Cloud Pathfinder

io.github.Baneado98由 GitHub 账号 Baneado98 发布v0.1.0更新于 Oct 24, 2026

IaC attack-path auditor: finds internet-to-crown-jewel chains in Terraform/CFN/K8s.

已验证Streamable HTTP可网页运行云端与基础设施开发者工具安全与监控

概览

AI 生成的概览

托管的 IaC 攻击路径审计服务,让助手在 Terraform、CloudFormation、Kubernetes 等模板中追踪从公网到核心资产的链路。

可以做什么
审计基础设施即代码:提交文件映射或单个源码块,获得 BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED 判定、风险评分,以及攻击路径、核心资产和错误配置的数量;格式按文件自动识别并一起分析,覆盖 AWS、GCP、Azure 资源和 Kubernetes 清单。比较两种状态:对比变更前后的目录树,查看该变更引入、消除或加剧了哪些公网到核心资产的链路,并给出门禁判定。请求 SARIF 2.1.0 输出用于 GitHub 代码扫描,代码流锚定到文件和行。付费后的深度结果会补充完整多跳链路、逐跳 file:line 证据和 IAM 提权可达性分析。
适用场景
当你审查基础设施即代码,想确认某份声明的配置是否真的把公网连接到数据存储、密钥或管理员角色,而不只是标出单个配置错误的资源时使用。它适合用于拉取请求门禁,以及对 Terraform、CloudFormation、Kubernetes、CDK、Pulumi 或 Bicep 变更的合并前审查。
运行要求
远程 MCP 端点;README 还记录了一个 npm 客户端,但它只是轻量 HTTP 调用方,因此分析始终在托管服务上运行,离线无法使用。免费层无需密钥,但限制为每 IP 每小时 30 次请求。深度分析需主动开启并付费:预付密钥通过 Authorization Bearer 头或 CLOUD_PATHFINDER_KEY 变量发送,或通过 x402 按次以 USDC 支付。
安装前请注意
你的基础设施即代码文本会发送到第三方托管服务;README 称其在内存中处理、不存储也不记录日志,但数据确实会离开你的机器。深度链路、证据和修复建议需要付费,可用预付密钥或通过 Base 结算的按次 USDC 支付,费用可能累积。结果是对声明模板的启发式静态分析,并非对实时云环境的评估,应视为线索而非保证。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 Cloud Pathfinder,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Web executable,通过 Streamable HTTP。 远程服务在工作区中配置后即可从网页运行时运行。

交给智能体安装

把这段提示词粘贴到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等智能体,或 SourceWeft 对话中。智能体会读取该服务器的安装指南,先向你展示发布者、端点和登录方式,经你同意后再把它添加到你的客户端。密钥不会写进任何命令。

阅读 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.Baneado98%2Fcloud-pathfinder/install.md,并按其中说明把这个 MCP 服务器接入我的客户端。修改任何配置之前,先告诉我它的发布者、端点和登录方式,等我确认。不要把 API 密钥写进命令或我会提交的文件;问我密钥应从哪里获取。

查看智能体所依据的安装指南

其他 MCP 客户端

把它添加到你客户端的 mcpServers 配置中。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cloud-pathfinder": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp"
    }
  }
}

README

cloud-pathfinder 🛰️

[License: MIT] [MCP Registry] [npm] [Pay] [SARIF]

Attack-path auditor for Infrastructure-as-Code — Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, CDK, Pulumi, Bicep/ARM. Not a linter. It parses your IaC into a resource graph, resolves cross-resource (and cross-file) relationships, and searches for the multi-hop chains from the public internet to your crown jewels (data stores, secrets, admin). It returns a BREACHABLE / EXPOSED / HARDENED verdict and the concrete route an attacker would walk.

Example chain it finds: open security group (SSH 0.0.0.0/0) → EC2 instance-profile role → iam:PassRole privilege escalation to admin → S3 exfiltration

Available as an MCP server (Claude, Cursor, any MCP agent) and a pay-per-call x402 API (autonomous AI agents with a wallet).


🔐 Privacy & data model (read this first)

Sending your IaC to a third party is sensitive — so here is exactly what happens:

  • Your IaC is never stored and never logged. Every audit runs in memory on the hosted service and is discarded when the response is sent. No database of your templates, no retention, no analytics on file contents.
  • What is sent: only the IaC text you pass (the files map or source blob). Nothing is read from your machine, your cloud account, or your credentials — cloud-pathfinder never touches a live cloud (see "honest limits" below). There are no cloud keys to provide because it analyzes the declared templates only.
  • Free tier vs deep tier — both run server-side, here's why and what differs:
    • The thin npm client ships zero analysis logic (no graph engine, no IAM privesc knowledge base). It is a pure HTTP caller. So even the free verdict + counts are computed on the hosted service, then your IaC is dropped. This is the honest tradeoff that keeps the moat off your machine — we say so plainly rather than claim a fake "100% local" mode.
    • Deep analysis is strictly opt-in (deep: true, behind payment). Only then are the full chains, file:line evidence and remediation returned. You send the same IaC either way — nothing extra leaves your machine for the deep tier.

Hosted service: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app — all analysis runs server-side. This npm package is a thin MCP client: it sends the IaC text to the hosted endpoint and renders the verdict. No analysis logic ships to your machine.


⚡ How it works (30 seconds)

  1. Your MCP agent calls audit_iac_attack_paths { files: { "main.tf": "..." } }.
  2. The thin client POSTs the IaC text to https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app.
  3. The hosted engine builds a typed resource graph, runs a BFS from an INTERNET node to every data store / secret / admin sink, and resolves IAM privilege-escalation reachability along each hop — in memory.
  4. The IaC is discarded; nothing is persisted.
  5. The deep tier returns every full chain with per-hop file:line evidence; the free tier returns the verdict, score and counts.

The npm tarball contains only the HTTP caller — so nothing, free or deep, runs offline. Without the server it degrades to a clear network error.


🆚 Why this isn't a linter (and why a local one can't replace it)

A linter flags resources one at a time: "this SG is open", "this role is broad". cloud-pathfinder reasons about how those facts connect — work a per-file local tool structurally cannot do:

CapabilityLocal lintercloud-pathfinder
Flag one open SG / one broad role✅✅
Graph — which SG attaches to which instance, which role it assumes, what it reads❌✅
Reachability BFS internet → crown jewel, full multi-hop chain + file:line❌✅
IAM privilege-escalation KB (20+ primitives: PassRole, CreatePolicyVersion…)❌✅
Multi-cloud — AWS / GCP / Azure in one graph❌✅
Choke-point analysis (the one hop that, fixed, cuts the most paths)❌✅
Diff mode — what a PR INTRODUCES / ELIMINATES / AGGRAVATES❌✅
Kubernetes LB/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin SA → Secret❌✅
SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning (inline chains on the Security tab)❌✅
  • 🔗 Graph, not lint. Builds a typed resource graph and resolves the real relationships across files and clouds.
  • 🧭 Reachability search. BFS from INTERNET to every data store / secret / admin sink, returning the full multi-hop chain with per-hop file:line evidence.
  • 👑 IAM privilege-escalation knowledge base. Knows AWS managed-policy permissions and 20+ privilege-escalation primitives (PassRole+RunInstances, CreatePolicyVersion, AttachRolePolicy, SSM SendCommand, UpdateFunctionCode, UpdateAssumeRolePolicy…).
  • ☸️ Kubernetes attack surface. LoadBalancer/NodePort exposure → privileged / hostPath / hostNetwork pods, cluster-admin ServiceAccounts, and mounted Secrets.

Formats are auto-detected per file and analyzed together — mix .tf, CloudFormation .yaml/.json and Kubernetes manifests in one call.


🚀 Quickstart — add it to your MCP client

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "cloud-pathfinder": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "cloud-pathfinder-mcp"] }  }}

No key needed for the free tier. Restart your client and the audit_iac_attack_paths + diff_attack_paths tools appear. (Remote server: https://cloud-pathfinder.vercel.app/mcp.)

Tool: audit_iac_attack_paths

jsonc
{  "files": {    "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" \"web\" { ingress { ... cidr_blocks = [\"0.0.0.0/0\"] } } ...",    "k8s.yaml": "apiVersion: v1\nkind: Service\n..."  }  // or: "source": "<a single IaC blob>", "filename": "main.tf"}

Example — input → output

audit_iac_attack_paths { "files": { "main.tf": "<SG open to 0.0.0.0/0 on 22 +                          EC2 with instance-profile role that can s3:* + iam:PassRole>" } }
→ FREE:  verdict: BREACHABLE · risk 86/100 · 1 attack path · 1 crown jewel · 3 misconfigs
→ DEEP (deep:true):  verdict: BREACHABLE   PATH #1 (internet → admin):     [1] INTERNET → aws_security_group.web   (main.tf:4  — ingress 22 from 0.0.0.0/0)     [2] → aws_instance.app                  (main.tf:19 — attaches sg web)     [3] → aws_iam_role.app_role             (main.tf:31 — instance profile)     [4] → iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances   (privesc → launch instance as admin role)     [5] → s3:* on aws_s3_bucket.data        (main.tf:52 — exfiltration sink)   CHOKE POINT: tighten main.tf:4 ingress → cuts this entire path.   FIX: restrict ingress CIDR; split the role; add a permissions boundary.

The free tier returns the verdict, risk score, and the counts (how many attack paths, crown jewels and misconfigurations). The deep tier returns every full chain with hops, file:line evidence, privilege-escalation reachability and remediation.

Tool: diff_attack_paths — the CI/CD gate

Give it the IaC before and after a change (a PR's base and head trees) and it reports exactly what the change did to your attack surface: which internet→crown-jewel chains it INTRODUCES, which it ELIMINATES, and which it AGGRAVATES — with an INTRODUCES_BREACH / REDUCES_RISK / NEUTRAL / MIXED verdict.

jsonc
{  "before": { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 10.0.0.0/16..." } },  "after":  { "files": { "main.tf": "...security group admits 0.0.0.0/0..." } }  // deep: true → full introduced/eliminated chains + before→after exploitability + which choke points now matter}

A per-file linter or a single-state scan cannot answer this: it needs the full graph

  • privesc reachability on both states and a semantic cross-state path match. HTTP: POST /diff (free, counts only) / POST /pro/diff (deep).

Free HTTP API

http
POST /auditContent-Type: application/json
{ "files": { "main.tf": "resource \"aws_security_group\" ..." } }

Rate-limited to 30 requests/hour/IP. For unlimited/commercial/deep use, call /pro/audit.

Input formats: Terraform / OpenTofu, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Kustomize, Pulumi (TS/JS/Python), Bicep/ARM, and AWS CDK — both the synthesized cdk.out/*.template.json and the un-synthed CDK program (TypeScript + Python), so a CI gate runs on the PR diff before cdk synth.


SARIF 2.1.0 → GitHub code scanning

Add ?format=sarif (or { "format": "sarif" }) to /audit, /pro/audit, /diff or /pro/diff to get SARIF 2.1.0 you can upload to GitHub code scanning — every attack chain shows up inline on the PR's Security tab.

  • Each chain is one SARIF result with a codeFlow (a step-through walk: internet → SG → instance role → privesc → S3), anchored to the IaC file:line, plus security-severity/CVSS so the badge colors correctly.
  • The diff SARIF only fails the check on introduced/aggravated routes (error-level); eliminated/eased land as note.
  • The free tier returns a redacted-but-schema-valid SARIF (counts only — no chains, no code-flows, no route file:line); the full code-flows are premium.
yaml
# .github/workflows/cloud-pathfinder.yml (sketch)- run: curl -s -X POST "$CPF/pro/diff?format=sarif" -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" \       --data @payload.json -o cloud-pathfinder.sarif- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3  with: { sarif_file: cloud-pathfinder.sarif }

💳 Unlock /pro — two ways to pay (dual-pay)

The deep /pro/audit returns the full attack chains, per-hop evidence, privilege-escalation analysis and remediation. Two payment lanes coexist:

LaneForHow
💳 Card (Stripe)Humans / teamsBuy a prepaid key at /pro/checkout, then send Authorization: Bearer <key> (or set CLOUD_PATHFINDER_KEY).
🪙 x402 (USDC)AI agents with a walletPay $0.30 per call automatically. Settles on Base. No signup, no key.
http
POST /pro/audit          # 402 (shows BOTH lanes) → pay → result

What it catches (selected)

ClassDetail
Public → role → dataOpen SG on a sensitive port (SSH/RDP/DB) → instance role that can read S3/Dynamo/RDS/Secrets → exfiltration
IAM privilege escalationiam:PassRole+ec2:RunInstances, iam:CreatePolicyVersion, iam:AttachRolePolicy, ssm:SendCommand, wildcard * on *, and ~15 more
Public data storespublicly_accessible = true RDS, world-open buckets
KubernetesLoadBalancer/NodePort → privileged pod → cluster-admin ServiceAccount → Secret
CloudFormation!Ref/!GetAtt intrinsics resolved; ManagedPolicyArns/inline policies analyzed

How it stays honest

The premium engine and knowledge base never ship in the npm package — the published client is a thin renderer that calls the hosted analysis service. The free tier is genuinely useful (verdict + counts); the deep chains, evidence and privesc analysis are server-side behind payment.

Heuristic static analysis of declared IaC, not a live cloud assessment. It reasons over what the templates declare (no runtime SCP/permissions-boundary/condition evaluation). Treat findings as prioritized leads, not a guarantee.

MIT · github.com/Baneado98/cloud-pathfinder

来源:README.md,提交 0ab62b7

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版本历史

1
  1. v0.1.0最新Sep 16, 2026

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