Vulnerability Exposure MCP
[Tests]
[PyPI version]
[Python versions]
[License: MIT]
[vulnerability-exposure-mcp MCP server – quality and maintenance score on Glama]
[Add to Cursor]
[Install in VS Code]
An MCP server that checks public IPs, domains, CVEs and software versions for confirmed vulnerabilities and exposure. A CVE only counts as affecting a version when NVD's version ranges confirm it; everything else is listed for review, so related or vendor-wide CVEs are never reported as yours.
It's the MCP version of Vulnerability Exposure Analyzer. The app needs a Cohere key to run its own agent; this one doesn't need any LLM key, because the model in your MCP client calls the tools and writes the report.
It runs locally over stdio, so it works with clients that launch local MCP servers: Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Antigravity, Windsurf, VS Code, LM Studio and similar. Web-only clients such as ChatGPT on the web and claude.ai connectors only accept remote (HTTPS) servers; this server is not hosted, because a public deployment would need its own authentication to keep your API keys from being used by anyone.
Give it a public IP, a domain, a CVE ID (CVE-2026-111497), a product and version (PHP 8.3.10, OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu-3ubuntu0.6), or your project's lockfile or SBOM, and it pulls evidence from NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, Exploit-DB, OSV.dev, Shodan, VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, Spamhaus, GreyNoise, SANS ISC, the internet registries and certificate transparency logs.
[Claude running "Run a security assessment of PHP 8.3.10" with this server: 7 tool calls, a report that passed check_report, an executive summary and a key findings table]
[The same report's confirmed CVEs for PHP 8.3.10, highest EPSS first, with severity, CISA KEV status and fix versions]
Install
Requires Python 3.11+. Setup is three steps: install, optionally store your keys, connect your AI client.
The simplest way is uv, which runs the server straight from PyPI with nothing to set up:
Or install it with pip (pip install vulnerability-exposure-mcp) and use the vulnerability-exposure-mcp command the same way. To run from source instead, see From source below.
Free keys: Shodan, VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, NVD (optional, raises the rate limit), GreyNoise (optional; GreyNoise only gives keys to accounts made with a work email, not Gmail or similar. Without one it allows a limited number of lookups, and SANS ISC covers the rest). CVE and software checks work with no keys at all. IP and domain checks also run without keys, using Shodan's free InternetDB, the internet registries, Spamhaus DROP and GreyNoise; the report then lists VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB as not checked.
Then ask: "Run a security assessment of PHP 8.3.10" or use the security_assessment prompt. Examples has more to try.
Store your keys securely
Keys can live in your operating system's credential store (Windows Credential Manager, macOS Keychain, or the Secret Service on Linux) instead of a config file. Run this in your own terminal; the key is typed into a hidden prompt and goes straight to the store:
Do the same for virustotal, abuseipdb, nvd and greynoise as needed. keys status shows which are stored (never their values) and keys delete NAME removes one. With keys stored this way, leave the env block below empty. An environment variable, if set, takes precedence over a stored key.
Servers, Docker containers and other headless Linux systems usually have no credential store. There keys set says so, and keys go in the env block instead.
Connect a client
Pass keys through the client's env block, not the command line.
Claude Desktop
Download vulnerability-exposure-mcp-<version>.mcpb from the latest release and open it: Claude Desktop installs it and asks for your (optional) keys in a form. Or add the JSON config below. From 1.1.0 each bundle has a signed build provenance attestation, so you can check it was built by this repository's release workflow: gh attestation verify vulnerability-exposure-mcp-<version>.mcpb --repo MRFrazer25/Vulnerability-Exposure-MCP.
Claude Code
Store your keys first (see above), so none go on the command line, then run:
Start a new Claude Code session afterwards: MCP servers load when a session starts.
Or install it as a plugin, which asks for each (optional) key in a masked prompt and keeps it in your credential store:
Codex (CLI, IDE extension and ChatGPT desktop app)
Store your keys first (see above), so none go on the command line, then run:
Or add it to ~/.codex/config.toml, which all three share:
Antigravity CLI
Store your keys first (see above), then install the plugin straight from this repo:
Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code, Claude Desktop and other JSON-configured clients
Add this to the client's MCP config (in Claude Desktop: Settings → Developer → Edit Config), then restart the client. With keys stored in the credential store, leave the env values empty or remove the block.
(VS Code uses "servers" instead of "mcpServers" in .vscode/mcp.json.)
Docker
Build the image once with docker build -t vulnerability-exposure-mcp ., then point the client at it. Containers have no credential store, so keys go in env; listing them as bare -e names passes their values through without putting them on the command line:
From source
Then use .venv/Scripts/python -m vulnerability_exposure_mcp (on macOS or Linux, .venv/bin/python) wherever the steps above say uvx vulnerability-exposure-mcp, with the full path to that Python in client configs, for example "command": "C:/path/to/Vulnerability-Exposure-MCP/.venv/Scripts/python.exe", "args": ["-m", "vulnerability_exposure_mcp"].
It keeps everything that makes the original app's reports reliable:
- The same analyst rules as the app's system prompt. The server's instructions are a short summary, since clients cut long ones short;
investigate_target returns the full rules and report format as analyst_guide.
- Baseline lookups run in code, so reputation and exposure checks never depend on the model remembering them.
- Analysis depth (Quick Scan, Standard, Comprehensive, Expert) sets the tool-call budget, per-service caps and how much detail each result keeps. The model can't override these limits.
- Key facts computed from the data, not the model, including the CISA KEV split into confirmed for this target and related, so the numbers are the same whichever model runs it.
- Fresher and more accurate than NVD alone: Ubuntu and Debian packages are checked against the distro's own fix data, so backported fixes count; recent CVEs NVD hasn't analysed are listed for review; and for packages such as Next.js, React and Django, GitHub advisories fill gaps before NVD has them. Each CVE carries its patch status and whether exploit code is published.
- One investigation per
investigation_id: a random handle returned by investigate_target, so several chats sharing one server process never mix evidence.
How this differs
Most CVE servers search NVD by keyword or product and hand back every match, so a report on nginx 1.30.0 can list CVEs that were fixed years earlier. This one:
- Checks the exact version. A CVE is confirmed only when NVD's version ranges include that version, and for an Ubuntu or Debian package, CVEs the distro fixed by backport are ruled out. Keyword and product-level matches are listed separately as related.
- Sets aside what isn't the product's. Plugin CVEs (Jenkins plugins), other products that share the name (Nginx Proxy Manager, Grafana Alloy) and CVEs NVD confirms only on another OS (PHP on Windows, for a Linux build) are listed separately instead of being counted against it.
- Combines the context a fix decision needs. One call returns CISA KEV status and ransomware use, EPSS and whether it's rising, the minimum safe version (and how far your current major version gets), end-of-life status, published exploits and patch status, instead of the model stitching together separate lookups.
- Checks the report, not just the data.
check_report flags a draft that cites a CVE, version or host name no tool returned, calls a related CVE confirmed, swaps an affected and an unaffected version, or gets a fix version, count, KEV, port, reputation or exploit claim wrong, before you see it.
- Says what it didn't check. Every report lists the sources that weren't checked (a missing key, a failed lookup), so a missing result is never presented as a clean one.
What it doesn't do
- No scanning. It never connects to the target. Everything comes from public databases and the target's DNS records, so it can't find services that Shodan hasn't seen or vulnerabilities in software it isn't told about.
- Public targets only. Private, local and reserved IPs and local hostnames are refused.
- No authenticated or internal checks. It can't see installed packages, configuration or anything behind a login. For that, use a scanner on the host.
- No exploitation or remediation. It reports what's published about a target and what to upgrade to. It doesn't test exploits or change anything.
- It's only as current as its sources. CVEs that NVD hasn't analysed yet can't be version-confirmed; they're listed for review instead.
Examples
Ask your AI client in plain words; it picks the tools. Some things to try:
Each answer says where every fact came from, and says "can't confirm" or "not checked" rather than calling something safe when the data doesn't show it.
Tools
There's also a security_assessment prompt (target + depth) that loads the analyst rules and the workflow: investigate_target → pass its investigation_id to each lookup → get_key_facts → draft the report →
check_report → fix what it flags. Lookups also work on their own without an id: they get Standard result sizes and the hourly cap below, but no tool-call budget, and they aren't counted in any investigation's key facts.
Every tool is read-only except watchlist, which only writes its own file in your config folder. Private, reserved and cloud-metadata IPs are refused.
What each tool sends, and where
No tool ever contacts the target. Every lookup asks a public data source about the target, so the target's own servers never see a request from you. Those services do see what you looked up and your IP address (and your key, if you use one).
Check your watchlist on a schedule
The watch command (1.2.0 and later; uvx fetches the newest release) checks the watchlist and prints what changed, so your operating system's scheduler can run it daily with no server. Add entries first, from your AI client ("add nginx 1.24.0 to my watchlist"). The list is a file in your config folder (%APPDATA%\vulnerability-exposure-mcp\watchlist.json on Windows, ~/Library/Application Support/... on macOS, ~/.config/... on Linux).
- Windows (Task Scheduler):
schtasks /Create /SC DAILY /ST 09:00 /TN "Vulnerability watchlist" /TR "cmd /c uvx vulnerability-exposure-mcp watch >> %USERPROFILE%\vuln-watch.log"
- Linux (cron):
0 9 * * * uvx vulnerability-exposure-mcp watch >> ~/vuln-watch.log 2>&1
- macOS: the same cron line, or a launchd agent that runs the same command.
With the disk cache on (VULN_EXPOSURE_CACHE=on), repeat checks are faster and use less of NVD's rate limit.
Settings
Repeating an identical call in the same investigation returns the earlier result without spending quota. Large results are trimmed to about 15,000 characters.
Security notes
- Tool results contain third-party text (banners, hostnames, CVE descriptions). They're returned as data, the server's instructions tell the model never to follow instructions found in them, and instruction-like text in banners, hostnames and registry records is replaced with
[instruction-like text removed] before the model sees it. Still, use a client that shows you tool calls.
check_report checks a draft report against the investigation's data in code, and lists IDs, versions, EPSS figures and claims no lookup supports.- To be alerted if any MCP server's tool descriptions change after you approve them (tool poisoning), you can run it behind Trail of Bits' mcp-context-protector.
- Keys are read from the environment or the OS credential store on each call, never logged, and redacted from error messages. Targets are not logged either, and failures are logged without tracebacks.
- Failed lookups are returned as tool errors (
isError), and every tool is marked read-only.
- The server speaks stdio only, so it runs on your machine and only your client can reach it.
- Nothing is stored on disk unless you turn on the disk cache (
VULN_EXPOSURE_CACHE=on), which keeps only public data-source responses, never keys or results. There's no telemetry. Targets are sent only to the data provider each lookup uses; see PRIVACY.md for what each one receives.
- Lockfiles and SBOMs given to
am_i_affected are untrusted input: files over 5 MB, JSON nested more than 64 levels and more than 5,000 packages are refused before parsing, a path is read only when it names a lockfile or SBOM, and only package names and versions are sent anywhere.
- Every push and pull request runs the tests, pip-audit against known-vulnerable dependencies, and gitleaks over the whole history so no key is ever committed. Dependencies are pinned and updated by Dependabot. See SECURITY.md to report a problem.
Responsible use
For legitimate security research, defensive security and education only. Only investigate systems you own or are authorized to assess, and follow each data provider's terms of service. Automated findings can be wrong; verify before acting.
Data sources and terms
Lookups use your own accounts and keys, so each provider's terms apply to you directly.
Several free tiers are for non-commercial use only: VirusTotal, AbuseIPDB, and Shodan's InternetDB and CVEDB. If you use this at work or in a paid product, get plans that allow commercial use.
This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.
Spamhaus DROP data is (c) The Spamhaus Project. Package advisories are from the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0), the PyPA Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0), the Go Vulnerability Database (CC BY 4.0), the RustSec Advisory Database (CC0, with advisories adapted from GitHub's under CC BY 4.0), OpenSSF Malicious Packages (Apache-2.0), Debian's security tracker and Ubuntu's security notices (CC BY-SA 4.0, (c) Canonical), all via OSV.dev; SANS ISC data is CC BY-NC-SA 4.0. CVE® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
Vulnerability Exposure MCP is an independent project. It is not affiliated with, endorsed by or sponsored by Shodan, VirusTotal (Google), AbuseIPDB, NIST, CISA, FIRST, MITRE, Spamhaus, GreyNoise, SANS, OffSec (Exploit-DB), GitHub, Google (OSV.dev and the Go team), the RustSec project, the OpenSSF, Debian, Canonical, endoflife.date, Sectigo (crt.sh), SSLMate (Cert Spotter) or the internet registries. Their names are used only to say which services it works with.
Tests
License
MIT
