Agentpay Sentinel Mcp

io.github.Rumblingb由 GitHub 账号 Rumblingb 发布v1.0.0更新于 Oct 24, 2026

Security guardrails for AI agent payments

发布方自己的服务：AgentPay — Pay-per-call AI Microservices

已验证STDIO仅桌面金融安全与监控

服务详情

标识符: io.github.Rumblingb/agentpay-sentinel-mcp
传输: STDIO
运行时: Desktop only
信任: Verified
发布于: Sep 16, 2026

安全提示

MCP 服务会接收对话中的工具调用请求，并可能执行外部操作。启用前请先了解该服务能做什么，并只授予它所需的权限。

注册中心已验证此条目所属的 GitHub 账号 Rumblingb。这并不表明该账号就是产品方。

SourceWeft 的检查只涵盖条目是否完整、端点是否响应；不审查服务器的代码，也不审查其工具的行为。

在 README 中添加徽章

向读者展示该 MCP 服务已收录于 SourceWeft，徽章链接到本页。

[![Listed on SourceWeft](https://sourceweft.com/badge/mcp/io.github.Rumblingb%2Fagentpay-sentinel-mcp.svg)](https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.Rumblingb%2Fagentpay-sentinel-mcp?utm_source=readme&utm_medium=badge)

概览

AI 生成的概览

一个本地看门狗 MCP，对 AI 代理的支付请求执行预检安全检查，返回 PASS 或 BLOCKED 结论。

可以做什么: 对支付交易执行九项检查（令牌哈希、预算上限、商户白名单、受限类别、过期、速率限制、金额不符、重放、吊销），返回 PASS/BLOCKED 结论与审计哈希
吊销令牌，使后续审计一律拦截；为合法重试从重放存储中清除 nonce
校验一串审计哈希是否构成完整链条
模拟令牌伪造、预算溢出、重放、商户冒充等攻击向量，返回严重程度、防御与检测方式
适用场景: 当代理被允许发起支付，且你希望在每次付款前用本地建议性关卡检查策略、预算与令牌完整性时适用。也适合用来了解常见支付攻击向量会如何被检测。
运行要求: 以本地 Python 进程运行：需要 Python 3.10+ 与 mcp 包，并在客户端配置（Claude Desktop 或 Cursor）中以命令加脚本路径启动。未声明任何 API 密钥或环境变量。状态保存在用户主目录下。

安装前请注意

结论仅为建议性质：它不拦截网络流量，代理必须在付款前主动调用并在 BLOCKED 时停止。吊销令牌和清除 nonce 会改动本地持久状态。README 列出付费 Pro 方案每月 19 美元（无限审计与威胁模拟），免费方案每月限 50 次审计。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

打开控制台中的 Agentpay Sentinel Mcp，将其添加到工作区。
为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only，通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程，因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照仓库中的启动说明。

README

[AgentPay]

AgentPay Sentinel MCP

A watchdog MCP that validates every agent payment request against all 9 security checks before it executes — catching policy violations, replay attacks, amount tampering, revoked tokens, and budget overruns at call time.

What your agent can do

Run a pre-flight audit on any payment transaction before executing it — get PASS or BLOCKED with the specific check that failed
Validate token integrity: confirms the SHA-256 hash matches the expected merchant_id:amount binding, catching forged or tampered tokens
Enforce budget caps: rejects transactions where current_spend + amount > budget_cap and returns exact remaining budget
Check merchant allowlist membership and block purchases in restricted categories
Verify token expiry and rate limits before the payment fires
Simulate known attack vectors (token forgery, budget overflow, replay, merchant spoof, expiry bypass) and get the specific defense mechanism and detection method for each

Installation

Requires: Python 3.10+, mcp package.

Claude Desktop — add to ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS) or %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json (Windows):

json

{  "mcpServers": {    "agentpay-sentinel": {      "command": "python",      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/agentpay-sentinel-mcp/server.py"]    }  }}

{  "mcpServers": {    "agentpay-sentinel": {      "command": "python",      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/agentpay-sentinel-mcp/server.py"]    }  }}

Cursor — add to .cursor/mcp.json in your project root:

json

{  "mcpServers": {    "agentpay-sentinel": {      "command": "python",      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/agentpay-sentinel-mcp/server.py"]    }  }}

{  "mcpServers": {    "agentpay-sentinel": {      "command": "python",      "args": ["/absolute/path/to/agentpay-sentinel-mcp/server.py"]    }  }}

Tool Reference

Tool	Description	Key params
`sentinel_audit_transaction`	Run all 9 security checks; returns PASS/BLOCKED + SHA-256 audit hash	`token_hash`, `merchant_id`, `amount`, `current_spend`, `budget_cap` (required) · `nonce`, `token_id`, `approved_amount` (enable checks 7–9)
`sentinel_revoke_token`	Permanently revoke a token — all future audits with this `token_id` will BLOCK	`token_id`, `reason`
`sentinel_clear_nonce`	Remove a nonce from the replay store (for legitimate refunds/retries only)	`nonce`
`sentinel_verify_chain`	Verify a sequence of audit hashes forms an unbroken chain	`audit_hashes`, `expected_chain_root`
`sentinel_threat_model`	Simulate any named attack vector; returns severity, defence, and detection	`attack_vector`, `context`

All 9 checks run by `sentinel_audit_transaction`

#	Check	What it catches	Param
1	Token integrity	SHA-256 hash mismatch — forged tokens	`token_hash`
2	Budget enforcement	Spend exceeding cap	`current_spend`, `budget_cap`
3	Merchant allowlist	Payment to unlisted merchant	`allowlist`
4	Category restriction	Purchase in blocked category	`blocked_categories`
5	Expiry check	Expired token	`expires_at`
6	Rate limit	Too many calls per minute	`calls_this_minute`
7	Amount mismatch	Agent changed amount after human approved	`approved_amount`
8	Replay attack	Same nonce used twice (file-backed store)	`nonce`
9	Revocation evasion	Agent using a revoked token	`token_id`

Checks 7–9 activate when the corresponding param is passed. State persists to ~/.sentinel/.

Attack vectors in `sentinel_threat_model`

token_forgery · budget_overflow · replay_attack · amount_mismatch · revocation_evasion · merchant_spoof · expiry_bypass

Security

sentinel_audit_transaction returns an advisory verdict — it does not intercept network traffic. Your agent is responsible for calling it before executing a payment and halting on BLOCKED. The audit hash returned is a SHA-256 digest of all check results, giving you a tamper-evident record of each pre-flight decision.