AppSec Toolbox MCP

io.github.ai-ronin-systems由 GitHub 账号 ai-ronin-systems 发布v0.3.0更新于 Oct 26, 2026

Passive AppSec scanners as eight parameterless MCP tools; the audited repository is data.

已验证STDIO仅桌面开发者工具安全与监控

概览

AI 生成的概览

在加固容器中运行十款固定版本的安全扫描器,以八个无参数 MCP 工具对不可信代码仓库做被动审计。

可以做什么
  • 运行完整审计包或单项扫描:带抑制清单的 SAST、密钥扫描、依赖与 OSV 检查、仓库与 IaC 扫描、语言专项分析以及 SBOM 生成
  • 获取各扫描器的原生报告,以及把每份报告 SHA-256 与被扫描目录指纹绑定的运行清单
  • 查看目标中发现的抑制标记清单,以及每次工具调用的审计日志
  • 当文件无法读取时记录覆盖范围限制,而不是让整次运行失败或给出虚假的干净结果
适用场景
当需要让助手审计你不信任的代码仓库,并希望得到证据而非结论,同时不提供 shell、不让其选择目标路径、也不执行仓库的构建或代码时使用。适合需要可复现、带指纹的扫描输出的安全审查流程。
运行要求
以 stdio 本地进程方式从 OCI 镜像(ghcr.io/ai-ronin-systems/appsec-toolbox-mcp:0.3.0)通过 Docker 运行,仅限桌面端。操作者需将一个仓库以只读方式挂载到 /runner/target,并将一个可写目录挂载到 /runner/output。可选环境变量 APPSEC_LANGS 用于选择语言配置(auto、none 或 python,node 之类的列表)。离线模式需事先获取规则与公告数据。
安装前请注意
被审计仓库被视为攻击者,读取其报告的助手也可能被其引导;容器是安全边界,扫描器解析器漏洞不在防护范围内。部分扫描器的行内忽略注释只会被记录,不会被阻止。在线模式下被攻陷的扫描器可能外泄数据,离线模式则不联网。运行清单未签名,能写入输出目录的人可篡改它。助手无法选择目标,也无法执行八项扫描之外的任何操作。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 AppSec Toolbox MCP,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

appsec-toolbox-mcp

[CI] [Release] [License]

Let an AI agent audit code you do not trust, without giving it a shell, a path to choose, or the repository's code to run.

Ten pinned security scanners behind eight parameterless MCP tools, in one hardened container. The audited repository is treated as the attacker. The agent only ever collects evidence.

[An agent connects over MCP, is refused a maintenance target, audits a deliberately vulnerable repository, and reads the findings, run manifest, and audit log]

Recorded from examples/agent_demo.py against examples/vulnerable-sample. Waiting time is shortened; the real scan time is in the last line.

In 30 seconds

  • What it is. Semgrep, Gitleaks, OSV-Scanner, Trivy, Checkov, Syft, and language specialists (Bandit, FindSecBugs, njsscan, gosec) exposed to any MCP client as fixed capabilities: security.sast, security.secrets, security.dependencies, and so on.
  • The threat model. The repository under audit is hostile: it controls every file the scanners parse and every string the agent reads back. So the agent gets nothing to steer: no arguments, no target path, no shell, no way to run the repository's build or code.
  • What you get. Native scanner reports, a run manifest that ties each report's SHA-256 to a recomputable fingerprint of the scanned tree, and an audit log of every tool call.

Engineering highlights

Each claim links to the code or test that proves it.

ProblemApproachProof
A prompt-injected agent with a shell can do anything.The agent's whole surface is eight parameterless tasks, governed by Makefile MCP. Maintenance targets exist but are refused..makefile-mcp.yaml, the demo
Scanning untrusted code usually runs it: setup.py, postinstall, Gradle plugins, Go toolchain downloads, scanner plug-ins.Strictly passive analysis: no build, install, or dependency resolution; Go runs with GOPROXY=off and GOTOOLCHAIN=local. An adversarial review found that a planted .checkov.yaml could make Checkov import the repository's Python; that path is closed and regression-tested.examples/hostile-sample, tests/image.sh
A hostile repository can silence its own findings with .semgrepignore, .gitleaksignore, # nosec, # nosemgrep...Every scanner runs on toolbox-owned configuration. Inline suppressions are disabled where the scanner allows it, and every marker found is inventoried for the reviewer either way.settings table, output/suppressions.json
Evidence is only worth something if it is tied to what was scanned.The manifest fingerprints the tree exactly like find . -type f -print0 | LC_ALL=C sort -z | xargs -0 sha256sum | sha256sum, including file names that are not UTF-8 or that sha256sum escapes, and records each report's digest, tool versions, and data sources.scripts/write-manifest.py, tests/unit/test_manifest.py
One malformed file should not let the target stop the audit.Input a scanner cannot read because of the target (an unloadable Go package, a corrupt lockfile) becomes a recorded coverage limit: not a failed bundle, and not a fake clean result.scripts/run-language-profiles.py, scripts/run-osv.sh
Results should be reproducible, and a compromised scanner should have nowhere to send the code.Offline mode: fetch rule and advisory data once, then scan under --network none. The manifest records the data's age and digest.Offline mode
A security tool is a supply-chain target.Every downloaded binary is checked against its published SHA-256 per architecture; the base image is pinned by digest; Actions are pinned by commit; release jobs that run project code hold no write token; images carry signed build provenance.Dockerfile, release.yml

Verification in layers. Unit tests cover the scripts. A smoke test drives the Makefile through Makefile MCP with fake scanners whose stubs fail if any hardening flag is missing. The image test runs the real scanners against a known-vulnerable sample, a hostile sample that tries every attack above, and offline mode, under the documented resource limits. Independent adversarial reviews attacked the image; every confirmed finding was fixed with a regression test, and what remains is written down in the threat model.

Quick start

bash
IMAGE=ghcr.io/ai-ronin-systems/appsec-toolbox-mcp:0.3.0docker pull "$IMAGE"gh attestation verify "oci://$IMAGE" --owner ai-ronin-systems

Offline mode, the resource limits, and the target-settings hardening are on main and ship in the next release. To use them now: docker build -t appsec-toolbox-mcp:dev . and IMAGE=appsec-toolbox-mcp:dev.

Run it as an MCP stdio server against one repository:

bash
docker run --rm -i \  --read-only --cap-drop=ALL --security-opt=no-new-privileges:true \  --tmpfs /tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=3g --memory=6g --pids-limit=512 \  --user "$(id -u):$(id -g)" \  -v "$PWD/my-project:/runner/target:ro" \  -v "$PWD/appsec-output:/runner/output:rw" \  "$IMAGE"

Register the same command as a stdio server in any MCP client:

json
{  "mcpServers": {    "appsec-toolbox": {      "command": "docker",      "args": ["run", "--rm", "-i", "--read-only", "--cap-drop=ALL",               "--security-opt=no-new-privileges:true",               "--tmpfs", "/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,size=3g", "--memory=6g", "--pids-limit=512",               "-v", "/abs/path/my-project:/runner/target:ro",               "-v", "/abs/path/appsec-output:/runner/output:rw",               "ghcr.io/ai-ronin-systems/appsec-toolbox-mcp:0.3.0"]    }  }}

Compose, offline mode, language selection, and every evidence file are in Usage.

How it works

text
untrusted repository (read-only)          |          v   /runner/target          |          v trusted Makefile + Makefile MCP    |       |       |       |       |       | Semgrep Gitleaks   OSV    Trivy  Checkov   Syft          |          +---- language profile selection ----+                 |       |        |        |               Bandit FindSecBugs njsscan  gosec               Python    Java     Node/JS   Go          |          v    /runner/output   reports, run-manifest.json, suppressions.json, audit log

The operator mounts exactly one repository at /runner/target and one writable directory at /runner/output. The audited path is never an MCP parameter, so the agent has no host-path capability. A trusted Makefile holds every scanner command; Makefile MCP decides which of its targets the agent may call. Language specialists are picked by detection (APPSEC_LANGS=auto) or by the operator, never by the agent.

CapabilityToolEvidence
security.auditeverything belowcomplete bundle
security.sastSemgrep + suppression inventorysemgrep.json, suppressions.json
security.secretsGitleaksgitleaks.json
security.dependenciesOSV-Scannerosv.json
security.repositoryTrivytrivy.json
security.iacCheckovcheckov.json
security.languageBandit, FindSecBugs, njsscan, gosec as applicablelanguage-profile.json + reports
supply_chain.sbomSyftsbom.cdx.json (CycloneDX)

Threat model

The audited repository is the attacker, and the agent reading its reports may be steered by it. Read the threat model: attacker goals, sixteen threats with their controls and residual risks, what is and is not guaranteed, and an operator checklist.

ProtectedNot protected
Target builds, installs, hooks, and Makefiles never run.Scanner parser bugs; the container is the boundary.
Target-owned scanner settings files cannot suppress findings or load code.Inline trivy:ignore and njsscan-ignore comments; Checkov lists its inline skips as skipped_checks. All are inventoried.
The agent cannot pick the target or run anything but the eight scans.An agent that misreports what the reports say.
No credentials in the container; read-only, unprivileged, non-root, resource-capped.Exfiltration by a compromised scanner in online mode. Offline mode runs with no network.
Each run's manifest ties report digests to a fingerprint of the scanned tree.Tampering by anyone who can write output/; the manifest is not signed.

Design choices

  • Evidence, not verdicts. Reports stay in each scanner's native format. The toolbox never grades, deduplicates, or normalizes findings; a consumer does that with the full evidence.
  • One closed set of scanners. Four language profiles, no plug-in framework, no user-defined pipelines. Generic SCA stays with OSV and Trivy; specialists add a different analysis engine, not a duplicate one.
  • Coverage gaps are recorded, never papered over. A source-only Java project gets no FindSecBugs pass, because the toolbox will not compile untrusted code; the manifest says so.
  • Everything pinned. Scanner versions are pinned and updated one at a time against known-positive and hostile fixtures (update policy).

It is not an autonomous auditor, an LLM agent, a DAST engine, a credential manager, a report normalizer, or a shell server.

Part of a larger system

text
appsec-audit-hound (planned)    decides why to scan, correlates evidence, writes findings        | MCPappsec-toolbox-mcp              collects governed, passive evidence   <- this repository        | built onmakefile-mcp                    exposes trusted Make targets to agents, deny-by-default

Makefile MCP is published on PyPI and the official MCP Registry, with its own threat model.

Documentation

DocumentWhat it covers
Threat modelAttacker goals, threats and controls, guarantees, limits, operator checklist
UsageRunning, tools and evidence files, language profiles, offline mode, scanner behaviour, network use, versions, development
ArchitectureTrust boundary, ownership, design rules
ToolingPinned versions, settings each scanner ignores, update policy
Security policySupported versions and private vulnerability reporting
ChangelogReleased and unreleased changes
ContributingHow to add a scanner without widening the boundary

Development

bash
pipx install pytest==8.4.2 && pipx install ruff==0.14.0make test         # ruff, unit tests, smoke testmake imagemake test-image   # the real image: known positives, hostile sample, offline mode

More in Usage.

License

Apache-2.0.

来源:README.md,提交 0bd11d0

工具

0
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版本历史

1
  1. v0.3.0最新Oct 25, 2026

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