Queryshield

io.github.bch1212由 GitHub 账号 bch1212 发布v1.0.1更新于 Oct 24, 2026

Secure SQL proxy for AI agents — NL→SQL, AST safety, per-agent RLS, audit log.

已验证STDIO仅桌面数据库安全与监控

概览

AI 生成的概览

一个安全的 SQL 代理,让助手用自然语言或预构建的 SELECT 语句查询企业数据库。

可以做什么
QueryShield 位于 AI 代理与客户数据库之间。代理调用 query_database 提交自然语言问题,或调用 query_database_sql 提交预构建的 SELECT,由代理完成翻译、校验与执行。校验基于 AST:只允许 SELECT,拒绝堆叠语句和被禁函数,并要求带 LIMIT。按代理的行级安全会应用模式与表白名单并注入 WHERE 过滤条件,get_audit_log 返回调用代理的近期尝试记录。
适用场景
当助手需要只读访问生产或内部 SQL 数据库,但不该持有连接字符串、也不应被信任执行写入时适用。适合希望对代理的数据库访问实施按代理范围限制、行过滤和审计追踪的团队。
运行要求
作为本地 stdio 进程运行,从 PyPI 包 queryshield-mcp 安装。需要环境变量 QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY,即 QueryShield 签发的代理 API 密钥,可选 QUERYSHIELD_BASE_URL 覆盖默认端点。QueryShield 服务本身需要单独部署,并配置 Anthropic 密钥、数据库 URL 和保险库密钥。
安装前请注意
代理 API 密钥是机密,通过 QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY 传入,应限定到单个代理。查询会发送到 QueryShield 服务,由其转发到所配置的数据库,并使用外部模型做自然语言翻译,因此数据会离开本机。该服务为商业产品,采用付费套餐。审计日志只存元数据,不存行内容。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 Queryshield,将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only,通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程,因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

QueryShield

[tests]

Agent security suite. QueryShield is the lead product: a secure SQL proxy and a named credential vault, one qs_ API key, one Stripe customer, and this docs site.

Agents call a single endpoint in plain English (or structured SQL). QueryShield:

  1. Translates natural language → SQL via Claude with prompt caching.
  2. Validates every query at the AST level — only SELECT is allowed, no stacked statements, no forbidden functions, LIMIT required.
  3. Applies per-agent row-level security: schema/table whitelists and WHERE clause injection.
  4. Executes against the customer DB and returns rows.
  5. Logs every attempt to an append-only audit table — metadata only, never row contents.

Agents never see connection strings.

The credential vault stores other secrets (API tokens the agent is allowed to use). It is the AgentVault product, folded into this service. Permission patterns decide which names an agent can read. Database connection strings stay in a separate encrypted store and are not readable through the vault.

Free tier / funnel: InjectShield scans untrusted text for prompt injection. It stays in its own repository (bch1212/injectshield) and its own API (api.injectshield.dev). Start there, then create one QueryShield workspace when an agent needs a database or a vault. Docs: injectshield.dev/docs. Suite page on this service: /suite.


Quickstart

bash
pip install -r requirements.txtcp .env.example .env# Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, DATABASE_URL, and VAULT_KEY in .env (see below).# Do not commit .env. QueryShield reads secrets from the environment only.
python -m queryshield.start

Generate a Fernet key for VAULT_KEY once and never lose it. Credential encryption and session signing both require VAULT_KEY (or SESSION_KEY for cookies). If it is unset, those operations fail instead of using a built-in key:

bash
python -c "from cryptography.fernet import Fernet; print(Fernet.generate_key().decode())"

End-to-end flow (curl)

bash
# 1) Boot a tenant. Returns the admin API key — copy it.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/tenants?name=Acme
# 2) Register the customer DB. Connection string is encrypted at rest.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/databases \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "alias": "prod",    "db_type": "postgresql",    "connection_string": "postgresql://READER:[email protected]:5432/app",    "allowed_tables": ["users", "orders"]  }'
# 3) Provision a scoped agent (different from admin) for your AI app.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/agents \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{ "name": "reporting", "tenant_id": "<tenant>" }'
# 4) Set the agent's RLS policy.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/policies \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "agent_id": "<agent>",    "database_alias": "prod",    "allowed_tables": ["users", "orders"],    "row_filters": { "users": "tenant_id = 42" }  }'
# 4b) Store a named credential and let one agent read it.#     The value is write-only on this call. Empty permissions grant nothing.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/credentials \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "name": "openai_key",    "provider": "openai",    "value": "YOUR_SECRET"  }'
curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/agents \  -H 'X-Admin-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "name": "writer",    "tenant_id": "<tenant>",    "credential_permissions": ["openai_*"],    "budget_daily": 5  }'
# The agent uses the same qs_ key it uses for /v1/query.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/vault/get/openai_key \  -H 'X-API-Key: qs_...'
# 5) The agent queries.curl -X POST localhost:8000/v1/query \  -H 'X-API-Key: qs_...' \  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \  -d '{    "database_alias": "prod",    "query": "how many active users do we have?",    "mode": "nl",    "max_rows": 10  }'

MCP integration

Listed in the official MCP Registry as io.github.bch1212/queryshield.

Install the client:

bash
pip install queryshield-mcp

Then drop this into your Claude Desktop / Cursor / agent config:

json
{  "queryshield": {    "command": "queryshield-mcp",    "env": { "QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY": "qs_..." }  }}

Source for the standalone PyPI package lives in packages/queryshield-mcp/.

For MCP directory evaluators such as Glama, the repository root also includes a slim Dockerfile that launches the published queryshield-mcp stdio server for tool introspection. The container does not need QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY for MCP initialization/tool discovery; the key is only required when a discovered tool is actually invoked against a QueryShield API tenant.

MCP integration (legacy)

Drop this into any MCP-aware client (Claude Desktop, Cursor, custom agents):

json
{  "queryshield": {    "command": "python",    "args": ["-m", "queryshield.mcp_server"],    "env": {      "QUERYSHIELD_API_KEY": "qs_...",      "QUERYSHIELD_BASE_URL": "https://api.queryshield.io"    }  }}

Tools exposed:

  • query_database(database_alias, question, max_rows) — natural-language
  • query_database_sql(database_alias, sql, max_rows) — pre-built SELECT
  • list_credentials() — names this agent may read
  • get_credential(name, cost) — one permitted secret, same API key
  • get_audit_log(limit) — recent attempts for the calling agent

The PyPI package queryshield-mcp picks up the vault tools on its next release. Until then, python -m queryshield.mcp_server from this repo already exposes them.


Security model

ThreatDefense
Agent crafts a DROP TABLEsqlglot AST refuses non-SELECT
Agent sneaks ; and a second statementparser rejects len(statements) > 1
Agent uses pg_sleep, xp_cmdshell, ...function deny-list at the AST node level
Agent reads tables outside its scopeRLS schema + table whitelist
Agent reads other tenants' rowsrow_filters injected via AST .where()
Connection string leaks via stack tracesFernet-encrypted, never returned in any API
Agent reads a secret it was not grantedfnmatch permissions; empty list fails closed
Vault audit becomes the secretcredential access log stores metadata only
Audit log becomes the data exfil vectoronly metadata is stored — never rows
VAULT_KEY rotationre-encrypt rows under new key (script-driven)

safety.py is the single most important module. Every additional check that lands there should ship with a test in tests/test_safety.py.


Pricing

TierMonthlyDatabasesCredentialsQueries / monthNotes
InjectShieldfree———prompt-injection funnel, separate site
Starter$5003251,000,000
Pro$1,5001010010,000,000audit export
Enterprise$3,500unlimitedunlimitedunlimitedSSO, SIEM webhook

QueryShield tiers are one Stripe customer. InjectShield sign-up stays on injectshield.dev until that billing is folded in. Targets $32.5K MRR @ 15 customers (10 Pro + 5 Enterprise).


Deploy

The repo is Railway-ready. python -m queryshield.start is the entrypoint (reads PORT via os.getenv, since Railway exec's the start command without a shell). Provision Postgres + (optionally) Redis from Railway's marketplace and the rest is env vars.

railway up

/health is the liveness check. /ready returns 503 if the control-plane DB is unreachable.


Tests

bash
pip install pytestpython -m pytest tests/

102 tests cover the original safety, RLS, proxy, and HTTP suites plus the credential vault (encryption, qs_ key hashing, permission checks, budgets, tenant isolation, and the column migration for existing databases) and fail-closed VAULT_KEY / SESSION_KEY checks. The original cases:

  • AST safety (24 cases — direct DDL, comments, encoded keywords, multiple statements, forbidden functions, missing LIMIT)
  • RLS engine (6 cases — whitelist enforcement, WHERE injection, conjunction with existing predicates)
  • Proxy end-to-end against a SQLite "customer DB" (5 cases — happy path, blocked DML, RLS row filtering, table whitelist, cache hit)
  • HTTP integration via FastAPI TestClient (7 cases — full provisioning → query flow, scoped agent with RLS, auth failures)

来源:README.md,提交 462a237

工具

0
SourceWeft 尚未在沙箱中启动过该软件包,因此其工具未知。

版本历史

1
  1. v1.0.1最新Sep 16, 2026

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