Draugr

dev.draugr由 draugr.dev 发布v0.168.0更新于 Nov 7, 2026

Security scanning for AI agents: SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, DAST, ranked by real risk.

已验证STDIO仅桌面开发者工具安全与监控

概览

AI 生成的概览

Draugr 对项目运行多种成熟安全扫描器,并按真实风险排序返回结果,让助手告诉你先修哪些问题。

可以做什么
  • 对提交在描述文件中的项目运行安全扫描,覆盖依赖漏洞、误提交的密钥、代码模式、基础设施配置、容器镜像、许可证、运行中应用探测、响应头、TLS、Kubernetes 与云基准、黑名单及镜像来源。
  • 按 P1–P4 优先级排序,综合暴露面与重要性,而不只看扫描器严重级别。
  • 将变更与基线对比,只报告新增或已修复的问题。
  • 输出 SARIF、JSON、Markdown、HTML 或 JUnit 报告,并生成 SBOM 与带原因的抑制记录。
  • 发现仓库或 Kubernetes 镜像,用于起草描述文件。
适用场景
当你希望 AI 编程助手在变更或发布前检查安全问题,并告诉你哪些问题对你的应用真正重要,而不是罗列原始扫描输出时使用。也适合在拉取请求上拦截新增高优先级问题的团队。
运行要求
作为本地进程在用户机器上运行(仅桌面端,stdio 传输),以 MCP 包形式安装;需要安装 Draugr 命令行工具及其扫描器,扫描器按固定版本校验后获取。需要一个已提交的描述文件说明项目。未声明任何账号、API 密钥或环境变量。
安装前请注意
超出读取代码库的扫描(例如探测在线主机或向第三方发送数据)据称会先询问,但仍应确认每个启用的检查项做什么。部分检查项会向外部服务发送数据,并各自带有许可证与条款。结果会写入报告文件,CI 集成可能发布评论并使构建失败。通过结论并不代表软件安全。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 Draugr,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

Draugr

Know which security findings to fix first, across the scanners you already run. SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC and containers, every finding ranked by exposure, criticality, exploitability and, for Go, reachability.

[CI] [OpenSSF Scorecard] [OpenSSF Best Practices] [Latest release] [License]

Describe your app in one file, and Draugr hands back the findings in the order to fix them.

Every application carries problems nobody put there on purpose: a library that turned out to have a hole in it, a password committed by accident, a server setting that leaves a door open. Draugr finds them, works out which ones actually matter for your app, and answers the question you are really asking before a release, is this safe to ship?

It runs the established open-source scanners for you, Trivy, Semgrep, Gitleaks and others, so there is nothing to choose between, wire up, or read five of. You describe what you built, once, in one file: where the repositories are, what images it builds, what it exposes, what infrastructure it runs on. Draugr picks the checks that apply, runs the right tool for each, and produces evidence you can hand to somebody else. Bring the scanners you already pay for, or use the open-source defaults.

Findings are ranked, not listed. A scanner's "critical" describes a flaw in the abstract, how bad it could be at its worst, anywhere. The same flaw is act-now in the service strangers can reach and backlog in the internal tool three people use, and no scanner can tell those apart because the difference is in the file you wrote, not in the code. And draugr diff gates a pull request on new findings only, so inheriting two hundred existing ones does not block every change.

Quickstart · See it in action · What it checks · In your pipeline · Documentation · What Draugr doesn't promise · Security

See it in action

[A draugr scan of the demo sandbox: a FAIL verdict, the four priority bands, the two controls that ran with their priority counts, what each was measured against, a per-component verdict, the signals that raised findings and what reachability analysis concluded, an accepted risk, then the ranked findings. The fifth is jQuery 1.8.3, marked as being on CISA's exploited catalog, and the seventh as deprecated.]

Priority (P1–P4) is not severity. Severity says how bad a flaw is at its worst, anywhere. Priority weighs that against how exposed and how important the part of your app it sits in is, which no scanner can work out, because it is not in the code.

draugr-dev/draugr-demo is a deliberately vulnerable app wired to Draugr: every control lights up, findings land in the repo's Security → Code scanning tab, and its example pull requests show the new-vs-fixed diff.

Quickstart

bash
curl -fsSL https://draugr.dev/install.sh | sh

Installs to ~/.local/bin, no sudo, and installs nothing if the archive fails verification. The script is readable in the repo; a download by hand, the GitHub CLI and go install are in the install guide.

bash
draugr init            # describe this project in a draugr.saga.yamldraugr tools install   # fetch the scanners it needs, pinned and verifieddraugr scan            # scan what the descriptor describes

tools install takes its answer from the descriptor beside it, so a small service gets three scanners rather than every one Draugr can provision. --all when you are preparing a machine for several projects.

Then describe what you actually ship:

yaml
project: my-apprelease:  version: "1.0"config:  controls:    images:      enabled: truecomponents:  - name: web    images:      - image: alpine:3.19
bash
draugr scan draugr.saga.yaml            # console summary; exits non-zero on faildraugr scan draugr.saga.yaml -o out/    # also writes report.json + results.sarifdraugr scan draugr.saga.yaml --format markdown   # or html, junit, json, sarif

Your editor already knows this file. Draugr's JSON Schema is registered with SchemaStore, so any *.saga.yaml gets completion, hover docs and typo warnings on open with nothing to configure.

Or let discovery write the descriptor for you:

bash
draugr survey github repos --org my-org -o draugr.saga.yamldraugr survey k8s images --namespace prod -o draugr.saga.yaml

Full walkthrough: quickstart.

Setting it up on a real repository? Reply to the pinned discussion with what the repository is and which scanners you run, and we'll write the descriptor with you, including the exposure and criticality that take judgment.

What it checks

Each control is backed by a tool Draugr executes rather than bundles, so every scanner stays under its own license, and you can swap it.

ControlLooks forBy default
scaknown flaws in the libraries you depend onTrivy, Grype and Mend opt-in
secretspasswords and keys committed by accident, history includedGitleaks
sastpatterns in the code you wrote that let somebody inSemgrep, gosec opt-in for Go
iacsettings that leave a door open, in Terraform, Kubernetes and DockerfilesTrivy
imageswhat is baked into your container imagesTrivy, Grype opt-in
licensesterms attached to code you did not writeTrivy
dastproblems only visible from outside a running appNuclei, authenticated, and from an OpenAPI spec
headershow your site answers a browsernative
tlscertificates and encryptionnative
kubernetesyour Kubernetes cluster, against the CIS benchmarksnative, kube-bench opt-in
cloudyour cloud account as it is, against the CIS benchmarksProwler
threatswhether anything you talk to is on a public blocklistabuse.ch URLhaus
provenancewhether an image is signed by the builder you expectSigstore cosign

Every scanner, what it sends and whose terms it carries: integrations catalog.

Alongside them: content-hash caching, an SBOM per repository and image, KEV/EPSS enrichment, per-control gate thresholds, and suppressions that stay in the report with the reason someone gave rather than disappearing.

In your pipeline

The first-party GitHub Action installs Draugr, and with tools: true the scanners the descriptor needs. On a pull request it compares the head with the base, posts the findings the change adds and fixes as one comment, and fails on a new P1 finding. On a push to main it runs the full scan, fails on any P1 finding, and sends every finding to the Security tab as one Draugr tool.

yaml
name: Securityon:  push:    branches: [main]  pull_request:permissions:  contents: read  pull-requests: write          # the pull-request comment  security-events: write        # the Security tab, on a pushjobs:  draugr:    runs-on: ubuntu-latest    steps:      - uses: actions/checkout@v4        with:          fetch-depth: 0          # the comparison needs the base commit      - id: draugr        uses: draugr-dev/draugr@v0   # pin @vX.Y.Z for reproducible CI        with:          saga: draugr.saga.yaml          tools: true             # provision the scanners the controls need          fail-on-new: P1         # fail a pull request on a new P1 finding      - if: always() && github.event_name == 'push'   # even when the gate fails        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3        with:          sarif_file: ${{ steps.draugr.outputs.sarif }}

Save it as .github/workflows/draugr.yml and commit it with the draugr.saga.yaml that draugr init wrote. The upload needs code scanning, which public repositories have and private ones get with GitHub Advanced Security; without it, delete the last step. To block a merge on a failing run, make the draugr check a required status check in the branch's protection rule or ruleset.

GitHub Actions · Code scanning: findings in the Security tab · GitLab: an include, GitLab's own report formats, a sticky merge-request comment · Azure Pipelines: a step template

From an AI coding assistant. Ask one to check a change and it will, using whatever scanner it finds over a scope it chose. draugr mcp serves Draugr over the Model Context Protocol so it reads your committed descriptor instead. A scan that does more than read the checkout, such as probing a live host or sending data to a third party, asks you first.

bash
claude mcp add draugr -- draugr mcp

See use Draugr from an AI coding assistant.

[Glama score for the Draugr MCP server]

Documentation

Documentation index →

What Draugr doesn't promise

A passing verdict means the controls you configured found nothing they were looking for. It is not a statement that your software is secure. It is silent about anything your descriptor does not declare, controls you did not enable, and whatever the underlying scanners miss. License findings are information, not legal advice. Draugr is provided under Apache-2.0 without warranty.

The details, including whose terms the scanners carry and your responsibility for authorization when scanning live endpoints: scope and disclaimer.

Security & supply chain

A security tool should hold itself to what it checks. Draugr does:

  • Standard output. Every finding is normalized to SARIF 2.1.0 (OASIS), so results flow into GitHub / GitLab / Azure DevOps code scanning and any SARIF-aware tool.
  • Signed releases and provenance. Release archives' checksums.txt is keyless-signed with cosign (Sigstore) into a checksums.txt.sigstore.json bundle, and each release publishes SLSA build-provenance attestations (gh attestation verify …); verify before installing (recipe).
  • SBOMs. A Syft SBOM is published for every release archive.
  • Verified tooling. draugr tools install fetches scanners pinned by SHA-256 and, where the upstream signs them, verifies the cosign signature too, and cosign itself is installable, so verification is self-sufficient.
  • We scan ourselves. Draugr runs its own scan on every pull request to this repository, static analysis included (Semgrep and gosec through the sast control, and gosec again in golangci-lint), and the findings are in the repository's Security tab. Supply-chain posture is tracked on the OpenSSF Scorecard.
  • Report a vulnerability. See SECURITY.md.

Development

Requires Go 1.26+. make build builds ./bin/draugr; make gate runs the full local gate (fmt, vet, lint, race tests with coverage and govulncheck). See CONTRIBUTING.md.

License

Draugr is licensed under the Apache License 2.0.

来源:README.md,提交 07356ba

工具

0
SourceWeft 尚未在沙箱中启动过该软件包,因此其工具未知。

版本历史

47
  1. v0.168.0最新Nov 7, 2026
  2. v0.166.3Nov 6, 2026
  3. v0.166.2Nov 6, 2026
  4. v0.166.1Nov 4, 2026
  5. v0.166.0Nov 3, 2026
  6. v0.165.6Nov 3, 2026
  7. v0.164.0Nov 1, 2026
  8. v0.163.0Nov 1, 2026
  9. v0.162.2Nov 1, 2026
  10. v0.162.0Oct 31, 2026
  11. v0.161.0Oct 30, 2026
  12. v0.160.0Oct 30, 2026
  13. v0.159.0Oct 29, 2026
  14. v0.155.1Oct 26, 2026
  15. v0.154.2Oct 25, 2026
  16. v0.154.1Oct 18, 2026
  17. v0.154.0Oct 18, 2026
  18. v0.153.0Oct 18, 2026
  19. v0.152.0Oct 17, 2026
  20. v0.151.0Oct 11, 2026
  21. v0.150.0Oct 8, 2026
  22. v0.149.1Oct 6, 2026
  23. v0.149.0Oct 6, 2026
  24. v0.148.0Oct 6, 2026
  25. v0.147.0Oct 5, 2026
  26. v0.146.0Oct 5, 2026
  27. v0.145.0Oct 4, 2026
  28. v0.144.0Oct 3, 2026
  29. v0.143.1Oct 2, 2026
  30. v0.143.0Oct 2, 2026
  31. v0.142.2Oct 1, 2026
  32. v0.142.0Oct 1, 2026
  33. v0.141.0Sep 30, 2026
  34. v0.139.0Sep 29, 2026
  35. v0.138.0Sep 28, 2026
  36. v0.136.0Sep 27, 2026
  37. v0.135.1Sep 27, 2026
  38. v0.135.0Sep 26, 2026
  39. v0.134.0Sep 25, 2026
  40. v0.132.0Sep 24, 2026
  41. v0.131.1Sep 23, 2026
  42. v0.130.0Sep 22, 2026
  43. v0.129.0Sep 22, 2026
  44. v0.128.0Sep 21, 2026
  45. v0.127.0Sep 18, 2026
  46. v0.126.0Sep 18, 2026
  47. v0.125.0Sep 16, 2026

评分

已满足适用检查项的 50%

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