附件上限为单文件 25 MB、单工作区 250 MB。发布仍依赖网页界面中的人工批准。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 LinkedIn Content Planner,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 连接 所需的 凭据。它们会被私密存储,绝不会在公开页面上展示。
  3. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Web executable,通过 Streamable HTTP。 远程服务在工作区中配置后即可从网页运行时运行。

交给智能体安装

把这段提示词粘贴到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等智能体,或 SourceWeft 对话中。智能体会读取该服务器的安装指南,先向你展示发布者、端点和登录方式,经你同意后再把它添加到你的客户端。密钥不会写进任何命令。

阅读 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/app.theona%2Flinkedin-content-planner/install.md,并按其中说明把这个 MCP 服务器接入我的客户端。修改任何配置之前,先告诉我它的发布者、端点和登录方式,等我确认。不要把 API 密钥写进命令或我会提交的文件;问我密钥应从哪里获取。

查看智能体所依据的安装指南

其他 MCP 客户端

把它添加到你客户端的 mcpServers 配置中。 客户端会在首次连接时完成 OAuth 登录。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "linkedin-content-planner": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://linkedin-mcp.theona.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

README

LinkedIn Content Planner (MCP)

A LinkedIn content pipeline built for AI agents, not humans typing into a text box. Your agent (Claude Code, Claude Desktop, or any MCP-compatible client, on whatever schedule you run it — cron, an agent loop, a chat session) drafts, formats, and moves posts through a review pipeline by calling MCP tools directly: create_post, update_post_content, submit_review, and more. A human just reviews, comments, and approves/requests changes from the web UI before anything goes live — the same shape as reviewing a PR before merge, not manually operating a scheduling tool.

Multi-tenant and OAuth-secured out of the box: agents authenticate against the planner's own OAuth 2.1 authorization server (PKCE, dynamic client registration) and every MCP call is scoped to the caller's workspace.

See PLAN.md and ARCHITECTURE.md for the full design.

Local development

Requirements: Node 20+, pnpm, a Postgres 16 instance (via infra/docker-compose.yml or a local install).

bash
# 1. Start Postgresdocker compose -f infra/docker-compose.yml up -d# (or point DATABASE_URL at any local Postgres 16 instance)
# 2. Install dependenciespnpm install
# 3. Configure envcp apps/server/.env.example apps/server/.env# edit DATABASE_URL if not using the default docker-compose credentials
# 4. Generate + run migrations, seed default workspacepnpm --filter @linkedin-planner/db generateDATABASE_URL=postgres://linkedin_planner:linkedin_planner@localhost:5432/linkedin_planner_dev pnpm --filter @linkedin-planner/db migrateDATABASE_URL=postgres://linkedin_planner:linkedin_planner@localhost:5432/linkedin_planner_dev pnpm --filter @linkedin-planner/db seed
# 5. Run the serverpnpm dev:server

MCP tool surface

Posts: create_post, list_posts, get_post, update_post_content, str_replace_post_content, set_post_state, set_post_date, delete_post. Versions: list_versions, get_version_diff, revert_to_version. Review: submit_review, list_reviews. Comments: add_comment, list_comments, resolve_comment. Attachments: prepare_attachment_upload, attach_file, list_attachments. Preview: render_preview. Webhooks (subscribe to post lifecycle events): create_webhook, list_webhooks, update_webhook, delete_webhook, list_webhook_deliveries. Full tool schemas are served at the /mcp endpoint itself; see PLAN.md for the design rationale behind each.

Uploading an attachment

attach_file takes base64 inline, which is only practical for small files: a 160 KB image is ~217,000 base64 characters, more context than most agents can spend and more than any of them can retype without a silent corruption. Anything larger goes through a ticket instead:

prepare_attachment_upload(postId, filename, mimeType)  -> { uploadUrl, method: "PUT", expiresAt, maxBytes }
curl -T ./carousel.pdf '<uploadUrl>'     # bytes never enter the conversationlist_attachments(postId)                 # confirm it landed

The URL embeds an HMAC-signed ticket scoped to that one post, valid 15 minutes, and rejected afterwards. Both paths converge on the same attachFile service, so the 25 MB per-file and 250 MB per-workspace caps apply identically. Set ATTACHMENT_UPLOAD_SECRET when running more than one instance — unset, each process signs with its own random key and a ticket minted by one instance will not verify on another.

Access keys

Some MCP clients cannot run the OAuth flow — an Apify Standby Actor, for one, whose Authorization header already carries the caller's Apify token. For those, a signed-in user creates a long-lived access key on the Connect page (/connect?label=Apify prefills the form) and the client sends it as Authorization: Bearer planner_mcp_….

A key opens /mcp for one workspace as the user who created it, and /mcp still re-checks that membership on every request. Only the key's sha256 is stored, so it is shown once and can only be revoked afterwards. When the key store cannot be reached, /mcp answers 503 rather than 401, so a client holding a working key is not told to replace it.

Discovery

Two unauthenticated documents let a client — or an MCP registry — learn what this server is and how to authenticate before it holds any credential:

PathWhat it says
/.well-known/mcp.jsonServer card: name, description, version, source repo, and the streamable-http endpoint at /mcp. Shaped to the MCP registry's server.json schema, so the bytes served here are the bytes submitted when publishing to a registry. The auth scheme rides in _meta under the registry's reverse-DNS key, since server.json has no first-class field for it.
/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcpRFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata: the resource identifier, the authorization server, and the single planner:agents scope. This is what /mcp's 401 WWW-Authenticate header points at, and it stays authoritative — the card only signposts it.

The card is served in every configuration; with AUTH_ENABLED unset it advertises authorization: { type: "none" } and the PRM is not registered at all, because the OAuth authorization server it would name is not mounted either. Both documents are built from APP_PUBLIC_BASE_URL, the same value the token check validates aud against.

The server's name and version live in apps/server/src/mcp/identity.ts and feed both the card and the serverInfo block of the MCP initialize response, so a registry listing cannot drift from what a connected client sees.

Publishing to the registry

Listed in the official MCP registry as app.theona/linkedin-content-planner. The namespace is the reverse DNS of theona.app and is proved by an Ed25519 TXT record on that domain's apex; the private half is MCP_REGISTRY_DNS_KEY and exists nowhere else. Rotation is one new key pair, one edited TXT record, one replaced secret — which is why the key needs no escrow and why any doubt about it should be answered by rotating rather than investigating.

It is an environment secret on mcp-registry, not a repository secret. A repository secret is readable by any workflow that anyone with write access adds; this one is released only to a job that names the environment and clears its rules — a required reviewer, and deployments restricted to v* tags. So pushing a tag does not publish: it opens a run that waits for a human.

Releasing is pushing a v<version> tag once the new version is deployed. The Publish to MCP Registry workflow fetches /.well-known/mcp.json from production and submits those bytes; nothing in this repository restates the card, so there is no second copy to drift. The order matters and the workflow enforces it: a tag whose version does not match what the deployed server reports fails the run rather than publishing the previous release's card under the new version's name. Deploy, then tag.

Monorepo layout

  • apps/server — REST API + MCP server (Streamable HTTP at /mcp), same process, same core logic.
  • apps/web — React UI: backlog, calendar, post review.
  • packages/core — domain types and service layer shared by REST and MCP.
  • packages/formatting — markdown-subset ⇄ LinkedIn Unicode formatting.
  • packages/db — Drizzle ORM schema and migrations.

License

PolyForm Noncommercial License 1.0.0. Source-available, not OSI open source: free to use, modify, and self-host for any noncommercial purpose; any commercial or paid use requires a separate license from Theona, Inc.

来源:README.md,提交 11c5bb5

工具

0
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版本历史

1
  1. v0.1.0最新Sep 16, 2026

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