Codemore

npx codemore@latest scan .

Table of contents

• Why CodeMore
• Quick start — CLI · MCP server · VS Code · GitHub Action · Hosted
• What it catches
• The report is the product
• Agentic fix loop
• Accuracy, measured honestly
• What CodeMore does not catch
• Architecture
• Development · Contributing · License

Why CodeMore

AI-assisted coding ships vulnerabilities at a measured, growing rate:

Existing scanners (SonarQube, DeepSource, Snyk) target human reviewers sitting at dashboards. But this code wasn't written by a human — and the LLM that wrote it is fully capable of fixing its own bug, if the report is shaped for a machine reader.

That's the wedge. CodeMore is not another SAST dashboard. It's the report contract between a scanner and a coding agent: every finding carries a suggestedFix with a patch template and explicit verificationCriteria — not just "here's a problem," but "here's exactly how to know you fixed it."

The agent that wrote the bug can also write the fix — if it can read the report.

Quick start

CLI

npx codemore@latest scan .

Prints a summary to the terminal. Add --json for the full report on stdout, or --out codemore-report.json to write it to disk: every finding pinned to file:line:column with rule citation, fix template, and verification criteria. Pipe it to your agent and watch findings close.

npm install -g codemore                        # once — or prefix each command below with `npx codemore@latest`codemore update                                # global install pinned an old version? this pulls latestcodemore scan . --fail-on BLOCKER              # CI gate: non-zero exit on any BLOCKERcodemore scan . --external-tools ruff,biome    # opt in to external toolscodemore scan . --external-tools all           # ruff · golangci-lint · clippy · biome · bandit · gitleaks · npm-audit · pip-auditcodemore scan . --format sarif --out codemore.sarif   # GitHub code scanning (upload-sarif)codemore fix . --rule <id> --write             # agentic fix loop from the CLI (needs an LLM API key)codemore baseline create                       # adopt on an existing repo without drowning in legacy findings

MCP server — Cursor, Claude Code, Codex, Claude Desktop

npx codemore mcp                              # print config snippet + every client's config pathnpx codemore mcp install --client cursor      # merge into existing config (backs up first, --dry-run supported)

{  "mcpServers": {    "codemore": {      "command": "npx",      "args": ["-y", "codemore@latest", "serve-mcp"]    }  }}

Six tools exposed: scan_project · scan_file · explain_issue · suggest_fix · apply_fix · validate_fix.

Per-client setup, exact config paths, and verified handshake evidence (Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop, Codex CLI): docs/ide-matrix.md.

VS Code extension

Install CodeMore from the VS Code Marketplace (Extensions → search "CodeMore" → Install), or build the VSIX yourself:

npm run vsce:package                             # builds codemore-<version>.vsixcode --install-extension codemore-<version>.vsix

Inline diagnostics; code-action quick-fix invokes the agentic loop (plan → generate → validate → retry, max 3 attempts).

GitHub Action

# .github/workflows/codemore.ymlon:  pull_request:    branches: [main]jobs:  scan:    runs-on: ubuntu-latest    permissions:      contents: read      pull-requests: write    steps:      - uses: actions/checkout@v4      - uses: abhinavteja123/codemore@v1        with:          fail-on: BLOCKER

PR-comment bot; only fails the build on findings new since the committed .codemore-baseline.json. A full copy-paste security gate chaining CodeMore + Ruff + Biome + Bandit + Gitleaks + npm-audit + pip-audit + Checkov lives at templates/.github/workflows/codemore-security-gate.yml (walkthrough).

Web Scanner (hosted)

Sign in at codemore.tech, paste a public GitHub URL or upload a ZIP — same report, same fingerprint, zero install.

What it catches

64 native rules across 6 packs, every rule mapped to a cited real-world incident class — not a hypothetical:

8 external adapters (off by default, opt in via --external-tools): ruff · golangci-lint · clippy · biome · bandit · gitleaks · npm-audit · pip-audit. Findings are namespaced ext:<tool>:<rule-id> — no collision with native rules; a missing binary skips silently instead of crashing.

The walker catches what .gitignore hides. When a developer "hides" a leaked secret file by gitignoring it, most scanners stop seeing it — but it's still on disk, in tarballs, in Docker images. CodeMore always scans secret-shaped filenames (.env*, *.pem, *.key, firebase-adminsdk*.json, credentials.json, .npmrc, .pypirc, …) even when gitignored. This is exactly how the audits found real production OpenAI keys, Google API keys, and Firebase admin SDK creds that other tools silently missed. Opt out with --respect-gitignore-fully.

Per-rule documentation: docs/rules — 64 pages, one per rule.

The report is the product

Every surface emits the same schema-stable codemore-report.json — verified byte-identical (modulo timestamps and instance IDs) on every release by test/parity.test.ts:

CLI    : issues=224  BLOCKER=5  fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23…MCP    : issues=224  BLOCKER=5  fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23…Daemon : issues=224  BLOCKER=5  fingerprint=sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23…

One brain, four skins. The schema is the API; surfaces are interchangeable.

{  "schemaVersion": "1.0.0",  "tool":    { "name": "codemore", "version": "0.3.0" },  "project": { "root": ".", "framework": "next.js", "language": "typescript",               "fingerprint": "sha256:7f95f2c62e0d3ecea6f23…" },  "summary": {    "issuesTotal": 42,    "bySeverity":  { "BLOCKER": 2, "CRITICAL": 5, "MAJOR": 15, "MINOR": 18, "INFO": 2 },    "byCategory":  { "security": 12, "bug": 7, "…": "…" },    "filesAnalyzed": 87,    "linesOfCode":   12450,    "technicalDebtMinutes": 1840  },  "issues": [    {      "id":          "vibe-supabase-rls-disabled",      "ruleVersion": "1.2.0",      "instanceId":  "01HZ…",      "severity":    "BLOCKER",      "confidence":  0.95,      "category":    "security",      "title":       "Supabase table has no RLS policy",      "evidence": {        "file": "supabase/migrations/001_init.sql",        "line": 14, "column": 1, "endLine": 14, "endColumn": 60,        "snippet": "create table profiles (id uuid primary key, …);",        "matchedPattern": "create-table-without-rls"      },      "whyItMatters": "Public Supabase client can read/write all rows. 70 % of Lovable apps leak data through this.",      "citation":     "https://codemore.tech/rules/vibe-supabase-rls-disabled",      "suggestedFix": {        "type":             "code-patch",        "instructions":     "Add `ALTER TABLE profiles ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;` plus at least one policy scoped to authenticated users.",        "patchTemplate":    "…",        "verificationCriteria": [          "Migration contains ALTER TABLE … ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY",          "At least one CREATE POLICY exists for the table",          "Re-scan no longer reports vibe-supabase-rls-disabled for this file"        ]      },      "suppression": {        "available": true,        "directive": "// codemore-ignore: vibe-supabase-rls-disabled",        "scope":     "same-line | next-line | file"      }    }  ],  "agentInstructions": {    "preamble":     "You are fixing issues found by CodeMore. Apply patches one issue at a time. After each, request re-scan via validate_fix.",    "orderingHint": "blockers → criticals → majors",    "doNotTouch":   ["node_modules/**", "*.lock", ".env*"],    "stopOn":       "first-validator-failure"  },  "meta": {    "rulesEnabled": 64,    "packsLoaded":  ["core-security", "core-quality", "vibe-supabase", "…"],    "scanDurationMs": 4321  }}

Schema source-of-truth: shared/report/schema.json. Breaking changes bump schemaVersion major and ship a migration guide.

Agentic fix loop

apply_fix runs a four-stage loop, up to 3 retries per finding — it terminates on first PASS and never silently keeps a failing patch:

detect  ──►  plan  ──►  generate  ──►  validate                                          │                                          ├──► (fail) → re-plan, retry (≤ 3)                                          └──► (pass) → apply patch · next finding

• agenticFixer.ts — orchestrator; reads finding + rule citation + framework context
• validatorHarness.ts — applies the patch in a tempdir copy, re-runs the rule, re-runs file-scoped tests, returns pass | fail + diagnostics
• LLM provider plug-ins: OpenAI · Anthropic · Gemini · local, configurable via workspace setting (VS Code) or CODEMORE_LLM_PROVIDER env (CLI)

Accuracy, measured honestly

Synthetic benchmarks lie; real codebases don't. Every release is audited against real projects, and the numbers are published — including the bad ones.

2026-07-07 audit (full report) — 7 codebases (Python app, 1.35M-LOC TS monorepo, polyglot Rust, synthetic ground-truth apps, self-scan): 100% of planted vulnerabilities detected, a real OpenAI key caught in a production .env, ~90% BLOCKER true-positive rate, self-scan noise reduced 85% after fixing four false-positive classes.

2026-06-12 audit (full report) — 10 real codebases, aggregate ~85% BLOCKER TP rate, above DeepSource's ≥ 75% production bar:

Quality gates, enforced in CI

• 100% TP / 100% FP on the 128-fixture corpus regression suite — every rule ships with at least one true-positive and one false-positive fixture under corpus/rules/<rule-id>/{tp,fp}/
• Lifecycle gating: rules are experimental → beta → stable, promotion requires fixture pairs plus real-world FP-rate evidence via opt-in telemetry; rules below the precision bar are gated behind --enable-experimental or ship with reduced confidence so agents weight them lower

What CodeMore does not catch

Out of scope by design — static analysis can't judge these, and an agent can't auto-fix them from a source diff. The rule is "agent-actionable or it's not a rule":

Weak password policies · audit-log completeness · business-logic flaws · race conditions · open S3/GCS buckets · DAST findings · MFA presence.

Full list with reasoning: docs/limitations.md. For these, pair CodeMore with OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, checkov, or your IdP's compliance dashboard.

Telemetry — opt-in only

Off by default. Enable per-scan with --telemetry. Collected: tool version, hashed project fingerprint, surface, rule-fire events. Never collected: file paths, contents, snippets, evidence text — the endpoint enforces a Zod strict() schema and rejects any payload containing those keys with HTTP 400. 64 KB payload cap, per-fingerprint rate limiting, RLS denies all reads.

Architecture

codemore/├── shared/                       ← one brain, shared across all surfaces│   ├── packs/                    ← 64 rule modules across 6 packs│   ├── rules/                    ← registry, lifecycle gating, suppression, AST helpers (TS + Python)│   └── report/                   ← codemore-report.json v1.0.0 schema + types + writer├── daemon/│   ├── cli/                      ← CLI entry · walker · ignore resolver · baseline diff│   ├── mcp/                      ← MCP server (6 tools)│   ├── external/                 ← 8 opt-in adapters, fail-loud parsers│   ├── services/                 ← agentic fixer · validator harness · scan orchestrator│   └── llm/                      ← OpenAI · Anthropic · Gemini · local provider plug-ins├── src/                          ← VS Code extension (forks daemon, renders diagnostics)├── web/                          ← Next.js: landing · dashboard · docs · /api/telemetry├── corpus/rules/<id>/{tp,fp}/    ← 64 TP/FP fixture pairs, 1:1 with the rule catalog├── docs/                         ← schema · limitations · security-gate · 64 per-rule pages└── templates/                    ← copy-paste GitHub Action workflows

One brain (shared/), four skins (CLI, MCP, extension, Action), one report schema — kept honest by the parity test, not by a slogan.

Development

git clone https://github.com/abhinavteja123/codemorecd codemorenpm ci                                         # postinstall skips binary downloads in dev automatically
npx tsc -p tsconfig.publish.json               # type-check the publishable surfacenpm run test:unit                              # unit tests (mocha + ts-node)npx mocha --require ts-node/register test/parity.test.ts   # surface-parity proof
node cli.js scan corpus/rules/vibe-no-rate-limit/tp --json --enable-experimental
cd web && npm ci && npm run dev                # landing + dashboard + docs → localhost:3000

VS Code extension: F5 in VS Code, or npm run watch + code --extensionDevelopmentPath=.

Contributing

Two paths:

1. New rules — read CONTRIBUTING-RULES.md. The PR bot gates every submission: rule module + TP fixture (must fire) + FP fixture (must not fire) + docs page + pack registration. The bot is the first reviewer; humans review after it passes.
2. Everything else (CLI, MCP, extension, daemon, web, docs) — read CONTRIBUTING.md.

Before opening a PR:

npx tsc -p tsconfig.publish.json           # type-checknode scripts/validate-rule-pr.js           # rule-PR bot equivalent (must report "passed")node scripts/measure-accuracy.js           # corpus regression (must stay 100% TP / 100% FP)npm run test:unit                          # full unit suite

Found a false positive? Open a rule-FP report — FP reports directly feed the beta→stable promotion pipeline.

Security findings: do not open a public issue — use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting flow (SECURITY.md).

Roadmap

• MCP registry listing (VS Code Marketplace: live)
• Demo video: open a real vibe-coded app, scan, hand the report to Claude Code, watch every BLOCKER close
• 50-app benchmark study with published dataset — live: benchmark/REPORT.md (40% of 50 AI-built repos had ≥ 1 BLOCKER; 24% after honest FP triage)
• Telemetry-driven rule auto-demotion — live: nightly auto-demote-rules.yml opens a review issue when a rule's FP rate crosses 10%
• JetBrains plugin · cross-language taint tracking (research)

Details: docs/roadmap.md.

License

MIT — see LICENSE. CodeMore is open source from line one and stays that way. The wedge is the report contract, not gatekeeping.