cloud-audit

io.github.gebalamariusz由 GitHub 账号 gebalamariusz 发布v2.0.1更新于 Oct 24, 2026

AWS security scanner with attack chain detection, IAM privilege escalation, and fixes

发布方自己的服务：audit.domains - Domain Valuation

已验证STDIO仅桌面云端与基础设施安全与监控AI 与机器学习

概览

AI 生成的概览

只读的 AWS 安全扫描 MCP 服务器，让助手扫描账户、查看发现与攻击链，并评估被劫持的 Bedrock 或 AgentCore 智能体能触及什么。

可以做什么
执行只读 AWS 扫描，获取发现、攻击链、健康评分和修复建议（含 AWS CLI 与 Terraform 修复），并列出可用检查项与合规框架。评估 AI 智能体暴露面：盘点 Bedrock Agents 与 AgentCore 运行时、网关和工具，按身份接管与行为接管两种威胁模型报告被劫持智能体可触及的范围。基于已保存的扫描报告离线运行爆炸半径、假设模拟和暴露排序。
适用场景
当你希望助手审计 AWS 账户的安全状况、排定修复优先级，或回答 Bedrock 与 AgentCore 智能体在被提示注入或凭据被盗后能触及什么时适用。
运行要求
以 Python 包形式本地运行（Python 3.10 至 3.13），可通过 uvx 或 pip 安装；真实扫描需要 AWS 凭据，建议使用 AWS 托管的 SecurityAudit 策略；需要访问 AWS 的网络。离线命令基于已保存报告运行，不调用 AWS。
安装前请注意
它需要可跨多项服务广泛读取的 AWS 凭据，应限定为只读的 SecurityAudit 策略。其说明称只读且从不修改基础设施，但在指向生产账户前请自行核实。扫描结果和报告可能包含资源 ARN、密钥名称等敏感账户信息。

安装

在 SourceWeft 中

  1. 打开 控制台中的 cloud-audit，将其添加到工作区。
  2. 为需要使用其工具的对话启用该服务。

Desktop only，通过 STDIO。 STDIO 服务会启动本地进程，因此需要 SourceWeft 桌面宿主。

其他 MCP 客户端

参照 仓库 中的启动说明。

README

[cloud-audit logo]

cloud-audit

English | 简体中文

What can a hijacked AI agent reach in your AWS account, and can you prove it?

Open-source, read-only AWS security scanner. 110 checks, 64 IAM privilege-escalation methods, 31 attack-chain rules, blast radius for any resource, and agent-blast for Bedrock Agents and AgentCore: what a prompt-injected or credential-stolen agent can reach, with the IAM policy simulator as the witness. Every finding ships an AWS CLI + Terraform fix. Nothing is written to your account.

[PyPI version] [Python versions] [CI] [License: MIT] [Docker] [Documentation]

30-second demo - agent-blast - Full scan - What's inside - Proof Mode - Installation - Documentation

Thirty seconds, no AWS account needed

bash
pip install cloud-audit
cloud-audit agent-blast --demo          # a hijacked Bedrock Agent, two threat models, one screencloud-audit demo --save demo.json       # a full sample scan, then explore it offline:cloud-audit blast-radius --report demo.json --resource arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/support-bot-ticket-rolecloud-audit simulate     --report demo.json --fix aws-iam-018cloud-audit exposure     --report demo.json

The sample account is invented. Everything derived from it (attack chains, root causes, breach cost, security graph, agent reach) is produced by the same engines a real scan uses.

With credentials, the real thing is one command and read-only. The AWS-managed SecurityAudit policy covers every check (permissions):

bash
cloud-audit scan                         # default profile and regioncloud-audit scan --verify                # plus IAM policy-simulator proof for escalation pathscloud-audit agent-blast --verify         # then: what your agents can reach, simulator-confirmed

agent-blast: what a hijacked AI agent can reach

An AI agent in AWS is a bundle of IAM identities: the role the agent runs as, the execution roles of the Lambda functions behind its tools, the roles of its knowledge bases, gateways and sandboxes. When the agent is hijacked, the attacker acts with those identities. agent-blast answers what that means, per agent, under two threat models:

Threat modelWhat the attacker hasWhat is in reach
Identity takeoverthe credentials of a role the agent runs as (sandbox escape, metadata-service read, leaked session)the full role: privilege-escalation methods, AssumeRole hops, data
Behaviour takeovernothing but a prompt (indirect prompt injection through a document, a ticket, a web page)what the agent's tools can do, bounded by the tools' own execution roles

Real output for the sample agent (cloud-audit agent-blast --demo -a support-bot):

support-bot (bedrock_agent, eu-central-1)├── A hijacked tool (tool: create-ticket) can escalate to account admin via PassRole+Lambda├── status: PREPARED├── Identity takeover (attacker holds the role's credentials)│   └── support-bot-agent-role arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/support-bot-agent-role│       └── no escalation path; 3 reach(es) from policy grants, 1 on named resources (see Reach)│           (risk 0/100, 1 nodes)├── Behaviour takeover (prompt injection: the agent's tools, their roles)│   ├── search-docs action_group_lambda -> support-bot-search-role│   │   ├── 3 OpenAPI path(s) in apiSchema; state ENABLED│   │   └── no escalation path; 4 reach(es) from policy grants, 4 on named resources (see Reach)│   ├── create-ticket action_group_lambda -> support-bot-ticket-role│   │   ├── 2 function(s) in functionSchema; state ENABLED│   │   ├── reaches Account Takeover in 1 hop(s) via PassRole+Lambda (risk 72/100)│   │   └── escalation: PassRole+Lambda│   └── product-docs knowledge_base -> support-bot-kb-role│       ├── 1 S3 data source(s)│       └── no escalation path; 2 reach(es) from policy grants, 2 on named resources (see Reach)├── Reach (13 action/resource pairs)│   ├── tool: search-docs secretsmanager:GetSecretValue on│   │   arn:aws:secretsmanager:eu-central-1:123456789012:secret:prod/db-credentials-Ab12Cd│   │   unverified read secret values│   ├── tool: create-ticket sts:AssumeRole on arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/ops-admin unverified│   │   assume IAM roles│   ├── tool: create-ticket lambda:InvokeFunction on * unverified invoke Lambda functions│   ├── tool: search-docs s3:PutObject on arn:aws:s3:::company-backups-2024/* unverified write S3│   │   objects│   ├── support-bot-agent-role s3:GetObject on arn:aws:s3:::kb-product-docs/* unverified read the│   │   agent's knowledge base│   ├── tool: search-docs s3:GetObject on arn:aws:s3:::company-backups-2024/* unverified read S3│   │   objects│   ...├── Tags│   ├── OWASP Agentic: ASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation, ASI03 Identity and Privilege Abuse,│   │   ASI05 Unexpected Code Execution│   └── MITRE ATLAS: AML.T0034 Cost Harvesting, AML.T0040 AI Model Inference API Access, AML.T0053│       AI Agent Tool Invocation, AML.T0086 Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation└── Simulated, not executed: identity policies, the attached permissions boundary and SCPs are    evaluated by the IAM policy simulator; resource-based policies of the targets, RCPs and VPC    endpoint policies are not. Tool reach is an upper bound set by the tool's role; what the tool    code does with its inputs is narrower.

The story the output tells: the support bot itself is harmless, but a document that tricks it into calling create-ticket runs code under a role that can pass an admin role to a new Lambda. The search-docs tool, meant to read product docs, can also read the production database secret and write into the backups bucket. Every line names the identity, the action and the resource, so the fix is a policy statement, not a debate.

The same engine covers AgentCore. For the sample gateway (--demo -a tools-gw) the headline is a cross-agent one:

tools-gw (agentcore_gateway, eu-central-1)├── tool: crm-sync can write into agent 'support-bot' knowledge base (RAG poisoning): arn:aws:s3:::kb-product-docs/*├── inbound authorizer: NONE; policy engine: none...│   ├── tool: crm-sync s3:PutObject on arn:aws:s3:::kb-product-docs/* unverified write into agent│   │   'support-bot' knowledge base (RAG poisoning)...├── Coverage notes│   └── tool 'erp-mcp' (gateway_target_mcp_server): backend identity unknown, not assessed - remote│       MCP server; credential provider: OAUTH

What agent-blast reads (all list/get, no charge):

  • Bedrock Agents: the agent resource role, every action group at the DRAFT version resolved to its Lambda and the Lambda's execution role, knowledge bases resolved to their S3 data-source buckets.
  • AgentCore: runtime role and network mode, gateway role with authorizer, policy engine and every target (Lambda, remote MCP server, API Gateway, OpenAPI, Smithy) with its credential provider, code interpreter and browser execution roles.
  • IAM policies of exactly those identities (inline, attached, group), kept raw: action, resource, effect, whether a Condition is present. Conditions are flagged, never guessed. The simulator decides.

Then, per identity: the 64 privilege-escalation methods, AssumeRole hops through the trust graph, and every data, secret, lateral, code-execution and model-invocation grant matched against concrete resources. A knowledge-base bucket is always a concrete target, even behind s3:* on *, and write access to it is reported as RAG poisoning. Anything the scanner could not read (a denied region, a tool without an IAM identity) is a coverage note, never a silent pass.

--verify asks iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy about every concrete pair, with the context an attacker really has (no MFA on the session, TLS transport), and marks each reach PROVEN, DENIED (with the policy layer that denied: SCP, permissions boundary) or not asserted. Output formats: tree, json, markdown. The MCP server exposes the same report as get_agent_blast.

A full scan

cloud-audit scan runs 110 read-only checks across 25 AWS services, correlates the findings into attack chains, ranks the fixes by how many chains they break and prices the exposure. This is the sample account (cloud-audit demo), rendered by the same code as a real scan and trimmed for length:

┌─────── Health Score ───────┐│ 15 / 100                   │└────────────────────────────┘  Provider             AWS  Account              123456789012  Regions              eu-central-1  Resources scanned    80  Checks passed        14  Checks failed        6  Attack chains        3  Risk exposure        $572K - $12.5M  (IBM/Verizon data)┌───────────────────────── Attack Chains (3 detected) ─────────────────────────┐│   CRITICAL      PassRole Escalation to Admin (support-bot-ticket-role)       ││                 Principal 'support-bot-ticket-role' has iam:PassRole and     ││                 can create resources with privileged roles via:              ││                 PassRole+Lambda. The attacker passes an admin role to a      ││                 service, then uses that service to execute code with admin   ││                 privileges.                                                  ││                 Fix: Scope iam:PassRole for 'support-bot-ticket-role' to     ││                 specific role ARNs                                           ││                 Risk: $250K - $5.0M                                          ││                                                                              ││   CRITICAL      Internet-Exposed Admin Instance                              ││                 i-0abc123def456789, sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f67890                     ││                 Instance i-0abc123def456789 is reachable from the internet   ││                 via open security group and has admin IAM role               ││                 'prod-admin-role'. An attacker can reach the instance,       ││                 access IMDS credentials, and gain full admin access to the   ││                 AWS account.                                                 ││                 Fix: Restrict security group sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f67890 to         ││                 specific IPs (effort: LOW).                                  ││                 Risk: $62K - $625K                                           ││                                                                              ││   CRITICAL      CI/CD to Admin Takeover                                      ││                 Role 'github-deploy-role' trusts an OIDC provider without    ││                 restricting the 'sub' claim AND has admin permissions. Any   ││                 repository on the CI/CD platform can assume this role and    ││                 gain full AWS admin access.                                  ││                 Fix: Add 'sub' condition to the trust policy (effort:        ││                 LOW).                                                        ││                 Risk: $125K - $1.2M                                          │└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┌────────────── Remediation Plan (fix 3 things, break 3 chains) ───────────────┐│    #  Fix                             Effort     Chains   Findings  Risk Red ││    1  Restrict security groups        LOW             1          1  $62.5K - ││    2  Add OIDC 'sub' condition to     LOW             1          1  $125K -  ││       trust policies                                                         ││    3  Remove IAM privilege            MEDIUM          1          1  $250K -  ││       escalation paths                                                       │└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘┌─────────────────── Quick Wins (break CRITICAL chains now) ───────────────────┐│ 1. aws ec2 revoke-security-group-ingress --group-id sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f67890     ││ --protocol tcp --port 22 --cidr 0.0.0.0/0                                    ││    Breaks: AC-01 (Internet-Exposed Admin Instance)                           ││                                                                              ││ 2. aws iam update-assume-role-policy --role-name github-deploy-role          ││ --policy-document file://trust-with-sub.json                                 ││    Breaks: AC-07 (CI/CD to Admin Takeover)                                   │└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Preview a fix before touching anything. simulate removes the findings a check would fix and recomputes score, chains and exposure offline:

$ cloud-audit simulate --report demo.json --fix aws-iam-018
Simulation: Apply Remove IAM privilege escalation paths
┌────────────────────────────── Impact Analysis ───────────────────────────────┐│   Metric                        Before                After          Delta   ││   Health Score                  15/100               35/100            +20   ││   Attack Chains                      3                    2             -1   ││   Findings                           6                    5             -1   ││   Risk Exposure         $572K - $12.5M      $187.5K - $1.9M           -85%   │└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Chains broken (1):  CRITICAL  PassRole Escalation to Admin (support-bot-ticket-role)  -> GONE
Chains remaining (2):  CRITICAL  Internet-Exposed Admin Instance  CRITICAL  CI/CD to Admin Takeover
Next recommended fix: Restrict security groups -> breaks 1 more chain(s)

Walk outward from any resource to see what its compromise reaches:

$ cloud-audit blast-radius --report demo.json --resource arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/support-bot-ticket-role
┌────────────────────────────────────── Blast Radius ──────────────────────────────────────┐│ Compromise of role/support-bot-ticket-role leads to Account Takeover via 2 hop(s).       ││ Resource: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/support-bot-ticket-role                         ││ Reachable: 3 | Paths to impact: 1 | Risk score: 72/100                                   │└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
role/support-bot-ticket-role - IAM Role (assumed compromised)├── Account Takeover - Full AWS admin (via grants admin, type=exploit) <high-value>└── arn:aws:s3:::company-backups-2024 - S3 bucket (reachable via admin) (via s3:GetObject +    ListBucket, type=data) <high-value>
Available fixes (from scan findings):  - aws-iam-018 Role 'support-bot-ticket-role' can escalate via PassRole+Lambda (breaks chain, effort=MEDIUM)  - aws-s3-001 Bucket 'company-backups-2024' has Block Public Access disabled (breaks chain, effort=LOW)

--format json drops straight into the open browser visualizer at blast-audit.haitmg.pl; --format mermaid gives a diagram for a wiki page. exposure ranks every node of the security graph by internet reachability and escalation:

$ cloud-audit exposure --report demo.json -n 6   Score    Type              Label                       Why      60    iam_role          prod-admin-role             internet-reachable      41    internet          Internet                    internet-reachable      41    ec2               i-0abc123def456789          internet-reachable      41    security_group    sg-0a1b2c3d4e5f67890        internet-reachable      20    iam_role          support-bot-ticket-role     escalation      20    iam_role          support-bot-search-role     linked to others

[blast-audit visualizer - executive briefing view]
The visualizer runs entirely in your browser on a blast-radius --format json export.

What's inside

CapabilitySizeCommand
Configuration checks, each with an AWS CLI and Terraform fix110 checks, 25 services: IAM, S3, EC2, VPC, RDS, KMS, CloudTrail, CloudWatch, GuardDuty, Config, Lambda, ECS, EFS, SSM, Secrets Manager, DynamoDB, Backup, Inspector, Security Hub, WAF, Bedrock, SageMaker, Bedrock AgentCore, Data Perimeter, accountscan, list-checks
IAM privilege escalation64 methods in 9 categories: IAM self-mutation, credential access, PassRole to a service, Lambda code modification, trust-policy abuse, permission-boundary bypass, resource-policy abuse, compute hijack, lateral AssumeRole (BFS over the trust graph)scan (aws-iam-018)
Attack chains31 rules correlating findings and live relationships (EC2 to role, Lambda to role, OIDC to policy) into paths with MITRE ATT&CK references and a priority fixscan
Root causes and quick winsgroups findings by the fix that removes them and ranks by chains brokenscan
What-Ifbefore/after score, chains and exposure for any set of checks, offlinesimulate --fix
Blast radiusforward BFS from an EC2 instance, IAM role or user, Lambda, S3 bucket or secret; JSON contract for the visualizerblast-radius
Exposure rankingevery security-graph node scored by internet reachability and escalationexposure
AI agentsinventory of Bedrock Agents and AgentCore runtimes, gateways, code interpreters, browsers with their IAM identities and tools; two-threat-model reach; OWASP Agentic and MITRE ATLAS tags; simulator proofagent-blast
Proof Modeiam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy on escalation paths (broad) and on concrete (principal, action, resource) triples (agent-blast)scan --verify, agent-blast --verify
Threat feed10 detectors of active abuse, each tied to a documented 2025-2026 incident pattern, versioned as a rules packthreat-feed
Data perimeter5 checks on resource policies: confused deputy and cross-organization exposure, evaluating condition valuesscan (aws-dp-*)
AgentCore configuration6 checks: code interpreter and runtime network mode, MMDSv2, memory KMS, gateway authorizer, gateway policy enginescan (aws-agc-*)
Breach costUSD range per finding and per chain with the public source behind each numberscan
Compliance6 frameworks with per-control evidence: CIS AWS v3.0, SOC 2 Type II, ISO 27001:2022, HIPAA, NIS2, BSI C5:2020scan --compliance, list-frameworks
Drift and trenddiff two scans with exit codes; posture history with sparklinesdiff, trend
Coverage gapsa read the scanner was denied is reported as "not assessed", never as a passevery command
Outputsconsole, JSON, HTML report, SARIF (GitHub Code Scanning), Markdownscan --format
MCP server7 read-only tools for Claude Code, Cursor and any MCP client, including get_agent_blastcloud-audit-mcp

The ten threat-feed detectors, as cloud-audit threat-feed --list prints them (rules pack 2026-Q2):

PatternSeverityWhat it catches
TF-001MEDIUMSES recently verified identity (phishing setup precursor)
TF-002HIGHPublic Lambda Function URL (AuthType=NONE)
TF-003CRITICALAWS-attached credential quarantine policy
TF-004CRITICALLeaked-credentials scanner user-agent observed in CloudTrail
TF-005HIGHRecently-created IAM role with cryptomining-style compute access
TF-006HIGHEC2 or AgentCore using IMDSv1 / MMDSv1 (SSRF credential theft vector)
TF-007MEDIUMCI/CD role at risk of whoAMI confusion attack
TF-008HIGHCloudTrail tampering precursor (logging stopped or delivery failing)
TF-009HIGHIAM Roles Anywhere trust anchor with external CA
TF-010HIGHAmazonDataZoneFullAccess attached to a non-admin principal

Proof Mode: simulated, not guessed

Static analysis of IAM policies over-reports. Proof Mode asks AWS's own authorization engine, iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy, which is read-only and carries no per-call charge.

  • scan --verify checks every detected escalation path. verified: true means the simulator allowed every required action; false means it denied one (the path is very likely a false positive); null means not asserted, with the reason in verification_detail.
  • agent-blast --verify checks every concrete (principal, action, resource) reach, supplies the context an attacker with stolen or assumed credentials has, and names the layer that denied.

What the simulator evaluates as of 2026-07-30: identity policies, the attached permissions boundary, the organization's SCPs including their condition keys, and the context keys you supply. What it does not: resource control policies, VPC endpoint policies, role chaining, and resource-based policies for IAM roles. cloud-audit says so on every verified line. A true proves the permission exists. It does not prove an end-to-end attack; nothing is executed.

Reports

bash
cloud-audit scan --format html     -o report.html     # client-readycloud-audit scan --format sarif    -o results.sarif   # GitHub Code Scanningcloud-audit scan --format json     -o report.json     # machine-readable, feeds every offline commandcloud-audit scan --format markdown -o report.md       # PR commentscloud-audit scan --compliance cis_aws_v3 --format html -o cis.htmlcloud-audit agent-blast --format markdown -o agents.md

CI/CD

yaml
- run: pip install cloud-audit- run: cloud-audit scan --format sarif --output results.sarif- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3  with:    sarif_file: results.sarif

--quiet exits with a code only: 0 clean, 1 findings, 2 error. Gate on severity with --min-severity high. cloud-audit diff old.json new.json --quiet exits 1 on new findings, so a daily scan catches ClickOps drift. The repository is also a composite GitHub Action (gebalamariusz/cloud-audit@v0). Ready-made workflows: basic scan, daily diff, post-deploy.

Installation

bash
pip install cloud-audit                               # pip (recommended)pipx install cloud-audit                              # isolateduvx --from cloud-audit cloud-audit scan               # no installdocker run ghcr.io/gebalamariusz/cloud-audit scan     # Docker (also on Docker Hub: haitmg/cloud-audit)

Docker with credentials:

bash
docker run -v ~/.aws:/home/cloudaudit/.aws:ro ghcr.io/gebalamariusz/cloud-audit scan

Python 3.10 to 3.13. Dependencies: boto3, typer, rich, pydantic, jinja2, pyyaml, mcp.

AWS permissions

Read-only. Attach the AWS-managed SecurityAudit policy; it covers every check, the IAM escalation analysis, the agent inventory and Proof Mode:

bash
aws iam attach-role-policy --role-name auditor \  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/SecurityAudit

cloud-audit never modifies your infrastructure. simulate, blast-radius, exposure, diff, trend and agent-blast run locally against a saved scan and make no AWS calls; --verify adds simulator calls only. Regions where a service does not exist are skipped; regions where the scanner is denied a read are listed as coverage gaps.

MCP server

Seven read-only tools for AI assistants: scan_aws, get_findings, get_attack_chains, get_remediation, get_health_score, list_checks, get_agent_blast.

bash
claude mcp add cloud-audit -- uvx --from cloud-audit cloud-audit-mcp

Then ask: "scan my AWS account and tell me what my Bedrock agents could reach if hijacked".

Common flags and configuration
bash
cloud-audit scan -R                                      # show remediation inlinecloud-audit scan --profile prod --regions eu-central-1   # profile / regioncloud-audit scan --regions all                           # all enabled regionscloud-audit scan --role-arn arn:aws:iam::...:role/audit  # cross-accountcloud-audit scan --export-fixes fixes.sh                 # every CLI fix as a scriptcloud-audit scan --categories security,cost              # skip reliability/performance checkscloud-audit agent-blast -a support-bot --profile prod --verify

Defaults live in .cloud-audit.yml (regions, min_severity, exclude_checks, time-boxed suppressions). Environment variables (CLOUD_AUDIT_REGIONS, CLOUD_AUDIT_MIN_SEVERITY, ...) override the file; CLI flags override everything. See the configuration guide.

Documentation

Full documentation at haitmg.pl/cloud-audit: getting started, agent-blast, attack chains, IAM escalation, blast radius, Proof Mode, threat feed, data perimeter, AgentCore, compliance, and the full check reference.

Commercial support

cloud-audit is free and stays free. If you want a human on the findings, the author offers professional services:

  • Scanner output review (free): send your cloud-audit, Prowler or Security Hub output, get a short written review of what actually matters and what to fix first
  • AWS security audit: full account audit with a prioritized report and ready-to-apply fixes
  • AI agent access review: what your Bedrock and AgentCore agents can reach, with the policy changes to narrow it
  • Remediation support: Terraform and IAM changes, verified against your workloads
  • Palo Alto VM-Series on AWS: architecture and security review (GWLB/TGW, HA, routing)

Details: haitmg.pl/cloud-audit-support or email [email protected].

Development

bash
git clone https://github.com/gebalamariusz/cloud-audit.gitcd cloud-auditpip install -e ".[dev]"pytest -q && ruff check src/ tests/ && mypy src/

See CONTRIBUTING.md to add a check. Releases in CHANGELOG.md.

License

MIT - Mariusz Gebala / HAIT

来源：README.md，提交 0207aa0

工具

0
SourceWeft 尚未在沙箱中启动过该软件包，因此其工具未知。

版本历史

1
  1. v2.0.1最新Sep 16, 2026

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商业与电商27 个工具Nov 1, 2026

Revenue Agent — OpenAPI Audit & Change Detection

news.prh官方发布者

一个远程 MCP 端点，用于审计 OpenAPI 规范并检测 API 变更，每次分析通过 Base 上的 x402 收取 0.10 USDC。

Streamable HTTP可网页运行
开发者工具2 个工具Oct 24, 2026

SEO Audit & Broken Link Checker

由 GitHub 账号 prometheus-maker 发布

由 Apify 托管的 MCP 服务器，用于审计网站页面的 SEO 元数据并查找失效链接和图片，返回每页评分。

Streamable HTTP可网页运行鉴权
数据与分析需要凭据Nov 7, 2026

FinePrint AI Legal Risk & Contract Audit MCP Server

由 GitHub 账号 RitualDev-Lab 发布

本地内存中运行的合同风险扫描器，为编码代理评估法律合同、NDA 与租约风险并生成修订建议。

STDIO仅桌面
AI 与机器学习尚未验证Nov 7, 2026

Mcp Supply Audit

由 GitHub 账号 kimmawla 发布

把 MCP 服务器当作供应链产物来审计：注册表条目、PyPI/npm 包、客户端配置与工具定义，全部为只读静态检查。

STDIO仅桌面
开发者工具未验证 · 软件包安装失败Nov 5, 2026