Touchstone

cv.touchstone由 touchstone.cv 发布官方发布者v1.1.0更新于 Oct 24, 2026

Bitcoin-anchored, tamper-evident audit log for AI agents — record, disclose and verify actions.

已验证Streamable HTTP可网页运行开发者工具安全与监控

服务详情

标识符: cv.touchstone/touchstone
传输: Streamable HTTP
运行时: Web executable
信任: Verified
发布于: Sep 16, 2026

安全提示

MCP 服务会接收对话中的工具调用请求，并可能执行外部操作。启用前请先了解该服务能做什么，并只授予它所需的权限。

注册中心已验证此服务的命名空间属于 touchstone.cv，且该域名同时运行其端点。这可以确认发布者，但并不代表该服务的工具是安全的。

SourceWeft 的检查只涵盖条目是否完整、端点是否响应；不审查服务器的代码，也不审查其工具的行为。

在 README 中添加徽章

向读者展示该 MCP 服务已收录于 SourceWeft，徽章链接到本页。

[![Listed on SourceWeft](https://sourceweft.com/badge/mcp/cv.touchstone%2Ftouchstone.svg)](https://sourceweft.com/mcp/cv.touchstone%2Ftouchstone?utm_source=readme&utm_medium=badge)

概览

AI 生成的概览

Touchstone 将 AI 智能体的操作记录到防篡改、以比特币锚定的审计日志中，每条记录都在本地用你的 Ed25519 密钥签名。

可以做什么: 记录事件：在本地规范化载荷，用你的密钥对承诺签名并追加到记录器，也可按字段分别提交以便日后选择性披露。为选定条目创建可分享的披露链接，仅公开指定字段，并附上针对已签名载荷哈希的 Merkle 证明。验证披露包，并获取记录器的公开信息与检查点状态。
适用场景: 当你需要一份可审计、外部锚定的智能体操作记录，并希望签名在本地完成、不把密钥交给远程服务时使用。选择性披露适合在公开部分字段证明的同时隐藏其他字段。
运行要求: 通过 stdio 运行 npm 包需要 Node.js 18 或更高版本，也可使用远程端点。需要 Touchstone 记录器 ID、Colony 主体和 Touchstone API 密钥；记录还需以内联或密钥文件方式提供 Ed25519 种子。记录器和密钥可通过开发者站点自行开通。

安装前请注意

服务器持有用于签名的 Ed25519 密钥，请妥善保管种子和密钥文件。API 密钥会发送给 Touchstone 服务，披露、验证和记录器信息查询也会代理到该服务。记录会向记录器追加条目，披露链接会让所选字段可被公开分享，请确认要公开的内容。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

打开控制台中的 Touchstone，将其添加到工作区。
连接 Authorization token 凭据。它们会被私密存储，绝不会在公开页面上展示。
为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Web executable，通过 Streamable HTTP。远程服务在工作区中配置后即可从网页运行时运行。

交给智能体安装

把这段提示词粘贴到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等智能体，或 SourceWeft 对话中。智能体会读取该服务器的安装指南，先向你展示发布者、端点和登录方式，经你同意后再把它添加到你的客户端。密钥不会写进任何命令。

阅读 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/cv.touchstone%2Ftouchstone/install.md，并按其中说明把这个 MCP 服务器接入我的客户端。修改任何配置之前，先告诉我它的发布者、端点和登录方式，等我确认。不要把 API 密钥写进命令或我会提交的文件；问我密钥应从哪里获取。

查看智能体所依据的安装指南

其他 MCP 客户端

把它添加到你客户端的 mcpServers 配置中。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "touchstone": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://touchstone.cv/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>"
      }
    }
  }
}

README

touchstone-mcp

Local MCP server for Touchstone — record what your agent did into a tamper-evident, externally-anchored log.

This server runs on your machine and holds your Ed25519 signing key. It signs each event locally and appends it to your recorder, so an agent only has to call touchstone_record({ event_type, payload }). The key never leaves this process. Canonicalization (JCS / RFC 8785) is done locally too, so a malicious or compromised server can't trick you into signing a different commitment than you intended.

Zero dependencies — Node 18+ built-ins only. It's a single file: read it before you trust it.

The remote MCP at https://touchstone.cv/mcp can't sign for you (Touchstone never holds your key), so its touchstone_record expects a signature you computed yourself. Run this server when you want frictionless local signing.

Install

bash

# one-off, no install:npx -y @touchstone-cv/mcp
# or vendor the single file:curl -O https://touchstone.cv/touchstone-mcp.mjs
# or clone:git clone https://github.com/Touchstone-CV/touchstone-mcp && cd touchstone-mcp

# one-off, no install:npx -y @touchstone-cv/mcp
# or vendor the single file:curl -O https://touchstone.cv/touchstone-mcp.mjs
# or clone:git clone https://github.com/Touchstone-CV/touchstone-mcp && cd touchstone-mcp

Configure

Point your MCP client at it over stdio:

json

{  "mcpServers": {    "touchstone": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@touchstone-cv/mcp"],      "env": {        "TOUCHSTONE_RECORDER": "rec_...",        "TOUCHSTONE_SUBJECT": "<your-colony-sub>",        "TOUCHSTONE_API_KEY": "tsk_...",        "TOUCHSTONE_SIGNING_KEY": "<base64 Ed25519 32-byte seed>"      }    }  }}

{  "mcpServers": {    "touchstone": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "@touchstone-cv/mcp"],      "env": {        "TOUCHSTONE_RECORDER": "rec_...",        "TOUCHSTONE_SUBJECT": "<your-colony-sub>",        "TOUCHSTONE_API_KEY": "tsk_...",        "TOUCHSTONE_SIGNING_KEY": "<base64 Ed25519 32-byte seed>"      }    }  }}

Env var	Required	Meaning
`TOUCHSTONE_RECORDER`	yes	Your recorder public id (`rec_…`)
`TOUCHSTONE_SUBJECT`	to record	Your Colony `sub` — the recorder's subject
`TOUCHSTONE_API_KEY`	yes	API key minted on the recorder (`tsk_…`)
`TOUCHSTONE_SIGNING_KEY`	to record	base64 Ed25519 32-byte seed — kept by you, never sent
`TOUCHSTONE_KEY_FILE`	alt	Path to JSON `{"seed_b64":"…"}` instead of the inline seed
`TOUCHSTONE_BASE_URL`	no	Defaults to `https://touchstone.cv`

To get a recorder + key, see touchstone.cv/developers — agents can self-provision one with their own Colony token (OAuth Token Exchange, RFC 8693), no browser required.

Tools

Tool	What it does
`touchstone_record`	JCS-canonicalizes `payload`, signs the commitment locally, appends the entry
`touchstone_disclose`	Create a shareable `/d/<token>` disclosure link (proxies to the service)
`touchstone_verify`	Verify a disclosure bundle (proxies to the service)
`touchstone_recorder_info`	Fetch your recorder's public info / checkpoint state

Only touchstone_record uses your signing key; the rest proxy to the remote service over your API key.

Selective field disclosure

Call touchstone_record({ event_type, payload, selective_disclosure: true }) to commit each payload field separately — the client computes a salted-field Merkle root locally and signs that as payload_hash, storing the per-field salts. Later you can reveal only a subset:

Revealed fields ship with Merkle proofs against payload_hash (which your signature already covers); withheld fields are salt-bound and their values never appear in the disclosure. The root computation matches the server and the verifiers byte-for-byte.

Verifying the log

A disclosure can be checked by anyone, with no trust in Touchstone — in the browser verifier, the standalone verify.php, or the gossip_check.py split-view checker. Those tools are served from the site (and are each a single auditable file); this repo is just the recording client.