@guardbee/mcp-prompt-leak-scanner
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[npm version]
[npm downloads]
[License: MIT]
An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server — and a standalone reverse proxy — that catches leaked credentials and PII in outbound LLM prompts, before they leave your application.
secret-scanner finds secrets sitting in your codebase. This package finds secrets and PII that made it into a runtime prompt — a support agent that pastes a customer's ticket (email, card number) straight into a system prompt, a debugging session where someone pastes an API key into a chat, an internal tool that forwards raw user input to an LLM without ever checking what's in it. That's a different moment in the pipeline, and a different failure mode than a leaked .env file.
Telemetry is off by default. With GUARDBEE_TELEMETRY=1 it sends the server, tool, success, duration and short parameter values such as a file path; longer strings and fields like content, token or password are replaced with a placeholder. See @guardbee/mcp-telemetry.
Two ways to use it
1. On-demand scanning (MCP tools) — scan_text/scan_messages/scan_file/scan_directory. Ask Claude to check a prompt, a chat-request-body fixture, or a directory of prompt logs before you ship something that builds prompts from user input.
2. A live reverse proxy (proxy CLI command) — sits between your application and the real LLM API. It buffers and inspects only the outbound request body (message/system text), then streams the upstream response straight back unmodified — so SSE/streaming completions pass through untouched; only the prompt going out is ever parsed. Point your app's baseURL at the proxy instead of the real API and nothing else in your integration needs to change.
Detection quality: checksums, not just regex
A bare regex for "11 digits" or "16 digits" would flag order numbers, phone extensions, and timestamps constantly. Every PII pattern that has a real checksum algorithm uses it:
- TC Kimlik No — the actual 11-digit Turkish national ID checksum algorithm (not just a digit-count regex)
- Credit card numbers — Luhn checksum
- IBAN — ISO 7064 MOD97-10 checksum
A random 11-digit number has roughly a 1-in-10 chance of passing the TC Kimlik checksum by coincidence — regex alone would be far noisier. Credential patterns (API keys, JWTs, private keys) are matched against real provider-specific prefixes/structure (sk-, AKIA, ghp_, -----BEGIN...PRIVATE KEY-----, JWT's three-segment base64url shape), the same low-false-positive approach secret-scanner uses. The checksum validators come from @guardbee/guard-core, shared with @guardbee/mcp-security-proxy.
Findings never echo the real value. A finding's maskedMatch shows only the first 3 and last 2 characters (sk-…wx) — logging or displaying the very thing you just caught would defeat the point. The proxy's audit events go further: they record which pattern fired and where, never the matched text itself.
Features
- 13 patterns, 4 categories: credential (9), financial-pii (2, checksum-validated), national-id (1, checksum-validated), contact-pii (2)
- Chat-body aware — understands OpenAI/Anthropic-style
messages[].content (string or content-block array) and system fields, not just flat text
- Live reverse-proxy mode with monitor/redact/block policies — request-only inspection, response streamed through untouched
- Masked findings and credential-free audit events — the tool never becomes a second copy of the leak
- SARIF 2.1.0 output — CI/CD integration (GitHub Code Scanning, etc.)
- Config file support via
guardbee.yml
- 29 unit tests — checksum validators verified against known-good/known-bad test vectors, proxy tested against a real local HTTP client/server round trip (not just in-process mocks) in all three modes
Quick Start
Claude Desktop / MCP Client
CLI (CI/CD)
CLI (live proxy)
MCP Tools
Detected Patterns
Configuration (guardbee.yml)
Limitations (by design)
- The proxy only inspects the request body; it does not parse or modify streaming SSE responses — those are piped through untouched.
- Only
messages[].content (string or {type:"text"} content blocks) and top-level system are extracted from a chat body; provider-specific fields outside that shape aren't scanned.
- This is pattern/checksum-based detection, not a general-purpose NER/PII model — it won't catch PII that doesn't match a known structural pattern (e.g. a name or street address in free text).
Development
License
MIT — GuardBee
Feedback
Questions, ideas, or a false positive? Start a thread in GitHub Discussions or open an issue. If GuardBee is useful to you, a ⭐ on the repository helps others find it.