Proxy AIops

io.github.AIops-tools由 GitHub 账号 AIops-tools 发布v0.13.0更新于 Oct 30, 2026

Governed Traefik + Caddy + HAProxy ops: routes, upstreams, certs, 5xx RCA. 28 tools.

概览

AI 生成的概览

面向 Traefik、Caddy 和 HAProxy 反向代理的受审计运维服务器:读取路由、上游、证书与流量,执行 RCA 分析,并进行受管控的配置写入。

可以做什么
  • 以相同工具名查看 Traefik、Caddy、HAProxy 的状态、入口点、路由、服务、上游、中间件与 TLS 证书
  • 读取流量与错误计数,快照并搜索实时配置树
  • 运行启发式分析:后端健康 RCA、证书到期扫描、5xx 错误率 RCA、路由冲突检测
  • 对 Caddy 配置执行受管控写入(设置、删除、整体加载),对 HAProxy 运行时服务器状态与权重写入,均支持 dry-run 预览
  • 列出并应用已记录的可逆写入撤销描述符
适用场景
适合需要诊断或运维混合反向代理边缘的场景,例如排查上游为何不可用、哪些证书即将过期、5xx 错误来自哪里、哪些路由被遮蔽,并且希望每次调用都写入审计数据库。
运行要求
需在本地安装 Python 包 proxy-aiops(uv tool、pipx 或 uvx),以 stdio 方式运行。需通过 init 向导生成列出目标平台与 base URL 的配置文件。HAProxy 需要 Data Plane API 凭据;Traefik 与 Caddy 仅在启用 Basic 认证时需要密码。加密密钥库由 PROXY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD 解锁,MCP 客户端必须显式设置。需要能访问各代理的管理 API。
安装前请注意
写入会改动线上代理配置与运行时服务器状态,删除与整体加载属高风险。没有只读开关或审批门禁,权限需在代理侧限制,例如为 HAProxy 配置只读角色。主密码用于解锁加密密钥库,必须在客户端配置中提供。每次调用都会写入本地审计数据库,撤销描述符仅被记录、不会由本工具执行。README 说明其 REST 路径尚未在真实代理上验证。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 Proxy AIops,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

Proxy AIops

Audit availability: Real writes require a committed pending audit row and stop before contacting the platform if storage is unavailable. Reads and previews may continue with a warning; new audit rows store outcome summaries rather than full responses.

Governed, audited AI-ops for Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy reverse proxies / load balancers — for AI agents (via MCP) and humans (via CLI).

Disclaimer: Community-maintained open-source project. Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by Traefik Labs, the Caddy project, HAProxy Technologies, or the HAProxy project. Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy are trademarks of their respective owners. MIT licensed.

proxy-aiops speaks to three proxy platforms behind one MCP server — Traefik (its API under /api/..., metrics-text counters via /metrics), Caddy (the admin API, default localhost:2019) and HAProxy (the Data Plane API v2 under /v2/..., HTTP Basic auth) — with the same tools working on all three. Each target in the config names its own platform; a name-keyed platform registry selects the API shape (auth + resource paths), and an explicit support matrix raises teaching errors for ops a platform genuinely cannot do — e.g. Traefik writes point you at its providers (file, container labels, orchestrator CRDs), never a silent no-op.

Every tool runs through a built-in governance harness (vendored, zero external dependency): audit log, token/call budget with runaway circuit-breaker, descriptive risk-tier labelling, undo-token recording, and output sanitisation.

Why this exists

  • One server, three proxies — Traefik, Caddy and HAProxy in a mixed edge, spoken to through identical tool names. Adding another proxy later is a new platform descriptor, not a rewrite.
  • Read the whole edge — version, entrypoints/listeners, routes (routers / caddy routes / frontends) with parsed hosts+paths, services and server-level upstream health, middlewares, TLS domain inventory, traffic/error counters, and the live config tree (snapshot + search).
  • Flagship RCA analyses — transparent heuristics that show their numbers, never a black-box verdict: backend_health_rca (down upstreams → cause class L4/L6/L7/DNS/maint + action), cert_expiry_sweep (days-to-expiry buckets + per-platform renewal hints), error_rate_rca (5xx share vs the fleet baseline, dominant code → 502/503/504/500 cause), and route_conflict_analysis (shadowed routes, dead routes, redirect loops).
  • Governed writes — caddy config set / delete / full load (the prior subtree/config is fetched first, so the recorded undo replays a real restore) and haproxy runtime server state (ready/drain/maint) and weight (undo restores the prior value) — all with dry_run previews; delete/load are risk=high with double confirmation at the CLI.

What this tool does, and does not, decide

It delivers proxy operations — reads and writes — accurately and efficiently, and records every one of them. It does not decide whether a write is allowed to happen. That is the agent's judgement, or the permission of the account you connect it with: give the HAProxy Data Plane API a read-only role, or scope down the Traefik/Caddy admin API you point it at, and the writes fail at the server — the place that actually owns the permission.

So there is no read-only switch, no policy file, no approval gate to configure. The one thing the tool guarantees is that nothing is silent: every call, over MCP and over the CLI alike, lands an audit row in ~/.proxy-aiops/audit.db, and reversible writes still capture their before-state and record an inverse.

Each tool declares a risk_level, kept in agreement with its [READ]/[WRITE] documentation tag by a test, and carried into the audit row as a descriptive tier — so a reviewer can see at a glance that a row was a high-risk delete. It is a label, not a gate.

Running a smaller / local model? See agent-guardrails.md — it lists the guardrails this tool now enforces for you (so you don't spend prompt budget restating them) and gives a ready-made system prompt for what's left.

Tool inventory (28 tools)

DomainTools#Kind
Statusproxy_overview, version_info, list_entrypoints3read
Routeslist_routes, route_detail, find_route3read
Serviceslist_services, service_detail, list_upstreams, upstream_detail, list_middlewares5read
Certificateslist_certificates1read
Traffictraffic_stats, error_counters2read
Configconfig_snapshot, search_config, get_config_value3read
Flagship analysesbackend_health_rca, cert_expiry_sweep, error_rate_rca, route_conflict_analysis4read
Writes (caddy)set_config_value1write (med)
Writes (caddy)delete_config_path, load_config2write (high)
Writes (haproxy)set_server_state, set_server_weight2write (med)
Undoundo_list, undo_apply2read / write

Reversible writes record an inverse undo descriptor built from the real fetched before-state (set_config_value restores the prior subtree; delete_config_path re-creates it; load_config re-loads the snapshotted config; server state/weight restore the prior value). The undo params match each tool's own signature, so the descriptor replays as-is.

Per-platform support matrix

Capabilitytraefikcaddyhaproxy
Routes / services / upstream health✅✅✅
Middlewares list✅teaching note (inline handlers)teaching note (haproxy.cfg)
TLS cert inventory + expiry sweep✅✅teaching note (.pem files)
Error counters / error-rate RCA✅ (/metrics)teaching note (no per-route counters)✅ (stats)
Config snapshot / search✅ (rawdata, read-only)✅teaching note
Config writesteaching error → edit the provider✅ (the write surface)teaching error → runtime writes
Runtime server state / weightteaching error → providerteaching error → config tree✅

Unsupported combinations raise a teaching error that says what to use instead — never a silent empty result.

Install

bash
uv tool install proxy-aiops        # or: pipx install proxy-aiops

Quick start

As a Claude Code plugin

One install gives an agent both the skill and the MCP server:

/plugin marketplace add AIops-tools/marketplace/plugin install proxy-aiops@aiops-tools

The MCP server is fetched with uv and pinned to the package version this plugin declares, so an audit row can be traced back to the code that wrote it. Credentials are still configured with proxy-aiops init — see below.

As an OpenClaw plugin

The same bundle is published on ClawHub, where one install delivers the skill and its MCP server together:

bash
openclaw plugins install clawhub:@zw008/proxy-aiopsopenclaw skills info proxy-aiops          # expect: Visible to model: yes

Restart the OpenClaw gateway afterwards so it loads the plugin. The MCP server is fetched with uv, pinned to this exact release, so uvx has to be on PATH — without it the skill still installs but reports Visible to model: no. Credentials are configured exactly as below.

As a CLI or standalone MCP server

bash
proxy-aiops init                     # wizard: pick platform (traefik/caddy/haproxy) + optional encrypted secretproxy-aiops doctor                   # verify config, secrets, and connectivityproxy-aiops overview                 # one-shot: version + route/service counts + upstream healthproxy-aiops routes list              # normalised route tableproxy-aiops services upstreams       # server-level upstream healthproxy-aiops analyze health           # backend/upstream health RCAproxy-aiops analyze errors           # 5xx error-rate RCAproxy-aiops analyze conflicts        # shadowed/dead routes, redirect loopsproxy-aiops certs --sweep            # TLS cert expiry sweep (traefik/caddy)proxy-aiops server state app web1 drain --dry-run   # governed haproxy write previewproxy-aiops config set apps/http/servers/srv0 '{"listen":[":8080"]}' --dry-run

Run the MCP server (stdio) for an agent:

bash
proxy-aiops mcp                      # or: proxy-aiops-mcp

MCP client config

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "proxy-aiops": {      "command": "uvx",      "args": ["--from", "proxy-aiops", "proxy-aiops-mcp"],      "env": { "PROXY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD": "your-master-password" }    }  }}

Env-block caveat: the env block is only needed when a credential is stored (haproxy always; traefik/caddy only behind Basic auth). MCP clients do not inherit your shell profile — set PROXY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD (and PROXY_AIOPS_CONFIG / PROXY_AIOPS_HOME if you relocated them) explicitly in the client config, or the server cannot unlock secrets.enc.

Configuration

~/.proxy-aiops/config.yaml (non-secret connection details only):

yaml
targets:  - name: edge1    platform: traefik        # traefik | caddy | haproxy    base_url: http://192.0.2.10:8080    verify_ssl: true  - name: caddy1    platform: caddy    base_url: http://127.0.0.1:2019  - name: lb1    platform: haproxy    base_url: http://192.0.2.20:5555    username: dpapi          # Data Plane API user

The secret — the HAProxy Data Plane API password, or an optional Basic-auth password in front of Traefik/Caddy — is stored encrypted in ~/.proxy-aiops/secrets.enc (Fernet + scrypt-derived key), never plaintext on disk. Traefik and Caddy commonly run unauthenticated on localhost, so their secret is optional (like a local socket); HAProxy's is required. Set it with proxy-aiops secret set <target> or the init wizard. The store is unlocked by a master password from PROXY_AIOPS_MASTER_PASSWORD (non-interactive/MCP/CI) or an interactive prompt (CLI on a TTY). A legacy plaintext env var PROXY_<TARGET>_SECRET is honoured as a fallback (migrate with proxy-aiops secret migrate).

Governance

Every MCP tool — and every CLI write, which routes through the same governed functions — passes through @governed_tool. It records; it does not authorize (see above).

  • Audit — every call is logged to ~/.proxy-aiops/audit.db (tool, params with secrets redacted, status, duration, risk tier, and any operator-supplied approver/rationale). The CLI writes the same row the MCP path does — there is no unaudited entry point.
  • Budget / runaway guard — a safety backstop, not an authorization gate: per-process token/call caps and a repeat-call circuit breaker stop a stuck agent from burning unbounded calls/time (PROXY_MAX_TOOL_CALLS, PROXY_RUNAWAY_MAX, …; disable the breaker with PROXY_RUNAWAY_MAX=0).
  • Undo recording — reversible writes record an inverse descriptor to ~/.proxy-aiops/undo.db from the fetched before-state (recording only; an external orchestrator executes it). Undo params match the target tool's own signature, so the descriptor replays as-is.
  • Risk tier — a descriptive label on the audit row derived from risk_level; it gates nothing.
  • Sanitisation — all proxy-returned text is bounded + control-character sanitised before it reaches the agent.

Platform support & verification status

  • Platforms: Traefik (API + /metrics), Caddy (admin API), HAProxy (Data Plane API v2).
  • Test coverage: behaviour is validated against mocked JSON/metrics responses — every module imports, every MCP tool carries the governance marker, the four flagship analyses are unit-tested against synthetic telemetry, the support matrix is asserted to raise teaching errors (never a silent no-op), and reversible writes are asserted to record the correct inverse undo descriptor. The concrete REST paths are modelled from each project's public API and have not yet been exercised against a live proxy. See docs/VERIFICATION.md for the checklist a live run must satisfy. All three platforms are free and self-hostable (a small container-compose lab with traefik + caddy + haproxy/dataplaneapi is a one-evening setup), and proxy-aiops doctor — a health/info probe per platform — is the fastest live check.
  • Routing note: this tool operates reverse proxies / load balancers. Do NOT use it for firewall rules — use firewall-aiops.
  • Missing a capability? Open an issue or PR at github.com/AIops-tools/Proxy-AIops — contributions and feedback welcome.

License

MIT — see LICENSE.

来源:README.md,提交 2e83573

工具

0
SourceWeft 曾在隔离沙箱中以无凭据方式启动该软件包一次,以列出其工具,但未能完成:服务器未能启动。

版本历史

5
  1. v0.13.0最新Oct 30, 2026
  2. v0.12.0Oct 15, 2026
  3. v0.10.0Oct 15, 2026
  4. v0.9.4Sep 17, 2026
  5. v0.9.3Sep 16, 2026

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