Haldir

io.github.ExposureGuard由 GitHub 账号 ExposureGuard 发布v0.1.0更新于 Oct 24, 2026

Guardian layer for AI agents: identity, secrets, audit via MCP.

已验证STDIO仅桌面金融安全与监控

概览

AI 生成的概览

Haldir 是面向 AI 代理的治理层,通过 MCP 提供会话权限、加密机密保管库、支出上限与可验证的审计记录。

可以做什么
创建、查询与撤销带权限范围的代理会话,并检查权限。存储、列出与取出保管库中的机密,代理仅在范围允许下取得。授权付款并查询支出,按会话预算管控。写入审计记录、查询审计轨迹,并验证哈希链、获取树头、包含证明与一致性证明。申请人工审批、查询审批状态,生成合规分数与证据包。
适用场景
当你让 AI 代理调用工具、动用资金或读取凭据,并需要权限范围、支出上限、加密保管库与可验证审计记录时适用。也适合需要人工审批与合规证据包的场景。
运行要求
以本地进程运行,需安装 PyPI 包 haldir 并具备 Python 环境。MCP 服务器需设置 HALDIR_API_KEY 环境变量,密钥由 haldir serve 或 haldir login 生成。自托管需本地服务与数据库,云端版本需网络连接。
安装前请注意
需提供 HALDIR_API_KEY 访问凭据,请妥善保管。保管库存放真实机密(如支付密钥),范围设置过宽时代理即可取得。可授权付款与设置支出上限,涉及真实资金。会写入审计记录、创建与撤销会话、删除机密与修剪审计数据,这些操作会改变数据。自托管时需自行设置 HALDIR_ENCRYPTION_KEY 并保护数据库。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 Haldir,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

Haldir

Scoped permissions, spend caps, an encrypted vault, and an audit log that can prove it wasn't edited — for AI agents that call tools, move money, and read secrets.

[tests] [PyPI] [License: MIT] [GitHub Stars]

[A live Haldir audit log being tampered with: a past entry is rewritten, the inclusion proof stops matching the live Merkle root, and the verdict flips to 'Tamper detected']

That loop is the whole idea, running live. Someone rewrites a row in the audit log — silently, straight in the database. The entry's inclusion proof no longer matches the live Merkle root, and the verdict flips. Not caught by monitoring, not caught by a diff: caught by arithmetic, because the root is a hash of what the log actually contains and the earlier Signed Tree Head is already pinned somewhere you don't control.

→ Try it yourself. Run haldir serve (below) and open http://127.0.0.1:8000/demo — the same tamper demo, against an instance on your own machine. It ships inside the package, so there is nothing to download and no account involved.

What you get

  • Scoped sessions — permissions and spend caps per agent, revocable the moment something looks wrong.
  • Encrypted vault — AES-256-GCM. Your agent asks for a secret; the model never sees it. Every ciphertext records which key made it, so you can rotate the encryption key without re-entering a single secret — and without downtime.
  • Tamper-evident audit — every call logged into an RFC 6962 Merkle tree with signed tree heads, so history can be proven, not just trusted.
  • Human approvals — pause a run on a spend threshold and get a webhook.
bash
pip install haldirhaldir serve

That starts a real Haldir on this machine — SQLite, no Docker, no Postgres, no account. It generates an encryption key, applies the schema, mints an API key, and points the CLI at itself, so the next command just works:

text
$ haldir serve
  Haldir is running  http://127.0.0.1:8000  data: ~/.haldir
  Your API key (saved to the Haldir CLI config):    hld_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  Try it:    haldir overview    haldir session create --agent my-agent --scopes read

From there, point anything at it — the CLI, the Python SDK, an MCP client — or read the API reference at /docs on the instance you started. When you want Postgres and containers, haldir init && haldir dev scaffolds and runs that instead; SELF_HOSTING.md covers the rest.

Works with Claude Code, Cursor, LangChain, CrewAI, AutoGen, LlamaIndex and the Vercel AI SDK — anything that can make an HTTP call or speak MCP. MIT licensed: self-host it, or point at haldir.xyz (free tier, no signup).

See it in action

Here's what Haldir actually looks like — no diagrams, no spec sheets, just screenshots of the real thing.

[Without Haldir vs with Haldir: no oversight vs scoped sessions, spend limits, secrets hidden, immutable audit trail]

Without Haldir, an agent calls whatever API it wants, spends whatever it wants, and accesses whatever secret it finds — with zero oversight and zero audit trail. With Haldir, every action is scoped, spend-limited, logged immutably, and secrets never leave the vault.

Here's the three things you'd see as a new visitor, in order:

[Quick tour: landing page, cloud dashboard, audit trail]

  1. Landing page — dark mode, live terminal animation at the top, four product cards (Gate, Vault, Watch, Proxy), a self-host vs cloud comparison, and a call to claim a design partner spot. One page, everything a first-time visitor needs.

  2. Cloud dashboard — this is what you see after signing in. A sidebar on the left takes you to any page — account, quotas, sessions, audit, webhooks, approvals, compliance, or settings. The account view shows your tenant, tier, live counts, and API keys by prefix (the full key is never shown again after it's minted, and revoking one never involves a database shell).

  3. Audit trail — the killer feature. Filter by session, agent, or tool. Click any row to see the full MCP call details: what tool was called, what upstream API it hit, how long it took, what arguments it sent, and what it returned. This is the one thing that makes the whole product click — you can see exactly what every agent did, when, and with what.

Here's the dashboard with the important parts labeled:

[Cloud dashboard with annotations: sidebar, stat cards, sessions table, audit table]

The sidebar on the left takes you anywhere. The numbered markers point at the parts you'll actually use: your tenant and tier, the live counts, and your API keys by prefix — with the revoke button right there, so ending an agent's access never means opening a database shell.

Play with it yourself

All of these ship inside the package and are served by haldir serve, so they work on your machine with no account and nothing to deploy:

→ The tamper demo at /demo/tamper — the one in the GIF above. Rewrite a real log row and watch the inclusion proof stop matching the Merkle root. Nothing is simulated; it is the same Merkle code the API ships.

→ The playground at /demo — four steps walk the happy path (mint a key, open a scoped session, check a permission, write to the audit trail), then three try to break it: spend past the cap, revoke the session mid-flight, and act after revocation. Pick a scope that was never granted in step 03 to see a denial as well as an approval.

→ The gallery at /gallery — every screenshot on this page in one place, if you'd rather look than read.

Want something to run without installing anything? There is a one-file demo binary — no Python, no clone — and a three-probe fixture that ships with the package. Both are in DEMO.md: what to run, what you'll see, and what each probe is built to catch.

The rest of the API

The full reference is at /docs and /openapi.json on whichever instance you are running. Below: the Python quickstart, performance numbers, and compliance mapping.

There is a hosted option at haldir.xyz — free tier, no signup. haldir serve is the path that works today, and the one to reach for if the cloud is not what you want anyway.


Two ways to run

Same product either way.

Self-hostCloud (haldir.xyz)
PriceFree foreverFree tier + paid plans
You runAPI + PostgresNothing
Best forRegulated, air-gapped, "must own data""Just make it work"

The cloud tier is free to start and needs no signup. We're taking 5 design partners — 30 days, full access, direct line to the founder: [email protected].

Self-host in 5 minutes

bash
git clone https://github.com/ExposureGuard/haldir.gitcd haldircp .env.example .envpython3 -c 'import base64, os; print(base64.urlsafe_b64encode(os.urandom(32)).decode())'# paste the output into .env as HALDIR_ENCRYPTION_KEY, then:docker compose up -dcurl http://localhost:8000/healthz

Full self-hosting guide: SELF_HOSTING.md

Cloud (no setup)

bash
pip install haldir

That's it — point at https://haldir.xyz, no signup for the free tier.


CLI

Install once, drive the whole platform from the terminal:

text
$ haldir overview
  Haldir tenant overview  acct_xyz123  ·  tier free  ·  2026-09-30T18:42:11+00:00
  Status     ● ok  API calls    4,217 / 10,000  ████████░░░░░░░░░░░░   42.2%  Spend      $ 47.30 this month  Sessions         3 active  ·  1/1 agents  Vault            8 secrets  ·  62 accesses this month  Audit        1,847 entries  ·  0 flagged (7d)  ·  chain ✓  Webhooks         2 registered  ·  541 deliveries (24h)  ·  99.82% success  Approvals        1 pending
bash
pip install haldirhaldir login                           # one-time; stashes API keyhaldir overview --watch                # top-style live dashboardhaldir status                          # green/yellow/red component pillshaldir ready                           # exits 0/1, perfect for CIhaldir audit trail --agent my-bot      # the last N entrieshaldir audit export --format=jsonl --out audit-2026-04.jsonlhaldir audit verify                    # hash chain integrity checkhaldir webhooks deliveries             # last 20 retry attemptshaldir migrate up                      # apply pending schema migrations

haldir --help lists every command and CLI.md is the full reference — what each one does, the flags it takes, and which commands support --json (not all of them do; the reference says which).


Why Haldir

AI agents are calling APIs, spending money, and accessing credentials with zero oversight. Haldir is the missing layer:

Without HaldirWith Haldir
Agent has unlimited accessScoped sessions with permissions
Secrets in plaintext env varsAES-256-GCM encrypted vault
No spend limitsPer-session budget enforcement
No record of what happenedImmutable, tamper-evident audit
No human oversightApproval workflows with webhooks
Agent talks to tools directlyProxy intercepts + enforces

Everything on the right is one process in front of your tools. Your agent keeps its existing tool calls; Haldir answers first:

[Haldir architecture: Agent → Proxy → (Gate/Vault/Watch/Policy) → Upstream APIs]


Quick Start (Python)

python
from haldir import HaldirClient
# The key and URL that `haldir serve` printed above.h = HaldirClient(api_key="hld_xxx", base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8000")
# Create a governed agent sessionsession = h.create_session("my-agent", scopes=["read", "spend:50"])
# Store secrets agents never see directlyh.store_secret("stripe_key", "sk_live_xxx")
# Retrieve with scope enforcementkey = h.get_secret("stripe_key", session_id=session["session_id"])
# Authorize payments against budgeth.authorize_payment(session["session_id"], 29.99)
# Every action is loggedh.log_action(session["session_id"], tool="stripe", action="charge", cost_usd=29.99)
# Revoke when doneh.revoke_session(session["session_id"])

Under the hood that's four HTTP calls — mint a key, open a session, check a permission, write to the audit chain:

[Haldir quickstart: install, create a scoped session, check permission, log the action to the hash-chained audit trail]


Products

Gate — Agent Identity & Auth

Scoped sessions with permissions, spend limits, and TTL. No session = no access.

bash
curl -X POST https://haldir.xyz/v1/sessions \  -H "Authorization: Bearer hld_xxx" \  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \  -d '{"agent_id": "my-bot", "scopes": ["read", "browse", "spend:50"], "ttl": 3600}'

Vault — Encrypted Secrets & Payments

AES-encrypted storage. Agents request access; Vault checks session scope. Payment authorization with per-session budgets.

bash
curl -X POST https://haldir.xyz/v1/secrets \  -H "Authorization: Bearer hld_xxx" \  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \  -d '{"name": "api_key", "value": "sk_live_xxx", "scope_required": "read"}'

Watch — Audit Trail & Compliance

Immutable log for every action. Anomaly detection. Cost tracking. Compliance exports.

bash
curl https://haldir.xyz/v1/audit?agent_id=my-bot \  -H "Authorization: Bearer hld_xxx"

Proxy — Enforcement Layer

Sits between agents and MCP servers. Every tool call is intercepted, authorized, and logged. Supports policy enforcement: allow lists, deny lists, spend limits, rate limits, time windows.

bash
# Register an upstream MCP servercurl -X POST https://haldir.xyz/v1/proxy/upstreams \  -H "Authorization: Bearer hld_xxx" \  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \  -d '{"name": "myserver", "url": "https://my-mcp-server.com/mcp"}'
# Call through the proxy — governance enforcedcurl -X POST https://haldir.xyz/v1/proxy/call \  -H "Authorization: Bearer hld_xxx" \  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \  -d '{"tool": "scan_domain", "arguments": {"domain": "example.com"}, "session_id": "ses_xxx"}'

Approvals — Human-in-the-Loop

Pause agent execution for human review. Webhook notifications. Approve or deny from dashboard or API.

bash
# Require approval for spend over $100curl -X POST https://haldir.xyz/v1/approvals/rules \  -H "Authorization: Bearer hld_xxx" \  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \  -d '{"type": "spend_over", "threshold": 100}'

MCP Server

Haldir is available as an MCP server with 19 tools for Claude, Cursor, Windsurf, and any MCP-compatible AI:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "haldir": {      "command": "haldir-mcp",      "env": {        "HALDIR_API_KEY": "hld_xxx"      }    }  }}

MCP Tools (the process above registers all 19):

GovernanceTamper-evidenceApprovals & compliance
haldir_create_sessionhaldir_verify_audit_chainhaldir_request_approval
haldir_get_sessionhaldir_get_tree_headhaldir_get_approval_status
haldir_check_permissionhaldir_get_inclusion_proofhaldir_compliance_score
haldir_revoke_sessionhaldir_get_consistency_proofhaldir_build_evidence_pack
haldir_store_secrethaldir_log_audit_actionhaldir_authorize_payment
haldir_get_secrethaldir_query_audit_trail
haldir_list_secretshaldir_get_spend

There is one tool catalog. The stdio server (haldir-mcp, or haldir mcp serve) registers all 19; the hosted POST /mcp endpoint implements a 10-tool subset under the same names. A name means the same thing on both surfaces, so a client written against one works against the other.

MCP HTTP Endpoint: POST https://haldir.xyz/mcp


Performance

Haldir is fast enough to sit in the hot path of every agent tool call without becoming the bottleneck.

Single-box HTTP throughput (gunicorn 4 workers, 32 concurrent clients, tuned SQLite backend, every request goes through the full middleware stack — auth, validation, idempotency, metrics, structured logging):

EndpointRPSp50p95p99
GET /healthz1,63819.1 ms32.5 ms41.6 ms
GET /v1/status1,38222.2 ms30.8 ms45.4 ms
GET /v1/sessions/:id90329.2 ms95.5 ms172.1 ms
POST /v1/sessions (create)1,14227.7 ms35.2 ms39.9 ms
POST /v1/audit (hash-chain)1,09228.7 ms37.6 ms52.6 ms

Hardware: 12th-gen Intel Core i3-1215U (8 cores, 8 GB RAM). SQLite is configured with WAL + synchronous=NORMAL + 256 MiB mmap + in-memory temp store — the session-lookup p99 dropped by 52 % versus the untuned path. Postgres deployments (configurable pool via HALDIR_PG_POOL_MIN/MAX) flatten the p99 further still; enable via DATABASE_URL=postgresql://....

Primitive cost (pure-Python, no I/O):

Primitivep50Notes
Vault.store_secret (AES-256-GCM encrypt + AAD)< 10 µsin-memory, no DB write
Vault.get_secret (AES-256-GCM decrypt + AAD)< 10 µsin-memory
AuditEntry.compute_hash (SHA-256 over payload)< 10 µs
Gate.check_permission over REST~50-120 msnetwork + DB round-trip, Cloudflare-fronted
Watch.log_action over REST~50-150 msincludes chain lookup + DB write
Full governed-tool envelope (check + log)~100-250 ms

Agents typically wait 500-3000 ms for an LLM completion and 100-1000 ms for an upstream API call, so Haldir's overhead sits inside the noise. Reproduce locally:

bash
# Concurrent HTTP throughput (launches a local gunicorn, ~60s total)python bench/bench_http.py --duration 10 --concurrency 32 --workers 4
# Primitive cost only (no API key needed)python bench/bench_primitives.py --local
# End-to-end against the hosted serviceexport HALDIR_API_KEY=hld_...python bench/bench_primitives.py

Compliance

One endpoint produces an auditor-ready proof-of-control pack covering eight sections, each anchored to a SOC2 trust services criterion:

bash
haldir compliance evidence --since 2026-01-01 --out evidence-q1-2026.md
#SectionSOC2
1Identity (tenant, subscription, period)—
2Access control (API keys + per-key scopes)CC6.1
3Encryption (AES-256-GCM, AAD binding)CC6.7
4Audit trail (entry count, hash chain)CC7.2
5Spend governance (per-session caps)CC5.2
6Human approvals (request/decision lifecycle)CC8.1
7Outbound alerting (webhook delivery rate)CC7.3
8Document signature (SHA-256 self-hash)—

The pack signs itself: a SHA-256 over the canonical JSON of sections 1-7. An auditor receiving an archived pack can re-call /v1/compliance/evidence/manifest and confirm the digest matches — proof the document was not modified after issuance.

JSON for evidence-locker upload, Markdown for the "show this to the auditor" moment, both from the same /v1/compliance/evidence endpoint.


Retention and deletion

Audit data is kept forever by default. When a policy requires otherwise, you can set a window and prune to it — and the prune stays provable:

bash
haldir retention set 90      # keep 90 days (0 = forever)haldir retention show        # what a prune would remove, before running ithaldir retention prune --yes

The audit log is a hash chain, so deleting old entries naively leaves the surviving chain pointing at a hash that no longer exists — which would turn a working audit trail into one that fails verification. Instead, a Signed Tree Head is taken over the log before anything is removed, and the hash of the last deleted entry is recorded as the link across the boundary.

The result is that pruning is not silent. haldir audit verify still passes, and reports what was removed along with the signed Merkle root that commits to it — so the honest answer to an auditor is "entries before this point were deleted under a retention policy, and here is the root they produced at the time." If that commitment cannot be produced, nothing is deleted.


API Reference

Full docs at haldir.xyz/docs — the complete OpenAPI 3.1 spec is at haldir.xyz/openapi.json.

Key endpoints (see the spec for the full surface):

EndpointMethodDescription
/v1/keysPOSTCreate API key
/v1/sessionsPOSTCreate agent session
/v1/sessions/:idGET/DELGet / revoke session
/v1/sessions/:id/checkPOSTCheck permission
/v1/secretsPOST/GET/DELStore / list / delete secrets
/v1/payments/authorizePOSTAuthorize payment
/v1/auditPOST/GETLog / query actions
/v1/audit/spendGETSpend summary
/v1/audit/retentionGET/PUTRead / set the retention window
/v1/audit/retention/prunePOSTPrune to the window (needs confirm)
/v1/audit/retention/checkpointsGETPrune history + signed commitments
/v1/approvals/rulesPOSTAdd approval rule
/v1/approvals/requestPOSTRequest approval
/v1/approvals/:id/approvePOSTApprove
/v1/approvals/:id/denyPOSTDeny
/v1/webhooksPOST/GETRegister / list webhooks
/v1/proxy/upstreamsPOSTRegister upstream MCP server
/v1/proxy/callPOSTCall through the proxy
/v1/usageGETUsage stats
/v1/metricsGETPlatform metrics

Agent Discovery

Haldir is discoverable through every major protocol:

URLProtocol
haldir.xyz/openapi.jsonOpenAPI 3.1
haldir.xyz/llms.txtLLM-readable docs
haldir.xyz/.well-known/ai-plugin.jsonChatGPT plugins
haldir.xyz/.well-known/mcp/server-card.jsonMCP discovery
haldir.xyz/mcpMCP JSON-RPC
smithery.ai/server/haldir/haldirSmithery registry
pypi.org/project/haldirPyPI

Design partners wanted

Live now: haldir.xyz · API Docs · OpenAPI Spec · Smithery

We're taking 5 design partners — 30 days free, full access, direct line to the founder. If you're shipping AI agents to production, email [email protected].


License

MIT


Links

来源:README.md,提交 a8235e3

工具

0
SourceWeft 尚未在沙箱中启动过该软件包,因此其工具未知。

版本历史

1
  1. v0.1.0最新Sep 16, 2026

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