Docker Compose Audit

io.github.UnbearableDev由 GitHub 账号 UnbearableDev 发布v1.0.0更新于 Oct 24, 2026

Security audit for docker-compose.yml — 25 checks: secrets, privileges, network, volumes, images.

发布方自己的服务：audit.domains - Domain Valuation

已验证Streamable HTTP可网页运行云端与基础设施开发者工具安全与监控

服务详情

标识符: io.github.UnbearableDev/docker-compose-audit
传输: Streamable HTTP
运行时: Web executable
信任: Verified
发布于: Sep 16, 2026

安全提示

MCP 服务会接收对话中的工具调用请求，并可能执行外部操作。启用前请先了解该服务能做什么，并只授予它所需的权限。

注册中心已验证此条目所属的 GitHub 账号 UnbearableDev。这并不表明该账号就是产品方。

SourceWeft 的检查只涵盖条目是否完整、端点是否响应；不审查服务器的代码，也不审查其工具的行为。

在 README 中添加徽章

向读者展示该 MCP 服务已收录于 SourceWeft，徽章链接到本页。

[![Listed on SourceWeft](https://sourceweft.com/badge/mcp/io.github.UnbearableDev%2Fdocker-compose-audit.svg)](https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.UnbearableDev%2Fdocker-compose-audit?utm_source=readme&utm_medium=badge)

概览

AI 生成的概览

一个远程 MCP 服务器，用于审计 docker-compose.yml 的安全配置错误，返回带严重级别、修复说明和 YAML 修复片段的报告。

可以做什么: 对 compose 文件执行完整安全审计，返回结构化报告，包含严重级别、受影响服务、问题描述、修复建议和可直接粘贴的 YAML 修复片段；输入可以是粘贴的 YAML 或公开 HTTPS 链接。按类别单独检查：权限与能力、网络暴露、卷挂载与文件系统、密钥卫生、资源限制、镜像固定、健康检查与重启策略、日志、Compose 规范卫生。浏览检查项目录，可按类别筛选。
适用场景: 适合在部署前让助手审查 docker-compose.yml，排查权限、网络、密钥或卷相关风险，或为正在编辑的 compose 文件生成具体修复建议。
运行要求: 远程 streamable HTTP 端点；需要 Apify API 令牌，通过 Authorization bearer 请求头发送。审计接受不超过 1 MB 的粘贴 YAML 或公开 HTTPS 链接（抓取超时 5 秒，最多 3 次重定向）。会话闲置 5 分钟后超时。

安装前请注意

按事件计费：每次审计或分类检查调用 0.02 美元，目录查询 0.005 美元，重复调用会产生费用。Apify 令牌属于凭据，应妥善保密。compose 内容或你提供的链接会发送到远程服务。仅做静态分析，不扫描镜像，也不检查运行中的容器。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

打开控制台中的 Docker Compose Audit，将其添加到工作区。
连接 Authorization token 凭据。它们会被私密存储，绝不会在公开页面上展示。
为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Web executable，通过 Streamable HTTP。远程服务在工作区中配置后即可从网页运行时运行。

交给智能体安装

把这段提示词粘贴到 Claude Code、Codex、Cursor 等智能体，或 SourceWeft 对话中。智能体会读取该服务器的安装指南，先向你展示发布者、端点和登录方式，经你同意后再把它添加到你的客户端。密钥不会写进任何命令。

阅读 https://sourceweft.com/mcp/io.github.UnbearableDev%2Fdocker-compose-audit/install.md，并按其中说明把这个 MCP 服务器接入我的客户端。修改任何配置之前，先告诉我它的发布者、端点和登录方式，等我确认。不要把 API 密钥写进命令或我会提交的文件；问我密钥应从哪里获取。

查看智能体所依据的安装指南

其他 MCP 客户端

把它添加到你客户端的 mcpServers 配置中。

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "docker-compose-audit": {
      "type": "http",
      "url": "https://unbearable-dev--docker-compose-audit.apify.actor/mcp",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer <YOUR_TOKEN>"
      }
    }
  }
}

README

Docker Compose Security Audit

MCP server that audits docker-compose.yml files for security misconfigurations. Trivy-grade check catalog, designed for AI agents — every finding ships with a severity rating, full remediation text, and a YAML fix snippet you can paste.

Built by Unbearable Labs. Pay-per-event pricing — you only pay when an audit runs.

Available on

Apify Actor Store — primary, metered usage (PPE)
MCPize — pending submission
MCP.so — pending submission
PulseMCP — pending submission
Smithery — pending submission
Glama — pending submission

Newsletter: Unbearable TechTips Weekly · All Actors: github.com/UnbearableDev

What it does

Point any MCP-capable client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, n8n, Make, Zapier, custom agents) at this server, hand it the contents of a docker-compose.yml, and get back a structured report with:

Severity — high / medium / low / info
Service — which compose service the finding affects
Description — what's wrong and why it matters
Remediation — what to do about it
Fix snippet — YAML you can paste directly into the file

Tools

Tool	Purpose
`audit_compose(compose_yaml? \| compose_url?, min_severity='low')`	Run all checks, return full report
`check_privilege(...)`	Container privilege & capability issues only
`check_network(...)`	Network exposure issues only
`check_filesystem(...)`	Volume mount & filesystem issues only
`check_secrets(...)`	Secret hygiene issues only
`check_resources(...)`	Resource limit issues only
`check_image_hygiene(...)`	Image tag / registry / pinning issues only
`check_runtime_lifecycle(...)`	Healthcheck / restart / init issues only
`check_logging(...)`	Logging driver / rotation issues only
`check_compose_hygiene(...)`	Deprecated fields / Compose-spec hygiene only
`list_checks(category?)`	Browse the full check catalog

All audit-running tools accept the same input:

compose_yaml (string) — paste the YAML content directly, OR
compose_url (string) — public HTTPS URL to fetch (e.g. GitHub raw URL)

Provide exactly one. min_severity defaults to low (drops info findings); set to medium or high to filter further.

Example response (truncated)

json

{  "summary": {    "total_findings": 14,    "by_severity": {"high": 3, "medium": 6, "low": 5, "info": 0},    "by_category": {"privilege": 4, "network": 3, "secrets": 2, "...": 5}  },  "findings": [    {      "id": "DCS-002",      "category": "privilege",      "severity": "high",      "service": "web",      "title": "Privileged mode enabled",      "description": "Service 'web' has `privileged: true`...",      "remediation": "Remove `privileged: true`. If you need specific capabilities...",      "fix_yaml_snippet": "    # remove `privileged: true`; if needed, use cap_add or devices selectively",      "references": ["CIS-Docker-5.4", "NIST-800-190"]    },    ...  ]}

{  "summary": {    "total_findings": 14,    "by_severity": {"high": 3, "medium": 6, "low": 5, "info": 0},    "by_category": {"privilege": 4, "network": 3, "secrets": 2, "...": 5}  },  "findings": [    {      "id": "DCS-002",      "category": "privilege",      "severity": "high",      "service": "web",      "title": "Privileged mode enabled",      "description": "Service 'web' has `privileged: true`...",      "remediation": "Remove `privileged: true`. If you need specific capabilities...",      "fix_yaml_snippet": "    # remove `privileged: true`; if needed, use cap_add or devices selectively",      "references": ["CIS-Docker-5.4", "NIST-800-190"]    },    ...  ]}

Pricing

You pay only when a tool is invoked. No subscription, no monthly minimums.

Check catalog (25 live in v1, growing toward 54)

Category	Live checks
Privilege	Root user (DCS-001), privileged mode (DCS-002), dangerous capabilities (DCS-003), `cap_add: ALL` (DCS-004), `cap_drop: ALL` missing (DCS-005), `no-new-privileges` missing (DCS-006)
Network	`network_mode: host` (DCS-010), port bound to 0.0.0.0 (DCS-011), SSH port exposed (DCS-013), DB port exposed (DCS-014)
Filesystem	`/var/run/docker.sock` mount (DCS-018), host root mount (DCS-019), sensitive host paths (DCS-020)
Secrets	Hardcoded secret in env (DCS-026), secret-pattern env without Docker secrets (DCS-027)
Resources	No memory limit (DCS-032), no CPU limit (DCS-033), no PID limit (DCS-034)
Image hygiene	Unpinned / `:latest` image (DCS-037)
Runtime lifecycle	No healthcheck (DCS-043), no restart policy (DCS-044)
Logging	No log driver (DCS-048), no log rotation (DCS-049)
Compose hygiene	Deprecated `version:` field (DCS-051), `depends_on` without healthcheck condition (DCS-052)

Use list_checks to get the canonical, up-to-date catalog with IDs, severities, and titles.

Connecting from Claude Desktop

Add to your MCP config:

json

{  "mcpServers": {    "compose-audit": {      "transport": "streamable-http",      "url": "https://YOUR-ACTOR-URL.apify.actor/mcp"    }  }}

{  "mcpServers": {    "compose-audit": {      "transport": "streamable-http",      "url": "https://YOUR-ACTOR-URL.apify.actor/mcp"    }  }}

(Replace YOUR-ACTOR-URL with the Standby URL shown on the Apify Store page after you start the Actor.)

Limits

YAML size: 1 MB cap per audit call
URL fetch: 5-second timeout, max 3 redirects, HTTPS only
Session timeout: 5 minutes of inactivity

What's NOT covered (yet)

Pure static analysis of the compose file only. Out of scope for this version:

Image vulnerability scanning (use Trivy / Grype for that)
Live container inspection
Kubernetes / Helm manifests (different surface)
Dockerfile-specific lint (use Hadolint)

The next 29 checks on the v1.x → v2 roadmap include build-context security, additional capability checks, secret-pattern detection in build args, and registry trust verification.